|Non-existence, philosophy: non-existence is not simply expressible for the classical predicate logic which attributes properties through quantification in the form of (Ex)(Fx) "There is at least one x, with the property F" (in short "There is at least one F"), since existence is not a property. The form "There is at least one x that does not exist" is contradictory. See also existence predicate, "There is", existence, unicorn example, pegasus example, round square, proof of God's existence._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Non-existence/Empty Names/Unicorn/Solution/Moore/Millikan: Moore introduced "concepts" so that names such as "Pegasus" have something they can correspond to.
Solution/Frege: "meaning" to which referentially equivalent terms with different meaning can correspond to.
Solution/Carnap/Millikan: E.g. "Pegasus": here we are talking about our linguistic usage or of the words, not the object. ((s) semantic rise).
Identity/Existence/Sentence/Representation/Millikan: Thesis: neither sentences that contain the "is" of existence, nor the "is" of identity are representations!
Identity statement/Millikan: no representation.
Existence assertion/existence statement/Existence/Millikan: are no representation.
Intentional icon: however, identity statements and existence statements are intentional icons. However, they are more primitive icons than representations.
Identity Theorem/Existence/Millikan: although they must map in accordance with mapping rules to perform their eigenfunction,...
...the variants of the facts in the world which they map do not have to be identified.
These sentences are icons of the relations of words to the world.
That is, we do not translate them into inner icons of facts.
Moved use/move/disengaged/non-existence/Millikan: E.g: "x does not exist":
1. This is not a representation. (Also not e.g. "x exists").
2. It is not a referential use._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005