Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Descartes, R. | Evans Vs Descartes, R. | Frank I 497 EvansVsDescartes/EvansVsHume/EvansVsLocke/EvansVsKant: the "I" of mental self-attribution refers neither to a Cartesian "Ego" now to a Lockean person, nor to a Humean bundle of perceptions, nor to a Kantian I, but rather to an object of flesh and blood! Consequence: the background element of self-identification must be the localization in space and time. I 517 EvansVsDescartes: strongest antidote: the fact that these ways to acquire knowledge about ourselves must be incoporated in the information component of a functional characterization of our "I" ideas. I 522 Body Awareness/Descartes: not a way to achieve knowledge about oneself, but only about something that one has. EvansVsDescartes: It’s hard to make sense from this. (s) This is not an argument. Descartes: I have to admit defeat when Descartes says that this was a way to gain knowledge about myself, but one that uses my identification! Evans: I have to admit that. I 523 EvansVsDescartes: our "I" notions are notions of bearers of physical no less than mental properties. I 562 EvansVsDescartes: the use of "I" simply bridges the gap between the mental and the physical and is not more closely connected to one aspect than to the other. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Evans, G. | Peacocke Vs Evans, G. | I 169/170 Demonstratives/Evans: perceptually demonstrative ways of givenness are possible, because these conditions are fulfilled: in a normal perception situation, there is an information link between subject and object, and also the subject knows or is able to find out where the object is. If the subject has the general ability to know what propositions makes of the form "π = p" true for any π (where π is an identification of a public place without index words (in a non-indexical frame of reference)) if p is the notion of a place in its egocentric Space. If it is also able to locate the object in its egocentric Space, we can say that it has an idea of the object. Idea/Notion/Evans/Terminology/Intension/Way of Givenness/Peacocke: Evans "Idea" (notion) corresponds to my way of givenness "mode of presentation". Idea/Evans: Thesis: we can conceive the idea of an object a as consisting in its knowledge of what it is to be true for an arbitrary sentence of the form "δ = a". Peacocke: where "δ" is the area of the basic ideas of an object. Fundamental Idea/Evans: is what you have if you think of an object as the possessor of the fundamental ground of difference that it actually has. Peacocke: i.e. what distinguishes an object from all others. I.e. for material objects type and location. PeacockeVsEvans: we have already seen cases where the thinker was unable to locate the object in his egocentric Space: E.g. the craters on the moon. I 171 E.g. apple in the mirror cabinet. But it still seems possible to think about it, for example, wonder where it is! It is true that it is possible to at least provide a rough direction in egocentric Space, but that is hardly sufficient for the knowledge condition of Evans. In the case of the memory image, it is clearer that no Localization in the current egocentric Space is needed. pro Evans: there must be additional imaginable evidence, e.g. experience or tools for Localization (if necessary, even Space travel!). If that were not imaginable, we would have to assume that the subject was not able to think of the object in public Space! pro Evans: an information link is not sufficient to think demonstratively about the object. VsEvans: but that is less than to demand that the thinker can locate the object at present. Weaker Requirement: Instead, a general ability of the subject can locate the object, if necessary, is sufficient. Evans: if you cannot locate an object, you can still think of it in the mixed demonstrative descriptive way of givenness: "that which causes my experience". But in normal cases this is a wrong description! Peacocke: it also seems to be wrong in the examples of the lunar craters, the apple in the mirror cabinet. PeacockeVsEvans: trange asymmetry: Idea/Evans: an idea a of a place in a self-centered Space is an adequate idea of a place in the public Space. Holistic/Evans: if an arbitrarily fundamental identification of a location is possible, it is holistic. (Varieties of reference, p. 162). Peacocke: this knowledge is grounded in a general ability to put a cognitive map of the objective spatial world over our own egocentric Space. I 172 E.g. in some cases this will not be possible, for example, when you are kidnapped, or ended up in an unknown area, etc. Point: even in such cases, you can still use the demonstrative pronoun "here" (in reference to objects). I.e. the thoughts are still thoughts about public Space! ((s) and the self-centered Space). Idea/Demonstrative Way of Givenness/PeacockeVsEvans: so his theory does not demand any ability to give a public, non-egocentric individuation our thoughts to have thoughts about a place in the public Space at all. Analogy/Peacocke: exactly analogous objections can be made in the case of demonstrative ways of givenness: E.g. Suppose a subject perceives an object of type F in the manner H. Then F is the token way of givenness. Then we can introduce: [W, Fs] for the perceptual "this F". Then there is exactly one proposition of the form "p = Localization of [W, Fs] now", which is true, and the subject knows what it is for it that it is true for it. PeacockeVsEvans: why should we demand here, but not in the earlier example, that the subject also knows which p (or which in the earlier case) is mentioned in this one true proposition? This is particularly absurd in the case of the lost subject. PeacockeVsEvans: his theory allows that [W, Fs] is an adequate idea here, although the subject has no fundamental idea of the object. Peacocke: but if we insisted that it could have a fundamental idea if he had more evidence, then why is an analogous possibility not also sufficient for adequacy in terms of the egocentric Space? I 173 There seem to be only two uniform positions: 1) Identification/Localization/Idea/Demonstratives/Liberal Position: sufficient for a genuine way of givenness or adequate ideas are the general ability of Localization plus uniqueness of the current Localization in the relevant Space. 