Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Continuants: temporally extended entities as opposed to events or occurrences. There is a debate about whether continuants themselves can have temporal parts. See also endurantism, perdurantism, ontology, person, four-dimensionalism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Ruth Millikan on Continuants - Dictionary of Arguments
I 283 Continuants/Identity/Identification/Whole/Millikan: we are dealing here with two problems that need to be distinguished: 1. The problem of the identity of a whole. 2. The problem of the identification of an object as a whole. How do we come to regard some things as whole, others only as parts of other things? Answer: by the way of composition. It is clear that parts of an object are never identical. Part/Whole/Relation/Part relation/Mereology/Millikan: The relation of a part to the whole or the parts to one another is never identity. And it has nothing to do with identity either. Question: Does the analogy between temporal and spatial parts help us? Surprisingly yes! Part/Whole/Millikan: the problems, which seem to be first the problems of identity, almost all of them appear as a problem of the part/whole relation. This is abbout the principles of union or unity. >Unity, >Identity, >Identification, >Temporal identity, >Mereology, >Parts, >Part-of-relation._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Millikan
> Counter arguments in relation to Continuants
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18