Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 29 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| A priori | McGinn | I 151 a Priori/McGinn: We have a number of cognitive abilities, which are based on innate foundations. - How is that possible? It's a miracle that we know so much, much more surprising than e.g. our abilities to walk and lift. Of course, there are also scientifically unresolved issues here, but that does not threaten their ontological status. I 165 A Priori/Transcendental Naturalism/TN/McGinn:We resemble three-dimensional beings that are equipped only with two-dimensional concepts. In the case of empirical knowledge, we understand, after all, with what kind of things we are dealing. I 166 a Priori/CAlM/Combinatorial Atomism with Lawlike Mappings/McGinn: Combinatorial Atomism with lawlike mapping deserts us with a priori: we cannot even formulate the kind of relationship that could be regulated by this scheme. We cannot even settle the corresponding facts in the realm of reality. a Priori/Transcendental Naturalism: Transcendental Naturalism asserts that the relationship between consciousness and the Brain did exist, but did not correspond to our thinking in form. McGinn: unlike the topics discussed so far, the chances of the Transcendental Naturalism to apply to a priori seem rather low. For it is not able to transform something profoundly incoherent in one good piece of our world inventory. I 170 A Priori/Transcendental Naturalism: due to the conceptual limits embedded in us, we will not succeed in establishing a unified theory about the a priori. It does not follow that we must correct any standard ideas. Reason cannot establish a complete theory of itself. >Circular reasoning, >Reason, >Totality, >Self-reference. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Ability | McGinn | I 228 Philosophy/ability/Gene/McGinn: It could be that the genes have already unconsciously solved some real philosophical problems. - E.g. explanation of reason. >Reason. Genes save information, but are almost non-trainable. - >Information. This explains specific knowledge skills. - They almost never change. - They embody the blueprint for the body and the Brain. >Knowledge. I 230 Their construction assets is a proof of their representation capacity. >Representation. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Brain/Brain State | McGinn | I 146f Even if we have an idea of the neural equivalents of decisions, it does not provide us with a theory of the nature of the decision. The generation of decisions is something completely different from the generation of motion. Because decisions are neither put together by antecedent desires or other settings, nor by Brain states. --- I 222 Brain/McGinn: It is now commonplace to interpret the brain as an information system (>Information Processing/Dennett) in whose interior most messages remain without a conscious counterpart. Many only concern the inner realities of the brain itself. --- I 223 Thesis: There has to be a silent internal theory of the brain, by the way also for the other organs. A theory which relates to the operation of the whole apparatus. Neural signals can only be interpreted when they are embedded in a representation of the Brain and body functions. The Brain must be a Brain researcher, but unconsciously. It must contain a theory of itself. There must be some real property that distinguishes Brains from other objects. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Brain/Brain State | Churchland | II 484 Brain/Consciousness/Churchland: the brain will not produce consciousness until it has produced a representation of itself. ((s)> McGinn: Thesis: the brain produces a theory of the brain.) Churchland: ... representation of himself ... KantVsHume would have expressed it in this way. It needs a representation that produces something similar to a "point of view". |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Colour | Jackson | McGinn II 34 Colors/Frank Jackson/E.g. Mary: the famous color researcher Mary was born and raised in a black and white room. She is a gifted physicist and learns everything physical, what there is to know about the human brain. (with a black/white monitor). One day she is released into the colored outside world. (She is not color blind). N.B.: she says: "I have learned" how it is "to perceive the color red." (How it feels). McGinn/Jackson: if true, then she did not know all about the mind, when she was in her room, although she knew everything about the Brain. Jackson: Mary-example: (color researcher in the room): "know-how-it-is" - without this, there is no complete knowledge. - Mary, as a Brain researcher, does not yet know all about the mind. >Knowing how, >Qualia, >Experience. --- Schwarz I 160 Color researcher Mary/Jackson: (1998c)(1): Jackson is of the opinion that the consequences of the Mary example are so implausible that a mistake must be stuck somewhere. 1. Frank Jackson [1998c]: “Postscript on Qualia”. In [Jackson 1998b], 76–80 |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Communication | McGinn | II 55 Cognitive Psychology/McGinn: today the prevailing view is, that the human mind consists of several separate sections that are each dedicated to a cognitive task. E.g. linguistic, social, practical, theoretical, abstract, spatial, emotional modules. >Cognitive psychology, >Social psychology on cognitive psychology, >Thinking, >Mind, >Brain. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Consciousness | Dennett | Rorty VI 161 Consciousness/Dennett: it is an illusion to believe that consciousness is the exception to the rule that everything can be explained by its relations to other things. It is no exception. Dennett I 534 Consciousness/DennettVsMcGinn: apart from problems that cannot be solved in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness will develop in a way that we cannot even imagine today. Dennett II 23ff Language/Animal/Consciousness/Dennett: since there is no limit to consciousness (with or without speech), since it has gradually emerged, the question which animals have consciousness is undecidable - "a matter of style" - consciousness is not the same as thinking! Dennett: no thought works without language but consciousness does work without thinking. >Thinking without language. Rosenthal I 430 Consciousness/Dennett: not even for the first person it is always clear what conscious is and what it is not - e.g. becoming aware of the inventory of a room - E.g. wallpaper pattern: Completion by judgment, is not sensory! Metzinger I 475 Consciousness/Dennett: consciousness is like a simulation of the world. It relates to the brain as flight simulations relate to the processes in the computer. Metzinger I 555 Consciousness/Dennett: 1) cultural construction - 2) you cannot have consciousness without having the concept of consciousness - BlockVsDennett: Incorrect fusion of p-consciousness and a-consciousness. (phenonmenal consciousness and access-consciousness). >Consciousness/Block. Chalmers I 113 Consciousness/Cognition/Dennett/Chalmer: Dennett (1978c)(1) brings a cognitive model of consciousness consisting of the perception module, short-term memory, memory, I 114 control unit and module for "public relations": for the implementation in everyday language. ChalmersVsDennett: that shows us something about information processing and the possibility to report about it, but not why there should be a way for such a model "how it is" to be this model. Later, Dennett introduced a more elaborate model (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991)(2) without a central "headquarter". ChalmersVsDennett: this also brings a possible explanation of attention, but not a better explanation of conscious experience. Consciousness/DennettVsNagel/DennettVsChalmers: thesis: what he shows, is nevertheless everything it takes to explain consciousness. As soon as one has explained the various functions, one has explained everything (Dennett, 1993a(3), p.210) and (FN9/Chapter 3) Cognitive Models/Chalmers: there are also models by Churchland, (1995)(4), Johnson-Laird (1988)(5), Shallice (1972(6), 1988a(7), 1988b(8)). ChalmersVs: my criticism VsDennett from above applies to all. Chalmers I 229 Consciousness/Dennett/Chalmers: (Dennett 1993b)(9) Consciousness is what stands out in the brain processes. ("Cerebral celebrity"). Such content is conscious that fix resources themselves and monopolize them. (P. 929). Chalmers: that is close to my approach, only that I speak of potential standing out, it must only be possible that a content can play this role. 1. Dennett, D. Toward a cognitive theory of consciousness. In: D. Dennett, Brainsorms, Cabridge 1978. 