Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Morals: morals refers to a more or less coded set of rules, action maxims, duties and prohibitions within a society or group. Most of these rules are unconsciously internalized among the members of the society or group. Their justification and the possible assessment of actions are reflected in ethics and meta ethics. See also values, norms, rights, ethics._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Friedrich Nietzsche on Morals - Dictionary of Arguments
Ries II 46 Moral/Nietzsche: social egoism. The "main rule" in relation to the crisis of value judgments: There are only moral interpretations of phenomena, but no moral phenomena "in themselves". Ries II 52 Moral/Nietzsche: drove economic forms of the animal kingdom: fear and power. Moral as a functional principle of atavistic impulses. Ries II 53 Moral/Nietzsche: the actual Circe of philosophy. Seduction through the thought of a "truly existing", the "beyond" the world of experience determined by death, suffering and powerlessness. Ries II 79 Moral/Christianity/On the Genealogy of Morality/Nietzsche: all Christian moral is an instrument of falsification and subjugation of original nature by what is not nature - God, reason, conscience. >Christanity/Nietzsche. Ries II 80 Moral/NietzscheVsSocial Nature/On the Genealogy of Morality/Nietzsche: the human is a social "animal", which in the course of the cruel history becomes a social being. Conscience: Remembrance of forced acts. (> Freud: Conscience = idiosyncratic memory). Cf. >Morality/Freud. Ries II 101 Moral/Mandeville: (1670 - 1733) already impulsive psychological explanation of the moral concepts. >Psychological theories on drives. Ries II 103 Moral/Nietzsche: there are no moral phenomena "in themselves", always only moral interpretations of these phenomena. (see above). Cf. >Cognitivism, >Emotivism. Moral as a model for explaining the world: traceability of the unknown back to the familiar. Social traffic rules. Displacement and sublimation as the two constitutive factors. Nietzsche understood his criticism of morality itself as a "high level" of morality. 1. F. Nietzsche Zur Genealogie der Moral, KGW VI. 2 --- Danto III 160 Moral/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche wants to tear us away from the prevailing habits of judging and thinking, let us see these attitudes from the outside, and let us recognize moral as 'a problem'.(1) Danto III 161 Nietzsche deals in particular with our belief in morality, i. e. a belief of the 2nd order over dogmas. Explanation/Nietzsche. It is the question of how far [a judgement] is life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, maybe even species-breeding'.(2) Danto III 162 NietzscheVsTradition: the old philosophers never questioned their identity according to Nietzsche. Danto III 163 Nietzsche tries to establish a science of morality. >Psychology/Nietzsche. Danto III 165 According to Nietzsche, there are no 'moral phenomena' but only a moral interpretation of phenomena. (3) ((s) See also Gilbert Harman: Ethics/Harman). There are no moral facts either.(4) Ethics/Moral/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche does not require us to abondon our moral beliefs, but only to abandon our meta-ethical beliefs. Danto III 166 This gives us the opportunity to choose from a range of morals. Danto III 191 Moral/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche distinguishes between "masters's morality" and "slave morality".(5) Danto III 192 Master/Nietzsche: Their existence depends on how far they are useful to the tribe, which in turn is a question of external circumstances. The supposedly noble ones need not have changed in order to be distinguished and slandered another time: everything depends on the possibilities offered to them to live out those emotions that shape their character and determine their superiority. Slaves/Nietzsche: The average members of the tribe, for whom those fight to threaten them in peacetime, are called 'slaves' by Nietzsche.(6) Danto III 200 Resentment/slave morality: the slave fears not only the malice of the master and digs it up: he resents (resentment) the strength of the master as well as his own relative powerlessness. Danto III 201 He cannot act out his hostility on the paths open to the aristocrats. Slave's strategy: to get the master to accept the slave's scoreboard and to judge himself from the slave's perspective. Eventually, the master becomes evil in his own eyes. >Master/Slave. Danto III 204 Slave moral/Nietzsche/Danto: while it is logical for Hobbes that there is no injustice in the natural state, because injustice presupposes a social juridical structure, the slave morality by Nietzsche requires that there are evil persons, or at least something like that, which can be labelled negatively with reference to the "good".(7) Danto III 205 The slave actually demands nothing less than that everyone should be equal to everyone and that everyone should align from the outside. The moral of everyone is the moral of the group to which they belong. Master's moral/Nietzsche/Danto: on the other hand, the master's moral is determined independently of any external criterion, and the aristocrat does not intend to align itself with others.(8) Danto III 217 On the top rung of the leader of civilization is not the blonde beast, but the ascetic. He is a self-disciplined person who differs from others in that he does not exercise his power over others, but over himself. The self-controlling ascetic is an avatar (originally Avatara), a persona of the beast at the lower end of the scale. Religion is responsible for the higher development, after all, the ascetic is the aristocrat in the tamed state that is so feared by the slaves. He is what they have produced in the course of their resentment. >Civilization/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche, Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft, KGW V.2, p. 232. 2. F. Nietzsche Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI.2, p. 12 3. Ibid. p. 92. 4. F. Nietzsche, Götzen-Dämmerung, KGW VI,3 p. 92. 5. F. Nietzsche Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI.2, p. 218. 6. F. Nietzsche, Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, KGW IV, 2 S. 81f. 7. Cf. F. Nietzsche Genealogie der Moral, VI. 2, p. 284f. 8. Ibid. p. 284._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
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