|Names, proper names, philosophy: the status of proper names is a relatively new philosophical problem. S. A. Kripke has treated it as one of the first in “Naming and Necessity” (three lectures at Princeton University 1970, reprint Cambridge, 1980). Against the traditional bundle theory, according to which the meaning of names lies in the properties, or at least in the essential properties of their bearers, Kripke develops a causal theory of the names, which ultimately goes back to a baptism in the broader sense. The decisive point is that the name is associated with the person but it is not required that the person has any additional properties. See also causal theory, possible worlds, rigidity, rigid designators, descriptions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|I 43 ff
Names/Mill: what is more appropriate: to conceive the name as something for an object or for an idea of the object?
MillVsHobbes: "Perception" is too metaphysical.
Definition Name/Hobbes: "an arbitrarily chosen word, which serves as a characteristic to awaken in our mind a thought which resembles a thought which one had before, and which, expressed to others, serves them as a sign of a thought which the speaker had earlier in his mind."
Names/Hobbes: names are not signs of things themselves. One only thinks of the stone.
MillVsHobbes: the word sun names the name of the sun and not our idea of the sun.
((s) The idea or imagination could change).
Mill: because the names not only share our ideas, but also teach the listener about our belief and this is a belief about the thing itself and not about the idea!
E.g. "The sun is the cause of daylight". This is not to say that the idea of the sun produces the idea of daylight.
Names/Mill: different types: some words are only parts of names:
E.g. from, to, often, truly, as well as pronouns like myself, to him, "John's", even adjectives.
These words express nothing which can be affirmed or denied.
Exception: e.g. "'heavy' is an adjective": here "heavy" is a complete name. Name of this sound sequence. >mention / >use.
Names/Mill: through their mediation we are able to state general sentences. They, themselves, can also be divided into >general terms (e.g. "human") and >singular terms (e.g. Maria). (> Zink).
"John" can only be affirmed by a single person (at least in the same sense).
Name/concrete/abstract/Mill: e.g. "white" is at the same time the name of an object and of many objects (concrete).
"Whiteness" is the name of an attribute. "Age": is the name of an attribute. (abstract, generalization). Originates from Locke and Condillac.
"Attribute" is itself the common name of many attributes.
Name/abstract/singular term/Mill: however, if an attribute does not allow degree differences or type differences, it is not a general term but a singular term:
E.g. visibility, tangibility, equality, rectangularity, milk white. No multiplicity of attributes, but a specific attribute.
Names/Mill: names always include some attribute in themselves, but they are not the name of this attribute! The attribute itself has its own, abstract name (singular term), for example, "The whiteness".
Names/Mill: names are not co-denotating, not connotative: they denote the individuals without any attributes.I 54
E.g. originally, Dartmouth may be located at the mouth of the Dart, but John is not named like this because it was part of the meaning that the father might have had the same name.
In addition, the mouth of the river may have shifted without changing the name of the city.
Proper names adhere to the things themselves (labels) and do not fall away if attributes of the object fall away.
Although only God may have the appropriate attributes, it is still a common name and does not belong here anywa
Co-denotating names/Mill: these names are identifications: e.g. "the only son of Johann Müller". Also identifies attributes.
So whenever names have any meaning, the meaning is in what they co-denotate and not in what they denotate (the bearer).
Non-denotating (normal) names have no meaning.
Names/Mill: names do not give the listener any knowledge of the subject. If perhaps he had already learned something about Cologne before, it was not through the word Cologne.
By knowing of how many objects the name can be, which it all denotates, we learn nothing, but only when we learn what it may co-denotate (attributes).
On the same thing, we may also employ different names whose meaning is not the same.
MillVsFrege: Therefore the bearer (of the name) is not the meaning.
Co-denotating names/Mill: here there is an uncertainty.
Solution: to give a fixed co-denotation for concrete names with occurring predicates._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
John St. Mill
A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843
Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993
J. St. Mill
Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998