Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Causality: causality is the relation between two (separate) entities, whereby a state change of the one entity causes the state of the other entity to change. Nowadays it is assumed that an energy transfer is crucial for talking about a causal link.
D. Hume was the first to consistently deny the observability of cause and effect. (David Hume Eine Untersuchung über den menschlichen Verstand, Hamburg, 1993, p. 95).

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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Friedrich Nietzsche on Causality - Dictionary of Arguments

Danto III 120
Causality/Nietzsche/Danto: since there are no objects for Nietzsche, the causality concept ((s) for which separate objects have to be accepted) is also a fiction. For Nietzsche, the truth is that there is a continuum ahead of us. (F. Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, KGW V, 2. p. 151).
Danto III 135
Causality/Nietzsche/Danto: the causal necessity is "not a matter of fact, but an interpretation" (F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 540). It turns out that it is based on a distinction between subject and object. If we give up the concept of the "thing" and thus the subject and object, our concept of causality will inevitably become invalid.
If we no longer believe in the effective subject, then also the belief in effective things, in interaction, cause and effect falls away between those phenomena that we call things.
Thing per se/NietzscheVsKant/Nietzsche/Danto: the contrast between "thing per se" and "appearance" is untenable (...) as well as the terms "subject" and "object" and ultimately also their various modifications e.g. "matter", "spirit" and other hypothetical beings, "eternity and unchangeability of matter" etc. We are rid of materiality. (F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 540f).
Danto III 262
Causality/Will/Nietzsche/Danto: let us assume with Nietzsche that the will is causally effective. This hypothesis does not contradict his polemic against that idea, the concept of will can serve as an explanation. In a non-revised analysis, Nietzsche expresses the idea that human beings would catch causality in the act as soon as they perform introspection with regard to the mode of action of their own will. Then the methodical monism ((s) Danto's expression) would have to see will as the only form of causality. But Nietzsche's conception of the will is not purely psychological.
Rather, it determines all acting forces as a will to power (F. Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI. 2, p. 51). See Power/Nietzsche, Process/Nietzsche, Will/Nietzsche.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-08-01
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