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Ruth Millikan on Correspondence - Dictionary of Arguments
Correspondence/correspondence relation/Millikan: here we are dealing with the relationship between an indicative intentional icon and its real value.
1. Definition: real value is the normal condition for the exertion of the direct eigenfunction of the icon.
2. There are correspondences between transformations on both sides!
3. Each transformation on the page of the icon has a normal condition for the eigenfunction (proper performance) of the corresponding transformation of the real value.
N.B.: this is about a comparison of the transformations of icon and real value, not a correspondence of the elements of icon and real value. ((s)> covariance).
Transformation/Millikan: this is not about "parts" but about invariant and variable aspects ((s) of a whole).
E.g. bee dance: variable: direction - invariant: existence of nectar.
Transformation/sentence/Millikan: for sentences, the most frequent transformation is substitution or negation.
E.g. "Theaitetos swims" Every transformation corresponds to a possible world situation (fact, world affair).
Articulation: a fact, is determined by a group of possible transformations.
Consensus/Millikan: first you have to know something about the objective world, not the world, as we perceive it (sensory world).
Consensus/judgment: consensus in judgment is not to respond to the same stimulus with the same reaction. Rarely two people react to the same stimulus with the same choice of words. There is also no agreement on how to divide the world into pieces. Instead, it is a sign that each speaker has contact with the world in its own way, and that it is the same, which is mapped in different ways.
Cf. >Picture theory.
Correspondence/Putnam: it is incoherent to assume that truth is a correspondence with the WORLD.
Image/Representation/Putnam: mathematical images are omnipresent, representations are not omnipresent.
Problem: a correspondence theory based on the fact that there is a mapping relation between a complete set of true representations and the world is empty.
Solution: there must first be a distinction between images and representations.
Solution: there must be an additional condition for reference, namely, that an intended interpretation is marked.
Causal theory/Putnam: a causal theory would not help here. For it is just as uncertain whether "cause" clearly refers, as if "cat" clearly refers.
Concept/Sign/Ockham/Putnam: Problem: a concept must not simply be a "mental particular", otherwise every sign merely refers to another sign again.
PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: it is incomprehensible how a relation between a sign and its object could be picked out, either by holding up the sign itself,
Or by holding up a different sign, e.g.
Meaning/Meaning rationalism/Putnam/Millikan: this is the meaning rationalism: in order to mean something, we must know what we mean and namely "know" with a very definite, meaning-rationalist shine on "know":
The relation between the head and the world must be reflected wholly in the head,
((s)> See Leibniz, the "overarching general").
PutnamVs: that would only work if there was a mysterious "direct understanding of forms" ((s) platonistic). Then the relation would not have to be mirrored again.
Correspondence/to mean/Meaning/References/MillikanVsPutnam/Millikan: Thesis: the relations between the head and the world are indeed between the head and the world.
However, the understanding of these relations does not contribute to the justification of meaning and reference. They do not have to be intended so that one can refer.
>Intentionality. _____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005
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