2) Strict position: this is neither sufficient for genuine ways of givenness nor for adequate ideas. PeacockeVs: this can hardly be represented as a unified theory: it means that, if you are lost, you cannot think about the objects that you see around you. That would also mean to preclude a priori that you as a kidnapped person can ask the question "Which city is this?". Demonstratives/Peacocke: Thesis: I represent the uniformly liberal position Demonstratives/Evans: Thesis: is liberal in terms of public Space and strictly in terms of egocentric Space! ad 1): does not deny the importance of fundamental ideas. If a subject is neither able to locate an object in the public nor in egocentric Space ((s) E.g. he wakes up from anesthesia and hears a monaural sound), then it must still believe that this object has a fundamental identification. Otherwise it would have to assume that there is no object there. Anscombe: E.g. a subject sees two matchboxes through two holes which (are manipulated) so arranged that it sees only one box, then the subject does not know what it means for the sentence "this matchbox is F" to be true. The uniformly liberal view allows the subject to use demonstratives which depend on mental images, even if it has no idea where in the public Space and when it has encountered the object. EvansVs: representatives of this position will say that the knowledge of the subject is at least partial, I 174 because this idea causally results from an encounter with the object. But that makes their position worse instead of better: for it completely twists the grammar and logic of the concept of knowing what it is for the subject that p is true. Ability/PeacockeVsEvans: but a capability can also consist in the experience of finding out the right causal chains in a given environment: the same goes for the Localization of an object point seen in the mirror in egocentric Space. PeacockeVsEvans: his distinction seems unreal: it may be simultaneously true that someone has a relation R to the object due to causal relations, and be true that the possibility of being in this relation R is a question of the abilities of the subject. E.g. (Evans) to recognize the ball: Peacocke: this is not a sensory motor skill, but rather the ability to draw certain conclusions, which however require an earlier encounter. This also applies to e.g. the cognitive map, which is placed over the egocentric Space: PeacockeVsEvans: in both cases it does not follow that the presented object, remembered or perceived, is thought of explicitly in causal terms: the way of givenness is truly demonstrative. First Person/PeacockeVsEvans: the second major objection concerns thoughts of the first person: the different examples of immunity to misidentification, which contain the first person, roughly break down into two groups: a) here, immunity seems absolute: E.g. "I am in pain". I 175 b) Here, the immunity seems to depend on presuppositions about the world: if these assumptions are wrong, they open the possibility of picking out something wrong without stopping to use the word "I". These include: E.g. "I was on the ocean liner": memory image. E.g. "I sit at the desk": visual, kinesthetic, tactile perceptions. The distinction between a) and b) may be made by the constitutive role: "The person with these conscious states." Infallibility/Tradition/Evans: (absolutely immune judgments): the judgment to be a judgment of a specific content can be constituted by the fact that this judgement responds to this state. Peacocke pro. PeacockeVsEvans: Problem: can this infallibility be connected to the rest of Evans' theory? Because: I/Evans: Thesis: the reference of "I" may fail! Peacocke: how is that compatible with the absolute immunity of "I am in pain"? Conditionalisation: does not help: E.g. "if I exist, I am in pain" that cannot fulfill the purpose: the existence of the idea still needs the reference of "I". Similarly: E.g. "If my use of "I" refers, I am in pain": because "my use" must be explained in terms of the first person. Question: Can we use memory demonstratives which refer to previous use of first-person ways of givenness? E.g. "If those earlier uses of "I" speak, I am in pain." (Point: not "my uses"). PeacockeVs: that does not help: Descartes' evil demon could have suggested you the memories of someone else. (>Shoemaker: q-memories.) I 176 Constitutive Role/Brains in the Vat/BIV/EvansVsPeacocke: the constitutive role of [self] would not explain why the brains in the vat would be able to speak in a demonstrative way about their own experiences: Mental States/Evans: differ from all other states and objects in that they refer demonstratively to their owners. Pain is identified as an element of the objective order. Then someone can have no adequate idea of these mental states if he does not know to which person they happen. Peacocke: we can even concede thoughts about its pain to the brain in a vat, provided that it can give a fundamental identification of the person who has the pain. Peacocke: No, the nerves must be wired correctly. I.e. this is not true for the brains in the vat. So we can stick to the liberal point of view and at the constitutive role and the idea of a person. Also to the fact that the mental states are individuated on the person who has them. Individuation/Mental States/PeacockeVsEvans: not through Localization (like with material objects), but through the person. I 177 E.g. Split-Brain Patient/Peacocke: here we can speak of different, but qualitatively equivalent experiences. From this could follow two centers of consciousness in a single brain. But: after the surgery we should not say that one of the two was the original and the other one was added later. E.g. olfactory sensation of the left and right nostril separate. Then there are actually separate causes for both experiences. ((s), but the same source.) Peacocke: it does not follow that in normal brains two consciousnesses work in harmony. Here, the sense of smell is caused by simultaneous input through both nostrils and is thus overdetermined. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Haecceitism | Lewis Vs Haecceitism | IV 140 LewisVsHaecceitism: Haecceitism/Possible World/poss.w./VsLewis: Followers of haecceity are not persuaded by the example of the two gods. Variant: e.g. 2 gods: both live in world W, two other gods live in world V, which differs from W because both gods have swapped their seats. The god on the highest mountain in W and the god on the coldest mountain in V are linked by a simple bond which somehow makes them one. (The same is valid for the other two.) If the god on the highest mountain in W does not know whether he sits on the hightest or the coldest mountain, then he cannot know for sure which one of the worlds is his. He may know everything about the qualitative state that can be known about his world, but he does not know whether his world is W or V. If he knew, he would know every proposition that is valid in his world. But it seems that he does not know one proposition: The one which would correspond to the sentence "I sit on the highest mountain." I/Haecceitism: If his pronoun "I" is accurate for both, his brother and him, in haecceitas on the coldest mountain, then the proposition is indeed valid in W, but not in V! IV 141 If he were to know this proposition, would he then not know that he sits on the hightest mountain? 2 gods/LewisVsHaeccetism: I would love to discover what I should know about the objects of belief, and leave the followers of haeccetism to themselves. But I cannot resist to barge in. If you were a follower of haecceitism, I would recommend you to not believe the analysis written above. Haecceitism or not, there is a kind of not knowing which cannot be healed by some sort of self-Localization in the logical Space. E.g. supposing that both gods have swapped their places, and it shall be conceded that the god on the highest mountain knows that his world is W and not V! He shall be all-knowing with regards to all propositions, not only the qualitative ones. Is this helpful? Do not occupy yourself with V of which he knows that he does not live there. Does he know the proposition: "I am on the highest mountain"? Naturally, he does! He knows all the propositions, and this is one of them. Does he therefore know that he sits on the highest mountain? No! Because this does not follow from it. Since he is the one on the highest mountain, his sentence expresses a particular proposition which is true in W but not in V. It is one he knows to be true. Had he been the god on the coldest mountain (which he could be for all he knows), the same sentence would have expressed a different proposition, one that is true in V and wrong in W. It would be one of which he knows that it is wrong. He would know the proposition which would indeed by expressed by "I am on the highest mountain". But that does not mean that he knows whether he is on the highest mountain. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Nagel, Th. | Stalnaker Vs Nagel, Th. | I 20 Objective Self/Nagel/Stalnaker: Nagel begins with the expression of a general sense of confusion about one's place in an impersonal world. I: if somebody says "I am RS" it seems that the person expresses a fact. I 21 Important argument: it is an objective fact whether such a statement is true or false, regardless of what the speaker thinks. Problem: our concept of the objective world seems to leave no place for such a fact! A full representation of the world as it is in itself will not pick out any particular person as me. (single out). It will not tell me who I am. Semantic diagnosis: attempts a representation of index words or self-Localization as a solution. NagelVsSemantic diagnosis: that does not get to the heart of the matter. StalnakerVsNagel: a particular variant can solve our particular problem here but many others remain with regard to the relation between a person and the world they inhabited, namely what exactly the subjective facts about the experience tell us how the world in itself is Self-identification/Self-localisation/belief/Stalnaker: nothing could be easier: if EA says on June 5, 1953 "I am a philosopher" then that is true iff EA is a philosopher on June 5, 1953. Problem: what is the content of the statement? Content/truth conditions/tr.cond./Self-identification/I/Stalnaker: the content, the information is not recognized through tr.cond. if the tr.cond. are made timeless and impersonal. ((s) The truth conditions for self-identification or self-Localization are not homophonic! That means they are not the repetition of "I'm sick" but they need to be complemented by place, date and information about the person so that they are timeless and capable of truth. Problem/Stalnaker: the speaker could have believed what he said, without even knowing the date and place at all or his audience could understand the statement without knowing the date, etc.. Solution: semantic diagnosis needs a representation of subjective or contextual content. Nagel: is in any case certain that he rejects the reverse solution: an ontological perspective that objectifies the self-.properties. Stalnaker: that would be something like the assertion that each of us has a certain irreducible self-property with which he is known. ((s) >bug example, Wittgenstein dito), tentatively I suppose that that could be exemplified in the objectification of the phenomenal character of experience. I 253 Self/Thomas Nagel/Stalnaker: Nagel finds it surprising that he of all people must be from all Thomas Nagel. Self/subjective/objective/Stalnaker: general problem: to accommodate the position of a person in a non-centered idea of an objective world. It is not clear how to represent this relation. Self/I/Nagel/Stalnaker: e.g. "I am TN". Problem: it is not clear why our world has Space for such facts. Dilemma: a) such facts must exist because otherwise things would be incomplete b) they cannot exist because the way things are they do not contain such facts. (Nagel 1986, 57). Self/semantic diagnosis/Nagel/Stalnaker: NagelVsSemantic diagnosis: unsatisfactory: NagelVsOntological solution: wants to enrich the objective, centerless world in a wrong way. Nagel: center position thesis: There is an objective self. StalnakerVsNagel: this is difficult to grasp and neither necessary nor helpful. I 254 Semantic diagnosis/StalnakerVsNagel: has more potential than Nagel assumes. My plan is: 1. semantic diagnosis 2. sketch of a metaphysical solution 3. objective self is a mistake 4. general problem of subjective viewpoints 5. context-dependent or subjective information - simple solution for qualitative experiences. Self/subjective/objective/semantic diagnosis/Nagel/Stalnaker: (in Stalnaker's version): This does not include that "I am TN" is supposedly without content. StalnakerVsNagel: the identity of the first person is not "automatically and therefore uninteresting". semantic diagnosis: starts with the tr.cond. WB: "I am F" expressed by XY is true iff XY is F. What information is transmitted with it? I 255 Content/information/self/identity/Stalnaker: a solution: if the following is true: Belief/conviction/Stalnaker: are sets of non-centered poss.w. Content/self-ascription/Stalnaker: is then a set of centered poss.w. E.g. I am TN is true iff it is expressed by TN, Content: is represented by the set of centered poss.w. that have TN as their marked object. Content/conviction/Lewis/Stalnaker: with Lewis belief contents can also be regarded as properties. (Lewis 1979). I 257 Semantic diagnosis/NagelVsSemantic diagnosis/Stalnaker: "It does not make the problem go away". Stalnaker: What is the problem then? Problem/Nagel: an appropriate solution would have to bring the subjective and objective concepts into harmony. I 258 StalnakerVsNagel: for that you would have to better articulate the problem's sources than Nagel does. Analogy. E.g. suppose a far too simple skeptic says: "Knowledge implies truth so you can only know necessary truths". Vs: which is a confusion of different ranges of modality. VsVs: the skeptic might then reply "This diagnosis is not satisfactory because it does not make the problem go away". Problem/Stalnaker: general: a problem may turn out to be more sophisticated, but even then it can only be a linguistic trick. Illusion/explanation/problem/Stalnaker: it is not enough to realize that an illusion is at the root of the problem. Some illusions are persistent, we feel their existence even after they are explained. But that again does not imply that it is a problem. I 259 Why-questions/Stalnaker: e.g. "Why should it be possible that..." (e.g. that physical brain states cause qualia). Such questions only make sense if it is more likely that the underlying is not possible. I 260 Self-deception/memory loss/self/error/Stalnaker: e.g. suppose TN is mistaken about who he is, then he does not know that TN itself has the property to be TN even though he knows that TN has the self-property of TN! (He does not know that he himself is TN.) He does not know that he has the property which he calls "to be me". ((s) "to be me" is to refer here only to TN not to any speaker). objective/non-centered world/self/Stalnaker: this is a fact about the objective, non-centered world and if he knows it he knows who he is. Thus the representative of the ontological perspective says. Ontological perspective/StalnakerVsNagel/StalnakerVsVs: the strategy is interesting: first, the self is objectified - by transforming self-localizing properties into characteristics of the non-centered world. Then you try to keep the essential subjective character by the subjective ability of detecting. I 263 Nagel: thesis: because the objective representation has a subject there is also its possible presence in the world and that allows me to bring together the subjective and objective view. StalnakerVsNagel: I do not see how that is concluded from it. Why should from the fact that I can think of a possible situation be concluded that I could be in it? Fiction: here there are both, participating narrator and the narrator from outside, omniscient or not. I 264 Semantic diagnosis/Stalnaker: may be sufficient for normal self-localization. But Nagel wants more: a philosophical thought. StalnakerVsNagel: I do not think there is more to a philosophical thought here than to the normal. Perhaps there is a different attitude (approach) but that requires no difference in the content! Subjective content/Stalnaker: (as it is identified by the semantic diagnosis) seems to be a plausible candidate to me. