Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Intensions: intensions are reference objects resulting from a linguistic description, in contrast to the material objects (extensions) that may differ therefore, whether due to inaccuracies, or by the use of indexical expressions. Examples of intensions are “the oldest person in the room”, “the winner”, “John's favorite quote”, “the one who violates the speed limit”. See also morning star/evening star, extensionality, extension._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Ruth Millikan on Intensions - Dictionary of Arguments
I 5 Belief/wishes/intension/Millikan: can be explained without reference to language. >Intentionality, >Intensionality, >Belief, >Language and Thought, >World/Thinking. I 111 Intension/Millikan: intension is something quite different from Fregean sense. >Fregean sense. It is not a rule, but an application criterion, relative to the speaker's state. We must take into account the speaker and his mechanisms. Its dispositions and its justification for the use of an icon. >Icon/Millikan, >Criteria. I 112 Intension: has therefore to do with causation and justification of utterances. Sense/Fregean Sense/Millikan: sense has nothing to do with the particular speaker and his situation, one does not have to know how he comes to map something, just how something is mapped. Meaning/Intension/Millikan: Difference: e.g. Pegasus: has an intension, but as an empty name it can have no (Fregean) sense. Adjective: correspondingly: "bewitched" has no sense, but intension. I 143 Intension/Concept/Language/Quine/Millikan: our concepts cannot be based on intensions, and these in turn on other intensions etc. Intrusive information/Quine: then we would be dealing with "intrusive information". Quine: everything would always have to be tested at once._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Millikan
> Counter arguments in relation to Intensions
