Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Churchland, P. Pauen Vs Churchland, P. Pauen I 99
Churchland/Pauen: commits sciences to a very strong notion of ​​nature as a kind of "thing in itself", ultimate authority in the decision about theories.
I 100
VsChurchland/Pauen: claim to be able to justify the renunciation of the terminology of folk psychology. However, this presupposes that the relevant entities do indeed not exist. So this is an ontological and not only a language philosophical thesis.
All the while, Churchland assumes that there are no serious objections to eliminative materialism. That's not the case, though.
I 101
VsMaterialism, Eliminative/Pauen: 1) false claim of knowing that there are neural, but not mental states. Performative contradiction: if this is about knowledge, then it must be true for its part. I.e. there may be no opinions (i.e. mental states).
On the other hand, however, the knowledge status implies that the representative of an assertion himself is of the opinion that the facts are true.
Patricia Churchland/Pauen: concedes this performative contradiction, but sees it as only another piece of evidence of our involvement in folk psychology.
VsChurchland: this is a mere announcement that the contradiction would eventually be dissolved.
I 102
Performative Contradiction/Churchland/Pauen: E.g. vitalism also diagnoses this contradiction: the opponent claims that there are no animal spirits. But this opponent himself is alive, so he must have animal spirits...
PauenVsChurchland: this is not the same: the contradiction does not run on the same level:
The opponent of vitalism does not make himself dependent on vitalism, but has an alternative design.
In contrast, the defender of folk psychology does not need to make such a requirement: the assertion that knowledge implies opinion (the controversial mental state) is not an invention of folk psychology after all, it is not an empirical thesis at all.
I 103
VsMaterialism, Eliminative/Pauen: 2nd problem of inter-theoretical reduction: folk psychology is to be eliminated mainly because it cannot be reduced to the neurobiology. Robert McCauley/Pauen: the two theories would have to compete on the same level for that. E.g. phlogiston/chemistry.
In contrast, folk psychology and scientific psychology are located on completely different levels. (First/Third Person, Micro/Macro).
I 104
3) E.g. Split Brain Patients/Pauen: Empirical evidence shows that feelings in particular are language-independent, and thus can also be identified pretheoretically. Patients respond, but have no conscious access anymore. The stimuli reach the right, unconscious hemisphere that is incapable of speech. Nevertheless, the patients can give correct information. In doing so, they can rely neither on the generalizations of folk psychology nor on a knowledge of the perceived object.
I 105
This can only be explained if one assumes that emotional states have an intrinsic quality that also allows theory-independent interpretation. Churchland/Pauen: consequently excludes phenomenal states from the elimination. Everyday experience should now no longer be changed by elimination.
VsChurchland: this now differs from the common folk psychology, however, which also includes pain. Before, he himself had still counted pain among the states which have been changed by the elimination of the concepts.
He is also inconsistent when he adheres to the eliminability of cognitive awareness.

I 188
Explanation Gap/Pauen: already recognized by Leibniz in principle. Then Dubois Reymond, Nagel, Joseph Levine. Explanation Gap/Levine/Pauen: between scientific and folk psychological theories.
Chalmers: "Hard Problem of Consiousness":
I 189
forces us to perform huge interventions in previously accepted views and methods. Identity theory: refers to ontology.
Explanatory gap argument epistemically refers to our knowledge.
Context: if we accept the identity theory, we must expect that our respective knowledge can be related to each other.
I 191
Churchland: it would now be a fallacy to try and infer from our present ignorance the insolubility of the problem. ("Argument from Ignorance") VsChurchland: in the case of the explanation gap that does not need to be plausible!
The representatives do not rely on their own Ignorance and do not refer to the failure of previous research. They assume a fundamental difference between entities such as e.g. water and heat on the one hand and mental processes on the other.
Therefore, our methods must fail.
I 192
Causal properties play a significant role with these differences. Then, according the representatives of the explanatory gap argument, it must be possible to characterize our natural phenomena designated by everyday concepts characterized by such causal properties:
Levine: then there is a two-stage process:
I 193
1) quasi a-priori process: the concept is brought "into shape" for the reduction through the determination of the causal role. 2) empirical work to discover what the underlying mechanisms are.
I 194
This method fails now when it comes to the explanation of mental and especially phenomenal states. They cannot be translated into causal roles in principle! Unlike in our colloquial speech of physical processes, we obviously do not mean these effects, when we talk about mental states.

