Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anthropic Principle | McGinn Vs Anthropic Principle | II 64 Consciousness/McGinn: Ex assume there is a characteristic "C", which explains how consciousness arises from neuronal tissue. We do not know what is "C", but we know that there must be this property. ((S) alternative to emergence). Introspection/McGinn: how should we identify this property? Introspection is not able to since it ends at the surface of consciousness. Introspection says what is happening at present in the consciousness, but not how it is that it exists. "C" is too close to the Brain. II 65 Introspection does not realize how consciousness is embodied in matter, does not see it as an aspect of the physical brain. Brain/Consciousness/McGinn: should we look for the linking characteristic "C" in the Brain instead of the consciousness? It is as little visible in the Brain as in consciousness. This is not so surprising, because there is no reason to believe that any theoretically interesting property of the world a priori must be perceptible (McGinnVsAnthrophisches principle.). But we need not postulate anything except a few physical conditions and their properties. Ex the electrochemical properties helped us a lot to find out more about the Brain. But it is precisely those characteristics that have proven so inadequate for the explanation of consciousness. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Berkeley, G. | McGinn Vs Berkeley, G. | I 181 Berkeley/McGinn: also depicts God as a gear in epistemological transmission. --- II 121 Mind/Matter/McGinn: "Universalmentalism:" one could set up an even crazier theory, namely that everything is thoroughly mental and only mental. (After all there are motivated extravagances). All properties are of a mental nature. Ex to have the property of being a square or an electron is a purely mental thing. These properties do not exist in our mind (as idealism meant). Rather, they exist long before our mind and independently of it. II 122 Ex for an electron a spin is a mental property. The aim of this theory would be to finally free the universe from dualism. VsUniversalmentalismus/McGinn: now you have to explain how the intellectual property to be a neuron can explain the intellectual property to feel pain or the mental characteristic to see yellow. If we assume that all Brain characteristics are in fact of mental nature (whatever that may mean) that put us in no more a favorable position to explain anything about our familiar perceptions and sensations. II 123 The explanatory gap is as wide as ever, except that now we call both sides "mental." |
C. McGinn I McGinn Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens, Stuttgart, 1996 II McGinn Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie?, München 2001 |
| Chomsky, N. | Dennett Vs Chomsky, N. | I 513 Chomsky: early thesis the brain works in a way that ultimately defies scientific analysis. Even >Fodor. Also >McGinn. DennetVsChomsky / DennettVsFodor: this is a kind saltationist view about the mind: they postulated cracks in the design space, and is therefore not Darwinian. Dennett: Chomsky actually represents quite a Darwinian view of the theory of language, but he has always shunned these views, like Gould. I 531 "Cognitive lock"/Independence/Chomsky/McGinn: Spiders can't think about fishing. That's how it is for us: the question of free will may not be solvable for us. McGinn/Fodor: human consciousness is such a mystery. I 533 Cognitive lock/DennettVsMcGinn: the situation for the monkey is different: he can not even understand the question. He is not even shocked! Neither Chomsky nor Fodor can cite cases from animals to which certain matters are a mystery. In reality, not as they represented a biological, but a pseudo-biological problem. It ignores even a biological accident: we can certainly find an intelligence scale in the living world. I 534 Consciousness/DennettVsMcGinn: apart from problems that are not solvable in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness is still developing as we can not even imagine today. Why Chomsky and Fodor do not like this conclusion? They hold the means for unsatisfactory. If our mind is not based on skyhook but on cranes, they would like to keep it secret. I 556 DennettVsChomsky: he is wrong if he thinks a description at the level of machines is conclusive, because that opens the door for >"Strong Artificial Intelligence". |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Davidson, D. | McGinn Vs Davidson, D. | I 134 McGinn used (insurmountable) "conceptual scheme:" to reveal his conception of the natural boundaries of knowledge. McGinnVsDavidson. I 136 McGinnVsDavidson: its determinism provides no sense to the idea of the freedom of action, because it looks like as if it were of the same type as any other causality. I 192 Consciousness/insight/McGinnVsDavidson: at this point often times an appeal is made to causal theories, but that is not satisfactory: it gives no explanation of the perceptivity of the attentive consciousness. And that is precisely the reason why one assumes frequently the causal approach leads to skepticism. Rorty VI 166 McGinnVsDavidson/Rorty: we have to revive the distinction "experience"/"belief" (DennettVs). McGinn: the (phenomenological) content of experience is determined by the intrinsic state of the Brain. |
McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Dennett, D. | McGinn Vs Dennett, D. | I 69 Consciousness / McGinn: Even a syntactic CaIM explanation, which assumes that there is in fact symbols in the brain that makes it impossible to explain consciousness as mere aggregation of such symbols. (McGinnVsDennett, McGinnVsPinker). (CaIM = combinatoric atomism with lawlike mappings). Basic structure of the states of consciousness: if there ever is such a thing, it is at the level of consciousness! It is not a method for extracting of consciousness from Brain states or Brain characteristics. II 191 Def death / McGinn: the annihilation of the ego, dying is the process of extinction. II 192 We have only the very idea of it, to exist in an instant and to cease to exist in the next moment. The process remains vague and opaque. It is in many ways the same as the beginning of existence. We can not simply imagine the beginning of the ego as we imagine how matter takes a form. (DennettVs). |
McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Dualism | McGinn Vs Dualism | McGinnVsDualism: the problem is that he goes too far in the interpretation of data. It responds to the appearances, by declaring that the mind is virtually independent of the Brain. 1 The zombie problem 2 The Haunted problem II 38 McGinnVsDualism: seperates the mind to radically from the Brain. So as if the mind could go about its business without assistance of the Brain machine . He s right that the Brain, just as we presently understand it, can not explain the mind - he is wrong when he concludes that no Brain property can do this. II 42 Mind / Brain / McGinn: the spirit is manifest in a causal relation to the Brain, as difficult as this may be to believe. Why should that be so, if the existence of consciousness depends on God (VsDescartes). Theism / McGinn: the theistic dualism exaggerates the gap between mind and Brain. II 106 Def Hyper Dualism / McGinn: assumed in the Big Bang there were two universes, a material and a parallel, which consisted only of consciousness. II 108 - II 110 McGinnVs Hyper dualism: Where is the fatal error? In the concept of causality. The mental universe is said to contain no matter and yet events and circumstances in this universe make things happen in the other universe. Thus, it is assumed that disembodied consciousness be able to influence the course of events. This raises two major questions: 1st How can a disembodied consciousness be the cause of something? 2nd How can the physical sequence of events be disturbed by anything in the material universe, which is going on in the other universe? |
McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Introspection | McGinn Vs Introspection | II 160 Introspection can not even say that I have a brain! >Mind Body Problem II 162 McGinnVsIncorrigibility/introspection: appearance and reality do not coincide in the consciousness! Thesis Aware that there is a level of reality that is not available to us, which is well beyond appearances. Consciousness has a hidden structure.This does not mean that it are both a conscious and an unconscious mind. >Incorrigibility. Consciousness/McGinn: if we were completely transparent that would constitute something unique in nature! Everything else in nature allows a distinction between its outer appearance and its reality. Nature has its unobserved side. >Consciousness/McGinn. II 164 There are two separate areas, which shut out introspection: the consciousness associated with the unconscious and the flipside of consciousness itself. >Nature/McGinn. The very conscious desire has its own hidden dimension that is not revealed to us. The introspection suffers then from a double blindness in respect to the whole truth about the mind. >Blind Spot. |
McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Materialism | McGinn Vs Materialism | II 33 McGinnVsMaterialism: intuitive answer: if materialism is right, I am despite all not a conscious being. Old joke: Materialism must simulate anesthesia! ((S) Because the physical processes remain the same.) - According to materialism we would all be zombies who imagine to have a consciousness. II 34 That leads to an argument VsMaterialism: Ex assuming I know all about your brain what there is to know in neurological terms. Then, do I know all about your mind? (Could I predict your future?) McGinn: No. How then both can be declared identical? MaterialismVsMcGinn: Facts are one matter and knowledge of facts is another matter. McGinnVsMaterialism: the problem with this objection is that there is no way to discriminate between mental and physical concepts without demanding a distinction at the level of facts. What differentiates the idea of pain from the idea firing C-fibers is precisely the fact that the focus of both concepts are quite different properties, and thus we can not say, both properties are identical. The materialist is forced to introduce the idea that one and the same fact can have two different manifestations. This concept of manifestations in turn is beased on the fact that in relation to manifestations there are facts that they can not be explained by facts about the Brain. II 42 McGinnVsMaterialism: he tries to construct the mind from properties that are not suitable for it. He assumes that enough drops of neuronal water will light the fire of the mind. He's right that some property of the Brain is responsible for consciousness, but he is mistaken about the nature of this property. |
McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Materialism | Papineau Vs Materialism | David Papineau Literature II 309 Def Antipathetic Fallacy/Papineau: from the fact that we do not have the experiences we erroneously conclude that we could not refer to them either. Confusion of mention and use: we slide from a) to b) a) Third person thoughts do not use conscious experiences b) Third person thoughts do not mention conscious experiences. However, there is no reason why a third person could not relate (mention) thoughts to the experiences of others, but without using them. (Mention = Reference) II 310 Antipathetic False Conclusion/Papineau: What should he explain? He should explain why so many people have such strong intuitions according to which conscious states are not physical. (VsMaterialism, VsPhysicalism, Papineau pro.). II 312 PapineauVsAntipathetic Fallacy/Papineau: error that the experience is something additional to the brain state. (Category error, e.g. as if the university was something additional to the sum of its parts). Papineau: there is nothing to explain. I am not denying consciousness, but that there are additional inner lights. (McGinn uses this metaphor.) |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
| Pinker, St. | McGinn Vs Pinker, St. | I 69 Consciousness / McGinn: Even a syntactic CaIM declaration, which assumes that there are in fact symbols in the brain does not make it possible to explain the consciousness as a mere juxtaposition of such symbols. (McGinnVsDennett, McGinnVsPinker). Basic structure of states of consciousness: if there is ever such a thing, it is at the level of consciousness! It is not a method for lifting the consciousness of Brain states or Brain properties. |
McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Popper, K. | McGinn Vs Popper, K. | I 137 Popper/Eccles: hold that freedom must be rooted in quantum mechanical indeterminacy. Ex Eccles/Popper: random events on the subatomic level in the brain are responsible. McGinnVs b): (Eccles/Popper): desperate response to problems of the first type: randomness on the deepest level is required. Then the actor is a quasi passive victim of quantum leaps. Both types of explanation are not satisfactory, the assumed similarities are distortions. |
McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Psychologism | McGinn Vs Psychologism | II 113/114 Def panpsychism/McGinn: moves the mind back in the material world (VsHyperdualism). ("Elvis Is Everywhere"). He states that consciousness is everywhere and wafts through space. II 115 a) Hard version of panpsychism: the neurons in the brain literally feel the pain, see yellow, think about dinner - and electrons and stars do the same. McGinnVsPanpsychism: 1. this is obviously not the case. Regular matter doesn't show any sign of thirst or pain. II 116 2. The problem with panpsychism is that it makes our mind look like an epiphenomenon! Since our mind is allegedly composed of all the states of mind that were intrinsic to matter before being formed into our brains. II 117 3. If all matter had mature thoughts and feelings, why do organisms then need nervous systems and brains to be able to think and feel? b) Soft panpsychism: obvious that atoms do not have mental states, but could they not contain the mind in a diluted form or on a lower level? McGinnVsPanpsychism (soft form): Problem: It is difficult to define what that means. If dilute states should be approximately like the consciousness before falling asleep, that leads back to the hard version. Stones would therefore have something like "proto mental" states, defined as any property of matter that allows for consciousness. II 118 McGinnVs: this theory is empty. It is true of course that matter has this or that property. And of course, matter must have the ability to give rise to consciousness, because it does so constantly. b) Brain plays an active role: the Brain makes use of the properties of matter and transforms it by virtue of its particular structure in consciousness. McGinn pro! McGinn pro panpsychism: all matter must have the potential to co-create consciousness because in the matter of which the Brain tissue is constructed there is nothing really special (!). Ultimately, all traces of matter can be traced back to the Big Bang. |
McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Searle, J.R. | McGinn Vs Searle, J.R. | I 68 Consciousness/McGinnVsSearle: conscious states do not allow for a emergentist explanation using mereological terms. We are unable to attribute the pain to its underlying neural entities. But in contrast, it is quite possible to explain the higher level properties of liquids in this way. ((S) Because all levels are readily available to us. States of consciousness are therefore not to explored according to CALM (combinatoric atomism with lawlike mappings). We can well understand higher-level Brain functions from its constituents, but if we start from the consciousness this explanation fails. Therefore, we do not have a model for a possible relation of emergence. We see no obvious causal relation. |
McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Various Authors | Vollmer Vs Various Authors | II 169 Method/Physics/Vollmer: the method of experimental physics does not exist at all. What would be the "unity of science" then? II 170 Bondi: Method is the most important thing in science. VollmerVsBondi: Results are more important than the method, unity of science means more than unity of method. II 97 DitfuthVsIdentity Theory/Vollmer: (VsEvolutionist Identity Theory): Life is certainly understandable as a system property. However, a material system is either animated or not animated. There is nothing in between. Vitality is an all or nothing property. On the other hand, there are different, even unlimited degrees of "soulfullness/animation": the psychic is not erratic, but has developed very gradually! Therefore it is inadmissible to simply add the "mental" (soul) to matter as a further, analogous stage. Ditfurth Thesis: Evolution could lead to the emergence of our brain and thus of consciousness only because the mental was present and effective in this development from the very beginning! ((s) >Evolution/McGinn). II 98 VollmerVsDitfurth: this one constructs a contrast that does not exist in this sharpness. 1. Life has also developed in many small steps. However, the intermediate stages have long been eliminated. 2. One can also say from consciousness that something is either "animated" or not "animated". Consciousness/Mind/Soul/Vollmer: one has to differentiate stronger between the individual functions in the future: memory, abstraction, language ability, self-confidence. I 40 VollmerVsCopernicus/VollmerVsKant: only the evolutionary epistemology takes the human out of his central position as "legislator of nature" and makes it an observer of cosmic events, which includes it. I 293 VollmerVsVsVs: no critic defines "knowledge", only Löw: this includes subjectivity (which he does not define either). Information/Löw: Information always exists only for one subject". Vollmer pro, but perhaps too dogmatic. Similarity/Löw: Similarity exists only for one subject. VollmerVsLöw: this is surely wrong. VollmerVsProjection Theory II 90 VsIdentity Theory/Vollmer: psychological and physical processes seem completely incomparable. Neuronal processes are localized, consciousness is not. Vollmer:(pro identity theory): Some identity theorists do not take this seriously at all, but the argument is not a threat at all: we can interpret difference projectively: as subjective and objective aspects of one and the same thing. Fig. cylinder appears from different sides as a circle or cuboid. (s)Vs: Example not mandatory. VollmerVsVs: Identity: not all properties must match: the optical and haptic impression of an apple are also not identical. ((s) These are extrinsic properties). II 92 Projection/Vollmer: this is how the projective model explains the apparent incompatibility of different properties such as mind and physis as different aspects of the same thing. II 93 VsProjection/Vollmer: could be interpreted as a relapse into the postulation of an unknown substance. VollmerVsVs: Solution: System concept of System Theory: System Theory/Vollmer: For example diamond/graphite: consist of the same carbon atoms, but have a different structure. Example diamond/silicon: same structure, different building blocks: (here silicon). II 94 None of the components is logically or ontologically superior to the other! Knowledge of one does not replace knowledge of the other. Both are constitutive. This shows how little is gained with the knowledge of the building blocks. I 282 VsEvolution Theory: can success guarantee truth? Truth/Simmel: actually goes the way of equating success with probation and probation with truth. Cf. Pragmatism. Evolutionary EpistemologyVsSimmel: it does not adopt this pragmatic approach. It makes a strict distinction between truth definition and truth criterion. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
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| Brain inexplicable | Versus | Dennett I 513 Brain ultimately inexplicable: Chomsky, McGinn, Fodor - Vs: Dennett: saltationist view. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Freedom | McGinn, C. | I 133 McGinn Thesis: Freedom as a modal force must be related to the characteristics of our brain. I 144 Modality/McGinn: modal truths are known to be a tricky and ambiguous matter. Thesis: Freedom is always freedom from something. ("subsequent relationship"). The action is not in a subsequent relationship to the set of facts in question, as long as it could have turned out differently. I 145 McGinn Thesis: The common concept of freedom requires a psychological but not a physical non-subsequent relationship. I 146 Freedom of Will/Freedom/Transcendental Naturalism/McGinn: Transcendental Naturalism/These: We basically do not know what freedom is. |
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| Brain | McGinn, C. | I 223 ff Brain/McGinn: Most messages in the brain remain without conscious counterpart - (s) > Mentalese) McGinn: Thesis: There must be a mute theory of the brain. - Interpretation: We can only interpret something that is represented - the brain must be an (unconscious) brain researcher - this also applies to the other senses. I 224 This is a correct theory (symbolic representation) of the relevant technology, not just a construction device. The theory must contain a "concept" of the nature of its object. - The brain must be able to produce all the mental phenomena it serves and react to damage. II 139 Mind/Brain/McGinn: the key is that the brain itself is not the simple spatial fact we think it is! This has to be explained. ("Before the Big Bang"). II 149 Thesis: Brains are not only inhabitants of ordinary physical space. They also exist in a spatial sphere that is literally invisible to the eye. They possess spatial attributes that are unique to them. But that does not mean that they exist in their own space, cut off from the other space. |
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