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Possible Worlds | Stalnaker Vs Possible Worlds | I 49 Possible world/poss.w./knowledge/mathematics/StalnakerVsLewis/Stalnaker: I am inclined to say that the poss.w.-theory makes assumptions about the nature of their properties that are - unlike the corresponding assumptions of mathematical platonism - incompatible with the representation of the connection between the knowledge subjects and their objects in the case of poss.w.. poss.w./MR/VsModal realism/knowledge/verificationism/StalnakerVsLewis: the modal realist cannot cite any verificationist principles for what he calls his knowledge. Conclusion: problem: the MR cannot on the one hand say that poss.w. things are of the same kind as the actual world (contingent physical objects) and say on the other hand that poss.w. are things of which we know by the same kind like of numbers, sets, functions. ((s) Namely no real existing things.). I 53 StalnakerVsLewis: he contradicts himself because his other thesis about poss.w. about which we can have substantial beliefs contradicts his definition of content (see above). I 58 Contradiction/Lewis: there is no object howsoever fantastic about which one could tell the truth by contradicting oneself. Footnote: Takashi YagisawaVsLewis: why not? What should you expect otherwise? Impossible things are impossible. II 20 Belief ascription/solution/Stalnaker: I always wonder how the poss.w. would be according to what the believer believes. E.g. Pierre: for him there are two cities (Londres and London) E.g. Lingens in the library: for him there are two men, one named "Lingens" about which the other reads something. Relations theory/RelTh/Stalnaker: this can reconcile with the assumption that propositions are the belief objects. (Team: Stalnaker pro Relations theory? (1999)) Index/belief/Stalnaker: nevertheless I believe that convictions have an irreducible indexical element. Solution/Lewis: sets of centered poss.w. as belief objects. StalnakerVsLewis: although I have accepted that such poss.w. then include a representation of the mental state of the believer. But that is not what it is about! It is not sufficient that poss.w. that are compatible with one's convictions then include a person who has these convictions (> e.g. Lingens), the believer must identify himself with the person who has this thought! Proposition/identification/self-identification/Stalnaker: I am not suggesting that this identification is fulfilled by the belief in a proposition. I now think that this is not at all about some kind of cognitive performance. Indexical conviction/Stalnaker: (E.g. Perry: memory loss, library, e.g. Lewis: 2 gods (2 omniscient gods, e.g. Castaneda: memory loss): indexical unknowing. Stalnaker: thesis: people do not differ in what they believe. II 21 E.g. O'Leary knows that he is in the basement and that Daniels is in the kitchen. And Daniels knows the same thing: that he is in the kitchen and O'Leary in the basement. Everyone knows who and where he is and who and where the other is. The poss.w. that are compatible with the convictions of the two are the same. They argue about nothing. Yet there is an obvious difference in their doxastic situation: O'Leary identifies himself with the one in the basement and Daniels identifies himself as one who is in the kitchen. poss.w. semantics/StalnakerVsPossible worlds semantics/Stalnaker: this difference in the belief states of the two is not reflected by a set of poss.w. as belief state. Solution/Lewis: self-ascription of properties, or - equivalently - sets of centered poss.w.. StalnakerVsLewis: I do not want that. StalnakerVsLewis: problem: it is wrong to treat the difference in perspective as a dispute (disagreement). The two argue about nothing. Problem: it is not sure if one can express their agreement with the fact that the set of their uncentered poss.w. is the same. Because E.g. Heimson/Perry/Stalnaker: (Heimson believes "I am David Hume") all his impersonal beliefs about Hume are correct. Suppose they are the same convictions as the convictions of Hume about Hume. Stalnaker: nevertheless it would be wrong to say that they argue about nothing. ((s) unlike O'Leary and Daniels). II 134 Localization/space/time/self-localization/logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: logical Space/Lewis/Stalnaker: set of poss.w. from which one selects one. Self-Localization/physical: in Space and time. We usually know where we are. ((s) but we never know all poss.w. in which we could be localized, we cannot distinguish all poss.w. because we do not know everything). Gods example/Stalnaker: the two know exactly where they are in the logical Space. II 135 But they do not know where within this poss.w. they