Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Field, H. Leeds Vs Field, H. Field II 304
Indeterminacy/Set Theory/ST/Leeds/Field: e.g. somebody considers the term "set" to be undetermined, so he could say instead: The term can be made "as large as possible". (Leeds 1997,24) (s) "everything that is included in the term"). As such the term can have a wider or narrower definition. Cardinality of the continuum/Indeterminacy/Field: This indeterminacy should at least contain the term set membership.
LeedsVsField: It is not coherent to accept set theory and to qualify its terms as indetermined at the same time. And it is not coherent to then apply classical logic in set theory.
Field: It could also look like this: the philosophical comments should be separated from mathematics. But we do not need to separate theory from practice, e.g. if the belief in indeterminacy is expressed in whether the degree of the mathematician's belief in the continuum hypothesis and his "doubt degree" adds up to 1 ((s) So that there is no space left for a third possibility).
Problem: A mathematician for whom it adds up to 1 could ask himself "Is the continuum hypothesis correct?" and would look for mathematical proof. A second mathematician, however, whose degree of certainty adds up to 0 ((s) since he believes in neither the continuum hypothesis nor its negation) will find it erroneous to look for proof. Each possibility deserves to be analyzed.
The idea behind indeterminacy however is that only little needs to be defined beyond the accepted axioms. ((s) no facts.)
Continuum Hypothesis/Field: Practical considerations may prefer a concept over one another in a particular context and a different one in another context.
Solution/Field: This is not a problem as long as those contexts are hold separate. But is has been shown that its usefulness is independent from the truth.
II 305
Williamsons/Riddle/Indeterminacy/Leeds/Field: (LeedsVsField): (e.g. it must be determined whether Joe is rich or not): Solution/Leeds: i) we exclude the terms in question, e.g. rich (in this example) from the markup language which we accept as "first class"
and
ii) the primary (disquotional) use of "referred" or "is true of" is only used for this markup language.
Indeterminacy/Leeds: Is because there is no uniform best way to apply the disquotional scheme in order to translate into the markup language.
Field: This is genius: To reduce all indeterminacy on the indeterminacy of the translation.
FieldVsLeeds: I doubt that a meaning can be found.
Problem: To differentiate between undetermined termini and those which are only different regarding the extension of the markup language. Especially if we have a number of translations which all have different extensions in our markup language.
Solution/Disquotationalism: It would integrate the foreign terms in its own language. We would then be allowed to cite.(Quine, 1953 b, 135. see above chap. IV II 129-30).
Problem: If we integrate "/" and "", the solution which we obtained above may disappear.
FieldVsLeeds: I fear that our objective - to exclude the indeterminacy in our own language- will not be reached.It even seems to be impossible for our scientific terms!
e.g. the root –1/√-1/Brandom/Field: The indeterminacy is still there; We can simply use the "first class" markup language to say that -1 has two roots without introducing a name like "i" which shall stand for "one of the two".
FieldVsLeeds: We can accept set theory without accepting its language as "first class". ((s) But the objective was to eliminate terms of set theory from the first class markup language and to limit "true of" and "refer" to the markup language.)
Field: We are even able to do this if we accept Platonism (FieldVsPlatonism) :
II 306
e.g. we take a fundamental theory T which has no vocabulary of set theory and only says that there is an infinite number of non-physical eternally existing objects and postulates the consistency of fundamental set theory. Consistency is then the basic term which is regulated by its own axioms and not defined by terms of set theory. (Field 1991). We then translate the language of set theory in T by accepting "set" as true of certain or all non-physical eternally existing objects and interpret "element of" in such a way that the normal axioms remain true.
Then there are different ways to do this and they render different sentences true regarding the cardinality of the continuum. Then the continuum hypothesis has no particular truth value. (C.H. without truth value).
Problem: If we apply mathematical applications to non-mathemtical fields, we do not only need consistency in mathematics but in other fields as well. And we should then assume that the corresponding theories outside mathematics can have a Platonic reformulation.
1. This would be possible if they are substituted by a nominal (!) theory.
2. The Platonic theorie could be substituted by the demand that all nominal consequences of T-plus-set theory are true.
FieldVs: The latter looks like a cheap trick, but the selected set theory does not need to be the one deciding the cardinality of the continuum.
The selected set theory for a physical or psychological theory need not to be compatible with the set theory of another domain. This shows that the truth of the metalanguage is not accepted in a parent frame of reference. It's all about instrumental usefulness.
FieldVsLeeds: We cannot exclude indeterminacy - which surpasses vagueness- in our own language even if we concede its solution. But we do not even need to do this; I believe my solution is better.

I 378
Truth/T-Theory/T-concept/Leeds: We now need to differentiate between a) Truth Theory (T-Theory) ((s) in the object language) and
b) theories on the definition of truth ((s) metalinguistic) .
Field: (1972): Thesis: We need a SI theory of truth and reference (that a Standard Interpretation is always available), and this truth is also obtainable.
(LeedsVsStandard Interpretation/VsSI//LeedsVsField).
Field/Leeds: His argument is based on an analogy between truth and (chemical)valence. (..+....)
Field: Thesis: If it would have looked as if the analogy cannot be reduced, it would have been a reason to abandon the theory of valences, despite the theory's usefulness!
Truth/Field: Thesis: (analogous to valence ): Despite all we know about the extension of the term, the term also needs a physicalistic acceptable form of reduction!
Leeds: What Field would call a physicalistic acceptable reduction is what we would call the SI theory of truth: There always is a Standard Interpretation for "true" in a language.
Field/Leeds: Field suggests that it is possible to discover the above-mentioned in the end.
LeedsVsField: Let us take a closer look at the analogy: Question: Would a mere list of elements and numbers (instead of valences) not be acceptable?
I 379
This would not be a reduction since the chemists have formulated the law of valences. Physikalism/Natural law/Leeds: Does not demand that all terms can be easily or naturally explained but that the fundamental laws are formulated in a simple way.
Reduction/Leeds: Only because the word "valence" appears in a strict law there are strict limitations imposed on the reduction.
Truth/Tarski/LeedsVsTarski: Tarski's Definitions of T and R do not tell us all the story behind reference and truth in English.
Reference/Truth/Leeds: These relations have a naturalness and importance that cannot be captured in a mere list.
Field/Reduction/Leeds: If we want a reduction à la Field, we must find an analogy to the law of valences in the case of truth, i.e. we need to find a law or a regularity of truth in English.
Analogy/Field: (and numerous others) See in the utility of the truth definition an analogy to the law.
LeedsVsField: However, the utility can be fully explained without a SI theory. It is not astonishing that we have use for a predicate P with the characteristic that"’__’ is P" and "__"are always interchangeable. ((s)>Redundancy theory).
And this is because we often would like to express every sentence in a certain infinite set z (e.g. when all elements have the form in common.) ((s) "All sentences of the form "a = a" are true"), > Generalization.
Generalization/T-Predicate/Leeds: Logical form: (x)(x e z > P(x)).
Semantic ascent/Descent/Leeds: On the other hand truth is then a convenient term, same as infinite conjunction and disjunction.
I 386
Important argument: In theory then, the term of truth would not be necessary! I believe it is possible that a language with infinite conjunctions and disjunctions can be learned. Namely, if conjunctions and disjunctions if they are treated as such in inferences. They could be finally be noted.
I 380
Truth/Leeds: It is useful for what Quine calls "disquotation" but it is still not a theory of truth (T-Theory). Use/Explanation/T-Theory/Leeds: In order to explain the usefulness of the T-term, we do not need to say anything about the relations between language and the world. Reference is then not important.
Solution/Leeds: We have here no T-Theory but a theory of the term of truth, e.g. a theory why the term is seen as useful in every language. This statement appears to be based solely on the formal characteristics of our language. And that is quite independent of any relations of "figure" or reference to the world.

Reference/Truth/Truth term/Leeds: it shows how little the usefulness of the truth term is dependent on a efficient reference relation!
The usefulness of a truth term is independent of English "depicts the world".
I 381
We can verify it: Suppose we have a large fragment of our language, for which we accept instrumentalism, namely that some words do not refer. This is true for sociology, psychology, ethics, etc. Then we will find semantic ascent useful if we are speaking about psychology for example. E.g. "Some of Freud's theories are true, others false" (instead of using "superego"!) Standard Interpretation/Leeds: And this should shake our belief that T is natural or a standard.
Tarski/Leeds: This in turn should not be an obstacle for us to define "T" à la Tarski. And then it is reasonable to assume that "x is true in English iff T (x)" is analytic.
LeedsVsSI: We have then two possibilities to manage without a SI:
a) we can express facts about truth in English referring to the T-definition (if the word "true" is used) or
b) referring to the disquotional role of the T-term. And this, if the explanandum comprises the word "true" in quotation marks (in obliqua, (s) mentioned).

Acquaintance/Russell/M. Williams: Meant a direct mental understanding, not a causal relation!
This is an elder form of the correspondence theory.
I 491
He was referring to RussellVsSkepticism: A foundation of knowledge and meaning FieldVsRussell/M. WilliamsVsRussell: das ist genau das Antackern des Begriffsschemas von außen an die Welt.
Field/M. Williams: His project, in comparison, is more metaphysical than epistemic. He wants a comprehensive physicalistic overview. He needs to show how semantic characteristics fit in a physical world.
If Field were right, we would have a reason to follow a strong correspondence theory, but without dubious epistemic projects which are normally linked to it.
LeedsVsField/M. Williams: But his argument is not successful. It does not give an answer to the question VsDeflationism. Suppose truth cannot be explained in a physicalitic way, then it contradicts the demand that there is an unmistakable causal order.
Solution: Truth cannot explain (see above) because we would again deal with epistemology (theory of knowledge).(>justification, acceptability).

