Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Lewis, D. | Perry Vs Lewis, D. | Schwarz I 170 Mental Content/Content/View/PerryVsLewis/Schwarz: some authors want to keep perspective out of the content (Perry 1977)(1): Thesis: locate perspective differences in the way of givenness: E.g. Fred in Kuala Lumpur, I in Berlin: our content is the same: that it rains on 12 August 2005 in Berlin, but the content is given differently which explains the different behavioral consequences. Def Givenness/Perry/Black: is the function that assigns to every situation the class of worlds in which it is rains at the place and time of the situation. LewisVsPerry: it makes no difference (1989b(2), 74, Fn 9). Content is simply the class of situations to which a true proposition is assigned. Perspective/Lewis: on the other hand, it is not possible to reconstruct the perspective proposition from Lewis' content. Perry: thus has an additional content component. Lewis: which is not needed with him. Perspective/Uncentered World/Perry/Schwarz: Perry has other tasks in mind: the uncentered content component should help with the semantics of beliefs and explain why Fred and I intuitively believe the same thing. LewisVsPerry: doubts that this is possible: semantics: when it comes to our intuitions about "meaning the same thing", they are more vague and complicated. E.g. there is a good sense in which Fred and I mean the same thing, if he believes that it rains where he is! E.g. "I wish it would rain" - "I wish the same thing." For this classes of possible situations are sufficient. 1. John Perry [1977]: “Frege on Demonstratives”. Philosophical Review, 86: 474–497 2. David Lewis [1989b]: “Dispositional Theories of Value”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 63: 113-137. Stalnaker I 255 Def Belief/Conviction/Self//Stalnaker: having a conviction with a given property means to attribute this property to yourself. Belief/Lewis: (not based on the self): believe that φ (φ being a proposition) = attributing the property of living in a possible world φ to yourself. Self/Semantic Diagnostic/PerryVsLewis/Stalnaker: provides no content of a self-attribution, but distinguishes belief content from Belief state. Relativized Proposition/Perry: classify believers: we have the same Belief state in common if we both have the belief, e.g. "I am a philosopher." That corresponds set-centered possible worlds. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Perry, J. | Stalnaker Vs Perry, J. | II 21 Ascription/attribution/belief attribution//propositional knowledge/index words/Heimson/Stalnaker: generally two questions have to be distinguished: 1. What is the content of belief? 2. What is the nature of the relationship between the believer and the content? The crucial indexical element lies in the answer to the second question. Solution/calibration/Stalnaker: the possible situations must be "calibrated": that means time and place have to be specified. ((s) Thus, the sets of possible worlds (poss.w.) are restricted). Solution/Perry/Stalnaker: Perry distinguishes Belief state and belief content. Content/StalnakerVsPerry: but this one has a different concept of content. His term does not reflect adequately the informational content of convictions. II 147 StalnakerVsPerry/Perry/Stalnaker: Belief state/Perry/Stalnaker: this one distinguishes it from belief content (content) Informational content/content/StalnakerVsPerry: with this distinction the informational content is not displayed correctly. Index words/Perry/Stalnaker: are part of the information, not part of the means of representation. II 148 Belief object/information/StalnakerVsPerry: problem: if the index words are part of the information its belief objects cannot be the informational content (or information). E.g. Ortcutt/Lingens: although according to Perry the content of the proposition "You are Rudolf Lingens" and the expressed belief and the one of the proposition "I am Rudolf Lingens" are the same this common content can, however, not be identified with the information! Common content/content/Perry/Stalnaker: according to Perry the common content is namely "Lingens is Lingens". Problem: Lingens believed that already earlier ((s) even without knowing that he himself is Lingens). Solution/Perry/Stalnaker: he believes it now in a new way. That means he is in a new Belief state. ((s) Perry like Frege: way of givenness). Belief state/informational content/StalnakerVsPerry: Belief states are too subjective to represent informational content because the relevant counterpart of Ortcutt is different to Lingens' Belief state in which he is put by Ortcutt's information. Content/Perry: = belief object. Belief object/content/StalnakerVsPerry: Perry's belief objects are too extensional to capture the information which is delivered during communication. We need an intermediate concept: II 149 Solution/Stalnaker: proposition as intermediate concept between belief state and belief object: Proposition/Stalnaker: divides the set of possible worlds (poss.w.) (here: possible situations) into two subsets, the ones in which the proposition is true and the ones in which it is false. Belief object/Stalnaker: propositions as b.o. can reconcile the traditional doctrines (see above) with the examples for essential indexical belief. This is a more natural access than that of Perry and Lewis. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Possible Worlds | Stalnaker Vs Possible Worlds | I 49 Possible world/poss.w./knowledge/mathematics/StalnakerVsLewis/Stalnaker: I am inclined to say that the poss.w.