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Lewis, C.I. | Schwarz Vs Lewis, C.I. | Schwarz I 31 Personal identity/SchwarzVsLewis: his criterion is not accurate and provides in interesting cases no answer. E.g. continuity after brain surgery, etc. But Lewis does not want that. Our (vague) everyday term should only be made explicitly. Beaming/Teleportation/Doubling/Lewis: all this is allowed by his theory. Schwarz I 60 Identity/Lewis/Centered world/Possible world/Schwarz: my desire to be someone else, does not refer to the whole world, but only to my position in the world. E.g. Twin Earth/Schwarz: one of the two planets is blown tomorrow, the two options (that we are on the one or the other) do however not correspond to two possible worlds! Detailed knowledge would not help out where we are, because they are equal. ((s) so no "centered world"). Actually, we want to know where we ourselves are in the world. (1979a(1),1983b(2),1986e(3):231 233). SchwarzVsLewis: says too little about these perspective possibilities. It is not enough here to allow multiple counterparts (c.p.) in a world. It should not just be possible that Humphrey is exactly as the actual Nixon, he should also to be allowed to be different. Humphrey may not be a GS of himself. (> Irreflexive counterpart relation,> see below Section 9.2. "Doxastic counterparts". Similarity relation. No matter what aspects you emphasize: Nixon will never be more similar to Humphrey than to himself. Schwarz I 100 Fundamental properties/SchwarzVsLewis: this seems to waver whether he should form the fE to the conceptual basis for the reduction of all predicates and ultimately all truths, or only a metaphysical basis, on which all truths supervene. (>Supervenience, >Reduction). Schwarz I 102 Naturalness/Natural/Property/Content/Lewis: the actual content is then the most natural candidate that matches the behavior. "Toxic" is not a perfectly natural property (p.n.p.), but more natural than "more than 3.78 light years away" and healthy and less removed and toxic". Naturalness/Degree/Lewis: (1986e(3):, 61,63,67 1984b(4):66): the naturalness of a property is determined by the complexity or length of their definition by perfectly natural properties. PnE: are always intrinsically and all their Boolean combinations remain there. Problem: extrinsic own sheep threaten to look unnatural. Also would e.g. "Red or breakfast" be much more complicated to explain than e.g. "has charge -1 or a mass, whose value is a prime number in kg. (Although it seems to be unnatural by definition). Naturalness/Property/Lewis: (1983c(5), 49): a property is, the more natural the more it belongs to surrounding things. Vs: then e.g. "cloud" less natural than e.g. "table in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant or clock showing 7:23". Schw I 103 Naturalness/Properties/Lewis: (1983c(5): 13f): naturalness could be attributed to similarity between characteristics: E.g. a class is more natural, the more the properties of its elements resemble each other. Similarity: Lewis refers to Armstrong: similarity between universals 1978b(6),§16.2,§21, 1989b(7): §5.111997 §4.1). Ultimately LewisVs. Naturalness/Lewis/Schwarz: (2001a(8):§4,§6): proposing test for naturalness, based on similarity between individual things: coordinate system: "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" axis. A property is then the more natural, the more dense and more compact the appropriate region is. Problem: 1. that presupposes gradual similarity and therefore cannot be well used to define gradual naturalness. 2. the pnE come out quite unnatural, because the instances often do not strongly resemble each other. E.g. if a certain mass property is perfect, of course, then all things with this mass build a perfectly natural class, no matter how dissimilar they are today. SchwarzVsLewis: it shows distinctions between natural and less natural properties in different areas, but does not show that the distinction is always the same. Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: could also depend on interests and biological expression. And yet, can in various ways the different types of natural - be determined by perfect naturalness. That is not much, because at Lewis all, by definition, by the distribution of p.n.p. is determined. ((s)>Mosaic). Schwarz I 122 Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: not reasonable to assume that it was objectively, regardless of how naturally it appears to us. Lewis introduced objective naturalness as a metaphysical basis for qualitative, intrinsic similarity and difference, as some things resemble each other like eggs and others do not. (see above 5.2). Intrinsic Similarity: also qualitative character and duplication: these terms are intended to be our familiar terms by Lewis. SchwarzVsLewis: but if objective naturalness is to explain the distinction of our opinions about similarity, one cannot ask with sense the question whether the distinction serves exactly this. So although there are possible beings (or worlds) whose predicates express relatively unnatural properties and therefore are wrong about natural laws, without