Dictionary of Arguments

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Skepticism: is an expression for the more or less well-formulated view that perceptual subjects cannot in principle have any security with regard to their knowledge about the external world. The doubts about the reliability of the sensory organs can be extended to doubts about the existence of an external world, if the possibility of a fundamental deception, for example by a permanent dream, is accepted. See also verification, evidence, perception, certainty, Moore's hands, solipsism.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Stroud I 89
Skepticism/Ambrose/Malcolm/Stroud: both: skepticism cannot be refuted empirically. Ambrose thesis: The skepticism cannot even describe what kind of thing would be proof of a "thing of the outside world". Therefore, the phrase "nobody knows if things exist" cannot be falsified. AmbroseVsSkepticism: skepticism cannot help but be aware of the things it talks about.
Stroud I 91
For example, when he says "I know I have three bucks in my pocket" he talks about something possible! ((s) If he thought it was impossible, he would not be a skeptic) - He admits that it is not necessarily false to use the language this way.
AmbroseVsMoore: can therefore not show that skepticism misuses the language.
VsMoore: argues as if the phrase "no one knows whether hands exist" was a necessary truth.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Malcolm I
Norman Malcolm
"Thoughtless Brutes" in: The Nature of Mind, D. M. Rosenthal (Ed), Oxford 1991, pp. 445-461
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005

Malcolm II
N. Malcom
Problems of Mind: Descartes to Wittgenstein (Harper Essays in Philosophy) 1971

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-04-25
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