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Conceivability: Conceivability in philosophy of mind is the capacity to imagine or mentally represent a scenario or state of affairs, even if it may not exist in reality, providing insight into the nature of consciousness.
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

David Chalmers on Conceivability - Dictionary of Arguments

I 73
Conceivability/Idea/Chalmers: when two worlds resemble each other in terms of all micro-physical conditions, there is no room for the notion that they differ in terms of higher-level properties such as biological phenomena.
>Possible worlds
, >Distinctions, >Levels/order, >Properties,
This unimaginability is not caused by any cognitive limitations. It is rather logically impossible that these worlds differ.
>Consciousness/Chalmers, >Experience.
I 98
Imagination/Conceivability/argument/proof/VsChalermers: some may argue that conceivability is not an argument - there may always be details which have not been taken into account.
ChalmersVsVs: but then one would have to specify somehow which details these are.
Chalmers: the only way in which conceivability and possibility are disjointed is connected to necessity a posteriori: e.g. the hypothesis that water is not H2O seems conceptually coherent, but water is probably H2O in all possible worlds.
>a posteriori necessity.
Necessity a posteriori/Chalmers: however, necessity a posteriori is irrelevant to the problem of whether our conscious experience is explainable.
I 99
Conceivability/Chalmers: one might think that one could imagine a situation in which Fermat's last sentence is wrong. But it would turn out that the situation was described wrongly. As it would turn out, the terms were misapplied.
I 130
Idea/Conceivability/VsDescartes/Chalmers: Descartes' argument from the mere conceivability is considered as rejected. From the fact that it is conceivable that A and B are not identical does not follow that they are not.
VsChalmers: Is that not true to the same extent for the zombies' example?
I 131
ChalmersVsVs: the difference is that it is not about identity here, but about supervenience!
>Supervenience, >Identity.
If one can imagine the existence of all physical properties without the existence of conscious properties, then it is simply that the physical facts do not exhaust everything. This is something completely different. Supervenience is also much more fundamental here.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

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