Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Identification: A) Identification is the equivalence of two characterizations of an object in which new properties may be attributed to the object. B) Identification is the discovery that an object is a particular element from a set of objects. In this case, the number of initially assumed properties of the object may be reduced. See also specification, background, information.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Ruth Millikan on Identification - Dictionary of Arguments

I 195
Identity/Equation/Equality/Identification/Millikan: provisionally, it will not be wrong to say that two external terms are translated into the same inner term.
I 239
Identification/Individuation/Millikan: Problem: the model of the act of identifying the real value of an intentional icon that I have offered so far was not adequate.
False: to assume that an external concept is translated into an inner expression with the same meaning.
Problem: how is the inner icon to be identified? (Regress).
Knowledge/Thinking/Millikan: Problem: how can I then know myself what I think, or what I have in the head or the body? Or how is it for me to know that? ((s) > subjectivity).
E.g. What is the difference between having a thought and distributing adrenaline? But this is not about the mystery of consciousness.
Identification/Millikan: Let us describe identification here in a naturalistic vocabulary.
I 240
Perception/Apprehension/Identification/Identify/Realism/Millikan: For the realist, thinking must be based on direct apprehension (perception). Thereby, a thing is presented directly, or a direct apprehension of the nature of the thing is presented to the mind, e.g. a similarity (likeness, equality).
Identification/Millikan: identification happens whenever perceptions of different senses represent something, represent something common, and thus an action is controlled.
E.g. you may have to see something and at the same time feel the same when you tie your shoes. This is effective precisely because certain aspects of seeing and touching overlap in real value. And this usually happens without the mediation of thinking.
Identification/Millikan: E.g. identification is also necessary, if one applies earlier learned knowledge.
I 241
And even if you do not have an explicit memory.
Learning/Millikan: on the other hand, it seems plausible that much of the learning happens below the threshold of conscious perception and does not require the formation of internal representations ((s) and thus no identification).
Transitivity: also requires identification: e.g "x is φer than y and y is φer than z, so x is φer than z".
Plan: needs identification: I must identify the object of my perception with the object of my intentions.
>Intention, >Intentionality.
I 242
Intention/desire/belief/conviction: the formation of an intention based on desires requires identification.
Identification/logical form/Millikan: identification, in general: requires at least two intentional icons, one element of which has the same real value as one element of the other. These icons must then be used together. Then it must be referred to the fact that the real value of these elements is the same.
I 243
Identification/Millikan: when an external term is translated into an inner term here, then there is the problem: what is, if the inner representation is never activated in a practical action? Were internal and external terms then identified?
In any case, there must be a schema of same/different in the translation.
I 244
Identification/Millikan: we can call a secondary type of identification the repetition of an inner term. (Definition secondary identification).
New expression/introduction: the coining of a new term, can be provisionally called identification.
I 249
Identification/Millikan: what purpose does it normally serve? Thesis:
A) it is supposed to help the application of earlier knowledge on to a present case.
B) it should bring together experiences that have been conveyed through a medium with experiences from another medium. E.g. Seeing and Language.
Identity/Relation/Millikan: then identification must be described as essentially relational! Classical realism cannot do this.
Identification/Classical Realism/Millikan: assumes that the identification of the object is involved in the thinking of it. And since thinking of an object is a momentary act, which has nothing to do with other acts, the grasping of an object under one aspect and that under another aspect, cannot at all be brought together! E.g. Knowing how Kant lived in Koenigsberg has nothing to do with knowing that he was a philosopher.
I 250
Recognition/Classical Realism/Millikan: recognizing the object as the same is another performance; it has nothing to do with the repeated thought of the object.
>Recognition, >Realism.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2023-03-24
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