Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Epistemic logic: epistemic logicis a logic that deals with the evaluation of knowledge and belief attitudes. A problem of epistemic logic is e.g. the everyday believing of contradictory sets of statements. See also paradoxes, knowledge, truth, paradoxes of knowledge, knowledge logic, beliefs, omniscience, transitivity, intensions, extensions, opacity.
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Jaakko Hintikka on Epistemic Logic - Dictionary of Arguments

II 11
Epistemic Logic/standard/Hintikka: there are usually extremely many alternatives that are compatible with what a person b knows.
But it is not necessary to demand that all such worlds are really within the domain of permitted alternatives.
>Possible worlds
II 12
Epistemic Logic/Hintikka: it is not clear how we should assess the situation
A) Vs Restriction of the individual domain: since the restriction can hardly be avoided in alethic standard modal logic, this is again an argument against the possibility of alethic modal logic.
B) One could affirm the idea that not all epistemic and doxastically possible worlds must be logically possible.
II 17
Epistemic Logic/Hintikka: epistemic logic is usually regarded as a branch of modal logic.
Semantics of possible worlds/possible world/semantics/Hintikka: the semantics of a possible world is a misleading term for the semantics of epistemic logic.
Epistemic Logic/Hintikka: most of the work focuses on syntactic questions and deductive techniques. This is a mistake.
One should focus on semantic (model-theoretical) questions.
Epistemic Logic/laws/Hintikka: the basic laws are obtained by a simple idea:
Def knowledge/Hintikka: knowledge is what enables the knowing person to concentrate on the subset W1 of the set of all worlds W.
W1: W1 is then relative not only to the knowing person b, but also relative to the scenario w0 ε W.
Definition b knows that S iff. S is true in all epistemic b alternatives.
II 143
Uniqueness Condition/W-questions/response/Hintikka: the condition that something is a complete and unambiguous answer to a who-question (ambiguous, see above) is first that (8) has to imply (7)
(6) Who is the man over there?
(7) I know who the man is over there.
E.g. It is Sir Norman Brook.
(8) I know that the man there is Sir Norman Brook.
Problem: the step from (8) to (7) is that of an existential generalization (EG).
>Existential generalization.
II 144
Problem: for that, we need an additional premise. E.g.
(13) (Ex) Ki (Sir Norman Brook = x).
(Non-mirrored quantifier, perceptually)
"I know who Norman Brook is."
Epistemic Logic/criterion/Hintikka: with this the epistemic logic freely provides an additional criterion for complete answers.
N.B.: this applies to both methods of identification (public/perspective).
Uniqueness condition: for the fact that e.g. "the man over there" is a clear and complete answer to (9):
(14) (∃x) Kl (that the man there = x)
That is, that the man who is pointed to is as an aquaintance of the one who asks the questions.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

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> Counter arguments against Hintikka
> Counter arguments in relation to Epistemic Logic

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20
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