Leeds I
Stephen Leeds
"Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Field, H. Soames Vs Field, H. I 467
Truth Theory/WT/Tarski/Soames: two statuses: a) as a mathematical theory with many rich results
b) philosophically significant for the concept of truth.
Truth Theory/Soames: there is controversy about what a truth theory should be; in general it should do one of the following three things:
(i) give the meaning of the truth predicate for natural languages.
(ii) replace these truth predicates reductionistically
(iii) use a previously understood truth concept to explain meaning or for other metaphysical purposes.
Proposition/Soames: for the following purposes you need propositions rather than sentences or utterances: Example
(1) a. the proposition that the earth is moving is true.
b. Church's theorem is true
c. Everything he said is true.
I 468
SoamesVsPropositions.
Truth Predicate/Generalization/Quine/Soames: e.g. to characterize realism: (5) There is a doppelgänger of the sun in a distant region of space, but we will never find sufficient evidence that he exists.
Soames: of course you can be a realist without believing (5). ((s) (5) is too special, it is only an example).
Anti-Realism/Soames: what then distinguishes it from realism? One is tempted to say:
(6) Either there is a doppelgänger of our sun.... or no doppelgänger.... and we will have no evidence at all....
I 470
SoamesVs: this leads to an infinite list that we should avoid. Solution: semantic rise:
(7) There is at least one sentence S, so that S is true (in German) but we will never find (sufficient) evidence for S.
I 472
Truth Definition/Field: consists of two parts: 1. "primitive denotation": e.g. (s) "Caesar" refers to Caesar.
2. the truth definition in terms of primitive denotation.
The result is a sentence of the metalanguage:
(8) For all sentences S of L, S is true iff T(S).
FieldVsTarski/Soames: (Field: "Tarski's Truth Theory" (this journal, I XIX, 1972): this assumption (that truth, truth and reference are physically acceptable in Tarski) is wrong!
Field: the proposed substitutions for the notions of primitive denotation are not physically acceptable reductions
I 474
of our pre-theoretical concepts of reference and truth. Soames: this is only true if Field assumes that Tarski has reduced truth to primitive denotation.
Truth-Def/Correctness/Tarski/Field/Soames: Field does not deny that the truth definition is extensionally correct.
FieldVsTarski: but extensional correctness is not sufficient.
"Cb" is a sentence and the semantic n facts about it are given in (9):
(9) a. "b" refers (in L) to Boston
b. "C" applies (in L) to cities (and cities only)
c. "Cb" is true (in L) iff Boston is a city. (speaker dependent)
Problem: you cannot just identify the facts from (10) with the facts from (9) now.
Semantic Property/Field: expressions of a language have only force through the way they are used by speakers (usage).
Problem: the facts from (9) would not have existed at all if the language behaviour (in the broadest sense) had been different!
N.B.: the facts from (10) are not dependent on speakers. Therefore they are not semantic facts. Therefore Tarski cannot reduce them to physical facts.
Truth Predicate/FieldVsTarski: it is both physicalistic and coextensive with "true in L", but it is still not a physicalistic truth concept.
Problem: the inadequacy inherits the characterization of the truth from the pseudo reductions that constitute the "base clauses" ((s) recursive definitions?) ((s) among other things for and, or etc. base clauses).
I 475
Solution/Field: we need to find real reductions for the concepts of primitive denotation or something like a model of the causal theory of reference. Field/Soames: these are again two stages:
1. Tarski's reduction from truth to primitive denotation ((s) as above)
2. an imagined reduction of the concepts of the reference of names and of the accuracy of predicates, similar to a causal theory.
Language independence/Field/Soames: if the physical facts that determine the denotation in a language do so for all languages, then the denotation applies to all languages. If logical constants and syntax are kept constant, we get a truth concept that is language independent.
Problem: 1. Reference to abstract objects ((s) for these there are no semantic facts).
2. Ontological relativity and undeterminedness of the reference.
SoamesVsField: he even understated his criticism of Tarski (FieldVsTarski)!
Tarski/Soames: because if Tarski did not reduce primitive denotation to physical facts, then he did not reduce truth to primitive denotation at all ((s) so he missed point 1).
Example two languages L1 and L2 which are identical except:
L1: here "R" applies to round things
L2: here on red things.
Truth conditional: are then different for some sentences in both languages:
(11) a. "Re" is true in L1 iff the earth is round
b. "Re" is true in L2 iff the earth is red.
Tarski/Soames: in its truth definition, this difference will be traceable back to the base clauses of the two truth definitions for each language, because here the applications of the predicates are presented in a list.
FieldVsTarski: its truth definition correctly reports that "R" applies to different things in the two languages, but it does not explain how the difference came about from the use of language by speakers.
SoamesVsField/SoamesVsTarski: Field does not say that the same accusation can be made against VsTarski
I 476
in relation to logical vocabulary and syntax in the recursive part of its definition. Example L1: could treat [(A v B)] as true if A or B is true,
L2: ...if A and B are true.
FieldVsTarski: then it is not sufficient for the characterization of truth to simply "communicate" that the truth conditions are different. It would have to be explained by the language behavior in the two different languages ((s) > speaker meaning).
FieldVsTarski: because he says nothing about language behavior (speaker meaning in a community), he does not meet the demands of physicalism ((s) to explain physical facts of behavior).
Soames: this means that Field's strategy of obtaining a real reduction of truth by supplementing Tarski with non-trivial definitions of primitive denotation cannot work. For according to Field, Tarski did not reduce truth to primitive denotation. He has reduced them at best to lists of semantic basic concepts:
(13) the term of a name referring to an object
The term of a predicate that applies to an object.
The concept of a formula which is the application of an n digit predicate to an n tuple of terms
...
I 477
Soames: but this requires a reformulation of each clause in Tarski's recursive definition. E.g. old: 14 a, new: 14.b:
(14) a. if A = [~B] , then A is true in L (with respect to a sequence s) iff B is not true in L (with respect to s).
b. If A is a negation of a formula B, then A is ....
Soames: the resulting abstraction extends the generality of truth definition to classes of 1. Level languages: these languages differ arbitrarily in syntax, plus logical and non-logical vocabulary.
SoamesVsField: Problem: this generality has its price.
Old: the original definition simply stipulated that [~A) is a negation ((s) >symbol, definition).
New: the new definition gives no indication which formulas fall into these categories.
SoamesVsField: its physicist must now reduce each of the semantic terms.
Logical Linkage/Constants/Logical Terms/Soames: we can either
a) define about truth, or
b) specify that certain symbols should be instances of these logical terms.
SoamesVsField: neither of these two paths is open to him now!
a) he cannot characterize negation as a symbol that is appended to a formula to form a new formula that is true if the original formula was false because that would be circular.
b) he cannot simply take negation as a basic concept (primitive) and determine that [~s] is the negation of s. For then there would be no facts about speakers, ((s) Language behavior, physicalistic), that would explain the semantic properties of [~s].
Soames: there are alternatives, but none is convincing.
Truth functional operator/Quine: (roots of the reference) are characterized as dispositions in a community for semantic ascent and descent.
Problem/Quine: uncertainty between classical and intuitionist constructions of linkages are inevitable.
SoamesVsField: Reduction from primitive denotation to physical facts is difficult enough.
I 478
It becomes much more difficult for logical terms. SoamesVsField: this is because semantic facts on physical facts must supervene over speakers. ((s) >speaker meaning, language behavior).
Problem: this limits adequate definitions to those that legitimize the use of semantic terms in contexts such as (15) and (16). ((s) (15) and (16) are fine, the later ones no longer).
(15) If L speakers had behaved differently, "b" (in L) would not have referred to Boston and "C" to cities and .....((s) Counterfactual Conditionals).
(16) The fact that L speakers behave the way they do explains why "b" (in L) refers to Boston, etc.
((s) Both times reference)
Soames: FieldVsTarski is convinced that there is a way to decipher (15) and (16)
that they become true when the semantic terms are replaced by physical ones and the initial clauses are constructed in such a way that they contain contingents to express physical possibilities. This is not the character of Tarski's truth definition.
I 481
Primitive Reference/language independent/SoamesVsField: For example a name n refers to an object o in a language L iff FL(n) = o. FL: is a purely mathematical object: a set of pairs perhaps. I.e. it contains no undefined semantic terms.
Truth Predicate/Truth/Theory/Soames: the resulting truth predicate is exactly what we need to metatheoretically study the nature, structure, and scope of a multiple number of theories.
Truth Definition/Language/Soames: what the truth definition does not tell us is something about the speakers of the languages to which it is applied. According to this view, languages are abstract objects.
((s) All the time you have to distinguish between language independence and speaker independence).
Language/primitive denotation/language independent/truth/SoamesVsField: according to this view languages are abstract objects, i.e. they can be understood in such a way that they essentially have their semantic properties ((s) not dependent on language behaviour or speakers, (speaker meaning), not physical. I.e. with other properties it would be another language).
I.e. it could not have turned out that expressions of a language could have denoted something other than what they actually denote. Or that sentences of one language could have had other truth conditions.
I 483
SoamesVsField: this too will hardly be able to avoid this division. Index Words/Ambiguity/Field: (p. 351ff) Solution: Contextually disambiguated statements are made unambiguous by the context. Semantic terms: should be applied to unambiguous entities.
I.e. all clauses in a truth definition must be formulated so that they are applied to tokens. Example
Negation/Field
(21) A token of [~e] is true (with respect to a sequence) iff the token of e it includes is not true (with respect to that sequence).
SoamesVsField: that does not work. Because Field cannot accept a truth definition in which any syntactic form is simply defined as a negation. ((s) Symbol, stipulates, then independent of physical facts).
Soames: because this would not explain facts about speakers by virtue of whom negative constructions have the semantic properties they have.
Semantic property(s): not negation itself, but that the negation of a certain expression is true or applies in a situation. Example "Caesar" refers to Caesar:
Would be completely independent from circumstances, speakers, even if not from the language, the latter, however, actually only concerns the metalanguage.
Solution/Soames:
(22) A token of a formula A, which is a negation of a formula B, is true (with respect to a sequence) iff a designated token of B is not true (with respect to this sequence).
"Designated"/(s): means here: explicitly provided with a truth value.

Soames I
Scott Soames
"What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Soames II
S. Soames
Understanding Truth Oxford 1999
Frege, G. Quine Vs Frege, G. Quine I 425
VsFrege: tendency to object orientation. Tendency to align sentences to names and then take the objects to name them.
I 209
Identity/Aristotle/Quine. Aristotle, on the contrary, had things right: "Whatever is predicated by one should always be predicated by the other" QuineVsFrege: Frege also wrong in "Über Sinn und Bedeutung".
QuineVsKorzybski: repeated doubling: Korzybski "1 = 1" must be wrong, because the left and right side of the equation spatially different! (Confusion of character and object)
"a = b": To say a = b is not the same, because the first letter of the alphabet cannot be the second: confusion between the sign and the object.
Equation/Quine: most mathematicians would like to consider equations as if they correlated numbers that are somehow the same, but different. Whitehead once defended this view: 2 + 3 and 3 + 2 are not identical, the different sequence leads to different thought processes (QuineVs).
I 264
according to Russell "Propositional Attitudes": believes, says, strives to, that, argues, is surprised, feares, wishes, etc. ...
I 265
Propositional attitudes create opaque contexts into which quantification is not allowed. (>) It is not permissible to replace a singular term by an equally descriptive term, without stretching the truth value here. Nor a general term by an equally comprehensive one. Also cross-references out of opaque contexts are prohibited.
I 266
Frege: in a structure with a propositional attitude a sentence or term may not denote truth values, a class nor an individual, but it works as "name of a thought" or name of a property or as an "individual term". QuineVsFrege: I will not take any of these steps. I do not forbid the disruption of substitutability, but only see it as an indication of a non-designating function.