are. LewisVsTradition: the doctrine of the proposition is focused only on one of the two types of localized belief. Generalization: is what we need and for that the transition from propositions to properties (as belief objects) serves. II 144 Gods example/Stalnaker: this is also a case of unknowing, which of two indistinguishable poss.w. is actual. One is actually the actual world while the other exactly the sam, with the exception that the god who sits in the actual world on the highest mountain is this time sitting on the coldest mountain and in fact with all the properties that the god on the highest mountain actually has. ((s) two individuals change places but keep all the properties. This is only possible if Localization is not a property) Omniscience/Stalnaker: then you have to say, the two gods are not really omniscient regarding propositions, but rather omniscient in relation to purely qualitative criteria. LewisVsStalnaker: Lewis rejects this explanation for two reasons: 1. because he represents the counterpart theory (c.th.) that makes the cross world identity superfluous or meaningless. 2. even without counterpart it would not work because Assuming that the two gods of world W have traded places in world V assuming the god on the highest knows that his world is W, not V. Assuming he is omniscient with respect to all propositions not only the qualitative propositions. II 145 V: the world V cannot be relevant because he knows that he does not live there. Problem: there are still two mountains in a poss.w. W where he after all what he knows can live. StalnakerVsLewis: that does not answer the question: you cannot simply stipulate that the God in W knows something and not V. Because after the explanation we proposed that leads to the fact that he knows on which mountain he lives. Lewis/Stalnaker: his explanation is plausible if one conceives it as a metaphor for a location in the logical Space: logical Space/Lewis/Stalnaker: assume that a map of the logical Space divided into large regions match the poss.w. and in smaller subdivisions represent the locations within poss.w.. Important argument: then we can tell someone in which large region he is without telling him exactly where he is located in it. Modal Realism/MR/logical Space/Stalnaker: for him this image might be appropriate. Actualism/logical Space/Localization/Stalnaker: for the actualism this image is misleading: to know in which country you are is different to know where in the country you are but it is not so clear that there is a difference between the fact that one knows anything about in which poss.w. one is and knowing which poss.w. is the actual. Lewis also admits this. Stalnaker: my approach seems to be really close to the one of Lewis, but no. Centered poss.w.: one should perhaps instead of indistinguishable poss.w. speak of centered worlds (after Quine). These are then distinguishable. Indistinguishability/poss.w./Stalnaker: distinct but indistinguishable poss.w. would then be the same worlds but with different centers. Attitude/properties/propositions/centered world/Lewis: to treat objects of attitudes as sets of centered poss.w. makes them to properties instead of propositions. Centered poss.w./Stalnaker: I agree that possible situations normally, perhaps even essential, are centered in the sense of a representation of a particular mental state. II 146 StalnakerVsLewis: but this makes the approach (gods example) more complicated when it comes to the relations between different mental states. E.g. to compare past with current states is then more difficult, or relations between the convictions of different people. Information/communication/Stalnaker: we need then additional explanation about how information is exchanged. Two examples: E.g. O'Leary is freed from his trunk and wonders at around nine: a) "What time was it when I wondered what time it was?" Stalnaker: that is the same question like the one he asked then. When he learns that it was three o'clock, his doubt has been eliminated. Solution: the doubt is eliminated since all possible situations (poss.w.) in which a thought occurs at two different times are involved. The centers of these situations have moved in the sense that it is now nine o'clock and O'Leary no longer in the trunk but it may be that the first occurrence of the then thought is what O'Leary is now thinking about. Important argument: this moving of the center does not require that the poss.w. that the propositions characterize are changed. b) "What time was it when I wondered if it was three or four?". (If he wondered twice) Indistinguishability: even if the two incidents were indistinguishable for O'Leary, it may still be that it was the first time which O'Leary remembers at around nine o'clock. StalnakerVsLewis: his approach is more complicated. According to his approach we have to say at three o'clock, O'Leary wonders about his current temporal Localization in the actual world (act.wrld.) instead of wondering in what poss.w. he is. Versus: at nine, things are quite different: now he wonders if he lives in a poss.w. in which a particular thought occurred at three or four. This is unnecessarily complicated. E.g. Lingens, still in the library, meets Ortcutt and asks him "Do you know who I am?" – "You are my cousin, Rudolf Lingens!". Stalnaker: that seems to be a simple and successful communication. Information was requested and given. The question was answered. II 147 Proposition/Stalnaker: (Propositions as belief objects) Ortcutt's answer expresses a proposition that