Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory. The most diverse approaches claim to define or explain truth, or to assert their fundamental indefinability. A. Linguistic-oriented theories presuppose either a match of statements with extracts of the world or a consistency with other statements. See also truth theory, truth definition, theory of meaning, correspondence theory, coherence theory, facts, circumstances, paradoxes, semantics, deflationism, disquotationalism, criteria, evidence. B. Action-oriented truth theories take a future realization of states as the standard, which should be reconciled with an aspired ideal. See also reality, correctness, pragmatism, idealization, ideas. C. Truth-oriented theories of art attribute qualities to works of art under certain circumstances which reveal the future realization of ideal assumed social conditions. See also emphatic truth, fiction, art, works of art.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
Horwich I 46
Truth/Moore: (early): identical with reality.
I 46
Truth/Fact/Generalization/Russell/Moore/R.Cartwright: Problem: if the true proposition is identical to the fact, then problem of generalization: - It is not excluded that the true proposition 2 + 2 = 4 is identical to the proposition that Scott Waverley wrote. - (because equivalence requires only equality of truth values).
Solution: a certain proposition must be given to identify it with a fact. - Generalization: not well-formed: because the last occurrence of "p" is not in a quantifiable proposition: For each proposition p, if p is true, then p is identical to the fact that p.
I 51
Truth/Moore: (late): Truth is not a simple quality: - false belief does not need an object. - There are no propositions at all. - Russell: held on to propositions for years - fact/Moore: pro, but not as an object of belief.
I 56
Truth/Proposition/Moore/Russell/R. Cartwright: Truth as an unanalyzable simple property: leads to problems with propositions. - After giving up propositions, they identified the bearers of truth with belief. Then a kind of correspondence theory became inevitable. - Truth must depend on something that lies outside the belief itself.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

CartwrightR I
R. Cartwright
A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994

CartwrightR II
R. Cartwright
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-04-08
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