II 201
Frege emphasized the "unsaturated" nature of the predicates and functions: they must be supplemented with arguments. (Objections to premature objectification of classes or properties). QuineVsFrege: Frege did not realize that general terms can schematized without reifying classes or properties. At that time, the distinction between schematic letters and quantifiable variables was still unclear.
II 202
"So that" is ontologically harmless. Despite the sad story of the confusion of the general terms and class names, I propose to take the notation of the harmless relative clause from set theory and to write:
"{x:Fx} and "ε" for the harmless copula "is a" (containment).
(i.e.​​the inversion of "so that").
Then we simply deny that we are using it to refer to classes!
We slim down properties, they become classes due to the well-known advantages of extensionality.
The quantification over classes began with a confusion of the general with the singular.
II 203
It was later realized that not every general term could be allocated its own class, because of the paradoxes. The relative clauses (written as term abstracts "{x: Fx}") or so-that sentences could continue to act in the property of general terms without restrictions, but some of them could not be allowed to exercise a dual function as a class name, while others could. What is crucial is which set theory is to be used. When specifying a quantified expression a variable may not be replaced by an abstraction such as: "x} Fx". Such a move would require a premise of the form (1), and that would be a higher form of logic, namely set theory:
(1) (Ey)(y = {x:Fx})
This premise tells us that there is such a class. And at this point, mathematics goes beyond logic!
III 98
Term/Terminology/Quine: "Terms", here as a general absolute terms, in part III single-digit predicates.
III 99
Terms are never sentences. Term: is new in part II, because only here we are beginning to disassemble sentences.

Applying: Terms apply.
Centaur/Unicorn/Quine: "Centaur" applies to any centaur and to nothing else, i.e. it applies to nothing, since there are no centaurs.
III 100
Applying/Quine: Problem: "evil" does not apply to the quality of malice, nor to the class of evil people, but only to each individual evil person.
Term/Extension/Quine: Terms have extensions, but a term is not the denotation of its extension.
QuineVsFrege: one sentence is not the denotation of its truth value. ((s) Frege: "means" - not "denotes").
Quine: advantage. then we do not need to assume any abstract classes.

VII (f) 108
Variables/Quine: "F", etc.: not bindable! They are only pseudo-predicates, vacancies in the sentence diagram. "p", "q", etc.: represent whole statements, they are sometimes regarded as if they needed entities whose names these statements are.
Proposition: these entities are sometimes called propositions. These are rather hypothetical abstract entities.
VII (f) 109
Frege: alternatively: his statements always denote one or the other of exactly two entities: "the true one" or "the false one". The truth values. (Frege: statements: name of truth values) Quine pro Frege: better suited to distinguish the indistinguishable. (see above: maxim, truth values indistinguishable in the propositional calculus (see above VII (d) 71).
Propositions/Quine: if they are necessary, they should rather be viewed as names for statements.
Everyday Language/Quine: it is best if we return to everyday language:
Names are one kind of expression and statements are another!
QuineVsFrege: sentences (statements) must not be regarded as names and
"p", "q" is not as variables that assume entities as values that are entities denoted by statements.
Reason: "p", "q", etc. are not bound variables! Ex "[(p>q). ~p]> ~p" is not a sentence, but a scheme.
"p", "q", etc.: no variables in the sense that they could be replaced by values! (VII (f) 111)
VII (f) 115
Name/QuineVsFrege: there is no reason to treat statements as names of truth values, or even as names.
IX 216
Induction/Fregean Numbers: these are, other than those of Zermelo and of von Neumann, immune against the trouble with the induction (at least in the TT), and we have to work with them anyway in NF. New Foundations/NF: But NF is essentially abolishing the TT!
Problem: the abolition of TT invites some unstratified formulas. Thus, the trouble with induction can occur again.
NFVsFrege: is, on the other hand, freed from the trouble with the finite nature which the Fregean arithmetic touched in the TT. There, a UA was needed to ensure the uniqueness of the subtraction.
Subtraction/NF: here there is no problem of ambiguity, because NF has infinite classes - especially θ - without ad-hoc demands.

Ad 173 Note 18:
Sentences/QuineVsFrege/Lauener: do not denote! Therefore, they can form no names (by quotation marks).
XI 55
QuineVsFrege/Existence Generalisation/Modal/Necessary/Lauener: Solution/FregeVsQuine: this is a fallacy, because in odd contexts a displacement between meaning and sense takes place. Here names do not refer to their object, but to their normal sense. The substitution principle remains valid, if we use a synonymous phrase for ")".
QuineVsFrege: 1) We do not know when names are synonymous. (Synonymy).
2) in formulas like e.g. "(9>7) and N(9>7)" "9" is both within and outside the modal operaotor. So that by existential Generalization
(Ex)((9>7) and N(9>7))
comes out and that's incomprehensible. Because the variable x cannot stand for the same thing in the matrix both times.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Frege, G. Hintikka Vs Frege, G. Cresswell I 148
Compositionality/Cresswell: It has long been known that it fails on the surface structure. (Cresswell 1973 p 77). HintikkaVsCompositionality/HintikkaVsFrege: H. says that it is simply wrong. In saying that, he ignores the deep structure. And indeed you can regard the difference of the two readings of (39) (Everybody loves somebody) in the context of the game theory as changing the order in the choice of individuals. Then you could say that the only linguistic object is the surface structure.
CresswellVsHintikka: but when it comes to that, his observations are not new. Compositionality/Cresswell: fails if we say that the two readings depend on the order in which we first process "and" then "or", or vice versa.
Nevertheless, the Frege principle (= compositionality) is in turn applicable to (44) or (45). It is treated like this in Montague. (see below Annex IV: Game-theoretical semantics).
I 149
HintikkaVsCompositionality/HintikkaVsFrege: fails even with higher order quantification. CresswellVsHintikka: this is a mistake: firstly, no compositionality is effective in the 1st order translation of sentences like (29).
But authors who use higher-order entities (Montague and Cresswell) do not see themselves as deniers of the Frege principle. Hintikka seems to acknowledge that. (1982 p 231).
I 161.
"is"/Frege/Russell: ambiguous in everyday language. HintikkaVsFrege/KulasVsFrege: (1983): not true!
Cresswell: ditto, just that "normal semantics" is not obliged to Frege-Russell anyway.

