Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Dialethism: dialethism is a paraconsistent logic that goes back to G. Priest (G. Priest, What is so Bad about Contradictions? Journal of Philosophy, 95, pp. 410-26). It is about the fact that contradictory statements can be asserted at the same time. See also paraconsistent logic, truth agglomerations, truth gaps, paradoxes._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Graham Priest on Dialetheism - Dictionary of Arguments
Field II 145 Dialethism/Priest/Paradoxa/Field: (Priest 1998): Thesis: the sentence of the liar as well as its negation are both assertable (and also their conjunction). The rules of the logic are weakened (> stronger/weaker; >strength of theories), so that not every assertion can be asserted by this. Most attractive variant: builds on Kleene's trivalent logic. Trivalent logic/Kleene/Priest/Field: Priest assumes here that the valid inferences are those that guarantee "correct assertion". But an assertion is only correct if it has one of the two highest truth values in the truth value table. Curry paradox: is thus excluded, since the only conditional in this language is the material conditional. Material conditional/Field: the material conditional is defined by ~ and v. It does not fully support the modus ponens in the logic of Kleene/Priest. Liar/KleeneVsPriest: (and other "deviant" sentences): have truth-value gaps. But there are no agglomerations of truth values. Deviating Sentence: E.g. Liar sentence, has no truth-value agglomerations but truth-value gaps. Liar/PriestVsKleene: (and other deviating sentences): have, conversely, truth-value agglomerations and no gaps. Problem/Kleene: here one cannot establish an equivalence between "p" and "p" is true! For to assert a truth-value gap in a sentence "A" would be to assert: "~ [true ("A") v true ("~A")]" and this should be equivalent to "~ (A v ~ A)". But one sentence of this form can never be legitimate in Kleene. Truth-value gap/logical form/Field: to assert a truth-value gap in a sentence "A" would mean to assert: "~ [true ("A") v true ("~ A")]" and this should be equivalent to "~ (A v ~ A)". Solution/Priest: if "A" is a deviating sentence, this is then a correct assertion in Priest. Also the assertion of the absence of a truth-value agglomeration in a sentence "A" would be the assertion "~ [(true ("A") u true ("A)"]" which should be equivalent to "~(a u ~A)". Kleene cannot claim this absence for deviant sentences, Priest can do this._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Pries I G. Priest Beyond the Limits of Thought Oxford 2001 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |
||
> Counter arguments against Priest
> Counter arguments in relation to Dialetheism
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19