being able to discover the error. But we can be sure a priori that we do not belong to them. Problem: the other beings may themselves believe a priori to be sure that their physical predicates are relatively natural. Solution: but they (and not we) were subject to this mistake, provided "natural" means in their mouth the same as with us. ((s) but we also could just believe that they are not subject to error. Respectively, we do not know whether we are "we" or "they"). Schwarz: here is a tension in our concept of natural law (NL): a) on the one hand it is clear that we can recognize them empirically. b) on the other hand they should be objective in a strong sense, regardless of our standards and terms. Problem: Being with other standards can come up with the same empirical data to all other judgments of NL. Schwarz I 134 Event/SchwarzVsLewis: perhaps better: events but as the regions themselves or the things in the regions: then we can distinguish e.g. the flight from the rotation of the ball. Lewis appears to be later also inclined to this. (2004d)(9). Lewis: E.g. the death of a man who is thrown into a completely empty space is not caused by something that happens in this room, because there is nothing. But when events are classes of RZ regions, an event could also include an empty region. Def Qua thing/Lewis/Schwarz: later theory: “Qua-things” (2003)(10): E.g. „Russell qua Philosoph“: (1986d(9a),247): classes of counterpieces – versus: LewisVsLewis: (2003)(10) Russell qua Philosoph and Russell qua Politician and Russell are identical. Then the difference in counterfactual contexts is due to the determined by the respective description counterpart relation. These are then intensional contexts. (Similar to 1971(11)). counterfactual asymmetry/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis' analysis assumes similarity between possible worlds. HorwichVsLewis: (1987(15),172) should explain why he is interested in this baroque dependence. Problem/SchwarzVsLewis: so far, the analysis still delivers incorrect results E.g. causation later by earlier events. Schwarz I 139 Conjunctive events/SchwarzVsLewis: he does not see that the same is true for conjunctive events. Examples A, B, C, D are arbitrary events, so that A caused B and C caused D. If there is an event B&C, which exactly occurs when both B and C happen, then A is the cause of D: without A, B would not have happened, neither B&C. Likewise D would not have happened without B&C. Because causation is transitive, thus any cause causes any effect. Note: according to requirement D would not happen without C, but maybe the next possible world, in which B&C are missing, is one in which C is still taking place? According to Lewis the next possible world should however be one where the lack of cause is completely extinguished. Schwarz: you cannot exclude any conjunctive events safely. E.g. a conversation or e.g. a war is made up of many events and may still be as a whole a cause or effect. Lewis (2000a(13), 193) even used quite unnatural conjunctions of events in order to avoid objections: E.g. conjunction from the state of brain of a person and a decision of another person. Absence/Lewis/Schwarz: because Lewis finds no harmless entities that are in line as absences, he denies their existence: they are no events, they are nothing at all, since there is nothing relevant. (200a, 195). SchwarzVsLewis: But how does that fit together with the Moore's facts? How can a relationship be instantiated whose referents do not exist?. Moore's facts/Schwarz: E.g. that absences often are causes and effects. Something to deny that only philosopher comes to mind. I 142 Influence/SchwarzVsLewis: Problem: influence of past events by future. Example had I drunk from the cup already half a minute ago, then now a little less tea would be in the cup, and depending on how much tea I had drunk half a minute ago, how warm the tea was then, where I then had put the cup, depending on it the current situation would be a little different. After Lewis' analysis my future tea drinking is therefore a cause of how the tea now stands before me. (? Because Ai and Bi?). Since the drinking incidents are each likely to be similar, the impact is greater. But he is not the cause, in contrast to the moon. Schwarz I 160 Know how/SchwarzVsLewis: it is not entirely correct, that the phenomenal character must be causal effect if the Mary and Zombie pass arguments. For causal efficacy, it is sufficient if Mary would react differently to a phenomenally different experience ((s) >Counterfactual conditional). Dualism/Schwarz: which can be accepted as a dualist. Then you can understand phenomenal properties like fundamental physical properties. That it then (as above Example charge 1 and charge 1 switch roles in possible worlds: is possible that in different possible worlds the phenomenal properties have their roles changed, does not mean that they are causally irrelevant! On the contrary, a particle with exchanged charge would behave differently. Solution: because a possible world, in which the particle has a different charge and this charge plays a different role, is very