Hintikka II 45
(A) Knowledge/Knowledge Objects/Frege/Hintikka: His concern was what objects we have to assume in order to understand the logical behavior of the language, when it comes to knowledge.
Solution/Frege/Hintikka: (see below: Frege’s knowledge objects are the Fregean senses, reified, >intensional objects).
Hintikka: For me, it is primarily about the individuals of which we speak in epistemic contexts; only secondarily, I wonder if we may call them "knowledge objects".
Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsFrege: we can oppose the possible worlds semantics to his approach. (Hintikka pro possible worlds semantics).
II 46
Idea: application of knowledge leads to the elimination of possible worlds (alternatives). Possible World/Hintikka: the term is misleading, because too global.
Def Scenario/Hintikka: everything that is compatible with the knowledge of a knower. We can also call them knowledge worlds.
Set of All Possible Worlds/Hintikka: we can call it illegitimate. (FN 5).
Knowledge Object/Hintikka: can be objects, people, artifacts, etc.
Reference/Frege/Hintikka: Frege presumes a completely referential language. I.e. all our expressions stand for some kind of entities. They can be taken as Fregean knowledge objects.
Identity/Substitutability/SI/Terminology/Frege/Hintikka: SI is the thesis of the substitutability of identity ((s) only applies with limitation in intensional (opaque) contexts).
II 47
E.g. (1) ... Ramses knew that the morning star = the morning star From this it cannot be concluded that Ramses knew that the morning star = the evening star (although MS = ES).
II 48
Context/Frege/Hintikka: Frege distinguish two types of context: Direct Context/Frege/Hintikka: extensional, transparent
Indirect Context/Frege/Hintikka: intensional, opaque. E.g. contexts with "believes" (belief contexts). ((s) Terminology: "ext", "opaque", etc. not from Frege).
Frege/Hintikka: according to his own image:
(4) expression >sense >reference.
((s) I.e. according to Frege the intension determines the extension.)
Intensional Contexts/Frege/Hintikka: here, the picture is modified:
(5) Expression (>) sense (> reference)
Def Systematic Ambiguity/Frege/Hintikka: all our expressions are systematically ambiguous, i.e. they refer to different things, depending on whether they are direct (transparent, extensional) contexts or indirect ones (intensional, opaque).
Fregean Sense/Hintikka: Fregean senses in Frege are separate entities in order to be able to work at all as references in intensional contexts.
E.g. in order to be able to restore the inference in the example above (morning star/evening start) we do not need the
identity of morning star and evening star, but the.
identity of the Fregean sense of "morning star" and "evening star".
II 49
Important argument: but Frege himself does not reinterpret the identity in the expression morning star = evening star in this way. He cannot express this fact, because there identity occurs in an extensional context and later in an intensional context. Identity/Frege/Hintikka: therefore we cannot say that Frege reinterprets our normal concept of identity.
Problem: It is not even clear whether Frege can express the identity of the senses with an explicit sentence. For in his own formal language (in "Begriffsschrift"(1) and "Grundgesetze"(2)) there is no sentence that could do this. He says that himself in: "Über Sinn und Bedeutung": we can only refer to the meanings of our expressions by prefixing the prefix "the meaning of". But he never uses this himself.
(B)
Knowledge Objects/Possible World Approach/HintikkaVsFrege:
Idea: knowledge leads us to create an intentional context that forces us to consider certain possibilities. These we call possible worlds.
new: we do not consider new entities (intensional entities) in addition to the references, but we look at the same references in different possible worlds.
Morning Star/Evening Star/Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: Solution: "morning star" and "evening star" now single out the same object, namely the planet in the real world.
II 50
(C) Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsFrege: there is no systematic ambiguity here, i.e. the expressions mean the same thing intensionally as extensionally.
E.g. Knowing what John knows means knowing those possible worlds which are compatible with his belief, and knowing which are not.
II 51
Extra premise: for that it must be sure that an expression singles out the same individual in different possible worlds. Context: what the relevant possible worlds are depends on the context.
E.g. Ramses: here, the case is clear,
On the other hand:
E.g. Herzl knew Loris is a great poet
Additional premise: Loris = Hofmannsthal.
II 53
Meaning Function/Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: the difference in my approach to that of Frege is that I consider problems locally, while Frege considers them globally. Fregean Sense/(= way of givenness) Hintikka: must be considered as defined for all possible worlds.
On the other hand:
Hintikka: if Fregean sense is construed as meaning function, it must be regarded as only defined for the relevant alternatives in my approach.
Frege: precisely uses the concept of identity of senses implicitly. And as meaning function, identity is only given if the mathematical function works for all relevant arguments.
Totality/Hintikka: this concept of totality of all logically possible worlds is now highly doubtful.
Solution/Hintikka: it is precisely the possible worlds semantics that helps dispense with the totality of all possible worlds. ((s) And to consider only the relevant alternatives defined by the context).
Fregean Sense/Hintikka: was virtually constructed as an object (attitude object propositional object, thought object, belief object). This is because they were assumed as entities in the real world (actual world), however abstract.
II 54
Meaning Function/M. F./HintikkaVsFrege/Hintikka: unlike Fregean senses, meaning functions are neither here nor elsewhere. Problem/Hintikka: Frege was tempted to reify his "senses".
Knowledge Object/Thought Object/Frege/Hintikka: Frege, unlike E.g. Quine, has never considered the problem.
Existential Generalization/EG/Hintikka: entitles us to move from a sentence S(b) with a singular term "b" to the existential statement (Ex) S(x).
This fails in intensional (epistemic) contexts.
Transition from "any" to "some".
E.g. epistemic context:
(10) (premise) George IV knew that (w = w)
(11) (tentative conclusion) (Ex) George IV knew that (w = x)
II 55
Problem: the transition from (10) to (11) fails, because (11) has the strength of (12) (12) George IV knew who w is.
EG/Fail/Solution/Frege/Hintikka: Frege assumed that in intensional (opaque) contexts we are dealing with ideas of references.
HintikkaVsFrege: Problem: then (11) would follow from (10) in any case ((s) and that’s just what is not desired). Because you’d have to assume that there is definitely some kind of sense under which George IV imagines an individual w.
Problem: "w" singles out different individuals in different possible worlds.
II 56
Possible Worlds Semantics/Solution/Hintikka: E.g. Suppose. (13) George knows that S(w)
to
(14) (Ex) George knows that S(x)
where S(w) does not contain expressions that create opaque contexts.
Then we need an additional condition.
(15) (Ex) in all relevant possible worlds (w = x).
This is, however, not a well-formed expression in our notation. We have to say what the relevant possible worlds are.
Def Relevant Possible Worlds/Hintikka: are all those that are compatible with the knowledge of George.
Thus, (15) is equivalent to
(16) (Ex) George knows that (w = x).
This is the additional premise. I.e. George knows who w is. (Knowing that, knowing who, knowing what).
Knowing What/Logical Form/Hintikka/(s): corresponds to "knows that (x = y)" ((s) >single class, single quantity).
E.g. knowing that "so and so has done it" does not help to know who it was, unless you know who so and so is. ((s) i.e. however, that you know y!)
 Solution/Hintikka/(s): the set of possible worlds compatible with the knowledge)
II 57
Meaning Function/M. F./Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: in order to be a solution here, the meaning function (see above) needs to be a constant function, i.e. it must single out the same individuals in all possible worlds. Frege/Identity/Opaque Context/Hintikka: Frege had to deal with the failure of the SI (substitutability in case of identity) ((s) i.e. the individuals might have a different name), not with the failure of the Existential Generalization (EG). ((s) I.e. the individuals might not exist).
Hintikka: therefore, we need several additional premises.
Possible Worlds Semantics:
SI: here, for substitutability in case of identity, we only need on the assumption that the references of two different concepts in any possible world can be compared.
Existential Generalization: here we have to compare the reference of one and the same concept in all possible worlds.
Frege/Hintikka: now it seems that Frege could still be defended yet in a different way: namely, that we now quantify on world-lines (as entities). ((s) that would accomodate Frege’s Platonism).
II 58
World Lines/Hintikka: are therefore somehow "real"! So are they not somehow like the "Fregean senses"?. HintikkaVs: it is not about a contrast between world bound individuals and world lines as individuals.
World Lines/Hintikka: but we should not say that the world lines are something that is "neither here nor there". Using world lines does not mean reifying them.
Solution/Hintikka: we need world-lines, because without them it would not even make sense to ask at all, whether a resident of a possible world is the same one as that of another possible world. ((s) cross world identity).
II 59
World Line/Hintikka: we use it instead of Frege’s "way of givenness". HintikkaVsFrege: his error was to reify the "ways of givenness" as "sense". They are not something that exists in the actual world.
Quantification/Hintikka: therefore, in this context we need not ask "about what we quantify".
II 109
Frege Principle/FP/Compositionality/Hintikka: if we proceed from the outside inwards, we can allow a violation of Frege’s principle. (I.e. the semantic roles of the constituents in the interior are context dependent).
II 110
HintikkaVsFrege/HintikkaVsCompositionality: Thesis: meaning entities should not be created step by step from simpler ones in tandem with syntactic rules. They should instead be understood, at least in some cases, as rules of semantic analysis.

1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964
2. Gottlob Frege [1893–1903]: Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Jena: Hermann Pohle

