Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Utilitarianism: is a doctrine of ethics which takes the assumed greatest benefit for the greatest number of affected people as the moral aim. See also hedonism, good/the good, preference-utilitarianism, rule-utilitarianism, ethics, morality, deontology, consequentialism, benefit._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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John J. C. Smart on Utilitarianism - Dictionary of Arguments
Rawls I 187 Utilitarism/Individuals/J. C. Smart/Rawls: In a sense, classical utilitarianism ignores the distinction of individual persons. The principle of rational choice for one person is at the same time the principle of rational choice for everyone. >rational choice. Thus, this ideal person becomes identical with the ideal compassionate observer! >Observation, >Ideal observer, >Method. I 188 Classical utilitarianism then culminates in the - impersonal - amalgamation of all desires into a single system of desires. >Generalization, >Generality. Further reading: See C. I. Lewis, The Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, 1946; J. C. SmartVsLewis: An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, p. 26_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Smart I J. J. C. Smart Philosophy and Scientific Realism London 2013 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |