|Experience: a) reflected perception, which can be compared with prior perceptions and can be processed linguistically. See also events, perception, sensations, empiricism.|
b) an event that is processed in the consciousness of a subject. No mere imagination. See also events, imagination, consciousness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
|Danto III 53
Experience/Nietzsche/Danto: (cf. Truth/Nietzsche (F. Nietzsche: Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn, KGW1/III, 2, p. 374f)). We are talking about metaphors.
Metaphor/Nietzsche/Danto: Please note that here metaphors are linguistic means of expression for experiences and not for things. This makes it almost inevitable that the expression of an unconventional experience will be almost incomprehensible.
Intuition/experience/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche calls experience here intuition:
(From) Intuition does not lead a regular way into the land of ghostly schemes, of abstractions: the word is not made for them, the human being falls silent when he sees them, or speaks in banned metaphors and outrageous coincided concepts, in order at least to creatively correspond to the mighty current intuition through the smashing and derision of the old conceptual barriers. (F. Nietzsche, Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn, KGW1/III, 2, p. 382f)).
Danto III 54
Experience/NietzscheVsKant/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche does not approach Kant, who took it for granted that experience should correspond to the forms imposed on them by a fixed set of terms and categories, i. e. the conditions of each comprehensible experience. According to Kant, we do not recognize things as they are per se, but as they are presented to us through the logic of experience and as they are preformed by their a priori apparatus.
Terms/Language/NietzscheVsKant/Danto: Unlike Kant, Nietzsche does not claim that a defined set of terms is inherent in the human mind, regardless of all differences between human beings.
For Nietzsche, the conceptual schemes (>conceptual scheme) vary according to society. According to Nietzsche, there are many ways of organising the experience, our experience is only one that has proven itself to us, but in which nothing is invariable, untouchable or necessary. There is nothing to prevent the (...) unconventional experiences (under a different structure) from becoming exemplary, so that the unconventional language here and now would be one day, and somewhere, a common speech._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009
Beyond Good and Evil 2014
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
Wege zur Welt München 1999
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005