Wittgenstein I 71
Def Existence/Wittgenstein: predicate of higher order and is articulated only by the existence quantifier. (Frege ditto).
I 72
Hintikka: many philosophers believe that this was only a technical implementation of the earlier idea that existence is not a predicate. HintikkaVsFrege: the inexpressibility of individual existence in Frege is one of the weakest points, however. You can even get by without the Fregean condition on a purely logical level.
HintikkaVsFrege: contradiction in Frege: violates the principle of expressing existence solely through the quantifier, because the thesis of inexpressibility means that through any authorized individual constant existential assumptions are introduced in the logical language.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Goodman, N. Quine Vs Goodman, N. Putnam I 259
QuineVsGoodman: of two true versions I can sometimes take one and sometimes the other, but I have to say at any time that the other one is false, or face self-contradiction. Goodman: the two versions can simply not be true in the same world! But the same accuracy of both versions shows precisely that they are true in different worlds.
Putnam I 260
QuineVsGoodman: this is a violation of the principle of austerity.
Quine II 123
Ways of Worldmaking/Goodman/Quine: motley bunch. We are currently experiencing a renaissance Leibniz' thoughts, so philosophers revel in a continuum of possible worlds. That Goodman keeps himself out of that is one of his virtues. In Goodman's View all worlds should be real! More like versions. There is no one world whose versions they would be. He would prefer to be satisfied with versions and jilt the world or the worlds. He appreciates the creative component of the natural sciences: even the simplest law is a Generalization that goes beyond the individual cases.
II 123/124
The observation itself also contains a creative element: We overlook properties that do not interest us. We perceive figures in broad outlines and complain about discontinuities. We fill out and complete. At the opposite extreme, theoretical physics, creativity is one part observation, ninety-nine parts conceptualization.
Can't there be a radically different conceptual structure to which all observations correspond, but that could not be translated into our scheme? Our own theory and that other one would be two world versions. Of the world? What would the world be? We should recognize both and leave it at that.
Quine: This is sure to alienate a large number of readers, not me! But he pushes on, to where I no longer will go:
Other world version: that of common sense that does not reflect a world of atoms and core particles, but one made of sticks, stones, people and other brutish objects.
Further, fragmentary world versions: The styles of different painters. Accordingly, he opposes the world of Rembrandt to the world Rouault or Picasso. Even in abstract painting and music there are versions. How is that possible when they represent nothing?
They refer in a different way. They serve as a pattern of interesting features and qualities. Significant continuity between exemplification and depiction as well as between depiction and description.
QuineVsGoodman: one has the impression that this series of worlds drowns in absurdities.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Heidegger, M. Quine Vs Heidegger, M. V 127
Identity/Everyday Language/Individuation/Reference/Quine: also identity is part of our referential apparatus, but it is obscure in everyday language, because we use it without clear individuation principle. E.g. Do two editions of a novel have the same hero? How unlike may the heroes be? Or e.g. how unlike may the editions be to still be considered as versions of the same novel?
E.g. Was Baal the devil? E.g. Did the Indians rever God by worshiping the Great Spirit?
Identity/Possible Worlds/PoWo/Quine: all these examples fall under the issue of cross-world identity. Identity in various possible worlds.
Differently:
Attributes/Identity/Quine: E.g. when attributes are coextensive, they are not necessarily the same attribute. But when are they anyway?
Wrong solution: some say in case of "necessary co-extensivity" the two attributes are identical.
QuineVs: that only shifts the problem.
Ontology/QuineVsHeidegger: we do not clarify ontological ambiguities by taking everyday language literally and sifting through it. (>Existence, >value of a bound variable).
((s) primacy of language not in ontology).
V 128
Solution/Quine: it is the other way round: one comes up with something and gears language towards it! Existence/Ontology/Language Learning/Quine: the existing things are genetically nothing but an interplay of grammatical analogies that cover up the differences in the forms of learning. In the center is talk of objects. Ontology begins with the Generalization of object study. (see above: e.g. color words, which, as you learn, do indeed not refer to individual things).
Grammar is thus simplified, ontology is multiplied.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Modal Logic Quine Vs Modal Logic Chisholm II 185
QuineVsModal Logic: instead space time points as quadruples. Reason: permanent objects (continuants) seem to threaten the extensionality. SimonsVsQuine: the Achilles heel is that we must have doubts whether anyone could learn a language that refers not to permanent objects (continuants).
---
Lewis IV 32
QuineVsModal Logic: which properties are necessary or accidental, is then dependent on the description. Definition essentialism/Aristotle: essential qualities are not dependent on description.
QuineVs: that is as congenial as the whole modal logic.
LewisVsQuine: that really is congenial.
---
I 338
But modal logic has nothing to do with it. Here, totally impersonal. The modal logic, as we know it, begins with Clarence Lewis "A survey of Symbolic Logic" in 1918. His interpretation of the necessity that Carnap formulates even more sharply later is: Definition necessity/Carnap: A sentence that starts with "it is necessary that", is true if and only if the remaining sentence is analytic.
Quine provisionally useful, despite our reservations about analyticity.
---
I 339
(1) It is necessary that 9 > 4 it is then explained as follows:
(2) "9 > 4" is analytically.
It is questionable whether Lewis would ever have engaged in this matter, if not Russell and Whitehead (Frege following) had made the mistake, the philonic construction:
"If p then q" as "~ (p and ~ q)"
if they so designate this construction as a material implication instead of as a material conditional.
C.I.Lewis: protested and said that such a defined material implication must not only be true, but must also be analytical, if you wanted to consider it rightly as an "implication". This led to his concept of "strict implication".
Quine: It is best to view one "implies" and "is analytical" as general terms which are predicated by sentences by adding them predicatively to names (i.e. quotations) of sentences. Unlike "and", "not", "if so" which are not terms but operators.
Whitehead and Russell, who took the distinction between use and mention lightly, wrote "p implies q" (in the material sense) as it was with "If p, then q" (in the material sense) interchangeable.
---
I 339
Material implication "p implies q" not equal to "p > q" (>mention/>use) "implies" and "analytical" better most general terms than operators. Lewis did the same, he wrote "p strictly implies q" and explained it as "It is necessary that not (p and not q)". Hence it is that he developed a modal logic, in which "necessary" is sentence-related operator.
If we explain (1) in the form of (2), then the question is why we need modal logic at all.
---
I 340
An apparent advantage is the ability to quantify in modal positions. Because we know that we cannot quantify into quotes, and in (2) a quotation is used. This was also certainly Lewis' intention. But is it legitimate?
---
I 341
It is safe that (1) is true at any plausible interpretation and the following is false: (3) It is necessary that the number of planets > 4
Since 9 = the number of planets, we can conclude that the position of "9" in (1) is not purely indicative and the necessity operator is therefore opaque.
The recalcitrance of 9 is based on the fact that it can be specified in various ways, who lack the necessary equivalence. (E.g. as a number of planets, and the successor to the 8) so that at a specification various features follow necessarily (something "greater than 4 ") and not in the other.
Postulate: Whenever any of two sentences determines the object x clearly, the two sentences in question are necessary equivalent.
(4) If Fx and only x and Gx and exclusively x, it is necessary that (w)(Fw if and only if when Gw).
---
I 342
(This makes any sentence p to a necessary sentence) However, this postulate nullifies modal distinctions: because we can derive the validity of "It is necessary that p" that it plays no role which true sentence we use for "p".
Argument: "p" stands for any true sentence, y is any object, and x = y. Then what applies clearly is:
(5) (p and x = y) and exclusively x
as
(6) x = y and x exclusively
then we can conclude on the basis of (4) from (5) and (6):
(7) It is necessary that (w) (p and w = y) if and only if w = y)
However, the quantification in (7) implies in particular "(p and y = y) if and only if y = y" which in turn implies "p"; and so we conclude from (7) that it is necessary that p.
---
I 343
The modal logic systems by Barcan and Fitch allow absolute quantification in modal contexts. How such a theory can be interpreted without the disastrous assumption (4), is far from clear. ---
I 343
Modal Logic: Church/Frege: modal sentence = Proposition Church's system is structured differently: He restricts the quantification indirectly by reinterpreting variables and other symbols into modal positions. For him (as for Frege) a sentence designated then, to which a modal operator is superior, a proposition. The operator is a predicate that is applied to the proposition. If we treat the modalities like the propositional attitude before, then we could first (1) reinterpret
(8) [9 > 4] is necessary
(Brackets for class)
and attach the opacity of intensional abstraction.
One would therefore interpret propositions as that what is necessary and possible.
---
I 344
Then we could pursue the model from § 35 and try to reproduce the modality selectively transparent, by passing selectively from propositions to properties: (9) x (x > 4) is necessary in terms 9.
This is so far opposed to (8) as "9" here receives a purely designated position in one can quantify and in one can replace "9" by "the number of planets".
This seemed to be worth in the case of en, as we e.g. wanted to be able to say
(§ 31), there would be someone, of whom is believed, he was a spy (> II).
But in the case of modal expressions something very amazing comes out. The manner of speaking of a difference of necessary and contingent properties of an object.
E.g. One could say that mathematicians are necessarily rational and not necessarily two-legged, while cyclist are necessarily two-legged but not necessarily rational. But how can a bicycling mathematician be classified?
Insofar as we are talking purely indicatively of the object, it is not even suggestively useful to speak of some of its properties as a contingent and of others as necessary.
---
I 344
Properties/Quine: no necessary or contingent properties (VsModal Logic) only more or less important properties Of course, some of its properties are considered essential and others unimportant, some permanently and others temporary, but there are none which are necessary or contingent.
Curiously, exactly this distinction has philosophical tradition. It lives on in the terms "nature" and "accident". One attributes this distinction to Aristotle. (Probably some scholars are going to protest, but that is the penalty for attributing something to Aristotle.)
---
I 345
But however venerable this distinction may be, it certainly cannot be justified. And thus the construction (9) which carries out this distinction so elegantly, also fails. We cannot blame the analyticity the diverse infirmities of modality.
There is no alternative yet for (1) and (2) that at least sets us a little on something like modal logic. We can define
"P is necessary" as "P = ((x) (x = x))".
Whether (8) thereby becomes true, or whether it is at all in accordance with the equation of (1) and (2), will depend on how closely we construct the propositions in terms of their identity. They cannot be constructed so tightly that they are appropriate to the propositional properties.
But how particularly the definition may be, something will be the result that a modal logic without quantifiers is isomorphic.
---
VI 41
Abstract objects/modal logic/Putnam/Parsons: modal operators can save abstract objects. QuineVsModal Logic: instead quantification (postulating of objects) thus we streamline the truth functions. Modal logic/Putnam/Parsons/Quine: Putnam and Charles Parsons have shown how abstract objects can be saved in the recourse to possibility operators.
Quine: without modal operators:
  E.g. "Everything is such that unless it is a cat and eats spoiled fish, and it gets sick, will avoid fish in the future."
((s) logical form/(s): (x) ((Fx u Gx u Hx)> Vx).
Thus, the postulation of objects can streamline our only loosely binding truth functions, without us having to resort to modal operators.
---
VI 102
Necessity/opportunity/Quine: are insofar intensional, as they do not fit the substitutivity of identity. Again, vary between de re and de dicto. ---
VI 103
Counterfactual conditionals, unreal conditionals/Quine: are true, if their consequent follows logically from the antecedent in conjunction with background assumptions. Necessity/Quine: by sentence constellations, which are accepted by groups. (Goes beyond the individual sentence).
---
VI 104
QuineVsModal logic: its friends want to give the necessity an objective sense. ---
XI 52
QuineVsModal Logic/Lauener: it is not clear here on what objects we are referring to. ---
XI 53
Necessesity/Quine/Lauener: ("Three Grades of Modal Involvement"): 3 progressive usages: 1. as a predicate for names of sentences: E.g. "N "p"": "p is necessarily true". (N: = square, box). This is harmless, simply equate it with analyticity.
2. as an operator which extends to close sentence: E.g. "N p": "it is necessarily true that p"
3. as an operator, too, for open sentences: E.g. "N Fx": through existence Generalization: "(Ex) N Fx".

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Parsons, Ter. Hilbert Vs Parsons, Ter. I 37
Non-existent Objects/unrealized possibilities/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: Thesis: there are non-existent objects in the real world. (>Possibilia). HintikkaVsQuine: the philosophers who reject it have thought too strongly in syntactic paths.
Hintikka. Thesis: one must answer the question rather semantically (model theoretically).
Fiction/Ryle: Test: is the paraphrase valid?
Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryle's test is missing in cases like "Mr. Pickwick is a fiction".
HintikkaVsParsons: the relevance of the criterion is questionable at all.
I 38
Ontology/Language/linguistically/HintikkaVsRyle: how should linguistic questions such as paraphrasability decide on ontological status? Solution/Hintikka: for the question whether there are non-existent objects: Model theory.
E.g. Puccini's Tosca: here the question is whether the soldiers have bullets in their gun barrels. ((s) sic, by Puccini, not by Verdi).
N.B.: even if they did, they would only be fictitious! ((s) within history).
((s) I.e. so that the story can be told at all, one must assume that the corresponding sentence can be decided with "true" or "false", depending on whether there are bullets in the gun barrels. Otherwise the sentence would be incomprehensible.)
Model Theory/Hintikka: provides a serious answer. ((s) "true in the model" means, in history it is true that bullets are in the gun barrels).
HintikkaVsParsons: one should not argue too strongly syntactically, i.e. not only ask which conclusions may be drawn and which may not.
Acceptance/Acceptability/Inferences/Hintikka: ask about the acceptability of inferences and of language and intuitions are syntactic.
Singular Term/Ontological Obligation/Existence/Parsons: Parsons says that the use of singular terms obliges us to an existential Generalization. And thus to a speaker. I.e. it is an obligation to an inference.
HintikkaVsParsons.
I 41
Non-existent Objects/possible object/unrealized possibilities/Hintikka: but are some of these non-existent objects not in our own actual world (real world)? Hintikka: Thesis: yes, some of these merely possible objects are in the real world. Bona fide object/Hintikka: can exist in one possible world and be missing in another.
World line/Hintikka: when it comes to which ones can be drawn, existence is not the most important problem. Rather well-defined.
HintikkaVsLeibniz: we also allow an object to exist in several possible worlds.
Question: if inhabitants of two different possible worlds can be identical, when are they identical?
I 42
Existential Generalisation/EG/HintikkaVsParsons: this shows that his criterion of the existential generalization is wrong, because it can fail for reasons that have nothing to do with non-existence. Example:
(1) Queen Victoria knew that Lewis Carroll is Lewis Carroll
one cannot infer from this, even though Caroll existed, and the Queen knew this, that
(2) (Ex)Queen Victoria knew that Lewis was Carroll x.
And therefore
(3) Someone is such that Queen Victoria knew he was Lewis Carroll.
(2) and (3) say the same thing as
(4) Queen Victoria knew who Lewis Carroll was.
But this is not entailed by (1).
Existential Generalization/EG/Hintikka: the equivalence of (2)-(3) with (4) is completely independent of whether the quantifiers only go over existing or also over non-existent objects.
The reason for the failure of the existential Generalization is not a failure of unambiguousness.
However, unambiguousness fails, because in different situations it is compatible with the Queen's knowledge, the name Lewis Carroll can be applied to different persons.
Therefore, not only a single, particular object can function as a value of "x".
Therefore, the existential Generalization does not apply and (1) and yet it can be understood as committing the external to the existence of Lewis Carroll. Therefore, Parson's criterion fails.
Possible Worlds Stalnaker Vs Possible Worlds I 49
Possible world/poss.w./knowledge/mathematics/StalnakerVsLewis/Stalnaker: I am inclined to say that the poss.w.-theory makes assumptions about the nature of their properties that are - unlike the corresponding assumptions of mathematical platonism - incompatible with the representation of the connection between the knowledge subjects and their objects in the case of poss.w.. poss.w./MR/VsModal realism/knowledge/verificationism/StalnakerVsLewis: the modal realist cannot cite any verificationist principles for what he calls his knowledge.
Conclusion: problem: the MR cannot on the one hand say that poss.w. things are of the same kind as the actual world (contingent physical objects) and say on the other hand that poss.w. are things of which we know by the same kind like of numbers, sets, functions. ((s) Namely no real existing things.).
I 53
StalnakerVsLewis: he contradicts himself because his other thesis about poss.w. about which we can have substantial beliefs contradicts his definition of content (see above).
I 58
Contradiction/Lewis: there is no object howsoever fantastic about which one could tell the truth by contradicting oneself. Footnote:
Takashi YagisawaVsLewis: why not? What should you expect otherwise? Impossible things are impossible.