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Fodor, J. Goodman Vs Fodor, J. IV 141
GoodmanVsFodor: Contemporary theorists assert that language proficiency is based on a dictionary and a grammar inside the consciousness. (Chomsky, GoodmanVs) The mental dictionary defines the meaning of the individual words. The mental grammar defines the manner in which the meanings of significant word sequences are derived from the meanings of their constituents.
IV 143
As if the consciousness were a digital computer. The charm lies in the seductive analogy to everyday machines and even the computer. According to Jerry Fodor, the computer is the only model of consciousness at our disposal. But introspection does not bring us even remotely close to a verification: the proponents of the view to be tested admit that access to the internal code is a deeply unconscious process. The reason for the belief that it does occur is that it is embedded in a high-performing linguistic theory. We are to believe that speakers "have access" to an internal syntactic and semantic code, and that is due to an analogy to the mutual attraction of bodies. I can know that ’elm’ and ’beech’ are separate classes of deciduous trees without having an idea of how to tell them apart.
Goodman: my language proficiency is not endangered by my Ignorance. I can connect with other members of the linguistic community to fill my gaps. In addition, the knowledge in question is not primarily linguistic, here is rather botanical or biographical.
Fodor gives in on this point, and draws the conclusion that the dictionary is referentially opaque. His entries define the concepts in which we think, but not what we think about.
IV 144
The analogy to the computer model is ambiguous, because it has a referential and a computer-like interpretation.
I 145
Of course, the computer knows nothing of the referential interpretation. - Accordingly, we would not know that a computer simulation represents a molecular interaction - But according to Fodor, this is exactly our situation in terms of sentences that we understand. - Questions about the truth value of sentences are inappropriate according to the computer-like reading. Fodor’s theory can neither explain how we know what new phrases rep nor what trusted ones rep. The role of the dictionary has emerged to serve other purposes. The linguists cannot explain understanding of metaphorical language.

G IV
N. Goodman
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
German Edition:
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Goodman I
N. Goodman
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
German Edition:
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

Goodman II
N. Goodman
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
German Edition:
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

Goodman III
N. Goodman
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
German Edition:
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997
Hume, D. Davidson Vs Hume, D. Davidson I (b) 18
In Hume: the impressions and ideas were "what they seemed to be, and they appeared to be what they actually were." I.e. objects that have all the properties and only the properties that they have in our opinion (ideas).
DavidsonVsHume: there are no such objects! Every object has infinitely many logically independent properties, (material objects), and that also applies to items whose entire "essential" properties (e.g. numbers) are given by us. (Hume thought since we are the producers of such objects, we have all properties "in our power" - DavidsonVs).
DavidsonVsHume: infinitely many properties, therefore Ignorance fo imaginary objects possible.

Hume I 24
History/Causality/Hume: (I 172): the reports of wars, intrigues, factions and upheavals are as much collection of experimental facts ... in the same way as the physicist or naturalist gets to know the nature of plants and other external objects through the experimental facts that he collects for this purpose. Deleuze: so history is almost to be construed as physics of man (Hume). (DavidsonVsHume).

Quine IV 415
Def Naturalism/Quine: understanding of man, of history, culture, knowledge and morals by means of the categories that have been trained for the knowledge of nature (Blumenberg). Naturalists in this sense were already Bacon and Hume.
Hume (had the ambition of becoming the "Newton of Sciences"): it is necessary to review whether the science of man does not allow for the same as accuracy as that of nature. (HumeVsSupra-naturalism of the Middle Ages). (DavidsonVsHume: behavior not according to law).

