Dictionary of Arguments

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Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. A belief is an attitude of a thinking person which can usually be formulated in a sentence, whereby the person must be able to integrate the sentence into a set of further sentences. A further condition is that the bearer of beliefs is able to reformulate the corresponding sentences and negate them, that is, to grasp their meaning. See also religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees, private language.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 5
Belief/Wishes/Intention/Millikan: can be explained without reference to language.
I 13
Beliefs: to the extent that our meanings and our abilities to recognize things are correct and valid,...
I 14
...most of our beliefs and judgments are true. ((s) > Beliefs/Davidson).
I 62
Belief/Millikan: 1. arises partly from the inner nature of the subject (nerves, interconnection, etc.). But not two people with the same interconnections must have the same beliefs.
I 63
2. Not all the internal hardware is in use, if one believes something.
Belief/Have/Use/Millikan: I can have a belief while I do not use it. For example, I hardly ever need the fact that Columbus discovered America, especially not when I brush my teeth.
Discovery/Belief/Millikan: For example, a mathematician who is awake and is looking for a proof and finally finds it: one cannot say of him that he already believed it before!
Imperative/Millikan: now it is certainly so that a listener, if asked whether the speaker intended that he obeys the command, will surely immediately answer "yes".
I 64
But that does not mean that he used this belief while being obedient.
I 67
Belief/Millikan: Thesis: if one believes something, one usually beliefs through observation judgments.
Problem: background information that might deter one of the judgment is not necessary an infomation of which a denial would be used in the normal case to support the belief!
I 68
I will use this principle MillikanVsQuine.
Theory/Observation/Quine: Thesis: both are irreversibly connected to each other.
Gricean Intentions/Millikan: these intentions should not be understood as a mechanism.
E.g. An engine: one can also regard an engine as a hierarchy, whereby higher levels can stop lower ones. As a user, I need to know little about how the lower levels work.
I 127
Belief/Intention/Millikan: Beliefs are inner intentional icons, perhaps sentences in an inner language.
I 300
Belief/Truth/World/Recognition/Millikan: the basic things we need to learn to distinguish when we want to acquire true beliefs about the world are properties and substances.
Properties/Property/Millikan: this also includes actions (acts) like e.g. sitting.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-05-25
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