II 20
Belief ascription/solution/Stalnaker: I always wonder how the poss.w. would be according to what the believer believes. E.g. Pierre: for him there are two cities (Londres and London)
E.g. Lingens in the library: for him there are two men, one named "Lingens" about which the other reads something.
Relations theory/RelTh/Stalnaker: this can reconcile with the assumption that propositions are the belief objects. (Team: Stalnaker pro Relations theory? (1999))
Index/belief/Stalnaker: nevertheless I believe that convictions have an irreducible indexical element.
Solution/Lewis: sets of centered poss.w. as belief objects.
StalnakerVsLewis: although I have accepted that such poss.w. then include a representation of the mental state of the believer.
But that is not what it is about! It is not sufficient that poss.w. that are compatible with one's convictions then include a person who has these convictions (> e.g. Lingens), the believer must identify himself with the person who has this thought!
Proposition/identification/self-identification/Stalnaker: I am not suggesting that this identification is fulfilled by the belief in a proposition.
I now think that this is not at all about some kind of cognitive performance.
Indexical conviction/Stalnaker: (E.g. Perry: memory loss, library, e.g. Lewis: 2 gods (2 omniscient gods, e.g. Castaneda: memory loss): indexical unknowing.
Stalnaker: thesis: people do not differ in what they believe.
II 21
E.g. O'Leary knows that he is in the basement and that Daniels is in the kitchen. And Daniels knows the same thing: that he is in the kitchen and O'Leary in the basement. Everyone knows who and where he is and who and where the other is. The poss.w. that are compatible with the convictions of the two are the same. They argue about nothing.
Yet there is an obvious difference in their doxastic situation: O'Leary identifies himself with the one in the basement and Daniels identifies himself as one who is in the kitchen.
poss.w. semantics/StalnakerVsPossible worlds semantics/Stalnaker: this difference in the belief states of the two is not reflected by a set of poss.w. as belief state.
Solution/Lewis: self-ascription of properties, or - equivalently - sets of centered poss.w..
StalnakerVsLewis: I do not want that.
StalnakerVsLewis: problem: it is wrong to treat the difference in perspective as a dispute (disagreement). The two argue about nothing.
Problem: it is not sure if one can express their agreement with the fact that the set of their uncentered poss.w. is the same. Because
E.g. Heimson/Perry/Stalnaker: (Heimson believes "I am David Hume") all his impersonal beliefs about Hume are correct. Suppose they are the same convictions as the convictions of Hume about Hume.
Stalnaker: nevertheless it would be wrong to say that they argue about nothing. ((s) unlike O'Leary and Daniels).

II 134
Localization/space/time/self-localization/logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: set of poss.w. from which one selects one.
Self-localization/physical: in space and time. We usually know where we are. ((s) but we never know all poss.w. in which we could be localized, we cannot distinguish all poss.w. because we do not know everything).
Gods example/Stalnaker: the two know exactly where they are in the logical space.
II 135
But they do not know where within this poss.w. they are. LewisVsTradition: the doctrine of the proposition is focused only on one of the two types of localized belief.
Generalization: is what we need and for that the transition from propositions to properties (as belief objects) serves.

II 144
Gods example/Stalnaker: this is also a case of unknowing, which of two indistinguishable poss.w. is actual. One is actually the actual world while the other exactly the sam, with the exception that the god who sits in the actual world on the highest mountain is this time sitting on the coldest mountain and in fact with all the properties that the god on the highest mountain actually has.
((s) two individuals change places but keep all the properties. This is only possible if localization is not a property)
Omniscience/Stalnaker: then you have to say, the two gods are not really omniscient regarding propositions, but rather omniscient in relation to purely qualitative criteria.
LewisVsStalnaker: Lewis rejects this explanation for two reasons:
1. because he represents the counterpart theory (c.th.) that makes the cross world identity superfluous or meaningless.
2. even without counterpart it would not work because
Assuming that the two gods of world W have traded places in world V assuming the god on the highest knows that his world is W, not V. Assuming he is omniscient with respect to all propositions not only the qualitative propositions.
II 145
V: the world V cannot be relevant because he knows that he does not live there. Problem: there are still two mountains in a poss.w. W where he after all what he knows can live.
StalnakerVsLewis: that does not answer the question: you cannot simply stipulate that the God in W knows something and not V. Because after the explanation we proposed that leads to the fact that he knows on which mountain he lives.
Lewis/Stalnaker: his explanation is plausible if one conceives it as a metaphor for a location in the logical space:
logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: assume that a map of the logical space divided into large regions match the poss.w. and in smaller subdivisions represent the locations within poss.w..
Important argument: then we can tell someone in which large region he is without telling him exactly where he is located in it.
Modal Realism/MR/logical space/Stalnaker: for him this image might be appropriate.
Actualism/logical space/localization/Stalnaker: for the actualism this image is misleading: to know in which country you are is different to know where in the country you are but it is not so clear that there is a difference between the fact that one knows anything about in which poss.w. one is and knowing which poss.w. is the actual.
Lewis also admits this.
Stalnaker: my approach seems to be really close to the one of Lewis, but no.
Centered poss.w.: one should perhaps instead of indistinguishable poss.w. speak of centered worlds (after Quine). These are then distinguishable.
Indistinguishability/poss.w./Stalnaker: distinct but indistinguishable poss.w. would then be the same worlds but with different centers.
Attitude/properties/propositions/centered world/Lewis: to treat objects of attitudes as sets of centered poss.w. makes them to properties instead of propositions.
Centered poss.w./Stalnaker: I agree that possible situations normally, perhaps even essential, are centered in the sense of a representation of a particular mental state.
II 146
StalnakerVsLewis: but this makes the approach (gods example) more complicated when it comes to the relations between different mental states. E.g. to compare past with current states is then more difficult, or relations between the convictions of different people.
Information/communication/Stalnaker: we need then additional explanation about how information is exchanged. Two examples:
E.g. O'Leary is freed from his trunk and wonders at around nine:
a) "What time was it when I wondered what time it was?"
Stalnaker: that is the same question like the one he asked then.
When he learns that it was three o'clock, his doubt has been eliminated.
Solution: the doubt is eliminated since all possible situations (poss.w.) in which a thought occurs at two different times are involved. The centers of these situations have moved in the sense that it is now nine o'clock and O'Leary no longer in the trunk but it may be that the first occurrence of the then thought is what O'Leary is now thinking about.
Important argument: this moving of the center does not require that the poss.w. that the propositions characterize are changed.
b) "What time was it when I wondered if it was three or four?". (If he wondered twice)
Indistinguishability: even if the two incidents were indistinguishable for O'Leary, it may still be that it was the first time which O'Leary remembers at around nine o'clock.
StalnakerVsLewis: his approach is more complicated. According to his approach we have to say at three o'clock, O'Leary wonders about his current temporal localization in the actual world (act.wrld.) instead of wondering in what poss.w. he is.
Versus: at nine, things are quite different: now he wonders if he lives in a poss.w. in which a particular thought occurred at three or four. This is unnecessarily complicated.
E.g. Lingens, still in the library, meets Ortcutt and asks him "Do you know who I am?" – "You are my cousin, Rudolf Lingens!".
Stalnaker: that seems to be a simple and successful communication. Information was requested and given. The question was answered.
II 147
Proposition/Stalnaker: (Propositions as belief objects) Ortcutt's answer expresses a proposition that distinguishes between possible situations and eliminates Lingen's doubt. StalnakerVsLewis: according to his approach (self-ascription of properties), it is again more complicated:
Lingens: asks if he correctly ascribes himself a certain set of properties i.
Ortcutt: answers by ascribing himself a completely different set of properties.
Lingens: has to conclude then subsequently himself the answer. So all the answers are always indirect in communication. ((s) also StalnakerVsChisholm, implicit).
Communication/Lewis/Chisholm/StalnakerVsLewis/StalnakerVsChsholm: everyone then always speaks only about himself.
Solution/Stalnaker: Lewis would otherwise have to distinguish between attitudes and speech acts and say that speech acts have propositions as object and attitudes properties as an object.
Problem/StalnakerVsLewis: Lewis cannot say by intuition that the content of Ortcutt's answer is the information that eliminates Lingen's doubt.
That is also a problem for Perry's approach. (> StalnakerVsPerry)

