Dictionary of Arguments

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Thought, philosophy: a thought corresponds to a complete sentence. There is debate about whether we can attribute such thoughts to animals. See also mentalism, mental states, opacity, thinking, reality, world/thinking, propositional attitudes, propositions, intensions, objects of thought, relation theory, mentalese, computation.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
I 13
Thoughts: so this is about knowledge-what.
Classical realism: thinking and knowledge are separated for classical realism, and intentionality is transparent.
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I 13
Intentionality/about/aboutness/MillikanVsTradition: Intentionality is not transparent: many processes that are "about" something are not aware of their users.
E.g. von Frisch knew what a bee dance is, the bees do not know. Bees react only appropriately to bee dances.
Thought: requires that the referent is identified.
Inference: involves acts of identification of what the thoughts are about. That is why they are representations.
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I 244
Grasp/Millikan: what is it for a thinker to grasp what his thought is about?
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I 245
Millikan: it is the ability to identify the referent of his thought with the referent of elements of other intentional icons.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-03-22
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