distinguishes between possible situations and eliminates Lingen's doubt. StalnakerVsLewis: according to his approach (self-ascription of properties), it is again more complicated: Lingens: asks if he correctly ascribes himself a certain set of properties i. Ortcutt: answers by ascribing himself a completely different set of properties. Lingens: has to conclude then subsequently himself the answer. So all the answers are always indirect in communication. ((s) also StalnakerVsChisholm, implicit). Communication/Lewis/Chisholm/StalnakerVsLewis/StalnakerVsChsholm: everyone then always speaks only about himself. Solution/Stalnaker: Lewis would otherwise have to distinguish between attitudes and speech acts and say that speech acts have propositions as object and attitudes properties as an object. Problem/StalnakerVsLewis: Lewis cannot say by intuition that the content of Ortcutt's answer is the information that eliminates Lingen's doubt. That is also a problem for Perry's approach. (> StalnakerVsPerry) |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Russell, B. | Tugendhat Vs Russell, B. | Wolf II 22 Identification/Individualization/Tugendhat: the subjective and the objective localization are equally original. TugendhatVsStrawson: Space-time not only particularly important, but the only possibility of identification. Like Strawson: sortal predicates must be added. (Taking out of the situation, recognition, countability). All singular terms refer to the lowest level of identification. "This F is G", verifiable. (KantVs). TugendhatVsRussell: although the existential statement "there is exactly one F here and now" is still implied here, it is no longer a general statement as with Russell: "among all objects there is one..." but Localization. Only with localizing expressions we have singular terms whose reference can no longer fail. Therefore, they no longer imply existential statements! Thus they resemble Russell's logical proper names. Difference: they no longer stand in an isolated assignment to the object, but in a Space-time order. Tugendhat I 378 Existential Statements/Tugendhat: contrary to appearances not statements about individual things but always general statements. In principle, the talk of existence always assumes that one speaks of all objects, and therefore one could not even say (VsRussell) of a single object that it exists. I 383 TugendhatVsRussell: but here it's not about a relation at all, specification takes place against the background of all objects. Russell has already seen that correctly with regard to singular terms, but with his logical proper names he was wrong anyway, precisely because he denied them the reference to that background of a peculiar generality. III 214 TugendhatVsRussell: neither the reaction of a living being nor the triggering sign can be true or false, because here there is no assumption that something is so or so, consequently no error is possible. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Sellars, W. | Putnam Vs Sellars, W. | III 131 Map/Sellars: unlike truth and reference: our normal linguistic schemata map the world more or less adequate. Some schemes are more adequate than others, although they are in no objective semantic relationship to the world. This has led to a split in the students of Sellars: Sellarean Left: Rorty waives the notion of mapping. PutnamVsSellars: does not explain how the picture would be possible for the frame of the ideal scientific scheme. III 132 To make a "perspective", characters and sounds have to map something. To give an objective description, they have to describe something. Absolute View/Williams: it will tell us, but not necessarily foreign researchers, how we understand this view. Putnam: So the "theory of error" is not provided by the absolute view, but from the "local perspective". Be it a perspective that is characterized by the absolute view. Does Williams claim that the existence of the absolute view is a member of our local perspective? Rorty could even agree on this. --- I (c) 96 Realism/theory/science/Peirce/Sellars: both try to maintain the idea that the theory B1 - (B) A statement may be wrong, even if it follows from our theory (or our theory plus the set of true observation sentences) - Could be wrong (yes, sooner or later turn out to be incorrect) without using a realistic concept of truth by not having identified them with present justified assertibility but with ideally justified assertibility. That is what both consider the meaning of the assertion, the Venus could also have no carbon dioxide. Realism/truth/PutnamVsPeirce/PutnamVsSellars: However, this presupposes that we sensibly fill the concept of "ideal limit" without a frame of Spacetime Localizations, objects, etc. and can specify the conditions for science. And that does not work. Besides, it also requires convergence. If there is no convergence, (so just more frequent cases of failure of convergence than of success) as Kuhn and Feyerabend believe, then the "ideal limit" is treated as badly as the realism. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Wiggins, D. | Simons Vs Wiggins, D. | I 130 Event/mereology/relation/Simons: how do the mereological relations between events look like? Here, we do not need to modify the predicates timely like continuants. This makes the event interesting for philosophers who want to preserve the extensionality. Relation currently: is for events direct and narrow. Relation to the Space: is for events indirect on the continuants involved in them. Duality/Wiggins: (1980,25-6,n12): events are "dual" to continuants in this regard. SimonsVsWiggins: this is not perfect because continuants occupy Space and continue as well. Event/splitting/scattered/Simons: because continuants are involved in them they can be split (to be divided, dispersed, scattered). And therefore they can have both spatial and temporal parts. But not as events involved continuants, e.g. the increase in the intensity of a magnetic field. Field: whether itself is a continuant is controversial. Event/Localization: Localization is only possible by the continuants involved in them. Entering/time/happening/Simons: the time of the happening (whether continuants are involved or not) can only be calculated by measuring time intervals. We must rely on local cyclic processes. I 221 Superposition/SimonsVsWiggins: what the superposition of things of the same kind is about is that we have no way to track things ((s) in its coming together and breaking up). I 222 Namely, they are temporarily indistinguishable (this is an epistemic problem). Epistemic/(s): why are epistemic problems at all important or interesting? Because we have to revise our language use in epistemic impossibility: for basically indistinguishable we should not use different words (no distinction without difference). Simons: e.g. two bee swarms unite and separate again. We generally do not know if the two are afterwards the same two as before. This could be, however, clarified by tracking each individual bee. Therefore, it is not an ontological problem. Superposition/Simons: there are apparently cases where things can superimpose in the same way and we can still track them: E.g. moving points of light or shadow, which overlap for a moment. E.g. mutually parallel wavefronts, here we assume this in addition to uniform wave velocity. E.g. (shorter): clouds of water vapor that can be manipulated by a "cloud projector", here we have a means of identification: causal paths. I 223 Wiggin's Principle/WP/Wiggins: pro: space can be displayed only by reference to its occupiers (availability), and spatial facts are conceptually independent of the existence of facts about individual things (particulars) and the identities of these particulars. Now, if space is mapped by reference to permanent particulars the non-identity of the particulars A and B, that are both of the type f, has to be sufficient to determine that the place of A to t is different from the place of B to t. Simons is pro illustration by reference to particulars. SimonsVsWiggins: nevertheless, objects of the same type may coincide: because the requirement of illustration only requires that some specific continuants can impossibly coincide with others of their kind. There are exceptions, though they are a minority: e.g. see above clouds, points of light, shadow, waves, etc. VsSimons: it could be argued that these objects are not material or substances. Simons: they actually are not substances. Just like accidents or disruptions. SimonsVsVs: still the answer is not yet there if two things of a kind can superimpose whether they can be substances. The examples suggest that we can appease Wiggins' fear that we cannot retrace the traces if we find the appropriate means, e.g. separate causes or uniform speed. Wiggins/Simons: Wiggins is only right if everything with which we can trace a continuant is, so to speak, in its own container. If this is the case, his principle (WP) is correct. These cases seem to make out the majority, so we have no problem to map the Space (illustrating, mapping). Sortal Concept/Simons: (for a continuant): the sortal concept tells us, inter alia, under which conditions the object continues to exist and under which it ceases. These were the "existence-conditions" ((s) meaning linguistically!). Superposition/SimonsVsWiggins: that various objects can superimpose follows from the fact that a single piece of matter can be in such a state that it simultaneously fulfills different existence conditions ((s) meaning intensional). I 260 Neccessary/Nec/Wiggins: "Nec" is a predicate modifier working on λ-abstraction, rather than using the proposition operator "N". QuineVsWiggins: (1977, 236): misleading: "Nec[(λx)(λy)(x = y)]" for "the relation like any r and s have if they are necessary identical" correct: "(λx)(λy)(N(x = y)" (p. 293). SimonsVsWiggins : "Nec" seems to be superfluous and Wiggins suggests this himself. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
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Reference |
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| Selfconsciousn.. irreduc. | Versus | Peacocke I 146 Evans: concept of the self dependend on localization in space. (> Frank I 550) |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Vs Absolutism. | Leibniz, G.W. | Staln I 226 Relationalism / space / Leibniz / Stalnaker: Thesis: per conceptual independence of space and time. Stalnaker: I think it is coherent. Thesis: there is no absolute Localization (position, no absolute rest point). That the assignment of number triples to Space points is arbitrary. Relationism Vs absolutism / Stalnaker: the bone of contention is whether the identification of Space points in time is conventional. Relationism: there is no absolute motion. Only change in the time the relative positions of things. Motion / relationism / Stalnaker: allegations of movements are completely useful here. But they are always understood in terms of a frame (frame of reference). |
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