Rorty V73
Universe/DavidsonVsHume/Rorty: convictions are not isolated. Even though, as Hume says, there can be a universe that consists only of one single sensation, we cannot make ourselves understand a universe that consists of only the one single thought that Caesar had crossed the Rubicon.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Kutschera, F. Vollmer Vs Kutschera, F. I 296
Literatur: Kutschera, 1981 Def Wissen. "Grundfragen der Erkenntnistheorie"
knowledge/Kutschera: Thesis: only to explicate as true belief. Neither the objective component of truth nor the subjective component of belief are capable of increasing.
Recognition/Kutschera: can be explained by knowledge, because recognition is the step from Ignorance to knowledge.
Since epistemology is less about acts of cognition than about criteria for knowledge, we have to start from knowledge. (1981, 9 10).
Recognition/VollmerVsKutschera: too narrow an understanding of recognition. Just like a journey is not sufficiently captured by the start and finish, so recognition is not captured by the start and end condition. Continuity or discontinuity, obstacles etc. play a role.
I 297
Norms/Vollmer: Norms do not follow from facts! (Naturalistic fallacy). But normative questions can often only be answered with factual knowledge. Epistemology must therefore consider the conditions of knowledge.

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Lewis, C.I. Schwarz Vs Lewis, C.I. Schwarz I 31
Personal identity/SchwarzVsLewis: his criterion is not accurate and provides in interesting cases no answer. E.g. continuity after brain surgery, etc. But Lewis does not want that. Our (vague) everyday term should only be made explicitly. Beaming/Teleportation/Doubling/Lewis: all this is allowed by his theory.
Schwarz I 60
Identity/Lewis/Centered world/Possible world/Schwarz: my desire to be someone else, does not refer to the whole world, but only to my position in the world. E.g. Twin Earth/Schwarz: one of the two planets is blown tomorrow, the two options (that we are on the one or the other) do however not correspond to two possible worlds! Detailed knowledge would not help out where we are, because they are equal. ((s) so no "centered world"). Actually, we want to know where we ourselves are in the world. (1979a(1),1983b(2),1986e(3):231 233).
SchwarzVsLewis: says too little about these perspective possibilities. It is not enough here to allow multiple counterparts (c.p.) in a world. It should not just be possible that Humphrey is exactly as the actual Nixon, he should also to be allowed to be different. Humphrey may not be a GS of himself. (> Irreflexive counterpart relation,> see below Section 9.2. "Doxastic counterparts".
Similarity relation. No matter what aspects you emphasize: Nixon will never be more similar to Humphrey than to himself.
Schwarz I 100
Fundamental properties/SchwarzVsLewis: this seems to waver whether he should form the fE to the conceptual basis for the reduction of all predicates and ultimately all truths, or only a metaphysical basis, on which all truths supervene. (>Supervenience, >Reduction).
Schwarz I 102
Naturalness/Natural/Property/Content/Lewis: the actual content is then the most natural candidate that matches the behavior. "Toxic" is not a perfectly natural property (p.n.p.), but more natural than "more than 3.78 light years away" and healthy and less removed and toxic". Naturalness/Degree/Lewis: (1986e(3):, 61,63,67 1984b(4):66): the naturalness of a property is determined by the complexity or length of their definition by perfectly natural properties.
PnE: are always intrinsically and all their Boolean combinations remain there.
Problem: extrinsic own sheep threaten to look unnatural. Also would e.g. "Red or breakfast" be much more complicated to explain than e.g. "has charge -1 or a mass, whose value is a prime number in kg. (Although it seems to be unnatural by definition).
Naturalness/Property/Lewis: (1983c(5), 49): a property is, the more natural the more it belongs to surrounding things. Vs: then e.g. "cloud" less natural than e.g. "table in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant or clock showing 7:23".
Schw I 103
Naturalness/Properties/Lewis: (1983c(5): 13f): naturalness could be attributed to similarity between characteristics: E.g. a class is more natural, the more the properties of its elements resemble each other. Similarity: Lewis refers to Armstrong: similarity between universals 1978b(6),§16.2,§21, 1989b(7): §5.111997 §4.1). Ultimately LewisVs.
Naturalness/Lewis/Schwarz: (2001a(8):§4,§6): proposing test for naturalness, based on similarity between individual things: coordinate system: "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" axis. A property is then the more natural, the more dense and more compact the appropriate region is.
Problem: 1. that presupposes gradual similarity and therefore cannot be well used to define gradual naturalness.
2. the pnE come out quite unnatural, because the instances often do not strongly resemble each other. E.g. if a certain mass property is perfect, of course, then all things with this mass build a perfectly natural class, no matter how dissimilar they are today.
SchwarzVsLewis: it shows distinctions between natural and less natural properties in different areas, but does not show that the distinction is always the same.
Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: could also depend on interests and biological expression. And yet, can in various ways the different types of natural - be determined by perfect naturalness. That is not much, because at Lewis all, by definition, by the distribution of p.n.p. is determined. ((s)>Mosaic).
Schwarz I 122
Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: not reasonable to assume that it was objectively, regardless of how naturally it appears to us. Lewis introduced objective naturalness as a metaphysical basis for qualitative, intrinsic similarity and difference, as some things resemble each other like eggs and others do not. (see above 5.2). Intrinsic Similarity: also qualitative character and duplication: these terms are intended to be our familiar terms by Lewis.
SchwarzVsLewis: but if objective naturalness is to explain the distinction of our opinions about similarity, one cannot ask with sense the question whether the distinction serves exactly this.
So although there are possible beings (or worlds) whose predicates express relatively unnatural properties and therefore are wrong about natural laws, without being able to discover the error. But we can be sure a priori that we do not belong to them.
Problem: the other beings may themselves believe a priori to be sure that their physical predicates are relatively natural.
Solution: but they (and not we) were subject to this mistake, provided "natural" means in their mouth the same as with us. ((s) but we also could just believe that they are not subject to error. Respectively, we do not know whether we are "we" or "they").
Schwarz: here is a tension in our concept of natural law (NL):
a) on the one hand it is clear that we can recognize them empirically.
b) on the other hand they should be objective in a strong sense, regardless of our standards and terms.
Problem: Being with other standards can come up with the same empirical data to all other judgments of NL.
Schwarz I 134
Event/SchwarzVsLewis: perhaps better: events but as the regions themselves or the things in the regions: then we can distinguish e.g. the flight from the rotation of the ball. Lewis appears to be later also inclined to this. (2004d)(9). Lewis: E.g. the death of a man who is thrown into a completely empty space is not caused by something that happens in this room, because there is nothing. But when events are classes of RZ regions, an event could also include an empty region.
Def Qua thing/Lewis/Schwarz: later theory: “Qua-things” (2003)(10): E.g. „Russell qua Philosoph“: (1986d(9a),247): classes of counterpieces – versus:
LewisVsLewis: (2003)(10) Russell qua Philosoph and Russell qua Politician and Russell are identical. Then the difference in counterfactual contexts is due to the determined by the respective description counterpart relation. These are then intensional contexts. (Similar to 1971(11)). counterfactual asymmetry/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis' analysis assumes similarity between possible worlds.
HorwichVsLewis: (1987(15),172) should explain why he is interested in this baroque dependence.
Problem/SchwarzVsLewis: so far, the analysis still delivers incorrect results E.g. causation later by earlier events.
Schwarz I 139
Conjunctive events/SchwarzVsLewis: he does not see that the same is true for conjunctive events. Examples A, B, C, D are arbitrary events, so that A caused B and C caused D. If there is an event B&C, which exactly occurs when both B and C happen, then A is the cause of D: without A, B would not have happened, neither B&C. Likewise D would not have happened without B&C. Because causation is transitive, thus any cause causes any effect. Note: according to requirement D would not happen without C, but maybe the next possible world, in which B&C are missing, is one in which C is still taking place? According to Lewis the next possible world should however be one where the lack of cause is completely extinguished.
Schwarz: you cannot exclude any conjunctive events safely. E.g. a conversation or e.g. a war is made up of many events and may still be as a whole a cause or effect. Lewis (2000a(13), 193) even used quite unnatural conjunctions of events in order to avoid objections: E.g. conjunction from the state of brain of a person and a decision of another person.
Absence/Lewis/Schwarz: because Lewis finds no harmless entities that are in line as absences, he denies their existence: they are no events, they are nothing at all, since there is nothing relevant. (200a, 195).
SchwarzVsLewis: But how does that fit together with the Moore's facts? How can a relationship be instantiated whose referents do not exist?.
Moore's facts/Schwarz: E.g. that absences often are causes and effects. Something to deny that only philosopher comes to mind.
I 142
Influence/SchwarzVsLewis: Problem: influence of past events by future. Example had I drunk from the cup already half a minute ago, then now a little less tea would be in the cup, and depending on how much tea I had drunk half a minute ago, how warm the tea was then, where I then had put the cup, depending on it the current situation would be a little different. After Lewis' analysis my future tea drinking is therefore a cause of how the tea now stands before me. (? Because Ai and Bi?). Since the drinking incidents are each likely to be similar, the impact is greater. But he is not the cause, in contrast to the moon.
