Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Counterpart theory: in the philosophy of David K. Lewis a counterpart is an object in a possible world, which corresponds to an object in our world - the actual world. For David Lewis no object is in more than one world. Therefore, he must accept counterparts. The counterparts may correspond exactly to the objects in our actual world or deviate more or less strongly from them. See also counterparts, counterpart relation, possible worlds, modal realism, actualism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Alvin Plantinga on Counterpart Theory - Dictionary of Arguments
Schwarz I 57 Counterpart/Counterpart theory/PlantingaVsLewis/PlantingaVsCounterpart theory: (1974(1),115f,1987(2),209): According to Lewis, then all things strictly speaking would have all their properties essential, since there is no possible value in which they (not just any substitutes) have other properties. >Essentialism, >Essence, >Properties, cf. >Contingency, >Possible worlds. For example, if it were one degree colder today, we would all not exist, because then another world would be real, and none of us would be there. >Counterparts/Lewis, >Counterparts, >Counterpart relation. Similar to Kripke: KripkeVsCounterpart Theory/KripkeVsLewis: For example, when we say "Humphrey could have won the election," according to Lewis we're not talking about Humphrey, but someone else. And nothing could be more indifferent to him ("he couldn't care less"). (Kripke 1980(3),44f). Counterpart/counterpart theory/SchwarzVsKripke/SchwarzVsPlantinga: the two objections are misunderstood by Lewis: Lewis does not claim that Humphrey could not have won the election, on the contrary: "he could have won the election" stands exactly for the quality that someone has if one of his counterparts wins the election. Humphrey has this trait by virtue of his character. (1983d(4),42). >Modal properties, >Counterfactuals. The real problem is how does Humphrey win the election in the world? Plantinga: Humphrey would have won, if the corresponding world (the facts) had the quality of existence. Lewis/Schwarz: this question has nothing to do with the intuitions Kripke and Plantinga refer to. >States of affairs, >Situations, >Facts. 1. Alvin Plantinga [1974]: The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2. Alvin Plantinga [1987]: “Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism”. Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 189–231 3. Saul A. Kripke [1980]: Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell 4. D. Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Plant I A. Plantinga The Nature of Necessity (Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy) Revised ed. Edition 1979 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Plantinga
> Counter arguments in relation to Counterpart Theory
