Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Malcolm, N. | Putnam Vs Malcolm, N. | IV 171 Theory Change/PutnamVsMalcolm, Norman: the new meaning is not given to the words. The sentence simply had no use previously. Meaning change/term change: some authors: you should not confuse the meaning change with a change of distribution (distribution) of a word. E.g. "go around the earth" can be a normal sentence, but no circumstances can be imagined in which the assertion of the identity of physical and mental states would not have got different. PutnamVs: this idea is not a good argument: for primitive people, it was inconceivable that the Earth would have been around. 40 years ago, the advances in modern science may have been unimaginable. The point is another: --- IV 172 Theoretical Identification: "is": (2) light is electromagnetic radiation (of this and this wavelength). (3) water is H2O. To (2): before the identification, there were two separate theoretical disciplines: optics and the theory of electromagnetic fields. It was a decision to define light as "electromagnetic radiation", justified by the following considerations: 1. it allowed to derive laws of optics from "more fundamental" laws of physics. 2. it allowed the derivation of new predictions in the reduced discipline (Optics). E.g. that the laws of geometrical optics would not apply in certain cases. (See Duhem: reduction of Kepler's laws to Newton's). For the identification of mental states with physiological states we needed not mere "correlates" of subjective states, but we needed something more far-reaching: --- IV 172/173 We must know physical states, with which we could not only predict, but also causally explain human behavior. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Various Authors | Duhem Vs Various Authors | I XXIII DuhemVsLord Kelvin: (in which mechanical models play a fundamental role). Kelvin: If I have a model, I understand, if I have none, I do not understand. - Today more set-theoretic models that Duhem certainly would not have challenged. I 254 DuhemVsMaxwell: Helmholtz established an electrodynamic theory which arises completely logically from the best-supported principles of the theory of electricity, in which no fallacies occur in the formulation of the equations, which are so common in the works of Maxwell. I 115 Newton Thesis: in healthy physics, every theorem is deduced from the phenomena and generalized by induction (DuhemVs). I 255 DuhemVsNewton: on closer inspection, the method is not as strict and simple as Newton claimed. I 257 Question: is this principle of universal gravitation then rather a simple generalization of two expressions provided by Kepler and extrapolated by Newton on the satellites? Can induction derive it from these principles? DuhemVsNewton: not at all! In fact, it is not only more general than the two expressions, it is not only different, it contradicts them. If the theory of Newton is correct, Kepler’s laws are necessarily false. I 261 DuhemVsAmpère: The mathematical theory of electrodynamics is not derived solely from experience: the raw facts of the experiment as they are by nature would not be accessible to the mathematical treatment. They must be reformed and brought into symbolic form. (Ampere did this in reality) I 263 DuhemVsInduction: The need for the physicist to express the experimental data symbolically before introducing them into his thoughts, makes the purely inductive path unusable! I 357 DuhemVsEuler: Euler follows a circular argument: Definition: A force is the force which brings a body from rest to movement. (everyday language use). I 355 We would say instead: A body which is not subjected to any force remains motionless. A body that is subjected to a constant force moves at constant speed. If the force with which a body is moved is increased, the speed of that body is increased as well. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
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