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Coherence: Coherence in philosophy refers to the logical consistency and interconnectedness of a set of beliefs or propositions, ensuring they form a unified and non-contradictory system of thought.
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Ruth Millikan on Coherence - Dictionary of Arguments

I 8
Coherence/Millikan: one will have to explain why coherence is good, how it helps us, not just what it is. Ultimately, this is only possible in a total theory about the world.
"New Empiricism"/Millikan: has so far only managed half of his task, it has not succeeded in overcoming the myth of the given, which is embedded in the theory of meaning.
Realism/Millikan: the arguments VsRealism are very simple:
VsRealism: "To find the meaning of a word, one must see what would justify its application, or what an application would cause. But the application is justified by earlier applications! And it was caused by past beliefs! ((s) also VsCausal theory, VsCorrespondence theory).
>Causal theory of knowledge.
>Realism, >Correspondence theory.
Correspondence: does not play any role in the justification or the causal explanation of an utterance. So correspondence has nothing to do with the meaning of "true".
MillikanVsVs: this can be turned around just as well:
Correspondence theory: pro: Correspondence is involved in the nature of truth, because for a sentence to be true means to correspond in a certain way to a part of the world. The fact that correspondence plays no role in the justification of an utterance can equally well be turned around: that the meaning has nothing to do with justification. (Millikan pro!).
Sentence Meaning/Meaning/Millikan: are the special mapping functions of the sentence. But since we reject correspondence as a test for truth, the mapping function cannot exist in rules in the head.
I 10
It cannot be the "user" who "assumes" that his sentences represent the world so and so. In addition, the "assumes" (the "should") that determines the meaning must be a different "assumes" ("should") than that of "assuming" from a person that it behaves in accordance with the expectation of others according to rules. ("Should behave").
Mapping function/image/meaning/Millikan: the questions become more and more difficult: What kind of things are that that map sentences? What kind of mapping functions are involved? What is the "should"?
Knowledge/Self/Meaning/Millikan: if something other than the way, as I justify my utterances, defines my meanings, how can I grasp what I think myself?
Thesis: We will have to give up that we know that a priori! We also do not know a priori what we mean.
Subject/predicate/coherence/language/world/Millikan: subject-predicate structure: I try to show how the law of consistency (the essence of coherence) fits into nature. For this I need Fregean sense as the main concept.
As one can be mistaken in knowledge, so also in meaning.
I 324
Coherence/Millikan: coherence is essentially consistency (consistent, consistency). The lack of contradictions can be a test for the adequacy of terms. Namely, before the theories were developed at all.
Perception judgement/repetition/Millikan: if a judgment can be repeated, it is a test in which no conclusion (inference) plays a role at all. Then it is only about coherence (of judgments, not of theories).
>Perception, >Judgment.
Coherence/Millikan: can therefore also be viewed as a test for truth, without necessitating a holism.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005

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