Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Attribution Theory | Castaneda Vs Attribution Theory | Frank I 322 Attribution theory/Terminology/Castaneda: his expression of the theory of Chisholm/Lewis, self-attribution. Theory/Terminology/Castaneda: represents what he called dia philosophy: alternative theories can be evolved tgether. CastanedaVsChisholm: VsAttributionstheorie: does not explain sufficiently the explicit self-esteem (SB). I 323 "Unsustainable Fichteanism": Fichte: no consciousness without self-consciousness. I 329 Proposition/Belief/Sself-attribution/CastanedaVsAttribution theory/CastanedaVsLewis: 1) Lewis defines the belief objects extensionally (from quantities). This violates Castaneda’s second intentionality condition for the objects of intentional attitudes. (see above). Possible Worlds are unsuitable as primary objects of belief because of their infinite extension (infinitely many aspects) and properties cannot be individuated by sets of objects, because the creation of sets presupposes the predication of properties. (>Individuation). 2. Lewis’ thesis that self-attribution can be explained only by a non-propositional knowledge depends on the premise that there could be no indexical proposition or related related to private issues. CastanedaVsLewis: but it lacks a convincing justification. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Disquotation | Putnam Vs Disquotation | Putnam VII 431 Truth/Putnam: the only reason one can have to deny that truth is a property would be that one is physicalist or phenomenalist. Or maybe a culture-relativist. Truth/property/Putnam: only reductionist theories deny that truth is a property. (PutnamVsDisquotationalism: >Disquotationalism). Truth/Putnam: is a property - >PutnamVsDeflationism - Rorty: (R. Rorty, The Mirror of Nature): truth is no property. --- Horwich I 455 Divine perspective/outside/PutnamVsGods perspective/Rorty: Putnam is amused as James and Dewey about such attempts. Rorty: but he has a problem when it comes to PutnamVsDisquotationalism: this one is too reductionist, to positivistic, to "behaviorist" for him ("transcendental Skinnerism"). Truth/Putnam: if a philosopher says, truth is something other than electricity because there is probably room for a theory of electricity but not for a truth theory, Horwich I 456 and that the knowledge of the truth conditions was everything what one could know about the truth, then he denies that truth is a property. Thus, there is then no property of the correctness or accuracy ((s)> Deflationism, PutnamVsDeflationism, PutnamVsGrover. PutnamVs: that is, to deny that our thoughts are thoughts and our assertions assertions. Theory/existence/reduction/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam assumes here that the only reason to deny is that one needs a theory for an X, to say that the X is "nothing but Y". ((s) eliminative reductionism). PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson must show that assertions can be reduced to noise. Then the field linguist must reduce acts on motions. Davidson/Rorty: but he does not say that assertions were nothing but noise. Instead: Truth/explanation/Davidson: unlike electricity truth is no explanation for something. ((s) A phenomenon is not explained that a sentence which it claims, is true). Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 --- Horwich I XIV VsDeflationism/Horwich: provides no explicit truth-definition, but is only based on a scheme (disquotational scheme). Horwich I XVI Truth/simple/unanalysable/Russell/Moore/Cartwright/Horwich: if truth is unanalysable basic concept (VsDeflationism), then it is completely independent of awareness. That is, truth gets something metaphysical. Problem: then we cannot assume that the propositions which we believe, have this property. Then the skepticism follows. --- Horwich I 457 Correctness/PutnamVsDavidson: although he shares his distaste for intentionalist terms, (and therefore does not consider truth as an explanation), he nevertheless wishes a representation of what kind of statement it is, to be correct. Putnam/Rorty: he wants that because he is afraid that the "inside view" of the language game where "true" is an appreciative term - is weakened, if it is not philosophically supported. Because: If language is only production of noise - without normative element - then the noises that we utter are nothing but "an expression of our subjectivity". Normativity/standard/language/Putnam: why should there be no normative elements in the language game? That would be the inside view of the language game. RortyVsPutnam: thus it still depends on a synoptic God's perspective to be brought together in the inner view and outside view of the language game. Norm/JamesVsPutnam/DeweyVsPutnam: we cannot take such a God's perspective. That is, we cannot solidify our standards in that we support them metaphysically or scientifically. Truth/appreciation/PragmatismVsPlato/DeweyVsPlato/RortyVsPutnam: we should not repeat Plato's error, and interpret expressions of appreciation as the names of esoteric entities. --- Williams II 497 Belief/PutnamVsDavidson: that most are true, is not guaranteed