2. Dennett, D. Consciousness explained. Little, Brown and Co., Boston 1991 3. Dennett, D. Back from the drawing board. In: B. Dahlbom (Ed) Dennett and His Critics, Oxford 1993. 4. Churchland, P. M. The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain. Cambridge 1995. 5. Johnson-Laird, P. A computational analysis of consciousness. Cognition and Brain Theory 6, 1983: pp. 499-508 6. Shallice, T., Dual funtions of consciousness. Psychological Review 79, 1972: pp. 383-93; Information-precessing models of consciousness: Possibilities and problems. In: A. Marcel and E. Bisach (Eds) Consciousness in Contemporary Science, Oxford 1988. 7. Shallice, T. Information-precessing models of consciousness: Possibilities and problems. In: A. Marcel and E. Bisach (Eds) Consciousness in Contemporary Science, Oxford 1988. 8. Shallice, T. From Neuropsychology toMental structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9. Dennett, D. The message is: there is no medium. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53:919-31 |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Rosenthal I David M. Rosenthal "Multiple drafts and the facts of matter" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Consciousness | McGinn | I 49 Consciousness/mind-body problem/McGinn: there seem to be no properties of physical organisms from which consciousness could arise under certain circumstances. Now, it is also difficult to specify exactly which property of consciousness ensures that it refuses a physical explanation. I 52 Consciousness/McGinn: Problem: what is the real hallmark of a state of consciousness? Where is the problem located? "What is it like to be a K?" I 56 Consciousness/McGinn: Problem: how is it possible that states whose condition is associated with "being-like" emerge from states where there is no "being-like"? Cf. >"What is it like to be a bat?", >Knowing how, >Experience. I 68 Consciousness/McGinnVsSearle: states of consciousness do not allow emergence-theoretical explanations with mereological terms. We are unable to reduce pain to the underlying neural units. On the contrary to that it is quite possible to explain the higher-level properties of liquids in this way. (s) because all levels are easily accessible to us. States of consciousness can therefore not be explored according to Combinatorial Atomism with lawlike mappings. We can well understand higher-level Brain functions from their constituents, but if we start with consciousness, this explanation fails. >Explanation. I 74 Mind/brain/meaning/reference/McGinn: so according to this view, there is no referent that would ever raise a philosophical problem of its own, because the objective world is not a problem from a philosophical point of view. Philosophical problems arise from the meanings in the light of which we understand the world. It is not the soul as a referent to which the mystery clings. >Philosophy. Consciousness/McGinn: is theoretically unfathomable, because we do not understand what kind of relationship would be capable of linking experience with the world in a way that is given by our imagination when we talk about knowledge. I 192 What does it really mean for my mind to put itself in the position of the world? Since we receive no response, there is the notion that our cognitive powers are directed entirely inwards. However, this retreat is a deception according to transcendental naturalism. >Terminology/McGinn. II 68 If the only thing on which we had relied was brain research, we would never even have got the idea that the brain houses a consciousness at all. I 86ff Knowledge/awareness/McGinn: even complete knowledge of ourselves would not let us look better in terms of consciousness. >Awareness/Chalmers. II 216 Consciousness is not a property that depends on its origin. >Artificial consciousness. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Consciousness | Searle | I 103 Consciousness/Block: a > I 112 Consciousness does not need to be naturalized, it is completely natural. I 124f Consciousness/McGinn: consciousness is a kind of substance. The substance itself is recognized by >introspection but we cannot recognize the connection in principle. SearleVsMcGinn: 1) Consciousness is not a substance, but a feature of the brain. 2) Consciousness is not recognized by introspection. I 149 Space/time/consciousness: asymmetry: consciousness is temporal, but not spatial (Kant, Searle). >Time, >Timeless, >Space. I 153f Conditions of satisfaction/Searle: properties of the objects are >fulfillment conditions of my experiences and they are therefore difficult to distinguish from the property of the experiences (these always in perspective). Consciousness reflects the fulfillment conditions. Consciousness is not always intentional: e.g. depression. I 168 ff Consciousness/Searle: consciousness has nothing to do with incorrigibility and introspection. Self-deception requires Cartesian dualism. >Incorrigibility, >Introspection, >Dualism, >Cartesianism. I 198 ff Background: in the background there are skills and abilities that allow the consciousness to function (e.g. understanding pictures (uphill/downhill?). The same real meaning determines different fulfillment conditions in different backgrounds. Background: the background itself is not intention, "to be assumed" is not explicit propositional content and not explicit belief (objects are fixed). Network: additional knowledge cannot interpret itself, a network is intentional and no ability (even during sleep) ("Bush is Predsident"). |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Consciousness | Bieri | I 65ff Consciousness/Leibniz/Bieri: it is the factory as a whole which is responsible for consciousness. >Thought experiments. I 66/67 Consciousness/Bieri: not laws are the problem, certainly there are some. - Problem: why they exist, what in the brain makes it necessary that a person experiences anything? - Unlike gravity: consciousness is a system property. Cf. >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Knowing how/Chalmers, >Experience/Chalmers. I 61 Consciousness/Bieri: is no uniform phenomenon. Inner drive, inner control, awareness, sensitivity ability (in any case not the same as self-awareness). >Awareness, >Sensations, >Experience, cf. >Self-Consciousness. Discriminative behavior, appropriate to a situation, coherent over a period of time, "integrated". Some mental states are verbalizable, others are not. >Mental states. Consciousness in the cognitive sense, however, does not appear to be something intellectual that is impenetrable. >Cognition, >Thinking. I 64 Experience/Riddle: the experience is the mystery, not its representation. Consciousness/du Bois Reymond: "cannot be explained from its material conditions". >Representation. BieriVsdu Bois-Reymond: why should it be? - Thesis: it is also not explained by the material conditions, if we know (which we do not now) all the material conditions. >Emergence, >Explanation. Consciousness/Leibniz: it is the "factory as a whole" that is responsible for consciousness. I 74 Explanation/Bieri: it always means revealing a certain kind of relationship. Cf. >Causal explanation, >Causal relation, >Causality. Puzzle/consciousness/Bieri: we have no idea what would be a solution, an understanding. >Understanding But it would be very strange if there was a special relationship here, which does not exist anywhere else. (VsMcGinn). >Consciousness/McGinn. If there were a being that shows us this strange relationship, we would not understand it, we could not comprehend it. |
Bieri I Peter Bieri Was macht Bewusstsein zu einem Rätsel? In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Bieri III P. Bieri Analytische Philosophie des Geistes Weinheim 2007 |
