|Representation, philosophy: representations are adopted internal conditions, such as visual imaginations or linguistic completions, which set in as associations or are possibly developed by reconstruction. In a wider sense, sentences, words, and symbols are representations within a character system. See also truth maker, idea, sentences, propositions, intensions, correspondence, speech act theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Ruth G. Millikan Verschiedene Arten von zweckgerichtetem Verhalten in Dominik Perler, Markus Wild (Hg) Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005
Representation/Millikan: representations are very abstract models: e.g. German sentences as representations: significant changes (by substitution) in the sentences usually correspond to changes of the things of which the sentences are about.
Neural networks: probably abstract models represent "maps" or designs for the environment.
Representation/Millikan: sentences, thoughts, belief, convictions are representations. They are different from general intentionality.
For example, bee dance: no representation.
Representation: exercises its eigenfunction only if the referent is identified.
Representation/Intentionality/Rationality/Millikan: Representation presupposes intentionality and does not explain it.
Involvement in inferences is indeed part of what makes a desire to a representation, but is not part of what makes it intentional, intentionality and rationality are not two sides of a medal.
No representation: e.g. "Cicero is Tullius" (identity): here, the word types "Cicero" and "Tullius" are not representative referents of tokens "Cicero" and "Tullius", but only protoreferents ((s) lowest types).
Protoreferent/Millikan: Example 1. The word type "Cicero" is the protoreferent of "Cicero".
2. Cicero himself (the person) is also protoreferent of "Cicero", for "Cicero is Tullius" maps that "Tullius" names Cicero.
Representation: but "Cicero" is not a representation (in an identity statement). The use of "A" in "A is B" is a parasitic use.
Solution: the function of "A" is here not to be translated into an inner term, but to create a change in the concept which governs the use of the inner term into which "A" is usually translated. E.g. "The Lady is a vixen": Here "vixen" is not translated as "female fox".
Shifted function: The representative referential function is shifted.
Representation/Negation/Millikan: Thesis: negative representations have indeterminate meaning. ((s) But Millikan admits that negations are representations, unlike identity sentences and existence sentences).
Millikan: as with indefinite descriptions, the real values are determined when they occur in true sentences, but they do not have to be identifiable for the listener to fulfill their eigenfunction.
Representation/Millikan: representation differs from image in that it should map according to certain rules.
These rules are defined by the same history that turns the representations into representations. ((s) > naturalism/Millikan)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005