Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Necessity, philosophy: different kinds of necessity are distinguished, differing in their strength. For example, physical, logical or metaphysical necessity. See also necessity de dicto, necessity de re._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Alan Sidelle on Necessity - Dictionary of Arguments
Stalnaker I 201/2 Necessity/Kripke/Alan Sidelle/Jackson/Chalmers/Stalnaker: one can still assume that necessity has its root in the language. Solution: two-dimensional semantics: shares e.g. necessary a posteriori on in necessary truth that is a priori knowable (through conceptual analysis) and a part which is only a posteriori knowable. >Two-dimensional semantics, >Semantics, >Knowledge, >a priori, >a posteriori, >Analysis, >Concepts, >Language, >Meaning, >Word Meaning. Metaphysical necessity/all authors: Metaphysical necessity is in any case no special kind of necessity. >Metaphysical necessity._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
||
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19