| Determinism | Popper | McGinn I 135 Freedom/domestication theory/indeterministical/McGinn: Thesis: only an acausal model could meet the freedom modality. If you say the actor was able to act otherwise, one must believe that a repeat would not lead to a decision that would be determined. (Accordingly some are of the opinion, freedom must be rooted in quantum indeterminacy.) E.g. Eccles/Popper: Thesis: Random events at the subatomic level in the Brain are responsible. See >Eccles/Popper. McGinnVsEccles/McGinnVsPopper: desperate responses to problems of the first type: randomness on the deepest level is required. Then the actor is quasi a passive victim of quantum leaps. Both types of explanation are not satisfactory, the assumed similarities are distortions. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Dualism | McGinn | II 37 Dualism/McGinn: is much closer to our common sense than other perspectives. Definition dualism/McGinn: the view that between mind and Brain is no logical relation. The fact that we cannot explain the mind with reference to the Brain, is that, that it is not essentially dependent on the Brain. Consciousness is a separate basic factor in the universe, such as space, time, matter. Perception/mind/Brain/McGinn: E.g. that I perceive a loud bang, presents itself as a different kind of phenomenon as the electrical activity in my Brain. II 38 McGinnVsDualism: the problem is that he goes too far in the interpretation of data. He responds to the appearances by declaring that the mind is virtually independent of the brain. 1. The zombie problem 2. The ghost problem Zombie/Dualism/McGinn: the zombie problem of dualism is that it allows us to withdraw the mind from the Brain and leaves the Brain intact. The zombie alternative is committed to epiphenomenalism. >Zombies, >Epiphenomenalism. II 40 Definition ghost problem/McGinn: is the reversal of the zombie problem: When the mind is separated from the body, not just the brain can exist without the mind, but also the mind without the brain. How could the mind then affect the physical world? Why do we even have such complex Brains when they are so unnecessary for the functioning of the mind? Why does Brain damage erases mental abilities? II 107ff Dualism/McGinn: There are two possible dualisms without God: 1. Hyperdualism 2. Panpsychism Definition Hyperdualism/McGinn: Suppose during the Big Bang there were two universes, a material and a parallel, which consisted only of consciousness. It does not contain matter, not even space. It consists in a kind of world mind, a vast sea of conscious sensations. However, it is totally disorganized. There is no self, no individual mind, as we know it. We can imagine, it contains particles, the basic building blocks of what will later become mind. Definition Panpsychism/McGinn: moves the mind back into the material world (VsHyperdualism).("Elvis Is Everywhere"). >Panpsychism. He says that consciousness is everywhere and wafts through outer space (presumably with Elvis together). That means, all matter, even stones, plankton, electrons and stars carry a trace of consciousness in themselves. The material components of the Brain already carry their own special awareness package with themselves. II 119 With that he claims that we already know which properties of the brain give rise to consciousness, namely the individual building blocks. (VsEmergence). a) Hard version of panpsychism: the neurons in the Brain literally feel the pain, see yellow, thinking about dinner. - And the same do electrons and stars. Brain/panpsychism/McGinn: there still remain problems related to the generative forces of the Brain: two points of view: a) The Brain plays a minimal role, only one kind of trigger b) The Brain plays a more active role: the Brain makes use of the properties of matter and transforms it by its particular structure in mind. McGinn pro. McGinn pro Panpsychism: all matter must have the potential to co-found awareness. >Awareness/Chalmers. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Free Will | McGinn | I 133 Free Will/freedom/McGinn: Problem: to find a marking of the modality of freedom (freedom modality) that reveals in how far free voting is possible: This relates to a specific (inherent) human capacity. If an object has an expressible force with modal terms, it will have its basis in certain properties of the objects. This force depends on the nature of what has the power. Accordingly freedom modality must have an internal nature and characteristics of the actor, which are probably related to his Brain. >Determinism, >Modality, >Brain/McGinn. I 139 Soul/McGinn: Is our supernatural soul determined, or is it not? The question is therefore only postponed. God himself would face the dilemma. >Soul. Thesis: Freedom is always freedom of something. >Freedom. ((s) "result ratio"/McGinn/(s): = connection between the elements, which correspond to a logical sequence). An action is not in a result ratio to the relevant set of facts, if it could have turned out differently. Problem: The critical question is whether the concept of freedom requires only with regard to some of the facts or in respect of all a ratio of not succeeding. If one defines all the physical facts, does one define all the decisions as well? I 145 McGinn Thesis: The ordinary concept of freedom requires a psychic but not a physical non-result ratio. I 154/55 The problem of knowledge is reminiscent of the problem of free will, which also has a kind of stimulus independence. Decisions come into being on own accord, they are not mere effects. >Knowledge/McGinn. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Genes | McGinn | I 235 McGinn: Genes have representation abilities without semantics. >Representation, >Semantics. Genes/McGinn: 2nd possibility: that it is less useful for the Brain to develop a potential solution to our philosophical problems than it is for the genes (genetic code). Genetic Code/Genes/McGinn: contain principles encrypted by the genes Principles that go beyond the reach of human reason and yet answer some of the bewildered questions of reason? ((s) VsMcGinn: from all these arguments that it would be highly useful it does not follow that it is). Obviously, the genetic code is a rule for the construction of animal bodies including the Brain and mind. >Brain, >Mind. I 228 Genes/McGinn: one of their most amazing features is the ability to store information. Likewise, the ability to copy the entire reproductive process. Errors occur only very rarely. That means that genes are virtually incapable of learning! Environmental changes lead to virtually no change in the construction rules for the next generation, no matter how disastrous they may be. Only random mutation. While the reason is a paragon of flexibility, genes are the culmination rigid behavior. >Behavior. I 229 McGinn: thesis: It could be that the genes (discussed above) have solved our philosophical problem, at least partially. Because firstly, they must have already solved the purely physical problems of the construction: i.e. they represent plans for the construction of the body, and secondly what is true of the body, also applies to the mind. As far as a mental feature is biologically sound, genes must contain instructions for building organisms with this feature. (Building consciousness, also the I, freedom of will, intentionality, all kinds of knowledge.) >Body, >Intentionality, >Existence, >Consciousness, >Knowledge. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Imagination | McGinn | II 34 Presentation/McGinn: ideas explain nothing. The idea of a specific connection in the brain cannot be used as an explanation of the operation, because this connection could also be different. >Idea >Explanation. II 83 Def Presentation/McGinn: An idea is nothing more than a set of properties that we ascribe to a thing. >Presentation. II 144 Space/McGinn: It is an even more radical approach than the above conceivable: namely, that we are completely wrong with our idea of what is actually space. "Space" is for us only a label for something out there, it does not carry a substantive statement about the properties of the medium named by it. The mind does not have length and width. We only perceive the room through the senses, but that says nothing about how it really is. >Space. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Intelligence | McGinn | II 52 Intelligence/McGinn: the newer doctrine emphasizes three characteristics: plant, moldability, adaptation. We do not learn to own arms, legs and kidneys. ((s) but we learn to develop our muscles). Intelligence is always at or for something. The ability to achieve the organism goals. >Psychological theories on intelligence. II 57 Human/Evolution/mind/McGinn: it is a remarkable coincidence that we are the only species on earth that is able to drive science and philosophy. There could easily be a different species with a certain level of scientific talent, about the level of a ten year-old. Or a species that is superior in biology but inferior in physics etc. The kind of intelligence that we have, is absolutely not necessary for living beings to survive. >Mind, >Brain, >Consciousness. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Introspection | McGinn | I 55 Introspection/perception/McGinn: the subjectivity of the human visual sense is in the connection with this sense secondary properties, namely the colors and not in the manner in which they impress our introspection ability. >Subjectivity. Because even if we had no such higher ability, the experience possessed nevertheless subjective character. The subjectivity of perception/experience depends on how the world is perceived. Hidden structure of consciousness: conscious states conceal covert facilities, through which they acquire the ability to hook to Brain states. But this is a knowledge-like and no objective obstacle. I 70ff Introspection: is "single-channel": A cognition ability is limited by its corresponding patterns of causal sensibility: it can only represent with what it can engage itself causally determined. The immovable this causal dependency relationship between the states of the ability and the states of the objects in question, the less this ability will report on the objects. It is such a very rigid and limited resonation ability of knowledge/cognition. For detecting the states of consciousness there is not rich variety of process options that would correspond to the five senses, which is subjected to a variety of causal channels. E.g. pain. >Pain. --- II 64f Consciousness/McGinn: E.g. Suppose there is a property "C", which explains how consciousness arises from neuronal tissue. We do not know what "C" is, but we know that there must be this property. How should we identify this property? The introspection cannot, because it ends at the surface of consciousness. Introspection says what is happening at present in the consciousness, but not how it happens that it exists. "C" is too close to the Brain. Introspection does not see how consciousness is embodied in matter, it does not see it as an aspect of the physical Brain. The infamous incorrigibility arises from the fact that it actually has no sense to imagine that states of consciousness could elude the reach of introspection. II 135f But it is not so that the states of consciousness always and necessarily touch the inner receptors and one would never come to err. The idea of touching and not touching is rather pointless. McGinnVsIncorrigibility/introspection: appearance and reality do not coincide in the consciousness. Thesis: In the consciousness there is a level of reality that is not available to us, which is also beyond the appearance. Consciousness has a hidden structure. >Incorrigibility, >First Person. This does not mean that there is both a conscious and an unconscious mind. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Knowledge | McGinn | I 52ff How it is/know how to/scope/McGinn: what logical scope have questions like E.g. How is it to be a bat? >"What is it like to be a bat?" "How-be": We are not quantified here about a single thing, but a type. Bat: range of all bats. The "how" of being for the bat is identical with the How-be of the world for the bat. How does it happen that we know anything at all? >Knowing how. I 177 Knowledge/Transcendental Naturalism/TN/McGinn: the transcendental naturalism claims that the gaps are ultimately gaps in our understanding ability. Their origin is of epistemological, not ontological kind. >Terminology/McGinn. I 230 Knowledge/representation/consciousness/McGinn: "be in the know" does neither require consciousness nor *belief, but only an effective representation. >Representation, >Consciousness, >Belief. --- II 35 Bat/Nagel/mind/brain/McGinn: the sonar perception in humans has no counterpart. But this lack of understanding is not a lack of understanding about the bat Brain. We might even know everything about the Brain of the bat, without knowing how it feels to be a bat. II 49 E.g. assuming, we can easily imagine a universe in which the vast majority of stars emit no light. In this universe there is much less knowledge. We would have no knowledge of any distances. So the world must be so that the mind can include its properties in itself. And there is never a guarantee that the right knowledge mediating relationship really exists. Knowledge is not a matter of course. I 180 Irreducibility/I/McGinn: irreducibility of knowledge: there is only one neurosis of the skeptic. The word "know" has an established use, which meets the conditions of justified assertibility. I simply know that I have two hands. (> Moore's hands). And that is good. (> DIME - domesticated irreducible mystic elimination: see Terminology/McGinn). |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Materialism | McGinn | II 30 f Materialism/Mind: Thesis: There is not more to the mind than there is to the brain. "Brain is all the mind needs". The mind consists of flesh, it is flesh. >Mind, >Brain, >Consciousness. II 31f Once the nature (or God) had planted neurons in our brains, no further work was necessary to provide us with consciousness. And that is not because neural processes cause consciousness processes, but because neuronal processes are processes of consciousness. II 32 It is also not true that consciousness processes are only one aspect of neuronal processes, but the state of consciousness is no more or less than its neural correlate. E.g. pain is simply reduced to physical processes, both of which are not only correlated, but identical. Granted, pain looks different in the introspection, but: introspection is merely a source of errors. The true nature of pain can only be disclosed by observing the third person. The mind is the Brain in disguise, the genie is the lamp, although it may look different. II 33 McGinnVsMaterialism: Intuitive Answer: if materialism is right, I am in spite of everything not a conscious being. Old joke: Materialism must simulate anesthesia ((s) because the physical processes remain the same). According to materialism we would all be zombies who pretend to have a consciousness. From this follows an argument VsMaterialism: E.g. assuming I knew all there is to know in neurological terms about your brain. Would I know all about your mind then? (Could I predict your future?) McGinn: No. How can both be declared identical then: MaterialismVsMcGinn: Facts are one thing and knowledge about facts is another. Maybe I know all about your Brain, but my knowledge is based on certain ideas (concepts). Materialism insists on that all mental facts are Brain facts, that we cannot translate notions of mental facts into notions at the level of Brain facts. ((s) A translation would have to perform a level change). E.g. All facts about water are facts about "H2O", although the words "water" and "H2O" do not mean the same thing. They are not synonyms. McGinnVsMaterialism: the problem with this objection is that there is no way to distinguish between mental and physical concepts without requiring a distinction at the level of facts. What distinguishes the idea of pain from the idea firing C-fibers is precisely the fact that in the focus of both concepts there are quite different properties, and thus we cannot say that both properties are identical. The materialist is forced to introduce the notion that one and the same fact can have two different manifestations. This concept of manifestations, however, is based in turn on that there are facts relating to manifestations which cannot be explained with Brain facts. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Mental States | McGinn | II 74f Perception/McGinn: The perception of yellow depends existentially on what occurs in the neurons of the visual cortex. But it is not true that these neural processes are part of the experience. Our consciousness states do not have an internal structure that can be defined by their physical foundations. A state of consciousness does not consist of neural components. >Perception, >Consciousness. II 123 If we assume that all the brain properties are mental (what ever that might mean) this puts us in no more favorable position to explain anything about our familiar impressions and sensations. The explanatory gap is as wide as ever, except that we now call both sides "mental". >Experience, >Perception. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Mentalese | McGinn | I 223 Mentalese/Brain/Brain state/language of thought/McGinn: Suppose that the brain contains a language, the brain will use it to set up a theory of its own. ((s) as to be able to ever recognize malfunctions, it must be able to compare the desired and actual states.) Seeing/McGinn: the Brain also makes use of an optical theory to interpret the distal importance of a pattern. >Seeing. McGinn: Thesis: so the Brain has certainly the necessary reserves, comprehensive representation areas that are not going to be noticed. >Brain/McGinn. I 226 Brain/Mentalese/McGinn: the brain is not subject to the same limitations as the conscious reason. E.g. pain: there may be a subsystem for self-monitoring, which prescribes the pain centers to change the fibers when overloaded. Here semantically mediated feedback loops would obviously be highly useful, the more clever, the better. The dimensions of this cleverness do not coincide with the consciousness. >Consciousness. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Nature | McGinn | II 21 There is obviously a deep gap between the brain, that brings forth consciousness and other organs that do not. How can clusters of cells produce mind? >Consciousness, cf. >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Mind body problem. II 22 Nature/McGinn: in order to save our assumption of the unity of nature, we must a) deny that the brain produces consciousness, or b) accept new non-physical properties. >Nature. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Necessity | Simons | I 269 Necessity of origin/organism/Kripke: (1972(1), 312ff, 1980(2), 110ff): thesis: an organism could not have descended from another cell of origin as it actually did (Simons pro). But the zygote is still no permanent essential part because it dies early. Phase-sortal/McGinn: e.g. "child" and "adult" are accordingly also zygotes. >Sortals. I 270 Solution/Simons: it is essential for the organism, that it follows from sexual reproduction and that it has its zygote as an initial spurious part. However, it is unclear whether the brain is an essential part (> Brain Transplant, see also Identity/Parfit, >Body/B. Williams). I 295 Necessary Existence/Simons: necessary existence is only possible with abstract objects: e.g. universals, numbers, etc. Problem: if something exists necessarily, everything else depends on it. >Existence. 1. Kripke, S. A. (1972). Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), 253-355 2. Kripke, S. A. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Pain | McGinn | I 65 McGinnVsSearle: We are not able, to lead back pain to the underlying neural entities. I 71 Pain/McGinn: can only be determined by introspection. We are unable to change the focus, or apply a different meaning. >Introspection. I 226f Brain/Mentalese/language of thought/McGinn: the brain is not subject to the same limitations as the conscious reason. E.g. pain: there may be a subsystem for self-monitoring, which prescribes the pain centers to change the fibers when overloaded. Here, semantically mediated feedback loops would obviously be highly useful, the more clever, the better. The dimensions of this cleverness do not coincide with the consciousness. >Consciousness. --- II 34 Pain/McGinnVsReductionism: pain cannot be reduced to the firing of C fibers, just as water cannot be reduced to H2O. But phenomena are what makes the mind. So mind cannot be reduced to the Brain. >Brain, >Mind, >Reductionism. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Pain | Chalmers | I 17 Pain/Chalmers: pain is an example for the fact that concepts have a double meaning a) as a psychological concept for the explanation of behavior, (> Functional role) - b) as a phenomenal concept of the first person. >Qualia/Chalmers. Both aspects naturally tend to occur together. But that is not a conceptual truth about pain! I 18 Everyday Language/Chalmers: everyday language brings psychological and phenomenal aspects together, although these are actually separated. This applies to many mental concepts. Learning: Here, the psychological aspect may be stronger. >Psychology/Chalmers. I 19 Emotions: the phenomenal aspect is probably predominant here. >Phenomena, >Aspects, >Emotion. Belief: here the case is more complex because intentionality plays a role, e.g. whether one believes a proposition and at the same time has a hope about it. At the same time, beliefs are used to explain behavior. >Behavior, >Explanation, >Beliefs, >Intentionality. Contents/Searle/Chalmers: (Searle 1990a)(1): Thesis: the content of a belief depends entirely on the connected consciousness state. Without consciousness, everything is as-if-intentionality. (Searle: See Chalmers I 360). >Intentionality/Searle, >Content. I 146f Pain/Knowledge/phenomenal/physical/identity/Kripke/Chalmers: Kripke's argument is based on identity, which is always necessary identity accordingto him. >Pain/Kripke, >Identity/Kripke. Pain/Kripke: it is pointless to say that there is something pain-like that is shown as a pain in the course of an examination, unlike in the case of water/H2O: Water has somehow been exposed as H2O. This identity is a necessity a posteriori after the discovery. >a posteriori necessity. I 147 ChalmersVsKripke: Kripke's argument, unlike mine, is based on a certain essentialism in relation to different states. With me, it is never about disembodiment. Nevertheless, there are many similarities between Kripke and me. Both of us are concerned with modal arguments with necessity and possibility. >S. A. Kripke, >Essentialism, >Modality, >Necessity, >Possibility. I 148 Brain State/Pain/Kripke: Thesis: You could have that particular brain state without feeling that particular pain, because for pain, only feeling is essential. (See also Feldman (1974)(2), McGinn (1977)(3)). >Brain states. Materialism/Pain/Boyd: (Boyd 1980)(4): the materialist does not have to assume that mental states in all possible worlds are physical states, as long as this is the case in the actual world. >Materialism, >Actual World, >Possible Worlds. I 149 Pain/Intension/Kripke/Chalmers: if Kripke says you cannot imagine a situation in which the feeling of pain but not the pain itself is absent, that means that the primary and secondary intensions are collapsing. ChalmersVsKripke: 1. The possibility of disorganization is inconsistent as an argument against materialism, but in our case is not decisive. 2. The same applies to the arguments based on identity. 3. An essentialist metaphysics is not decisive (for our purposes), apart from the fact that the feeling of pain is essential for pain - but it is about the meaning of "pain". 4. Kripke's apparatus of the rigid designators (>cross-world identity) is central to our problem, but has a deep core in the failure of the logical supervenience we have established. >Rigidity, >Supervenience. 1. J. R. Searle, Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Scineces. 13, 1990: pp.585-642. 2. F. Feldman, Kripke on the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 71, 1974: pp. 665-76 3. C. McGinn, Anomalous Monism and Kripke's Cartesian intuitions. Analysis 2, 1977: pp. 78-80 4. R. N. Boyd, Materialism without reductionism: What physicalism does not entail. In: N. Block (Ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. VOl. 1. Cambridge 1980. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Robustness | Minsky | I 194 Robustness/resilience/Artificial Intelligence/Minsky: Most machines that people build stop working when their parts break down. Isn't it amazing that our minds can keep on functioning while they're making changes in themselves? How could anything be so robust? Here are some possibilities: Duplication: It is possible to design a machine so that every one of its functions is embodied in several duplicated agents, in different places. Self-Repair: Many of the body's organs can regenerate — that is, they can replace whichever parts are lost to injury or disease. However, Brain cells do not usually share this ability. Consequently, healing cannot be the basis of much of the Brain's robustness. ((s) Cf. >Brain/McGinn: the brain has a theory of the brain.) Distributed Processes: It is possible to build machines in which no function is located in any one specific place. Instead, each function is spread out over a range of locations, so that each part's activity contributes a little to each of several different functions. Accumulation: Consider any learning-scheme that begins by using the method of accumulation — in which each agent tends to accumulate a family of subagents that can accomplish that agent's goals in several ways. Later, if any of those subagents become impaired, their supervisor will still be able to accomplish its job, because other of its subagents will remain to do that job, albeit in different ways. >Software-Agents/Minsky. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