Schwarz I 160
Know how/SchwarzVsLewis: it is not entirely correct, that the phenomenal character must be causal effect if the Mary and Zombie pass arguments. For causal efficacy, it is sufficient if Mary would react differently to a phenomenally different experience ((s) >Counterfactual conditional). Dualism/Schwarz: which can be accepted as a dualist. Then you can understand phenomenal properties like fundamental physical properties. That it then (as above Example charge 1 and charge 1 switch roles in possible worlds: is possible that in different possible worlds the phenomenal properties have their roles changed, does not mean that they are causally irrelevant! On the contrary, a particle with exchanged charge would behave differently.
Solution: because a possible world, in which the particle has a different charge and this charge plays a different role, is very unlike to our real world! Because there prevail other laws of nature. ((s) is essential here that besides the amended charge also additionally the roles were reversed? See above: >Quidditism).
SchwarzVsLewis: this must only accept that differences in fundamental characteristics do not always find themselves in causal differences. More one must not also accept to concede Mary the acquisition of new information.
Schwarz I 178
Content/Individuation/Solution/LewisVsStalnaker: (1983b(2), 375, Fn2, 1986e(3), 34f), a person may sometimes have several different opinion systems! E.g. split brain patients: For an explanation of hand movements to an object which the patient denies to see. Then you can understand arithmetic and logical inference as merging separate conviction fragments.
knowledge/Belief/Necessary truth/Omniscience/SchwarzVsLewis/SchwarzVsFragmentation: Problem: even within Lewis' theory fragmentation is not so easy to get, because the folk psychology does not prefer it.
Schwarz I 179
E.g. at inconsequent behavior or lie we do not accept a fragmented system of beliefs. We assume rather that someone changes his beliefs or someone wants to mislead intentionally. E.g. if someone does not make their best move, it must not be the result of fragmentation. One would assume real ignorance contingent truths instead of seeming ignorance of necessary truths. Fragmentation does not help with mathematical truths that must be true in each fragment: Frieda learns nothing new when she finally finds out that 34 is the root of the 1156. That they denied the corresponding proposition previously, was due to a limitation of their cognitive architecture.
knowledge/Schwarz: in whatever way our brain works, whether in the form of cards, records or neural networks - it sometimes requires some extra effort to retrieve the stored information.
Omniscience/Vs possible world/Content/VsLewis/Schwarz: the objection of logical omniscience is the most common objection to the modeling mental and linguistic content by possible worlds or possible situations.
SchwarzVsVs: here only a problem arises particularly, applicable to all other approaches as well.
Schwarz I 186
Value/Moral/Ethics/VsLewis/Schwarz: The biggest disadvantage of his theory: its latent relativism. What people want in circumstances is contingent. There are possible beings who do not want happiness. Many authors have the intuition that value judgments should be more objective. Solution/Lewis: not only we, but all sorts of people should value under ideal conditions the same. E.g. then if anyone approves of slavery, it should be because the matter is not really clear in mind. Moral disagreements would then in principle be always solvable. ((s)>Cognitive deficiency/Wright).
LewisVsLewis: that meets our intuitions better, but unfortunately there is no such defined values. People with other dispositions are possible.
Analogy with the situation at objective probability (see above 6.5): There is nothing that meets all of our assumptions about real values, but there is something close to that, and that's good enough. (1989b(7), 90 94).
Value/Actual world/Act.wrld./Lewis: it is completely unclear whether there are people in the actual world with completely different value are dispositions. But that does not mean that we could not convince them.
Relativism/Values/Morals/Ethics/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis however welcomes a different kind of relativism: desired content can be in perspective. The fate of my neighbor can be more important to me than the fate of a strangers. (1989b(14), 73f).
Schwarz I 232
Truthmaker principle/SchwarzVsLewis: here is something rotten, the truth maker principle has a syntax error from the outset: we do not want "the world as it is", as truth-makers, because that is not an explanation, we want to explain how the world makes the truth such as the present makes propositions about the past true.
Schwarz I 233
Explanation/Schwarz: should distinguish necessary implication and analysis. For reductive metaphysics necessary implication is of limited interest. SchwarzVsLewis: he overlooks this when he wrote: "A supervenience thesis is in the broader sense reductionist". (1983,29).
Elsewhere he sees the difference: E.g. LewisVsArmstrong: this has an unusual concept of analysis: for him it is not looking for definitions, but for truth-makers ".