-theory makes assumptions about the nature of their properties that are - unlike the corresponding assumptions of mathematical platonism - incompatible with the representation of the connection between the knowledge subjects and their objects in the case of poss.w.. poss.w./MR/VsModal realism/knowledge/verificationism/StalnakerVsLewis: the modal realist cannot cite any verificationist principles for what he calls his knowledge. Conclusion: problem: the MR cannot on the one hand say that poss.w. things are of the same kind as the actual world (contingent physical objects) and say on the other hand that poss.w. are things of which we know by the same kind like of numbers, sets, functions. ((s) Namely no real existing things.). I 53 StalnakerVsLewis: he contradicts himself because his other thesis about poss.w. about which we can have substantial beliefs contradicts his definition of content (see above). I 58 Contradiction/Lewis: there is no object howsoever fantastic about which one could tell the truth by contradicting oneself. Footnote: Takashi YagisawaVsLewis: why not? What should you expect otherwise? Impossible things are impossible. II 20 Belief ascription/solution/Stalnaker: I always wonder how the poss.w. would be according to what the believer believes. E.g. Pierre: for him there are two cities (Londres and London) E.g. Lingens in the library: for him there are two men, one named "Lingens" about which the other reads something. Relations theory/RelTh/Stalnaker: this can reconcile with the assumption that propositions are the belief objects. (Team: Stalnaker pro Relations theory? (1999)) Index/belief/Stalnaker: nevertheless I believe that convictions have an irreducible indexical element. Solution/Lewis: sets of centered poss.w. as belief objects. StalnakerVsLewis: although I have accepted that such poss.w. then include a representation of the mental state of the believer. But that is not what it is about! It is not sufficient that poss.w. that are compatible with one's convictions then include a person who has these convictions (> e.g. Lingens), the believer must identify himself with the person who has this thought! Proposition/identification/self-identification/Stalnaker: I am not suggesting that this identification is fulfilled by the belief in a proposition. I now think that this is not at all about some kind of cognitive performance. Indexical conviction/Stalnaker: (E.g. Perry: memory loss, library, e.g. Lewis: 2 gods (2 omniscient gods, e.g. Castaneda: memory loss): indexical unknowing. Stalnaker: thesis: people do not differ in what they believe. II 21 E.g. O'Leary knows that he is in the basement and that Daniels is in the kitchen. And Daniels knows the same thing: that he is in the kitchen and O'Leary in the basement. Everyone knows who and where he is and who and where the other is. The poss.w. that are compatible with the convictions of the two are the same. They argue about nothing. Yet there is an obvious difference in their doxastic situation: O'Leary identifies himself with the one in the basement and Daniels identifies himself as one who is in the kitchen. poss.w. semantics/StalnakerVsPossible worlds semantics/Stalnaker: this difference in the Belief states of the two is not reflected by a set of poss.w. as Belief state. Solution/Lewis: self-ascription of properties, or - equivalently - sets of centered poss.w.. StalnakerVsLewis: I do not want that. StalnakerVsLewis: problem: it is wrong to treat the difference in perspective as a dispute (disagreement). The two argue about nothing. Problem: it is not sure if one can express their agreement with the fact that the set of their uncentered poss.w. is the same. Because E.g. Heimson/Perry/Stalnaker: (Heimson believes "I am David Hume") all his impersonal beliefs about Hume are correct. Suppose they are the same convictions as the convictions of Hume about Hume. Stalnaker: nevertheless it would be wrong to say that they argue about nothing. ((s) unlike O'Leary and Daniels). II 134 Localization/space/time/self-localization/logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: set of poss.w. from which one selects one. Self-localization/physical: in space and time. We usually know where we are. ((s) but we never know all poss.w. in which we could be localized, we cannot distinguish all poss.w. because we do not know everything). Gods example/Stalnaker: the two know exactly where they are in the logical space. II 135 But they do not know where within this poss.w. they are. LewisVsTradition: the doctrine of the proposition is focused only on one of the two types of localized belief. Generalization: is what we need and for that the transition from propositions to properties (as belief objects) serves. II 144 Gods example/Stalnaker: this is also a case of unknowing, which of two indistinguishable poss.w. is actual. One is actually the actual world while the other exactly the sam, with the exception that the god who sits in the actual world on the highest mountain is this time sitting on the coldest mountain and in fact with all the properties that the god on the highest mountain actually has. ((s) two individuals change places but keep all the properties. This is only possible if localization is not a property) Omniscience/Stalnaker: then you have to say, the two gods are not really omniscient regarding propositions, but rather omniscient in relation to purely qualitative criteria. LewisVsStalnaker: Lewis rejects this explanation for two reasons: 1. because he represents the counterpart theory (c.th.) that makes the cross world identity superfluous or meaningless. 2. even without counterpart it would not work because Assuming that the two gods of world W have traded places in world V assuming the god on the highest knows that his world is W, not V. Assuming he is omniscient with respect to all propositions not only the qualitative propositions. II 145 V: the world V cannot be relevant because he knows that he does not live there. Problem: there are still two mountains in a poss.w. W where he after all what he knows can live. StalnakerVsLewis: that does not answer the question: you cannot simply stipulate that the God in W knows something and not V. Because after the explanation we proposed that leads to the fact that he knows on which mountain he lives. Lewis/Stalnaker: his explanation is plausible if one conceives it as a metaphor for a location in the logical space: logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: assume that a map of the logical space divided into large regions match the poss.w. and in smaller subdivisions represent the locations within poss.w.. Important argument: then we can tell someone in which large region he is without telling him exactly where he is located in it. Modal Realism/MR/logical space/Stalnaker: for him this image might be appropriate. Actualism/logical space/localization/Stalnaker: for the actualism this image is misleading: to know in which country you are is different to know where in the country you are but it is not so clear that there is a difference between the fact that one knows anything about in which poss.w. one is and knowing which poss.w. is the actual. Lewis also admits this. Stalnaker: my approach seems to be really close to the one of Lewis, but no. Centered poss.w.: one should perhaps instead of indistinguishable poss.w. speak of centered worlds (after Quine). These are then distinguishable. Indistinguishability/poss.w./Stalnaker: distinct but indistinguishable poss.w. would then be the same worlds but with different centers. Attitude/properties/propositions/centered world/Lewis: to treat objects of attitudes as sets of centered poss.w. makes them to properties instead of propositions. Centered poss.w./Stalnaker: I agree that possible situations normally, perhaps even essential, are centered in the sense of a representation of a particular mental state. II 146 StalnakerVsLewis: but this makes the approach (gods example) more complicated when it comes to the relations between different mental states. E.g. to compare past with current states is then more difficult, or relations between the convictions of different people. Information/communication/Stalnaker: we need then additional explanation about how information is exchanged. Two examples: E.g. O'Leary is freed from his trunk and wonders at around nine: a) "What time was it when I wondered what time it was?" Stalnaker: that is the same question like the one he asked then. When he learns that it was three o'clock, his doubt has been eliminated. Solution: the doubt is eliminated since all possible situations (poss.w.) in which a thought occurs at two different times are involved. The centers of these situations have moved in the sense that it is now nine o'clock and O'Leary no longer in the trunk but it may be that the first occurrence of the then thought is what O'Leary is now thinking about. Important argument: this moving of the center does not require that the poss.w. that the propositions characterize are changed. b) "What time was it when I wondered if it was three or four?". (If he wondered twice) Indistinguishability: even if the two incidents were indistinguishable for O'Leary, it may still be that it was the first time which O'Leary remembers at around nine o'clock. StalnakerVsLewis: his approach is more complicated. According to his approach we have to say at three o'clock, O'Leary wonders about his current temporal localization in the actual world (act.wrld.) instead of wondering in what poss.w. he is. Versus: at nine, things are quite different: now he wonders if he lives in a poss.w. in which a particular thought occurred at three or four. This is unnecessarily complicated. E.g. Lingens, still in the library, meets Ortcutt and asks him "Do you know who I am?" – "You are my cousin, Rudolf Lingens!". Stalnaker: that seems to be a simple and successful communication. Information was requested and given. The question was answered. II 147 Proposition/Stalnaker: (Propositions as belief objects) Ortcutt's answer expresses a proposition that distinguishes between possible situations and eliminates Lingen's doubt. StalnakerVsLewis: according to his approach (self-ascription of properties), it is again more complicated: Lingens: asks if he correctly ascribes himself a certain set of properties i. Ortcutt: answers by ascribing himself a completely different set of properties. Lingens: has to conclude then subsequently himself the answer. So all the answers are always indirect in communication. ((s) also StalnakerVsChisholm, implicit). Communication/Lewis/Chisholm/StalnakerVsLewis/StalnakerVsChsholm: everyone then always speaks only about himself. Solution/Stalnaker: Lewis would otherwise have to distinguish between attitudes and speech acts and say that speech acts have propositions as object and attitudes properties as an object. Problem/StalnakerVsLewis: Lewis cannot say by intuition that the content of Ortcutt's answer is the information that eliminates Lingen's doubt. That is also a problem for Perry's approach. (> StalnakerVsPerry) |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wanderers (Expl) | Perry, J. | Fra I 421 Belief state / opinion state / 2 wanderers / Perry: there is no identity, not even an isomorphic correspondence, but only a systematic relation between the belief states in which you are, and what one believes, based on the way! |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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