|Doubts: the restraint of a belief. A concrete alternative does not have to be available in any case. For example, it may be that a result of an election is questioned without being able to indicate an exact percentage for a different result. See also truth value, attribution, concept._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
G. E. M. Anscombe on Doubts - Dictionary of Arguments
Frank I 19
Doubt/Descartes/Anscombe: For example, when Descartes doubts whether he is Descartes, he does not question the certainty of his "Cartesian cogito"!
E.g. Mach, who does not recognize himself in the bus window: ("what a shabby school master"): he does not doubt that it is he who has been mistaken.
G. Elizabeth M.Anscombe (1975a): The First Person, in:
Samuel Guttenplan (ed.) (I975): Mind and Language: Wolfson College
Lectures 1974, Oxford 1975,45-65_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
G.E. M. Anscombe
"The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank, Frankfurt/M. 1994
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994