Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Representation, philosophy: representations are adopted internal conditions, such as visual imaginations or linguistic completions, which set in as associations or are possibly developed by reconstruction. In a wider sense, sentences, words, and symbols are representations within a character system. See also truth maker, idea, sentences, propositions, intensions, correspondence, speech act theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Ruth Millikan on Representation - Dictionary of Arguments
Ruth G. Millikan Verschiedene Arten von zweckgerichtetem Verhalten in Dominik Perler, Markus Wild (Hg) Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005 II 208 Representation/Millikan: representations are very abstract models: e.g. English sentences as representations: significant changes (by substitution) in the sentences usually correspond to changes of the things of which the sentences are about. >Compositionality. Neural networks: probably abstract models represent "maps" or designs for the environment. >Picture theory. --- I 12 Representation/Millikan: sentences, thoughts, belief, convictions are representations. They are different from general intentionality. For example, bee dance: no representation. I 13 Representation: exercises its eigenfunction only if the referent is identified. I 140 Representation/Intentionality/Rationality/Millikan: Representation presupposes intentionality and does not explain it. Involvement in inferences is indeed part of what makes a desire to a representation, but is not part of what makes it intentional, intentionality and rationality are not two sides of a medal. I 199 No representation: e.g. "Cicero is Tullius" (identity): here, the word types "Cicero" and "Tullius" are not representative referents of tokens "Cicero" and "Tullius", but only protoreferents ((s) lowest types). Protoreferent/Millikan: Example 1. The word type "Cicero" is the protoreferent of "Cicero". 2. Cicero himself (the person) is also protoreferent of "Cicero", for "Cicero is Tullius" maps that "Tullius" names Cicero. I 200 Representation: but "Cicero" is not a representation (in an identity statement). The use of "A" in "A is B" is a parasitic use. Solution: the function of "A" is here not to be translated into an inner term, but to create a change in the concept which governs the use of the inner term into which "A" is usually translated. E.g. "The Lady is a vixen": Here "vixen" is not translated as "female fox". Shifted function: The representative referential function is shifted. I 224 Representation/Negation/Millikan: Thesis: negative representations have indeterminate meaning. ((s) But Millikan admits that negations are representations, unlike identity sentences and existence sentences). >Negation/Millikan. Millikan: as with indefinite descriptions, the real values are determined when they occur in true sentences, but they do not have to be identifiable for the listener to fulfill their eigenfunction. >Terminology/Millikan, >Description. I 331 Representation/Millikan: representation differs from image in that it should map according to certain rules. These rules are defined by the same history that turns the representations into representations. ((s) > naturalism/Millikan)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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> Counter arguments in relation to Representation
