Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Analytic/synthetic: achieved by decomposition or by composition. In philosophy analytically true = true according to the meaning of the components - synthetic insight = substantial expansion of knowledge._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Gerhard Schurz on Analyticity/Syntheticity - Dictionary of Arguments
I 106 Analytic/Synthetic/SchurzVsQuine: his discarding of the distinction is problematic: the relation between language and world contains a conventional element. E.g. if it is not clear what "raven" means, one cannot hypothesize. And this conventional element is supposed to capture just the analytic. Analytic/Schurz/(s): is the result of the conventional determination of meaning in a language. Quine/Schurz: Quine's problem is that this conventional moment operates predominantly in an ostensive way. >Ostension, >Conventions, >Meaning, >Sense. I 171 Analytic/Synthetic/QuineVsCarnap/Schurz: Quine's insight into local indistinguishability brought a profound upheaval. Carnap accepted it late. >Analyticity/Quine. However, he had recognized that several reduction theorems together produce empirical content. (see above). ((s) if one has observed that something dissolves in water, one has thereby "empirically inferred" that it does not dissolve in oil?). Reduction/Schurz: but with the term "reduction theorem" he just remained true to his reductionist program. Assignment law/terminology/Schurz: Carnap (1956)(1) calls it "correspondence rules" (K). I 172 Total theory/Carnap: "T u K". ("theory and assignment laws"). Assignment law/SchurzVsCarnap: this cannot be, because assignment laws are consequences of a theory T, which follow from the interaction of all theorems. ((s) circular). Analyticity/Carnap: sums up in (Carnap 1963(2), 964) that he failed to formulate an appropriate notion. Solution/Carnap: decomposition of theory into Ramsey-theorem and Carnap-theorem: Ramsey-theorem/Carnap: synthetic Carnap-theorem/Carnap: analytic. Analytic/synthetic/Ernest Nagel: (Nagel 1961)(3) the analytic content of mechanics is not localizable! 1. Carnap, R. "The Methological Character of Theoretical Concepts". In: Feigle,H./Scriven, M(eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol I, Menneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, pp. 38-76. 2. Carnap, R. (1963) "Carl G. Hempel on Scientific Theories". In: Schilpp, P. A. (ed.) The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, La Salle, pp. 958-965. 3. Nagel, E. (1961). The Structure of Science, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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> Counter arguments against Schurz
> Counter arguments in relation to Analyticity/Syntheticity
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-23