by the methodology of interpretation, because the stock of beliefs is constantly changing. Therefore, we can only give a sense (ii) if we explain the reliability of learning and that can only do the realism. Causal theory/correspondence/Putnam: the reliability of learning: would represent us as reliable signal transmitters. What would the truth theory add? It announced that the sentence is true iff the condition exists. This is the correspondence, which is involved in the causal theory, it is precisely the correspondence that is established by the truth definition. Deflationism/correspondence/M. Williams: the minimal correspondence is also available for him. That is, Putnam's argument does not guarantee physical correspondence or another substantive theory. Williams II 502 Truth/Putnam: must be substantial ((s) explanatory role, truth as a property, PutnamVsDeflationism). Otherwise it leads to cultural relativism. PutnamVsCultural relativism: an extreme culture-relativist may himself not even consider a thinker or speaker, as opposed to a mere noise maker. ((s) speaking not distinguishable from sound). This is mental suicide. PutnamVsDisquotationalism: has no explanatory power, unless something is said about the concept of assertion. M. WilliamsVsPutnam: do we need that? Putnam: to be able to view ourselves as thinkers, speaking must be more than noise-making and then we must be able to explain to ourselves what it means to understand a sentence. PutnamVsmetaphysical Realism/M. Williams: although Putnam finds this picture sympathetic, he prefers to explain meaning in terms of situation appropriate use. Problem: that we do not stop that there are various inguistic practices ((s) different communities) and therefore different ways of justification. Solution: ideal justification. And that is how Putnam understands truth. Truth/PutnamVsDisquotationalism: if we say nothing about the truth in terms of assertibility conditions, we do not get a concept of objective truth, which allows the cultural relativism to escape. Then we identified truth implicitly with assertibility relative to the norms of a particular community. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Küng, H. | Mackie Vs Küng, H. | Stegmüller IV 507 Religion/Küng: (Existiert Gott?, Küng, H. 1978): Küng tends to classify arguments as "modern" or "unmodern". MackieVsKüng: enormous erudition, at the same time confused. Too strong an emphasis on "modernity". IV 508 So it only depends on whether an argument is right or wrong. Küng: Thesis: "...after the difficult walk through the history of modern times, a clear, convinced "yes" answered by critical reason can be given as an answer to the question "Does God exist?" But the question is, what does this "yes" refer to? To the God of traditional theism, or to a substitute God? Küng: Thesis: both the naively anthropomorphic and the enlightened-deistic conception of God are obsolete. God is neither a supernatural being in the clouds, nor an extraterrestrial being in the metaphysical sky. Rather he is in this world and this world is God. God is the infinite in the finite, the absolute in the relative. That which works constantly, that which has the possibility as an absolute of becoming history. Küng seems to agree with the tradition of a negative theology: God is not to be understood by any concept, even the concept of being does not override him, because he is not an existing being. The God of the Bible is not a person like a human, but a God who establishes personality, so he cannot be apersonal. Thus one can also accept the God of the Bible as a God with a human face. IV 509 MackieVsKüng: 1. He obviously takes advantage of the fact that he tries to have everything at the same time: this can be seen in his remarks about miracles: these are all that the human is "surprised" about. Mackie: 2. If this was all, miracles would in no way support any kind of supernaturalism or theism! 3. Retreat to such an indefinite and unclear concept of God that it no longer provides any starting point at all to critically discuss the question of existence. God/Existence/Proof of God/Küng: Thesis: Argument for the existence of God: the danger of nihilism. The question is not whether we can infer from our knowledge about the world, consciousness and morality further specific theistic conclusions. Rather, modern thought is threatened by nihilism. Nihilism/Küng: (classical representative: Nietzsche): Vs three classical transcendentals: there is 1. no unity 2. no truth 3. no goodness. IV 510 Küng: admits that nihilism is not only possible, but irrefutable. Question: Can it be overcome? Truth/Rationalism/MackieVsKüng: he refers to a wrongly understood concept of critical rationality in Popper (KüngVsPopper). Küng believes that he renounces any critical examination of the foundations of our knowledge. IV 510/511 ad 2: the assumption that there is order in the world, i.e. regularity, which does not necessarily have to be causal determination, makes sense in two ways: 1. as a regulative principle, 2. as a far-reaching hypothesis. (Küng seems to understand above all the latter by it.) ad. 3. no goodness: here (the one quoted by Küng) Mackie has already given sufficient answers before. Values/Küng: after all, we have to assume something like objective value from which standards can be derived. MackieVsKüng: this is clearly wrong: every value is a human and social product. IV 512 Atheism/Küng: also atheists and agnostics can strive for humanity and morality. Belief/God/Küng: but the basic trust in identity, meaningfulness, and value of reality is ultimately only justified if the reality itself, to which the human also belongs, does not remain groundless, unfounded and aimless. MackieVsKüng: no, that is not clearly visible. It is just wrong. The basic trust is reasonable in itself for the reasons mentioned! And exactly the same applies to the development of values. Whereby Küng accepts this indirect proof as the only proof of God at all, i.e. he does not want any demonstrative proof. IV 513 MackieVsKüng: This seems to amount to the assertion that in the execution of belief it proves to be true. Küng constantly fluctuates between a reference to a pleasant and purely subjective security and the reference to the ontological argument explicitly rejected by himself before. Nihilism/Küng: the first appearance of senselessness results from the fact that reality is not God, the second appearance that the human is not God. MackieVsKüng: also in these two respects the God hypothesis is not better than naturalism! IV 514 Explanation/MackieVsKüng: with him everything boils down to God being the one who somehow gives reason, stability and purpose to reality. But this is no explanation at all: one cannot explain a being by what it does. A "somehow acting". Nihilism/MackieVsKüng: ironically, he himself collected the material to show how nihilism can be met on a purely human level (without the God hypothesis). Namely by what Küng calls "basic trust" (>James, see above). Mackie: this trust is already reasonable out of itself. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Lewis, D. | Castaneda Vs Lewis, D. | Frank I 329 Proposition/Belief/Self-attribution/CastanedaVsAttribution theory/CastanedaVsLewis: 1) Lewis defines the belief objects extensionally (from quantities). This violates Castaneda’s second intentionality condition for the objects of intentional attitudes. (see above). Possible Worlds are unsuitable as primary objects of belief because of their infinite extension (infinitely many aspects) and properties cannot be individuated by sets of objects, because the creation of sets presupposes the predication of properties. (>Individuation). 2) Lewis’ thesis that self-attribution can be explained only by a non-propositional knowledge depends on the premise that there could be no indexical proposition or related related to private issues. CastanedaVsLewis: but there is no convincing justification for that. Possible world/CastanedaVsLewis: considers it conceivable that a possible world does not only consist of public physical objects, but also contains subjective referees like I representations and indexical representations. This world could then also include its subjectively colored ways of the circumstance (intension). Then a subject that knows all the propositions would also be able to recognize its own position (propositional knowledge). I 356 Propostional knowledge/Lewis: E.g. "Two omniscient Gods": (slightly abridged original quote): they are omniscient, because they know every proposition. But I can imagine that they suffer from one ignorance: neither of them knows which one he is. There is nothing else to know, they would merely attribute more of the properties they have to themselves. He has this property and his world comrade does not have it, so the self-attribution of this property does not depend on him knowing which one is his world. Thesis: sometimes there are property objects, while propositional objects are not available. Some beliefs and some knowledge cannot be understood as propositional, but can be understood as self-attribution of properties. CastanedaVsLewis: that depends on the relevant meaning that one associates with "property" and "proposition". Therefore, he defines them in his spirit, and creates counter-intuitive premises. I 358 6) CastandedaVsLewis: It also does not readily apply that perceptual knowledge is not propositional. To the extent that demonstrative references take place, it is about the question of whether possible worlds contain volatile and private particulars. 7) the idea that Is, nows and this’s are objects of private knowledge is well founded. CastanedaVsLewis: but they do not have to be inexpressible. It is just the function of quasi indicators to capture the indexical references of other persons by means of interpersonal and non-volatile references. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Nominalism | Castaneda Vs Nominalism | Frank I 337 Belief/NominalismVsPropositions/Castaneda: instead sentence theories that understand belief as a relation between a believer and a particular sentence or a class of sentences. VsNominalism: Problem: There may not be enough sentence or attribute classes to carry nominalistic reductions. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Pascal, B. | James Vs Pascal, B. | Stegmüller IV 493 Belief/James: there is no justification for belief. JamesVsPascal: if we were in God's place, we would probably happily exclude believers from eternal salvation. Bet: it is really about real choices: 1. they are lifelike, 2. momentous, IV 494 3. inevitable. >Pascal's wager. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Russell, B. | James Vs Russell, B. | I 105 Belief/Russell: differentiates whether we believe in something that exists or in something that does not exist. PragmatismVsRussell/JamesVsRussell: but particularly the effect of a content of imagination has a specific effect. |