| Space | McGinn | I125 Mind/brain/space/McGinn: while the brain is three-dimensional, the mind cannot be defined spatially in this way. How can this mind then be identical to the brain? >Brain, >Mind, >Consiousness. II 126 Representation/sensation/McGinn: the spatiality of the world is something that our impressions never lack. II 127 Mirrors are for the sense of sight, but not for the sense of touch! Also not for hearing, smelling and tasting. But these are also space-dependent, though not as strong as seeing. II 139 Our consciousness is not spatially. Consciousness itself is not physically perceptible. It enables us to perceive the world, but it itself is not so noticeable. The mind is not spatially, so the senses cannot respond to it in principle. Space/consciousness/materialism: denies that consciousness is not spatial. Mind/Brain/McGinn: Thesis: the key is that the Brain itself is not the simple spatial condition, for which we take it. II 140 Originally pre-spatial properties (before the Big Bang) would therefore (assuming physical conservation) be cause of matter and mind. II 141 Consciousness/Big Bang/McGinn: Thesis: consciousness is sort of a fossil of the early universe. (Before the Big Bang.) It must entail reminiscences of this far past time. II 144 Space/McGinn: It is an even more radical approach than the above conceivable: namely, that we are completely wrong with our idea of what is actually space. "Space" is for us only a label for something out there, it does not carry a substantive statement about the properties of the medium named by it. The mind does not have length and width. We only perceive the room through the senses, but that says nothing about how it really is. >Space. II 145 Thesis: perhaps the space has a (hidden) structure, which puts it in a position to unite mind and matter in itself. II 146 This space gives the mind a home, because it needs one. Somewhere. II 148/49 Mind, unlike numbers, is causally correlated with matter in space, so it cannot be entirely located outside the space. Now, if space is something that contains all causally linked things, then the conscious mind must be present in any sense in the space. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Supervenience | McGinn | I 68 Consciousness/Supervenience/McGinnVsSearle: conscious states do not allow an emergence theoretical explanation using mereological terms. We are unable, to trace back pain to underlying neural entities. >Consciousness, cf. >Mereology, >Explanation. In contrast to that, it is quite possible to explain the higher level properties of liquids in this way. ((s) Because all levels are easily available to us.) I 69 States of consciousness are therefore not to be explored according to CAlM (combinatorial atomism with lawlike mappings). We can probably grasp higher order brain functions of their constituents, but if we start from the consciousness, this explanation fails. Therefore, we do not have a model for a possible emergence relation. We do not see an obvious consequence relation. (> Supervenience/McGinn). I 98 I/McGinn: is subject to a kind of physically induced consequence relation: are two bodies physically identical, and if one of them is a person, the other one must be a person, too. Because in terms of person-likeness there can be no difference, which would not be based on a physical difference. >I,Ego,Self, >Mind body problem. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Terminology | McGinn | I 22 Definition B-term/McGinn: one for which the question is how its former use was possible. Definition DIME/terminology/McGinn: domesticated irreducible mystic elimination - D: the idea that one must domesticate the term B. - The term presents his subject misleading and exaggerates the ontological peculiarity. I: theory: the term would be irreducible. I 35 M: stands for Magic - accepts the facts of the concept at face value. I 36 E: Elimination: the B-concepts would not be applicable to the world. I 37 Thesis: the Transcendental Naturalism presents (TN) a neglected alternative to domesticated irreducible mystic elimination. I 65 VsDomesticated irreducible mystic elimination: is imprinted on the problem without solving it. I 39 Definiton CAIM/McGinn: combinatorial atomism with lawlike mappings. - According to that a crowd of basic elements obeys given linking principles - E.g. physics, mathematics and linguistics have CAlM (combinatorial atomism with lawlike mappings) character. - New things are explained with linking rules. - McGinn: an indispensable, but unsuitable realization process. I 45 Problem: the contents of the modules (subjects) cannot be applied. I 68 Consciousness is not to be explored by CAlM. I 110 FIN-features (fruitfulness, invulnerability, normativity)/terminology/McGinn: fertility, invulnarability, normativity. Connection with semantics, but not with behavior, brain state, etc. I 166 Transcendental Naturalism asserts that the relationship between consciousness and the brain did exist, but did not correspond to our thinking in form. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anthropic Principle | McGinn Vs Anthropic Principle | II 64 Consciousness/McGinn: Ex assume there is a characteristic "C", which explains how consciousness arises from neuronal tissue. We do not know what is "C", but we know that there must be this property. ((S) alternative to emergence). Introspection/McGinn: how should we identify this property? Introspection is not able to since it ends at the surface of consciousness. Introspection says what is happening at present in the consciousness, but not how it is that it exists. "C" is too close to the Brain. II 65 Introspection does not realize how consciousness is embodied in matter, does not see it as an aspect of the physical brain. Brain/Consciousness/McGinn: should we look for the linking characteristic "C" in the Brain instead of the consciousness? It is as little visible in the Brain as in consciousness. This is not so surprising, because there is no reason to believe that any theoretically interesting property of the world a priori must be perceptible (McGinnVsAnthrophisches principle.). But we need not postulate anything except a few physical conditions and their properties. Ex the electrochemical properties helped us a lot to find out more about the Brain. But it is precisely those characteristics that have proven so inadequate for the explanation of consciousness. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Berkeley, G. | McGinn Vs Berkeley, G. | I 181 Berkeley/McGinn: also depicts God as a gear in epistemological transmission. --- II 121 Mind/Matter/McGinn: "Universalmentalism:" one could set up an even crazier theory, namely that everything is thoroughly mental and only mental. (After all there are motivated extravagances). All properties are of a mental nature. Ex to have the property of being a square or an electron is a purely mental thing. These properties do not exist in our mind (as idealism meant). Rather, they exist long before our mind and independently of it. II 122 Ex for an electron a spin is a mental property. The aim of this theory would be to finally free the universe from dualism. VsUniversalmentalismus/McGinn: now you have to explain how the intellectual property to be a neuron can explain the intellectual property to feel pain or the mental characteristic to see yellow. If we assume that all Brain characteristics are in fact of mental nature (whatever that may mean) that put us in no more a favorable position to explain anything about our familiar perceptions and sensations. II 123 The explanatory gap is as wide as ever, except that now we call both sides "mental." |
C. McGinn I McGinn Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens, Stuttgart, 1996 II McGinn Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie?, München 2001 |
| Chomsky, N. | Dennett Vs Chomsky, N. | I 513 Chomsky: early thesis the brain works in a way that ultimately defies scientific analysis. Even >Fodor. Also >McGinn. DennetVsChomsky / DennettVsFodor: this is a kind saltationist view about the mind: they postulated cracks in the design space, and is therefore not Darwinian. Dennett: Chomsky actually represents quite a Darwinian view of the theory of language, but he has always shunned these views, like Gould. I 531 "Cognitive lock"/Independence/Chomsky/McGinn: Spiders can't think about fishing. That's how it is for us: the question of free will may not be solvable for us. McGinn/Fodor: human consciousness is such a mystery. I 533 Cognitive lock/DennettVsMcGinn: the situation for the monkey is different: he can not even understand the question. He is not even shocked! Neither Chomsky nor Fodor can cite cases from animals to which certain matters are a mystery. In reality, not as they represented a biological, but a pseudo-biological problem. It ignores even a biological accident: we can certainly find an intelligence scale in the living world. I 534 Consciousness/DennettVsMcGinn: apart from problems that are not solvable in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness is still developing as we can not even imagine today. Why Chomsky and Fodor do not like this conclusion? They hold the means for unsatisfactory. If our mind is not based on skyhook but on cranes, they would like to keep it secret. I 556 DennettVsChomsky: he is wrong if he thinks a description at the level of machines is conclusive, because that opens the door for >"Strong Artificial Intelligence". |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Davidson, D. | McGinn Vs Davidson, D. | I 134 McGinn used (insurmountable) "conceptual scheme:" to reveal his conception of the natural boundaries of knowledge. McGinnVsDavidson. I 136 McGinnVsDavidson: its determinism provides no sense to the idea of the freedom of action, because it looks like as if it were of the same type as any other causality. I 192 Consciousness/insight/McGinnVsDavidson: at this point often times an appeal is made to causal theories, but that is not satisfactory: it gives no explanation of the perceptivity of the attentive consciousness. And that is precisely the reason why one assumes frequently the causal approach leads to skepticism. Rorty VI 166 McGinnVsDavidson/Rorty: we have to revive the distinction "experience"/"belief" (DennettVs). McGinn: the (phenomenological) content of experience is determined by the intrinsic state of the Brain. |
McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Dennett, D. | McGinn Vs Dennett, D. | I 69 Consciousness / McGinn: Even a syntactic CaIM explanation, which assumes that there is in fact symbols in the brain that makes it impossible to explain consciousness as mere aggregation of such symbols. (McGinnVsDennett, McGinnVsPinker). (CaIM = combinatoric atomism with lawlike mappings). Basic structure of the states of consciousness: if there ever is such a thing, it is at the level of consciousness! It is not a method for extracting of consciousness from Brain states or Brain characteristics. II 191 Def death / McGinn: the annihilation of the ego, dying is the process of extinction. II 192 We have only the very idea of it, to exist in an instant and to cease to exist in the next moment. The process remains vague and opaque. It is in many ways the same as the beginning of existence. We can not simply imagine the beginning of the ego as we imagine how matter takes a form. (DennettVs). |
McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Dualism | McGinn Vs Dualism | McGinnVsDualism: the problem is that he goes too far in the interpretation of data. It responds to the appearances, by declaring that the mind is virtually independent of the Brain. 1 The zombie problem 2 The Haunted problem II 38 McGinnVsDualism: seperates the mind to radically from the Brain. So as if the mind could go about its business without assistance of the Brain machine . He s right that the Brain, just as we presently understand it, can not explain the mind - he is wrong when he concludes that no Brain property can do this. II 42 Mind / Brain / McGinn: the spirit is manifest in a causal relation to the Brain, as difficult as this may be to believe. Why should that be so, if the existence of consciousness depends on God (VsDescartes). Theism / McGinn: the theistic dualism exaggerates the gap between mind and Brain. II 106 Def Hyper Dualism / McGinn: assumed in the Big Bang there were two universes, a material and a parallel, which consisted only of consciousness. II 108 - II 110 McGinnVs Hyper dualism: Where is the fatal error? In the concept of causality. The mental universe is said to contain no matter and yet events and circumstances in this universe make things happen in the other universe. Thus, it is assumed that disembodied consciousness be able to influence the course of events. This raises two major questions: 1st How can a disembodied consciousness be the cause of something? 2nd How can the physical sequence of events be disturbed by anything in the material universe, which is going on in the other universe? |
McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Introspection | McGinn Vs Introspection | II 160 Introspection can not even say that I have a brain! >Mind Body Problem II 162 McGinnVsIncorrigibility/introspection: appearance and reality do not coincide in the consciousness! Thesis Aware that there is a level of reality that is not available to us, which is well beyond appearances. Consciousness has a hidden structure.This does not mean that it are both a conscious and an unconscious mind. >Incorrigibility. Consciousness/McGinn: if we were completely transparent that would constitute something unique in nature! Everything else in nature allows a distinction between its outer appearance and its reality. Nature has its unobserved side. >Consciousness/McGinn. II 164 There are two separate areas, which shut out introspection: the consciousness associated with the unconscious and the flipside of consciousness itself. >Nature/McGinn. The very conscious desire has its own hidden dimension that is not revealed to us. The introspection suffers then from a double blindness in respect to the whole truth about the mind. >Blind Spot. |
McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Materialism | McGinn Vs Materialism | II 33 McGinnVsMaterialism: intuitive answer: if materialism is right, I am despite all not a conscious being. Old joke: Materialism must simulate anesthesia! ((S) Because the physical processes remain the same.) - According to materialism we would all be zombies who imagine to have a consciousness. II 34 That leads to an argument VsMaterialism: Ex assuming I know all about your brain what there is to know in neurological terms. Then, do I know all about your mind? (Could I predict your future?) McGinn: No. How then both can be declared identical? MaterialismVsMcGinn: Facts are one matter and knowledge of facts is another matter. McGinnVsMaterialism: the problem with this objection is that there is no way to discriminate between mental and physical concepts without demanding a distinction at the level of facts. What differentiates the idea of pain from the idea firing C-fibers is precisely the fact that the focus of both concepts are quite different properties, and thus we can not say, both properties are identical. The materialist is forced to introduce the idea that one and the same fact can have two different manifestations. This concept of manifestations in turn is beased on the fact that in relation to manifestations there are facts that they can not be explained by facts about the Brain. II 42 McGinnVsMaterialism: he tries to construct the mind from properties that are not suitable for it. He assumes that enough drops of neuronal water will light the fire of the mind. He's right that some property of the Brain is responsible for consciousness, but he is mistaken about the nature of this property. |
McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Materialism | Papineau Vs Materialism | David Papineau Literature II 309 Def Antipathetic Fallacy/Papineau: from the fact that we do not have the experiences we erroneously conclude that we could not refer to them either. Confusion of mention and use: we slide from a) to b) a) Third person thoughts do not use conscious experiences b) Third person thoughts do not mention conscious experiences. However, there is no reason why a third person could not relate (mention) thoughts to the experiences of others, but without using them. (Mention = Reference) II 310 Antipathetic False Conclusion/Papineau: What should he explain? He should explain why so many people have such strong intuitions according to which conscious states are not physical. (VsMaterialism, VsPhysicalism, Papineau pro.). II 312 PapineauVsAntipathetic Fallacy/Papineau: error that the experience is something additional to the brain state. (Category error, e.g. as if the university was something additional to the sum of its parts). Papineau: there is nothing to explain. I am not denying consciousness, but that there are additional inner lights. (McGinn uses this metaphor.) |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
| Pinker, St. | McGinn Vs Pinker, St. | I 69 Consciousness / McGinn: Even a syntactic CaIM declaration, which assumes that there are in fact symbols in the brain does not make it possible to explain the consciousness as a mere juxtaposition of such symbols. (McGinnVsDennett, McGinnVsPinker). Basic structure of states of consciousness: if there is ever such a thing, it is at the level of consciousness! It is not a method for lifting the consciousness of Brain states or Brain properties. |
McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Popper, K. | McGinn Vs Popper, K. | I 137 Popper/Eccles: hold that freedom must be rooted in quantum mechanical indeterminacy. Ex Eccles/Popper: random events on the subatomic level in the brain are responsible. McGinnVs b): (Eccles/Popper): desperate response to problems of the first type: randomness on the deepest level is required. Then the actor is a quasi passive victim of quantum leaps. Both types of explanation are not satisfactory, the assumed similarities are distortions. |
McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Psychologism | McGinn Vs Psychologism | II 113/114 Def panpsychism/McGinn: moves the mind back in the material world (VsHyperdualism). ("Elvis Is Everywhere"). He states that consciousness is everywhere and wafts through space. II 115 a) Hard version of panpsychism: the neurons in the brain literally feel the pain, see yellow, think about dinner - and electrons and stars do the same. McGinnVsPanpsychism: 1. this is obviously not the case. Regular matter doesn't show any sign of thirst or pain. II 116 2. The problem with panpsychism is that it makes our mind look like an epiphenomenon! Since our mind is allegedly composed of all the states of mind that were intrinsic to matter before being formed into our brains. II 117 3. If all matter had mature thoughts and feelings, why do organisms then need nervous systems and brains to be able to think and feel? b) Soft panpsychism: obvious that atoms do not have mental states, but could they not contain the mind in a diluted form or on a lower level? McGinnVsPanpsychism (soft form): Problem: It is difficult to define what that means. If dilute states should be approximately like the consciousness before falling asleep, that leads back to the hard version. Stones would therefore have something like "proto mental" states, defined as any property of matter that allows for consciousness. II 118 McGinnVs: this theory is empty. It is true of course that matter has this or that property. And of course, matter must have the ability to give rise to consciousness, because it does so constantly. b) Brain plays an active role: the Brain makes use of the properties of matter and transforms it by virtue of its particular structure in consciousness. McGinn pro! McGinn pro panpsychism: all matter must have the potential to co-create consciousness because in the matter of which the Brain tissue is constructed there is nothing really special (!). Ultimately, all traces of matter can be traced back to the Big Bang. |
McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Searle, J.R. | McGinn Vs Searle, J.R. | I 68 Consciousness/McGinnVsSearle: conscious states do not allow for a emergentist explanation using mereological terms. We are unable to attribute the pain to its underlying neural entities. But in contrast, it is quite possible to explain the higher level properties of liquids in this way. ((S) Because all levels are readily available to us. States of consciousness are therefore not to explored according to CALM (combinatoric atomism with lawlike mappings). We can well understand higher-level Brain functions from its constituents, but if we start from the consciousness this explanation fails. Therefore, we do not have a model for a possible relation of emergence. We see no obvious causal relation. |
McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Various Authors | Vollmer Vs Various Authors | II 169 Method/Physics/Vollmer: the method of experimental physics does not exist at all. What would be the "unity of science" then? II 170 Bondi: Method is the most important thing in science. VollmerVsBondi: Results are more important than the method, unity of science means more than unity of method. II 97 DitfuthVsIdentity Theory/Vollmer: (VsEvolutionist Identity Theory): Life is certainly understandable as a system property. However, a material system is either animated or not animated. There is nothing in between. Vitality is an all or nothing property. On the other hand, there are different, even unlimited degrees of "soulfullness/animation": the psychic is not erratic, but has developed very gradually! Therefore it is inadmissible to simply add the "mental" (soul) to matter as a further, analogous stage. Ditfurth Thesis: Evolution could lead to the emergence of our brain and thus of consciousness only because the mental was present and effective in this development from the very beginning! ((s) >Evolution/McGinn). II 98 VollmerVsDitfurth: this one constructs a contrast that does not exist in this sharpness. 1. Life has also developed in many small steps. However, the intermediate stages have long been eliminated. 2. One can also say from consciousness that something is either "animated" or not "animated". Consciousness/Mind/Soul/Vollmer: one has to differentiate stronger between the individual functions in the future: memory, abstraction, language ability, self-confidence. I 40 VollmerVsCopernicus/VollmerVsKant: only the evolutionary epistemology takes the human out of his central position as "legislator of nature" and makes it an observer of cosmic events, which includes it. I 293 VollmerVsVsVs: no critic defines "knowledge", only Löw: this includes subjectivity (which he does not define either). Information/Löw: Information always exists only for one subject". Vollmer pro, but perhaps too dogmatic. Similarity/Löw: Similarity exists only for one subject. VollmerVsLöw: this is surely wrong. VollmerVsProjection Theory II 90 VsIdentity Theory/Vollmer: psychological and physical processes seem completely incomparable. Neuronal processes are localized, consciousness is not. Vollmer:(pro identity theory): Some identity theorists do not take this seriously at all, but the argument is not a threat at all: we can interpret difference projectively: as subjective and objective aspects of one and the same thing. Fig. cylinder appears from different sides as a circle or cuboid. (s)Vs: Example not mandatory. VollmerVsVs: Identity: not all properties must match: the optical and haptic impression of an apple are also not identical. ((s) These are extrinsic properties). II 92 Projection/Vollmer: this is how the projective model explains the apparent incompatibility of different properties such as mind and physis as different aspects of the same thing. II 93 VsProjection/Vollmer: could be interpreted as a relapse into the postulation of an unknown substance. VollmerVsVs: Solution: System concept of System Theory: System Theory/Vollmer: For example diamond/graphite: consist of the same carbon atoms, but have a different structure. Example diamond/silicon: same structure, different building blocks: (here silicon). II 94 None of the components is logically or ontologically superior to the other! Knowledge of one does not replace knowledge of the other. Both are constitutive. This shows how little is gained with the knowledge of the building blocks. I 282 VsEvolution Theory: can success guarantee truth? Truth/Simmel: actually goes the way of equating success with probation and probation with truth. Cf. Pragmatism. Evolutionary EpistemologyVsSimmel: it does not adopt this pragmatic approach. It makes a strict distinction between truth definition and truth criterion. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
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Reference |
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| Brain inexplicable | Versus | Dennett I 513 Brain ultimately inexplicable: Chomsky, McGinn, Fodor - Vs: Dennett: saltationist view. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Freedom | McGinn, C. | I 133 McGinn Thesis: Freedom as a modal force must be related to the characteristics of our brain. I 144 Modality/McGinn: modal truths are known to be a tricky and ambiguous matter. Thesis: Freedom is always freedom from something. ("subsequent relationship"). The action is not in a subsequent relationship to the set of facts in question, as long as it could have turned out differently. I 145 McGinn Thesis: The common concept of freedom requires a psychological but not a physical non-subsequent relationship. I 146 Freedom of Will/Freedom/Transcendental Naturalism/McGinn: Transcendental Naturalism/These: We basically do not know what freedom is. |
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| Brain | McGinn, C. | I 223 ff Brain/McGinn: Most messages in the brain remain without conscious counterpart - (s) > Mentalese) McGinn: Thesis: There must be a mute theory of the brain. - Interpretation: We can only interpret something that is represented - the brain must be an (unconscious) brain researcher - this also applies to the other senses. I 224 This is a correct theory (symbolic representation) of the relevant technology, not just a construction device. The theory must contain a "concept" of the nature of its object. - The brain must be able to produce all the mental phenomena it serves and react to damage. II 139 Mind/Brain/McGinn: the key is that the brain itself is not the simple spatial fact we think it is! This has to be explained. ("Before the Big Bang"). II 149 Thesis: Brains are not only inhabitants of ordinary physical space. They also exist in a spatial sphere that is literally invisible to the eye. They possess spatial attributes that are unique to them. But that does not mean that they exist in their own space, cut off from the other space. |
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