Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Rationalism, philosophy: rationalism is a collective term for theories that, in addition to the original question, which statements are true, take the demand for consistency as the starting point for their creation. Rationalist theories are, of course, more linguistic and logical than empirical approaches. In conflict situations, they may be more concerned about coherence than about correspondence. See also empiricism, verifiability, verificationism, coherence, coherence theory, inferentialism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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M. Horkheimer on Rationalism - Dictionary of Arguments
Seel III 102 Rationalism /Reason/Horkheimer: "objective reason" is unrelated to human will. >Objectivity. SeelVsHorkheimer: that was a mistake - today: will and wishes of humans are quite objective (beyond the moment). >Objectivity/Nagel, >Desires, >Will, >Freedom, >Society, cf. >Subjectivity._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Seel I M. Seel Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997 Seel II M. Seel Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000 Seel III M. Seel Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001 |
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> Counter arguments against Horkheimer
> Counter arguments in relation to Rationalism
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18