|Sensory Impressions, philosophy: the concept of impression is intended to serve as a boundary to the concept of perception. It places the weight on information not yet processed on the side of the receiving subject. Perception, on the other hand, refers to prepared information, which allows classification, storage and evaluation. See also stimuli, perception, sensations, input, information, qualia._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Holz I 43
Sensory impression/empiricism/Leibniz: what is given by the senses is unprovable.
Impression/Sensory Impression/Identity/Leibniz: therefore Leibniz does not rely on the "impression" (terminology: Locke: "sensation", Hume: "impression").
LeibnizVsLocke/LeibnizVsHume: in the sensible givenness itself lies the identity relation.
Holz I 45/46
Sensory perception/proof/Leibniz: sensory perception is unprovable. Only what can be traced back to simple terms (by definition) from complex concepts can be proved.
"Chain of definitions"._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
Hans Heinz Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994