Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Artificial consciousness: The question of whether machines or computer systems can develop an artificial consciousness is about whether they can become sentient, have experiences and make independent decisions. See also Artificial Intelligence, Strong Artificial Intelligence, Human Level AI, Machine Learning, Superintelligence._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Dieter Birnbacher on Artificial Consciousness - Dictionary of Arguments
Metzinger II 719 Consciousness/Machine/Birnbacher: why should one not "be able to say" that a machine has consciousness? >Consciousness, >cf. >Artificial Intelligence, >Strong Artificial Intelligence, >Artificial General Intelligence, >Human Level AI. That a chair "thinks" would simply be empty due to a lack of empirical criteria. >Criterion/Birnbacher. II 720 Concept/Wittgenstein/Birnbacher: Wittgenstein attributes the attribution criteria of a thing, to the concept of the thing, therefore he has an extended concept of the term. >Attribution. For example, the concept of pain is characterized not only by what pain in itself is, but also by its specific function in our lives. >Pain, >Language game, >Language community. Consciousness/Machine/Wittgenstein/Birnbacher: it follows that for Wittgenstein an artificial consciousness is logically impossible, since in our linguistic usage we only attribute it to humans. We would have no conditions according to which we would describe the behavior of machines as conscious. (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations § 360) Truth/Assertiveness/Consciousness/Machine/Wittgenstein/Birnbacher: The conditions of truth may be fulfilled, but the conditions of assertiveness may never be fulfilled. >Truth conditions, >Assertability conditions, >Assertability. I.e. even if it were true that the machine had consciousness, it would be conceptually impossible for us to claim it, because our concept of consciousness would not fit on it. Cf. >Machine Learning. The factually valid criteria are made for the factually applicable and not for any conceivable application situations. >Zombies, >Intentionality, >Thinking. II 722 Consciousness/Machine/Nomological Impossibility/Julian Huxley: in a BBC broadcast: "real" emotions and intentions are only possible in biotic matter. Also Paul Ziff, end of the 50s. II 724 Zombie/Robot/"Imitation Man"/Birnbacher: current discussion (early nineties): Phenomena of consciousness occur when a certain threshold of activation rate is exceeded. An "imitation man" might not feel anything, but he might think, mean, or expect something. (Intention). He could also think of himself, without actual self-consciousness. II 725 Consciousness/Man/Birnbacher: the nomological conditions for human consciousness are not only necessary, but also sufficient. I.e. they force consciousness in humans! >Sufficiency, >Conditions, >Necessity. II 726 Criteria/Consciousness/Human/Wittgenstein: behaviour as a criterion for attributing consciousness. >Behavior. Consciousness/Machine/Birnbacher: behaviour cannot be a criterion for attributing consciousness to machines. Here neurophysiological criteria are important, which Wittgenstein attributes to the symptoms. >Symptoms. Consciousness/Behaviour/Animals/Rollin/BirnbacherVsWittgenstein: even in animals, behaviour is an unreliable criterion for consciousness! For example, cows eat immediately after an operation. Reason: their food is so low in nutrients that they would be weakened too much if they took long breaks. Longer periods of fasting are possible in humans. >Consciousness, >Self-consciousness, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Speaking, >Robots._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Birn I D. Birnbacher Analytische Einführung in die Ethik Berlin 2013 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
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> Counter arguments against Birnbacher
> Counter arguments in relation to Artificial Consciousness