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Quine, W.V.O. Fodor Vs Quine, W.V.O. Esfeld I 62
FodorVsQuine: (and Lepore): the confirmation holism and verificationism refer to different things: Verificationism: refers to linguistic things. Confirmation holism: refers to cross-language entities like propositions. EsfeldVsFodor: However, if we assume beliefs, we can summarize both.
Fodor II 114
Language/Behavior/Meaning/Quine/Fodor: but even if there were an identifiable property, how could we justify the assertion, assuming we had found it? Quine: (The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics): Test for the question of whether S is a grammatical phoneme sequence: whether the expression triggers puzzlement. FodorVsQuine: that will fail in both directions: 1) almost all expressions in everyday language are ungrammatical! 2) Almost every grammatical sentence may cause puzzlement in certain situations! Our intuitions about grammar are often not consistent with grammar as such. On the other hand, intuition in semantics is far less reliable than in grammar.
Fodor/Lepore IV 54
Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: his argument is a fallacy of equivocation! ((s) Between statement and formula). (Namely:
IV 52
Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Def immanence of confirmation: the thesis that, because confirmation is defined through types of entities whose connection IV 53 to a particular theory is essential, it does not have to be possible to construct such questions as if it were about whether two theories match regarding their confirmation conditions.).
IV 76/77
Child/Language Acquisition/Language Learning/Quine: perhaps the child has a background (perhaps innate), E.g. about the character of his dialect? Anyway, in that case it differs from that of the linguist in that it is not a bootstrapping. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: this is totally unjustified. His choice of a WT does not justify true belief and provides no knowledge. But then you cannot attribute any knowledge of the language to the child! Solution: Children know the language in the sense that they can speak it, therefore they have any possible true belief that the speaking may require ((s) and that is compatible with it, i.e. goes beyond that). Not even Quine believes that the epistemic situation of the child is fully characterized by the fact that the observational data are determined. Somehow, even the child generalizes. Problem: the principles of generalization, in turn, cannot have been learned. (Otherwise regress). They must be innate. Solution/Quine: similarity space. Likewise: Skinner: "intact organism" with innate dispositions to generalize in one, but not in the other direction. Hume: Association mechanisms, "intrinsic" in human nature, etc. - - - Note
IV 237
13> IV 157 o
Causal Theory: many philosophers consider causal relationships constitutive of semantic properties, but their examples always refer to specific intuitions about specific cases, E.g. that we need to distinguish the mental states of twins (Twin Earth?). Quine: he has, in contrast, no problem in explaining why that which causally causes consent must be the same that specifies the truth conditions. For Davidson rightly writes that, for Quine, these are the "sensory criteria" which Quine treats as evidence. And as a verificationist, Quine takes the evidence relation (evidence) as ipso facto constitutive of semantic relations. ((s): relation/relation). VsQuine: the price he has to pay for it is that he has no argument against skepticism!.
IV 218
Intuitionism/Logic/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Quine favors an ecumenical story, according to which the logical connections (connectives) signify different things, depending on whether they are used in classical or intuitionistic logic. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: as long as there is no trans-theoretical concept of sentence identity, it is unclear how it is ever to be detected.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Quine, W.V.O. Chisholm Vs Quine, W.V.O. III 86
Analytic/Synthetic/Chisholm: many authors maintain that the distinction is untenable.
III 87
1. for that one would have to speak of necessity 2. from the behavior of people it is not evident that their language is such that it is necessarily true: if a certain expression applies to something, then it applies also another way of saying the same thing.
3. The behavior does also not show the need that two expressions must apply to the same thing.
ChisholmVsQuine/Chisholm: That together, if it were true, would be insufficient to show that the distinction is untenable. An additional premise would have to contain a philosophical Generalization on the conditions for such a distinction.
Generalization/Chisholm: how would it be defended: we see that in connection with the question of the criterion (see below) and skepticism (see below) -
ChisholmVsQuine: none of the possible Generalizations was ever defended. Therefore, it is not true that the distinction analytic/synthetic was proved untenable.
Simons I 124
Event/occurrents/Ontology/Chisholm/Simons: Chisholm disproves three arguments for the ontology of events (occurrences): (Chisholm 1976, Appendix A) 1. Argument of spatial analogy: there is a great disanalogy between space and time: a thing cannot be in two different places at the same time, but a thing can be in the same place at two different times.
ChisholmVs: this is not conclusive, a defender of temporal parts can argue against it. But then he can use this argument to argue for his thesis without circularity.
2. Argument of change: for example, how can Philip be drunk once and sober once? For him, both are contradictory together.
ChisholmVsFour-Dimensionalism/Solution: instead of saying a time stage of Philip is (timelessly) drunk, we simply say in everyday language: he was drunk last night and is now sober.
Either we use grammatical times like in everyday language or we relativize our predicates to the time ((s) "have-at-t", "be-at-t".)
3. Argument of the river (not "flux-argument"): Example
River/QuineVsHeraclitus: Quine uses the temporal extension of the river on the same level as the spatial extension.
ChisholmVsQuine: not every sum of river stages is a river process.
I 125
Solution/Chisholm: we have to say what conditions a sum has to meet to be a river process. ChisholmVsQuine: Problem: this again requires continuants: (river banks, human observers) or a theory of absolute space or the introduction of a technical term ((s) predicate) "is cofluvial with").
Problem: this can only be understood in terms of "is the same flux as". So circular.
VsFour-Dimensionalism/VsProcess-Ontology: he did not succeed in eliminating all singular or general terms that denote continuants.

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Quine, W.V.O. Grover Vs Quine, W.V.O. Horwich I 356
T-Predicate/truth-predicate/Generalization/Semantic Ascent/Quine: (1970): the T-predicate is not used to generalize E.g. "Dick is mortal", "Tom is ..." ((s) that is possible with "x"), but for the generalization of "Tom is mortal or not mortal." ((s) If "a or b" is true, then a is true or b is true or both. Where now "a" represents an entire sentence and unlike "x" which stands for an individual). Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB: pro.
GroverVsQuine/CGBVsQuine: For that, however, you need no quantification over sentences or propositions in the sense that we attribute a characteristic with the T-predicate.
Pro-sentence: is used quantificatorically here, therefore English* without T-predicate is sufficient.
Solution: for every proposition, either it is true or it is not true that it is true.
Important argument: "is true" has a dual role here:
1) It seems necessary in order to make the link "it is not true that".
2) It works as quantificatorical pro-sentence. With it, the quantifying expression is anaphorized "for each proposition".
CGBVsQuine: this should be called semantic ascent. See also T-Predicate (truth predicate).

Grover I
D. L. Grover
Joseph L. Camp
Nuel D. Belnap,
"A Prosentential Theory of Truth", Philosophical Studies, 27 (1975) pp. 73-125
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Russell, B. Hintikka Vs Russell, B. II 165
On Denoting/Russell/Hintikka: (Russell 1905) Problem: with phrases that stand for genuine constituents of propositions. Problem/Frege: failure of substitutivity of identity (SI) in intensional contexts.
Informative Identity/Frege: the fact that identity can even sometimes be informative is connected to this.
EG/Existential Generalization/Russell: it, too, may fail in in intensional contexts, (problem of empty terms).
HintikkaVsRussell: he does not recognize the depth of the problem and rather circumvents the problems of denoting terms.
E.g. The bald king of France/Russell: Problem: we cannot prove by existential Generalization that there is a present king of France.
HintikkaVsRussell: But there are also other problems. (see below for ambiguity of cross world identificaiton).
Description/Russell/Hintikka:
Def Primary Description: the substitutivity of identity applies to them (SI)
Def secondary description: for them, substitutivity of identity (SI) fails.
II 166
Existential Generalization/Russell: two readings: (1) George IV did not know whether Scott was the author of Waverley.
Description/Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: "the author of Waverley": (ix)A(x)
primarily: the description has the following power:
(2) (Ex)[A(x) & (y) A(y) > y = x) & ~ George IV knew that (Scott = x)].
((s) notation: quantifier here always normal existential quantifier, mirrored E).
I.e. the quantifier has the maximum range in the primary identification.
The second reading is more likely, however: Secondary:
(3) ~George IV knew that (Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x & (Scott = x)].
((s) narrow range):
Range/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not know that there is also a third option for the range of a quantifier ((s) >"medium range"/Kripke).
(4) ~(Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x ) & George IV knew that (Scott = x)].
II 166
Existential Generalization/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not see that there was a reason for the failure of the existential generalization, which is not caused by the non-existence of the object. E.g.
(5) George IV knew that the author of Waverley is the author of Waverley.
a) trivial interpretation:
I 167
(6) George IV knew that (Ex)(A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x)) everyday language translation: he knew that one and only one person wrote Waverley.
I 166
b) non-trivial interpretation: (7) (Ex)(A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x) & George IV knew that (A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x))).
((s) no quantifier after "knew that
everyday language translation: George knew of the only person who actually wrote Waverley, that they did.
Because knowledge implies truth, (7) is equivalent to
(8) (Ex) George IV knew that (Ez)(A(z) & (y)(A(y) > y = z) & x = z).
this is equivalent to.
(9) (Ex) George IV knew that (the author of Waverley = x)
Here, the description has secondary (narrow) range.
Everyday language translation: George knew who the author of Waverley is.
I 167
Knowledge/Who/What/Where/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell cannot explicitly analyze structures of the form knows + W-sentence. General: (10) a knows, who (Ex x) is so that A(x)
becomes
(11) (Ex) a knows that A(x).
Hintikka: this is only possible if we modify Russell’s approach:
Problem: the existential Generalization now collapses in a way that cannot be attributed to non-existence, and which cannot be analyzed by Russell’s Theory of Descriptions (ThoD).
Problem: for every person, there are a lot of people whose names they know and of whose existence they know, but of who they do not know who they are.
II 168
E.g. Charles Dodgson was for Queen Victoria someone of whom she had heard, but whom she did not know. Problem: if we assume that (11) is the correct analysis of (10), the following applies.
(12) ~(Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x)
But that’s trivially false, even according to Russell.
Because the following is certainly true:
(13) Victoria knew that Dodgson = Dodgson)
Existential Generalization/EG: then yields
(14) (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x)
So exactly the negation of (12) contradiction.
II 168
Descriptions/Hintikka: are not involved here. Therefore, Russell’s description theory cannot help here, either. E.g. we can also assume that Victoria knew of the existence of Dodgson.
Empty Terms/Empty Names: are therefore not the problem, either.
Ontology/Hintikka: so our problem gets an ontological aspect.
Existential Generalization/EG/Being/Quine/Ontology/Hintikka: the question of whether existential Generalization may be applied on a singular term "b", E.g. in a context "F(b)", is the same as whether b may be value of a bound variable.
Existential Generalization/Hintikka: does not fail here because of non-existence.
II 169
We are dealing with the following problems here: Manifestation used by
a) no SI Frege, Russell
b) no EG
(i) due to non-existence Russell
(ii) because of ambiguity Hintikka
Ambiguity/Solution/Hintikka: possible worlds semantics.
E.g. (12) - (14) the problem is not that Dodgson did not exist in the actual world or not in one of Victoria’s worlds of knowledge, but that the name Dodgson singles out different individuals in different possible worlds.
Hence (14) does not follow from (13).
II 170
Existential Generalization/EG/Ambiguity/Clarity/Russell/Hintikka: Which way would have been open to Russell?. Knowing-Who/Russell/Hintikka: Russell himself very often speaks of the equivalence of knowledge, who did something with the existence of another individual, which is known to have done... + ...
II 173
Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: Important argument: an ingenious feature of Russell’s theory of denotation from 1905 is that it is the quantifiers that denote! Theory of Denotation/Russell: (end of "On Denoting") includes the reduction of descriptions to objects of acquaintance.
II 174
Hintikka: this relation is amazing, it also seems to be circular to allow only objects of acquaintance. Solution: We need to see what successfully denoting expressions (phrases) actually denote: they precisely denote objects of acquaintance.
Ambiguity/Clarity/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential Generalization.
Existential Generalization/Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: his own example shows that only objects of acquaintance are allowed: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is in fact a primary incident i.e. his example (2).
"Whether"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: wanted to know "if" instead of "did not know". (secondary?).
Secondary Description/Russell: can also be expressed like this: that George wanted to know of the man who actually wrote Waverley whether he was Scott.
II 175
That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (in the distance) and had asked "Is that Scott?". HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell select an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not usually deal with beings of flesh and blood whose identity is known to us, instead of only with objects of perception?.
Knowing Who/Knowing What/Perception Object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely with perception objects it seems as if the kind of clarity that we need for a knowing-who, is not just given.
Identifcation/Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in my approach Dodgson is a bona fide individual iff. he is one and the same individual in all worlds of knowledge of Victoria. I.e. identifiable iff.
(15) (E.g.) in all relevant possible worlds it is true that (Dodgson = x).
Problem: What are the relevant possible worlds?.
II 178
Quantifier/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell systematically confuses two types of quantifiers. (a) of acquaintance, b) of description). Problem: Russell has not realized that the difference cannot be defined solely in terms of the actual world!.
Solution/Hintikka: we need a relativization to sets of possible worlds that change with the different propositional attitudes.
II 179
RussellVsHintikka: he would not have accepted my representation of his position like this. HintikkaVsRussell: but the reason for this merely lies in a further error of Russell’s: I have not attributed to him what he believed, but what he should have believed.
Quantification/Russell/Hintikka: he should have reduced to objects of acquaintance. Russell believed, however, it was sufficient to eliminate expressions that seemingly denote objects that are not such of acquaintance.
Important argument: in that his quantifiers do not enter any ontological commitment. Only denoting expressions do that.
Variable/Russell/Hintikka: are only notational patterns in Russell.
Ontological Commitment/Quine/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell did not recognize the ontological commitment that ​​1st order languages bring with them.
Being/Ontology/Quine: "Being means being value of a bound variable".
HintikkaVsRussell: he has realized that.
II 180
Elimination/Eliminability/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in order to eliminate merely seemingly denoting descriptions one must assume that the quantifiers and bound variables go over individuals that are identified by way of description. ((s) Object of the >Description). Otherwise, the real Bismarck would not be a permissible value of the variables with which we express that there is an individual of a certain species.
Problem: then these quantifiers may not be constituents of propositions, because their value ranges do not only consist of objects of acquaintance. Therefore, Russell’s mistake was twofold.
Quantifier/Variable/Russell/Hintikka, 1905, he had already stopped thinking that quantifiers and bound variables are real constituents of propositions.
Def Pseudo Variable/Russell/Hintikka: = bound variable.
Acquaintance/Russell: values of the variable ​​should only be objects of acquaintance. (HintikkaVsRussell).
Quantifiers/HintikkaVsRussell: now we can see why Russell did not differentiate between different quantifiers (acquaintance/description): For him quantifiers were only notational patterns, and for them the range of possible interpretations need not be determined, therefore it makes no difference if the rage changes!.
Quantification/Russell: for him, it was implicitly objectional (referential), and in any event not substitutional.

