Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Denotation, naming: specify a word or phrase for an object. Related terms description designation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Ruth Millikan on Denotation - Dictionary of Arguments
I 71 Denotation/stabilization function/reference/Millikan: more interesting is the stabilization function in referring or denotating expressions. >Terminology/Millikan. Question: is the classification as "denotating" or "referring" equal to the categorization as a function? Millikan: Thesis: no, the characteristic for denotation is not a function, but intentionality. >Intentionality. Intentionality/Millikan: 1. Thesis: intentionality is not always intentional because of a particular function, but because of the way something normally performs its eigenfunction. The eigenfunction of intentional patterns themselves have practically nothing in common. 2. However, there is another commonality: intentional expressions lead to an identification of their speaker. Representation: because of the identification function, such intentional states are representations. >Representation. Representation/Millikan: essential: representations need something to identify their referents. Through this they are representations. No representation: e.g. bee dances do not identify a place ((s) they are not "about" something specific), but make other bees to behave appropriately._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |