Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Actualism: in relation to worlds the thesis that only our own world is real. - Counter-position essentialism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Steven E. Boer on Actualism - Dictionary of Arguments
I 5 Definition Actuality/Existence/Being/Frege/Russell/Quine/Boer: Thesis: There is no distinction between existence and being. (> Non-existence, non-existencing). That is, there are no non-existent things. Nominalism is, of course, an actualism. Tolerant actualism/Boer: admits, e.g. that there are non-actual states. E.g. causally not effective non-concreted individuals. For example, non-exemplified properties. Intentional relation/tolerant actualism: allows that it is only possible that we participate in such relations. Principle (DI): (DI) Definition "X participates/participation in the world": If X is an individual, then it exists localized in the space time, if X is a proposition, it exists and is true. If X is a state, it exists and persists. If X is a property or relation, then it exists and is exemplified. If X is an event, then it exists and X occurs. Non-actuality/Boer: would say that non-existent things can no longer participate in the world, as unexamplified properties. I 6 Therefore (DI) can be accepted by actualists as well as by non-actualists. I 5 Scientific Camp: Plantinga: (1974)(1) is a liberal actualist without nominalist scruples - also allows properties, relation and propositions. 1. Plantinga, Alvin: 1974, The Nature of Necessity, Clarendon, Oxford. 2. Boër, Steven E., and William G. Lycan. “Who, Me?” The Philosophical Review, vol. 89, no. 3, 1980, pp. 427–466. (JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2184397. Accessed 7 Feb. 2021.)_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
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