Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Knowledge: Knowledge is a conscious relationship to sentences or propositions, which legitimately attributes to them truth or falsehood. What is known is true. Conversely, it does not apply that everything that is true is also known. See also knowledge how, propositional knowledge, realism, abilities, competence, truth, facts, situations, language, certainty, beliefs, omniscience, logical knowledge, reliability

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data

Marvin Minsky on Knowledge - Dictionary of Arguments

Minsky I 72
Knowledge/Minsky: To be considered an expert, one needs a large amount of knowledge of only a relatively few varieties. In contrast, an ordinary person's common sense involves a much larger variety of different types of knowledge — and this requires more complicated management systems.
There is a simple reason why it is easier to acquire specialized knowledge than commonsense knowledge. Each type of knowledge needs some form of representation and a body of skills adapted to using that style of representation. Once that investment has been made, it is relatively easy for a specialist to accumulate further knowledge, provided the additional expertise is uniform enough to suit the same style of representation.
I 124
Knowledge/accumulation/Minsky: Uniframing doesn't always work. We often try to make an everyday idea precise - but just can't find much unity. Then, we can only accumulate collections of examples.
(Def Uniframe/Minsky: a description constructed to apply to several different things at once.)
Most likely, different parts of our brains have evolved to use both kinds of strategies. Accumulations need not take longer to manipulate if all the examples can be handled at the same time, by separate agents that don't interfere with one another. But once those processes begin to need each other's help, the whole society's efficiency will decline rapidly.
I 125
On the surface, it might seem easier to make accumulations than to make uniframes - but choosing what to accumulate may require deeper insight.
Classification/learning: Our various motives and concerns are likely to require incompatible ways to classify things.
I 126
Unity: Accumulations rarely seem quite satisfactory because we feel ideas should have more unity. We wouldn't have a word for chair or arch or currency if they meant nothing more than lists of unrelated things. Many good ideas are really two ideas in one — which form a bridge between two realms of thought or different points of view.
Rationality/means/ends/Minsky: Our different worlds of ends and means don't usually match up very well. So when we find a useful, compact uniframe in one such world, it often corresponds to an accumulation in our other worlds. >Classification, >Rules/Minsky.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Minsky I
Marvin Minsky
The Society of Mind New York 1985

Minsky II
Marvin Minsky
Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-06-17
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