|Reference, philosophy: reference means a) the relation between an expression and one or more objects, thus the reference or b) the object (reference object) itself. Terminological confusion arises easily because the author, to whom this term ultimately goes back - G. Frege - spoke of meaning (in the sense of "pointing at something"). Reference is therefore often referred to as Fregean meaning in contrast to the Fregean sense, which describes what we call meaning today. See also meaning, sense, intension, extension.|
_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Reference/Millikan: the sentence sense depends on much more fundamental types of relations than the correspondence or reference.
For example, the relation of a true sentence to what it maps in the world cannot be analyzed as a reference, just as e.g. "blood pumping" cannot be analyzed as "blood pumping". ((s) > Naturalistic fallacy).
Referent/Millikan: referent is a complex term.
1. Index words: here the referent is context-dependent.
2. In some contexts the normal referent is replaced by another: e.g quotation marks, intentional contexts.
3. Proto referent: see below, Chapter 13.
Definition referent/Millikan: if there is something definite and real existent, on which an expression is to map, then this is the referent.
But this does not have to be an object.
Reference/Image/Identity/Millikan: "A is B" is a non-representative sentence. The element "A" is as much related to its real-value as an element of a e.g. bee dance on its real value.
N.B.: of the values is assumed in neither of the two cases that they are identified. That is, we are not dealing with reference but with protoreference:
Definition proto reference/Millikan: e.g. proto referent of "A" and "B" in "A is B" are the lowest types of "A" and "B"._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005