Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Individuals: In philosophy, individuals are entities that are distinct from other entities. They are typically characterized by their own unique properties and experiences. Individuals can be physical objects, such as humans, animals, and plants, or they can be non-physical objects, such as minds, souls, and thoughts. See also Particulars, Individuation. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Émile Durkheim on Individuals - Dictionary of Arguments
Habermas IV 91 Individual/Durkheim/Habermas: Durkheim thesis: The individual breaks down into two parts: a) a non-socialized part subject to self-interest and self-preservation imperatives and b) a moral part shaped by the group identity. (1) The division of the social universe into areas of the profane and the sacred is repeated psychologically in the contrast of body and soul or body and mind, in the antagonism of inclination and duty, sensuality and reason. HabermasVsDurkheim: here it becomes clearer than anywhere else how strongly Durkheim remains attached to the traditional philosophy of consciousness. He distinguishes between states of individual and collective consciousness, but both are considered states of consciousness of the individual. (2) Individual/Durkheim: owes its identity as a person exclusively to Habermas VI 92 the identification with or internalisation of characteristics of collective identity; personal identity is a reflection of collective identity. Durkheim: "So it is not true if we believe that the more individualistic we are, the more personal we are." (3) Habermas IV 93 MeadVsDurkheim: unlike Durkheim, Mead assumes that identity formation takes place via the medium of language communication. And since the subjectivity of one's own intentions escapes by no means from the desires and feelings, the instances of I and superego (in Mead "I" and "Me") must emerge from the same process of socialization. >Identity/Mead, I/Self/Mead, Individuation/Mead. 1. E. Durkheim, Les formes élementaires de la vie religieuse, Paris, 1968, German: Frankfurt 1981, p. 37. 2. E. Durkheim, Le dualisme de la nature humaine et ses conditions sociales, in: ders.La science sociale et l’action, (Ed) J. C. Filloux, Paris 1970, p. 330. 3. Durkheim (1981). p. 369._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Durkheim I E. Durkheim The Rules of Sociological Method - French: Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique, Paris 1895 German Edition: Die Regeln der soziologischen Methode Frankfurt/M. 1984 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 |