unlike to our real world! Because there prevail other laws of nature. ((s) is essential here that besides the amended charge also additionally the roles were reversed? See above: >Quidditism). SchwarzVsLewis: this must only accept that differences in fundamental characteristics do not always find themselves in causal differences. More one must not also accept to concede Mary the acquisition of new information. Schwarz I 178 Content/Individuation/Solution/LewisVsStalnaker: (1983b(2), 375, Fn2, 1986e(3), 34f), a person may sometimes have several different opinion systems! E.g. split brain patients: For an explanation of hand movements to an object which the patient denies to see. Then you can understand arithmetic and logical inference as merging separate conviction fragments. Knowledge/Belief/Necessary truth/Omniscience/SchwarzVsLewis/SchwarzVsFragmentation: Problem: even within Lewis' theory fragmentation is not so easy to get, because the folk psychology does not prefer it. Schwarz I 179 E.g. at inconsequent behavior or lie we do not accept a fragmented system of beliefs. We assume rather that someone changes his beliefs or someone wants to mislead intentionally. E.g. if someone does not make their best move, it must not be the result of fragmentation. One would assume real ignorance contingent truths instead of seeming ignorance of necessary truths. Fragmentation does not help with mathematical truths that must be true in each fragment: Frieda learns nothing new when she finally finds out that 34 is the root of the 1156. That they denied the corresponding proposition previously, was due to a limitation of their cognitive architecture. Knowledge/Schwarz: in whatever way our brain works, whether in the form of cards, records or neural networks - it sometimes requires some extra effort to retrieve the stored information. Omniscience/Vs possible world/Content/VsLewis/Schwarz: the objection of logical omniscience is the most common objection to the modeling mental and linguistic content by possible worlds or possible situations. SchwarzVsVs: here only a problem arises particularly, applicable to all other approaches as well. Schwarz I 186 Value/Moral/Ethics/VsLewis/Schwarz: The biggest disadvantage of his theory: its latent relativism. What people want in circumstances is contingent. There are possible beings who do not want happiness. Many authors have the intuition that value judgments should be more objective. Solution/Lewis: not only we, but all sorts of people should value under ideal conditions the same. E.g. then if anyone approves of slavery, it should be because the matter is not really clear in mind. Moral disagreements would then in principle be always solvable. ((s)>Cognitive deficiency/Wright). LewisVsLewis: that meets our intuitions better, but unfortunately there is no such defined values. People with other dispositions are possible. Analogy with the situation at objective Probability (see above 6.5): There is nothing that meets all of our assumptions about real values, but there is something close to that, and that's good enough. (1989b(7), 90 94). Value/Actual world/Act.wrld./Lewis: it is completely unclear whether there are people in the actual world with completely different value are dispositions. But that does not mean that we could not convince them. Relativism/Values/Morals/Ethics/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis however welcomes a different kind of relativism: desired content can be in perspective. The fate of my neighbor can be more important to me than the fate of a strangers. (1989b(14), 73f). Schwarz I 232 Truthmaker principle/SchwarzVsLewis: here is something rotten, the truth maker principle has a syntax error from the outset: we do not want "the world as it is", as truth-makers, because that is not an explanation, we want to explain how the world makes the truth such as the present makes propositions about the past true. Schwarz I 233 Explanation/Schwarz: should distinguish necessary implication and analysis. For reductive metaphysics necessary implication is of limited interest. SchwarzVsLewis: he overlooks this when he wrote: "A supervenience thesis is in the broader sense reductionist". (1983,29). Elsewhere he sees the difference: E.g. LewisVsArmstrong: this has an unusual concept of analysis: for him it is not looking for definitions, but for truth-makers ". 1. David Lewis [1979a]: “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”. Philosophical Review, 88: 513–543. 2. David Lewis [1983b]: “Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation”. Philosophical Review, 92: 3–32. 3. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 4. David Lewis [1984b]: “Putnam’s Paradox”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377 5. David Lewis [1983c]: “New Work for a Theory of Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377. 