1. David Lewis [1979a]: “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”. Philosophical Review, 88: 513–543.
2. David Lewis [1983b]: “Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation”. Philosophical Review, 92:
3–32.
3. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell
4. David Lewis [1984b]: “Putnam’s Paradox”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377
5. David Lewis [1983c]: “New Work for a Theory of Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
61: 343–377.
6. David M. Armstrong [1978b]: Universals and Scientific Realism II: A Theory of Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 7. David M. Armstrong [1989b]: Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder: Westview Press
8. David Lewis [2001a]: “Redefining ‘Intrinsic’ ”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 381-398
9. David Lewis [2004d]: “Void and Object”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 277–291
9a. David Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269
10. David Lewis [2003]: “Things qua Truthmakers”. Mit einem Postscript von David Lewis und Gideon
Rosen. In Hallvard Lillehammer und Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Hg.), Real Metaphysics:
Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor, London: Routledge, 25–38.
11. David Lewis [1971]: “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies”. Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203–211.
12. David Lewis [1987]: “The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance”. Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 12: 81–97.
13. David Lewis [2000a]: “Causation as Influence”. Journal of Philosophy, 97: 182–197. Gekürzte Fassung von [Lewis 2004a]
14. David Lewis [1989b]: “Dispositional Theories of Value”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 63: 113-137.
15. Paul Horwich [1987]: Asymmetries in Time. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Lewis, D. Castaneda Vs Lewis, D. Frank I 329
Proposition/Belief/Self-attribution/CastanedaVsAttribution theory/CastanedaVsLewis: 1) Lewis defines the belief objects extensionally (from quantities). This violates Castaneda’s second intentionality condition for the objects of intentional attitudes. (see above).
Possible Worlds are unsuitable as primary objects of belief because of their infinite extension (infinitely many aspects) and properties cannot be individuated by sets of objects, because the creation of sets presupposes the predication of properties. (>Individuation). 2) Lewis’ thesis that self-attribution can be explained only by a non-propositional knowledge depends on the premise that there could be no indexical proposition or related related to private issues.
CastanedaVsLewis: but there is no convincing justification for that.
Possible world/CastanedaVsLewis: considers it conceivable that a possible world does not only consist of public physical objects, but also contains subjective referees like I representations and indexical representations. This world could then also include its subjectively colored ways of the circumstance (intension). Then a subject that knows all the propositions would also be able to recognize its own position (propositional knowledge).
I 356
Propostional knowledge/Lewis: E.g. "Two omniscient Gods": (slightly abridged original quote): they are omniscient, because they know every proposition. But I can imagine that they suffer from one ignorance: neither of them knows which one he is. There is nothing else to know, they would merely attribute more of the properties they have to themselves. He has this property and his world comrade does not have it, so the self-attribution of this property does not depend on him knowing which one is his world. Thesis: sometimes there are property objects, while propositional objects are not available. Some beliefs and some knowledge cannot be understood as propositional, but can be understood as self-attribution of properties. CastanedaVsLewis: that depends on the relevant meaning that one associates with "property" and "proposition". Therefore, he defines them in his spirit, and creates counter-intuitive premises.
I 358
6) CastandedaVsLewis: It also does not readily apply that perceptual knowledge is not propositional. To the extent that demonstrative references take place, it is about the question of whether possible worlds contain volatile and private particulars. 7) the idea that Is, nows and this’s are objects of private knowledge is well founded. CastanedaVsLewis: but they do not have to be inexpressible. It is just the function of quasi indicators to capture the indexical references of other persons by means of interpersonal and non-volatile references.


Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference,
and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55

James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An
International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians,
Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Rawls, J. Newen Vs Rawls, J. New I 157
Def Just/Basic Order/Rawls/Newen: just is a basic order if the participants themselves have agreed on it under fair conditions. Original State/Society/Rawls/Newen. Precursor: Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau.
Rawls:
1) The contract parties make a final choice of a basic order
2) They choose the order from a list of historical influential candidates that they can modify
3) the contract parties think rationally
4) they have the three higher-ranking regulatory interests.
5) they have general economic and psychological knowledge
6) they make their choice behind the veil of Ignorance: they do not know their place in society.
I 158
Veil of Ignorance/Rawls/Newen: Point: leads to an endorsement of the Maximin principle. Principles/Rawls/Newen: the two principles would be supported by someone if their enemy can assign them a place. (Rawls ThdG 233).
Newen: with that, Rawls builds on Kant.
I 159
Veil of Ignorance/Rawls/Newen: is released gradually, each with reference to decisions already taken on a level. Justice/Justice Theory/Rawls/Pogge/Newen: a conception of justice that people with different worldviews obey together neither needs to affirm nor deny its own capacity for truth.
Justification/Pogge: it is enough for it to distinguish it as the most sensible or appropriate for our political culture. (Pogge, John Rawls, p 173).
I 160
VsRawls/Newen: people are more influenced by emotion than Rawls believes. Should people heavily influenced by emotion be excluded from the order?
I 161
VsRawls: he is at risk of falling behind the procedural fairness of the Enlightenment which ensures that all people can participate in the constitution-making process on an equal footing, regardless of race, opinion, and education. VsRawls: this leaves open the possibility of a "justice expertocracy".
UntilitarianismVsRawls/EnlightenmentVsRawls: they consider the political autonomy also of non-experts a priority.
VsRawls: cannot submit a concept for the (inhomogeneous) world population.

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Non-knowledge Stalnaker, R. Sch I 179
Knowledge / belief / LewisVsStalnaker / SchwarzVsStalnaker: such examples speak against Stalnakers thesis that the actual ignorance in apparent ignorance of necessary truths always concerned linguistic facts, according to the meta-linguistic "diagonal" Proposition of one mind attribution. (Stalnaker 1981.1987 b).