. Friedrich Nietzsche on Will - Dictionary of Arguments

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Will, philosophy: Will is a conscious mental state that is directed to a given action or procedure for obtaining a result. The result is evaluated in such a way that the action is initiated if there are no stronger reasons against it. The will to do something is not yet equal with its implementation. See also acts of will, free will, weak will, intentionality, intention, action, desire, dispositions.
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Friedrich Nietzsche on Will - Dictionary of Arguments

Danto III 136
Will/Nietzsche/Danto: If it is true that Nietzsche tries to escape the usual distinction between mental and material, then the will to power must seem contradictory. After all, "will" is an expression concerning the spiritual. (See Causality/Nietzsche
, I, Ego, Self/Nietzsche, Subject/Nietzsche).
Danto: That is not true. As with Schopenhauer, Nietzsche's usual connotations concerning the spiritual are combined with the concept of "will" in the metaphysical sense. The will to power is not limited to the mental. If we do not respect this, we cannot understand Nietzsche.
NietzscheVsActs of Will: Nietzsche attacks the "Acts of Will", which are not only accepted by philosophers.
Danto III 137
Acts of Will/Danto: behave to actions like causes to effects.
Hume/Danto: Hume rejected the idea that we could have an experience that corresponds to our idea of causal nexus, just how our will becomes active through our body parts or thoughts.
Hume: we have absolutely no idea how the will works. Nevertheless, Hume accepts acts of will.
NietzscheVsHume: is more radial, there is simply nothing that can be proven to be linked to our actions.
Danto III 138
Thinking/Certainty/Subject/NietzscheVsDescartes: Nietzsche disproves the Cartesian thought that our own mental processes are immediately transparent, that we know about our way of thinking. He disproves it by setting up a series of interlinked thoughts and letting them "freeze":
When Descartes talks about his doubts about reality being at least certain that these are his own doubts, he drags a lot of tacit assumptions with him.
NietzscheVsDescartes: if his argumentation boils down to an "It is thought", our belief in the concept of substance is already assumed and after that a subject is assumed.(1)
Danto III 140
Will/NietzscheVsSchopenhauer/Nietzsche/Danto: The philosophers tend to talk about the will as if it were the most known thing in the world; yes, Schopenhauer suggested that the will alone was known to us.(2)
DantoVsSchoepenhauer: in reality this is not the case. There is no simple, self-identifiable mental operation that would be recognized as an act of will and intuitively grasped.
Nietzsche: There is no 'will': this is just a simplistic conception of the mind.(3)
Danto III 141
Will/Nietzsche: Perhaps the worst of all these fallacies is the conclusion that 'wanting is enough for action'.(4)
Danto III 143
Will/Nietzsche/Danto: The will does not move any more, therefore it does not explain anything - it merely accompanies processes, it can also be missing.(5)
Danto: if there is no will, there is no free or unfree will.(6)
Freedom of will/Nietzsche/Danto: This conclusion is hasty: the doctrine of free will does not depend at all on a psychological theory about the will as a mental phenomenon; 'free' is applied to actions, but not to the will.
Nietzsche mostly puts the argument about free will on ice, the idea of free will is due to "logical emergency breeding".

1. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 577.
2. F. Nietzsche Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI.,2 S.25.
3. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 913.
4. F. Nietzsche Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI.,2 S.27.
5. F. Nietzsche, Götzen-Dämmerung, KGW VI,3 S. 85.
6. Vgl. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 913.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-05-21
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