6. David M. Armstrong [1978b]: Universals and Scientific Realism II: A Theory of Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 7. David M. Armstrong [1989b]: Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder: Westview Press 8. David Lewis [2001a]: “Redefining ‘Intrinsic’ ”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 381-398 9. David Lewis [2004d]: “Void and Object”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 277–291 9a. David Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269 10. David Lewis [2003]: “Things qua Truthmakers”. Mit einem Postscript von David Lewis und Gideon Rosen. In Hallvard Lillehammer und Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Hg.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor, London: Routledge, 25–38. 11. David Lewis [1971]: “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies”. Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203–211. 12. David Lewis [1987]: “The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance”. Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 12: 81–97. 13. David Lewis [2000a]: “Causation as Influence”. Journal of Philosophy, 97: 182–197. Gekürzte Fassung von [Lewis 2004a] 14. David Lewis [1989b]: “Dispositional Theories of Value”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 63: 113-137. 15. Paul Horwich [1987]: Asymmetries in Time. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
Reichenbach, H. | Fraassen Vs Reichenbach, H. | I 170 Mixture/Probability/prblty/Quantum Mechanics/QM/Fraassen: "mixture" or "mixed state" as opposed to "pure" state: is in quantum mechanics what the difference between micro-state and macro-state is in statistical mechanics. Two problems: (in connection with probability): 1) how mixtures are connected with pure states 2) the relation of pure states to each other. Mixture: is typically introduced in the context of uncertainty. I 171 Ignorance Interpretation/Statistical Mechanics: here you can say likewise that a gas is in macro-state D iff. it is in one of the micro-states which are compatible with D. Problem: VsIgnorance Interpretation, VsReichenbach. Degeneration/QM/prblty/Fraassen: there is usually more than one way to decompose a mixed state, then (1) is compatible with (2) 1/3 w = 1/3 w1 + 1/3 w’2 + 1/3 w’3. VsIgnorance Interpretation: 1) according to it we would now have to come to a probability >1! Namely 1 + 1/3. Because we would have to add up all probabilities of incompatible (disjoint) events. That cannot be: E.g. naive statistical interpretation: says, A) that state w’ cannot be attributed to a single particle, but only to ensembles. And that the number 1/3 expresses the relative size of the sub-ensemble w1, w2, and w3. Problem: we would have to say the same thing also for w’2 and w’3. I 172 With that we end up higher than 1 with 5 x 1/3. That cannot be. They must not overlap, otherwise a particle would simultaneously be in several pure states, which is impossible. Or B) if we may not ascribe any state to particles, we ask: which state belongs to sub-ensemble, which is the common part of the sub-ensemble w2 and w’2? Should not any part of an ensemble that is in a pure state also be in a pure state? Solution/Fraassen: weakening the Ignorance interpretation: (FN 10). Then we say that the specification of state w is incomplete, that there is lost information about the nature that has been lost in the attribution of the mixed state. I 172 Metaphysics/QM/Fraassen: Thesis: usually the latter is an unintended metaphysical bonus. There is usually no physical difference. But: VsIgnorance Interpretation: 2) There is another situation in which the mixtures are formed naturally: Interaction: according to this, there are sometimes two separate systems X and Y which are isolated, but we only have one pure state for a complex system. Then it may be inconsistent to attribute a pure state each to X and Y. (Schrödinger: call this "the new specialty of QM"). Solution: certain mixed states are attributed to X and Y ("reduction of the density matrix" (FN 11). VsIgnorance Interpretation: that would make it impossible: because according to it, the attribution of a mixed state contains the assertion that the system is in reality in a pure state! According to it we can ascribe neither a pure nor a mixed state. I 183 Probability/Statements/Reichenbach/Fraassen: Solution: we should think of statements about probability in physics as related to ideal extend indefinitely long series. VsReichenbach: that contradicts his assertion that a probability statement is nothing more and nothing less than a statement about relative frequency in an actual reference class (which then also must be able to be small). Problem: how should we consider the actually finite series, as representing a random sample themselves of a non-actual infinite series? But which non-actual series? Thus a modal element is already introduced. ReichenbachVsModality/Fraassen: his approach of strict frequency is precisely an avoidance of modality. Infinite/Fraassen: let’s assume instead the pure case of an actual very long series. (To avoid modality): But how are we to interpret probability then? Reichenbach: we should focus only on the actual results (of a long series). I 184 Questions: 1) Is it consistent to say that probability is the same thing as relative frequency? I.e. they have the functions P(-) and relative frequency(-, s) the same properties? 2) Even if this is consistent, is the interpretation not too wide or too narrow? I.e. does the relative frequency introduce structures such as probability spaces that do not have the right properties, or vice versa, are some probability spaces not capable of providing a function of relative frequency (rel. Fr.) in the long run? FraassenVsReichenbach: the problem of his approach of strict frequency is that he hardly answers these questions. I 185 FraassenVsReichenbach: ...therefore we cannot say that relative frequencies are probabilities. Law of Large Numbers/Loln/Reichenbach/Fraassen: It is often said that these laws provide a connection between probability and relative frequency. They do that, but they do not allow a strict interpretation of the frequency. (FraassenVsReichenbach). |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
Smart, J. C. | Quine Vs Smart, J. C. | II 118 ff The Oxford trained philosopher today turns one ear to common sense and the other one to science. Historians who do not want to be outflanked claim that the real driving force behind development was fashion. Even quantum theorists are heard to say that they do not attribute reality so much to the tiny objects of their theory as primarily to their experimental apparatuses, i.e. to ordinary things. In refreshing contrast to that is the Australian philosopher Smart: he represents a shamelessly realistic conception of physical elementary particles. The worldview of the physicist is not only ontologically respectable, but his language gives us a truer picture of the world than common sense. (Smart mainly studies physics). There have also been materialists who believe that living beings are indeed material, but subject to biological and psychological laws, which cannot be reduced to physical laws in principle. This was the emergence materialism. Smart's materialism is more robust than that. II 119 Smart Thesis: He denies that there are any laws in the strict sense in psychology and biology at all. The statements there are site-specific generalizations about some terrestrial plants of our acquaintance. SmartVsEmergence. They are at the same level as geography or reports on consumer behavior. That even applies to statements about cell division. They will most likely be falsified at least elsewhere in outer space, if not even here with us. (Law: explanatory force) Smart admits that statements about the small processes in biology tend to have more explanatory force. (Precisely, they come indeed closer to physicochemistry.) Biology describes a site-specific outgrowth, while physics describes the nature of the world. Psychology then describes an outgrowth on this outgrowth. II 120 Colors: Smart on the color concept: Color dominates our sensory experience, with its help we distinguish objects. But, that's the point of Smart's explanations: color differences rarely have an interesting connection to the laws of physics: a mixed color can appear to us as a pure one depending on contingent mechanisms inside us. It can be assumed that extraterrestrial beings have similar concepts of distance and electric charge, but hardly similar concepts of color. To view the world sub specie aeternitatis we have to avoid the concept of color and other secondary qualities. Primary: length, weight, hardness, shape, etc. are those that are easiest to incorporate in physical laws. For Smart, physicalism wins. On the subject of "humans as machines", today's opponents of mechanistic thought refer to Godel's theorem, which states that no formal proof method can cover the entire number theory. II 121 Smart, who represents the mechanistic view, argues against this rather gloomy application of the great Gödel theorem. The place where man defies the barriers of formal proof theory is that of the informal and largely resultless maneuvers of scientific method. Determinism: Smart agrees with Hobbes that >determinism and freedom are not antithetic to one another: deterministic action is considered free if it is in a certain way mediated by the agent. Ethics: The differentiation of activities for which one can be responsible, and those for which this is not true, follows the social apparatus of rewarding and punishing. Responsibility is assigned a place where reward and punishment tended to work. Disposition/Smart: This corresponds to an important element in the use of "he could have done." Smart continues to infer on "it could have" (e.g. broken). He brings this into context with the incompleteness of information relating to causal circumstances. Quine: I welcome this thesis for modalities. These modalities are not based on the nature of the world, but on the fact that we ourselves, e.g. because of Ignorance, disregard details. There is a conception mocked by Smart, according to which the present moment moves forward through time at a velocity of sixty seconds per minute. Furthermore, there is the idea that sentences about the future are neither true nor false. Otherwise fatalism would get the the reins in his hand. Such thoughts are widespread and confused and partially go back to Aristotle. They have been put right with great clarity by Donald Williams