Peacocke I 190
Possible Worlds/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: R. is unable to explain the cases in which we quantify in belief contexts (!) where (according to Hintikka) the quantifier over "publicly descriptively identified" particulars is sufficient. Hintikka: compares with a "roman à clef".
Peacocke: it is not clear that (whether) this could not be explained by Russell as cases of general ideas, so that the person with such and such characteristics is so and so.
Universals/Acquaintance/Russell/Peacocke: we are familiar with universals and they are constituents of our thoughts.
HintikkaVsRussell: this is a desperate remedy to save the principle of acquaintance.
PeacockeVsRussell: his arguments are also very weak.
Russell: E.g. we cannot understand the transitivity of "before" if we are not acquainted with "before", and even less what it means that one thing is before another. While the judgment depends on a consciousness of a complex, whose analysis we do not understand if we do not understand the terms used.
I 191
PeacockeVsRussell: what kind of relationship should exist between subject and universal?. Solution: the reformulated PB: Here we can see to which conditions a term is subject, similar to the principle of sensitivity in relational givenness.
I 192
HintikkaVsRussell: ("On denoting what?", 1981, p.167 ff): the elimination of objects with which the subject is not familiar from the singular term position is not sufficient for the irreducibility of acquaintance that Russell had in mind. Quantification/Hintikka: the quantifiers will still reach over objects with which the subject is not familiar.
But such quantifiers cannot be constituents of propositions, if that is to be compatible with the PB. Because they would certainly occur through their value range Occur and these do not consist of particulars with which one is familiar.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Smart, J. C. Quine Vs Smart, J. C. II 118 ff
The Oxford trained philosopher today turns one ear to common sense and the other one to science. Historians who do not want to be outflanked claim that the real driving force behind development was fashion. Even quantum theorists are heard to say that they do not attribute reality so much to the tiny objects of their theory as primarily to their experimental apparatuses, i.e. to ordinary things. In refreshing contrast to that is the Australian philosopher Smart: he represents a shamelessly realistic conception of physical elementary particles. The worldview of the physicist is not only ontologically respectable, but his language gives us a truer picture of the world than common sense. (Smart mainly studies physics).
There have also been materialists who believe that living beings are indeed material, but subject to biological and psychological laws, which cannot be reduced to physical laws in principle. This was the emergence materialism.
Smart's materialism is more robust than that.
II 119
Smart Thesis: He denies that there are any laws in the strict sense in psychology and biology at all. The statements there are site-specific generalizations about some terrestrial plants of our acquaintance.
SmartVsEmergence.
They are at the same level as geography or reports on consumer behavior. That even applies to statements about cell division. They will most likely be falsified at least elsewhere in outer space, if not even here with us. (Law: explanatory force) Smart admits that statements about the small processes in biology tend to have more explanatory force. (Precisely, they come indeed closer to physicochemistry.)
Biology describes a site-specific outgrowth, while physics describes the nature of the world. Psychology then describes an outgrowth on this outgrowth.
II 120
Colors: Smart on the color concept: Color dominates our sensory experience, with its help we distinguish objects. But, that's the point of Smart's explanations: color differences rarely have an interesting connection to the laws of physics: a mixed color can appear to us as a pure one depending on contingent mechanisms inside us. It can be assumed that extraterrestrial beings have similar concepts of distance and electric charge, but hardly similar concepts of color. To view the world sub specie aeternitatis we have to avoid the concept of color and other secondary qualities. Primary: length, weight, hardness, shape, etc. are those that are easiest to incorporate in physical laws. For Smart, physicalism wins.
On the subject of "humans as machines", today's opponents of mechanistic thought refer to Godel's theorem, which states that no formal proof method can cover the entire number theory.
II 121
Smart, who represents the mechanistic view, argues against this rather gloomy application of the great Gödel theorem. The place where man defies the barriers of formal proof theory is that of the informal and largely resultless maneuvers of scientific method. Determinism: Smart agrees with Hobbes that >determinism and freedom are not antithetic to one another: deterministic action is considered free if it is in a certain way mediated by the agent.
Ethics: The differentiation of activities for which one can be responsible, and those for which this is not true, follows the social apparatus of rewarding and punishing. Responsibility is assigned a place where reward and punishment tended to work.
Disposition/Smart: This corresponds to an important element in the use of "he could have done." Smart continues to infer on "it could have" (e.g. broken). He brings this into context with the incompleteness of information relating to causal circumstances.
Quine: I welcome this thesis for modalities. These modalities are not based on the nature of the world, but on the fact that we ourselves, e.g. because of ignorance, disregard details.
There is a conception mocked by Smart, according to which the present moment moves forward through time at a velocity of sixty seconds per minute.
Furthermore, there is the idea that sentences about the future are neither true nor false. Otherwise fatalism would get the the reins in his hand. Such thoughts are widespread and confused and partially go back to Aristotle.
They have been put right with great clarity by Donald Williams et al.
As Smart puts them right again, distinctive details are added.
II 122
Incredible contrast between probability and truth. Smart: "probably" is an indicator; such as "I", "you" "now" "then" "here", "there". A word that depends on the use situation. For a specific statement of fact is, if at all, true at all times, whether we know it or not, but even then it can be more or less probable, depending on the situation. So modality concept of probability finally ends in subjective ambiguity, like the modalities. Quine: Smart is an honest writer. Smart overcomes all moral dilemmas; the materialist takes the bull by the horns and effortlessly wins over the moralists!

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Innate Pro Fodor / Lepore IV 76/77
Innate: per: Skinner: generalization: that it does not happen in the one but in the other direction - Hume: association mechanisms of human nature intrinsically - Quine: generalization principles are not themselves learned - Quine: Similarity space - Vs: Fodor / Lepore: unclear to what extent an innate is ability has an effect - Churchland: relatedness to a particular language unlikely.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
T-Predicate Grover, D. II 47
T-Predicate/Everyday Language/Grover: p: takes sentences as substituents. Question: how is "Epp" or "(p)(If Jon knows that p then p)" translated? Grover: Thesis: We need a harmless extension of English for this.
II 48
Thesis: Sentences as substituents of propositional variables make sense. However, in § 3 we will discuss other theories which require that these must be names of sentences or that-sentences. A summary is given in § 4.
II 151
Truth/True/T-Predicate/Proset Theory/Grover: Thesis: Consent is expressed by saying "the same thing". The theory that truth is a property of sentences changes the subject in this case.
II 157
T-predicate/"true"/Grover: Thesis: The occasions in which the predicate is used (property-writing, for sentences) are probably those (if any) if there is a reason to speak about sentences (meta-language).
II 158
Example Quine; if he needs the T-predicate for generalization, he uses it as a property-attributable. (Truth as property of sentences).
Emergence Smart, J.C. Quine II 119
Smart: thesis: He denies that there are any laws in the strict sense in psychology and biology. The statements there are site-specific generalizations about some underground growths of our acquaintance.
SmartVsEmergence.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980