Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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"There is...," philosophy: it is the question whether the talk that "there is" something is synonymous with the assumption of the existence of the said thing. In contrast to that the existential quantification is the attribution of properties to objects. See also everyday language, existence, existential quantification, existence predicate, existence statements, quantification, attribution, properties, schematic letters.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 12
Existence independency/conceptual dependency/non-actuality/"there is"/"exists"/Boer: distinction between "exists" and "there exists":
VsNon-Actualism/Boer: this is fixed on shady entities like potential fat men. (Unrealized Possibilities).
BoerVsVs: these are overreactions.
Solution/Boer: a metaphysical basis for the distinction exist/be without ontological overpopulation.
I 15
Non-actualism/existence independence/concept dependency/Boer: ... now we construct the quantifiers again referentially. (> Substitutional quantification/Boer)
Domain/N.B.: now consists of the class of objects some of which exist and some do not.
Be/"There is"/Quantor/Boer: is expressed by "some" E.g. "(Ex)"
Actual/exist/existence: by the predicates "exists" and "is actual", symbolized by "E!".

(D3) R is an existence-independent relation = It is possible for an existing thing to have the ^relation R to something that is not an existing thing.

(D3): now becomes (D3NA) as a definition of existence independence, whereby now the object is no longer presupposed.

(D3NA) R is an existential-independent relation = M (Ex) (Ey) (E!(X) & xRy & ~E!(y)).

According to (D3NA): and (T1), existence independence contains participation independence, but not vice versa.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Boer I
Steven E. Boer
Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010

Boer II
Steven E. Boer
Knowing Who Cambridge 1986

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-04-03
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