et al. As Smart puts them right again, distinctive details are added. II 122 Incredible contrast between probability and truth. Smart: "probably" is an indicator; such as "I", "you" "now" "then" "here", "there". A word that depends on the use situation. For a specific statement of fact is, if at all, true at all times, whether we know it or not, but even then it can be more or less probable, depending on the situation. So modality concept of probability finally ends in subjective ambiguity, like the modalities. Quine: Smart is an honest writer. Smart overcomes all moral dilemmas; the materialist takes the bull by the horns and effortlessly wins over the moralists! |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Theism | Mackie Vs Theism | Stegmüller IV 466 Theodicy/popular version: (i) logical necessity: God cannot create e.g. quadrangular circles. Since evil is logically a part of the good, one cannot exist without the others. Vs: firstly: this is not a conclusion from the premise! further: a) The principle is not compellent. 1. if there were a common property that each and every thing possessed automatically, there would be no need for a predicate for it in any language. 2. It could be that this property would not be noticed by anyone! However, one could not assert: if everything possessed this property, this property didn't exist at all. b) The argument would explain at most the occurrence of very few evils. (As a side effect, not as e.g. planned genocide). IV 467 Theodicy/popular version: (ii) frequently, the argument of "necessary means" is brought forward: The evil as a means for the good. Ex. children must learn from mistakes. StegmüllerVs: However, many children do not learn from the mistakes of the world, but perish from them! Ex. pain as a warning function. Stegmüller: all these truisms are irrelevant to the problem. They are relevant only for limited beings, but God is attributed omnipotence. IV 468 (iii) principle of the organic whole: like an aesthetic principle: evil is part of the "organic whole". Such a world were even better than a purely good world. It were not static, but dynamic. Gradual overcoming of evil by the good. Def. evil of 1st order: suffering, pain, illness Def. values of 1st order: joy, happiness Def. values of 2nd order: moral values, responses to evil of 1st order: compassion, assistance, kindness, heroism. Theism must then support the thesis that evils of 1st order are satisfactorily explained and justified by values of 2nd order. Stegmüller IV 469 Theism/Mackie: Question: can the theist rightly claim that there is only absorbed evil in this world? Only then can he defend his position, otherwise there is unnecessary evils that God in his omnipotence could have avoided. VsTheism: 1. there is much more unabsorbed evils of 1st order (suffering, pain, etc.) as can fit in a valuable whole. 2. the game would be repeated at the next level! The values of 2nd order are accompanied by evils of 2nd order: Ex. wickedness, callousness, gloating, cruelty, cowardice etc. IV 470 Oly possibility: Values of 3rd order: only candidate: free will. It need not be such a value itself, but is logically necessary for realization. IV 471 Theism/Theodicy/R. Gruner: the theist should not only concede the evils, but empasize them as particularly important. The most faithful people have always been those who were most convinced of the reality of evil. Paradox: that faith depends precisely on that fact of which one claims it refuted it. This position is taken in the dialogues of Hume of the Demea. IV 479 Theodicy/free will: in defense of theism the concept of free will could be modified: freedom as a high value, such that God did not know at creation, how people would make use of it. Therefore God is not omniscient. Vs: 1. If God is not omniscient, he is no longer omnipotent, because a limitation of information is a limitation of power. Vs: 2. God would have to be thought of in a timely manner. This renounces an essential element of monotheistic religion. Vs 3. If God did not know what people would do, he still had to know what they could do! IV 481 MackieVsTheism: canot be explained without contradiction, without changing major points. Hume: would say: our boundless Ignorance prevents us from claiming to have conclusively refuted theism. IV 516 MackieVsTheism: the competing naturalism always has the better arguments and lower improbability on its side. IV 517 Religion/Theism/R. Robinson: Thesis: the main contradiction between religion and reason is that religion prefers the consolation of truth. God/Spinoza/Stegmüller: (relatively strong modification of the traditional concept of God): no creator God, but infinite. Metaphysical necessity is part of him and thus the universe itself. Theodicy/Spinoza: Thesis: God knows no mercy! It is not a person, even not an infinite one, but a being who does not care about human concerns. IV 518 Religion/theology/Mackie: the monotheistic religions rely on a for them indispensable assumption of existence that is probably wrong. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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