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Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments
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Modal realism: Modal realism is the metaphysical view that there are many possible worlds, and that these possible worlds are as real as the actual world. See also Possible worlds, Actual world, Possibility, Ontology, Modal logic._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Author
Concept
Summary/Quotes
Sources
Peter van Inwagen on Modal Realism - Dictionary of Arguments
Schwarz I 42
Van InwagenVsModal Realism/InwagenVsLewis: "concretism", Stalnaker: "extreme modal realism".
>Possibility, >Possible worlds, >Possibilia, >Modalities.
Schwarz I 64
Modal Realism/possible worlds/VsLewis/Schwarz: some: Lewis' possible worlds would have to be part of reality because "actuality", "world" and "reality" are synonymous terms for the totality of all things, (Plantinga 1976(1), 256f Lycan 1979(2), 290): the idea of real things outside the world is simply inconsistent.
Reality/world/LewisVsVs: Lewis distinguishes between world and reality: "actual world" means only a small part of all things (reality includes world, world is only part of reality). This resolves the contradictions.
Schwarz: this is a neutral formulation of modal realism. Question: what does the reality of space-time maximal objects deal with modality?
Modality/van InwagenVsLewis/Schwarz: here it is about how our world could have been, not about how any of us isolated things are. (1985(3), 119,1986(4), 226), Plantinga 1987(5)).
LewisVsVs: modal operators are just quantifiers about such things.
>Modal operators.
Van InwagenVsLewis: the objection goes deeper: e.g. there are exactly 183 space-time maximal objects. This is not analytically wrong. There is also no rigid designator.
>Rigid designator.
Schwarz I 65
It could be true or not. Lewis appears to assert that there are as many space-time objects as there are sets.
VsLewis: thus the totality of the worlds has become contingent!
1. Alvin Plantinga [1976]: “Actualism and Possible Worlds”. Theoria, 42: 139–160. In [Loux 1979].
2. William G. Lycan [1979]: “The Trouble with Possible Worlds”. In [Loux 1979]: 274-316.
3. Peter van Inwagen 1985]: “Plantinga on Trans-World Identity”. In James Tomberlin und Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Alvin Plantinga: A Profile, Dordrecht: Reidel.
4. Peter van Inwagen [1986]: “Two Concepts of Possible Worlds”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 9. In [van Inwagen 2001].
5. Alvin Plantinga [1987]: “Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism”. Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 189–231._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals
indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate
the page number. The corresponding books
are indicated on the right hand side.
((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Inwagen I
Peter van Inwagen
Metaphysics Fourth Edition
Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-03-29