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| Tradition | Castaneda Vs Tradition | Frank I 342 Proposition/Tradition/Castaneda: its strength: that all of these entities which this theory equates must somehow converge. If language is to be an efficient means of thinking, then meaning and thought content must coincide. I 343 Belief/Intention/Tradition: their contents should coincide. Frege: what can be believed can also be demanded, commanded, required, requested, etc. CastanedaVs: that seems to be synchronically successful, but it lacks dynamism. The discrepancies between the different entities involved in proposition ((i) - (vii) emerge when we consider the diachronic river, where one undergoes changing experiences about a constantly changing world. In particular, we must have direct contact with the world in order to locate ourselves in it. This is precisely the role of the indexical reference. Propositions/CastanedaVsTradition: classical propositionality theory fails with indexical reference when it encounters experiences with "here", "now", "I", "he", etc. I 345 Thinking/Language/Proposition/CastanedaVsTradition: we seem to have assumed that thinking is embodied by symbolic activity. While thinking one somehow produces an illustrative token; since it happens both when thinking aloud and in silence, there has to be some brain pattern. I 346 The distinction between episodes of production of sentences and episodes of thinking is already made in the theory itself: therefore it postulates the convergence of sentence meaning and thought content. The propositionality theory does not have to identify a thinking episode ,that p, with an event in the brain or in the entire body. It is not about the body-soul problem. Vs: the required application of this distinction breaks the elegant arrangement of the coincident units: the distinction between a symbolic system and its application! This is Saussure’s distinction between langue/parole. This accomodates the dynamics of language and is itself not dangerous for the propositionality theory. But: Problem: the distinction between knowing the meaning and correct use exists! This is not a problem in most cases, but: I 347 E.g. "I have 30 grams of nitrogen compounds in my liver": we may understand the sentence, but we do not know whether someone expresses a truth or falsity with it. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Various Authors | James Vs Various Authors | I 17 JamesVsHegel. I 29 JamesVsPhysiological Psychology (Lotze/JamesVsLotze). I 52 Monism / James: (terminology): label for neo-Hegelian: existence of an omniscient mind is a prerequisite for knowledge and experience (JamesVsMonism/JamesVsNeo-Hegelianism). Stegmüller IV 494 W. K. Clifford: Thesis: it's wrong to believe anything at all! JamesVsClifford: our mind-like nature is not only allowed to, it must make a choice between alternatives. Our extra-reasonable nature influences our beliefs. What hypotheses do for us are almost always acts of will. (Mackie pro). Most of what one believes, is believed because of authority! (Mackie pro). IV 495 It makes a difference whether you want to recognize truth or avoid error. Moral/James: is objective (MackieVs), but we cannot wait for empirical evidence. IV 495/496 Moral/James: asserts two things. 1) the best things are the more permanent ones that reach into the afterlife. 2) we are already feeling better now if we believe the first statement. Religion/James: the more perfect and more permanent part of the universe is understood personally. The only practical way to assume the religious hypothesis is to meet it halfway. >Morals; social interaction, trust. Facts/Belief/James: even with fact questions the mind may well be the deciding factor. MackieVs: that is too close to Pascal. IV 497 James: where speculative reason does not provide results, self-interest should make the difference. MackieVs: we should not welcome this, it should make us even more critical! MackieVsClifford: we must not only be willing to come up with hypotheses and test them, we also have to be able to carefully agree with them. IV 498 James: the only way to test a hypothesis is to enter into a relation with the (corresponding) person. Theism/James: "meet halfway", get involved in it! We will be better off in the end when we have at least tried to commit ourselves to it. IV 499 James/Mackie/Stegmüller: of all criticized authors, James has the best stand with him. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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