Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Haecceitism | Lewis Vs Haecceitism | IV 140 LewisVsHaecceitism: Haecceitism/Possible World/poss.w./VsLewis: Followers of haecceity are not persuaded by the example of the two gods. Variant: e.g. 2 gods: both live in world W, two other gods live in world V, which differs from W because both gods have swapped their seats. The god on the highest mountain in W and the god on the coldest mountain in V are linked by a simple bond which somehow makes them one. (The same is valid for the other two.) If the god on the highest mountain in W does not know whether he sits on the hightest or the coldest mountain, then he cannot know for sure which one of the worlds is his. He may know everything about the qualitative state that can be known about his world, but he does not know whether his world is W or V. If he knew, he would know every proposition that is valid in his world. But it seems that he does not know one proposition: The one which would correspond to the sentence "I sit on the highest mountain." I/Haecceitism: If his pronoun "I" is accurate for both, his brother and him, in haecceitas on the coldest mountain, then the proposition is indeed valid in W, but not in V! IV 141 If he were to know this proposition, would he then not know that he sits on the hightest mountain? 2 gods/LewisVsHaeccetism: I would love to discover what I should know about the objects of belief, and leave the followers of haeccetism to themselves. But I cannot resist to barge in. If you were a follower of haecceitism, I would recommend you to not believe the analysis written above. Haecceitism or not, there is a kind of not knowing which cannot be healed by some sort of self-Localization in the logical space. E.g. supposing that both gods have swapped their places, and it shall be conceded that the god on the highest mountain knows that his world is W and not V! He shall be all-knowing with regards to all propositions, not only the qualitative ones. Is this helpful? Do not occupy yourself with V of which he knows that he does not live there. Does he know the proposition: "I am on the highest mountain"? Naturally, he does! He knows all the propositions, and this is one of them. Does he therefore know that he sits on the highest mountain? No! Because this does not follow from it. Since he is the one on the highest mountain, his sentence expresses a particular proposition which is true in W but not in V. It is one he knows to be true. Had he been the god on the coldest mountain (which he could be for all he knows), the same sentence would have expressed a different proposition, one that is true in V and wrong in W. It would be one of which he knows that it is wrong. He would know the proposition which would indeed by expressed by "I am on the highest mountain". But that does not mean that he knows whether he is on the highest mountain. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Modal Realism | Stalnaker Vs Modal Realism | Stalnaker I 36 Proposition/closeness/Stalnaker: whatever propositions are, if there are any at all, there are also sets of them. And for each set of propositions it is definitely true or false, that all of its elements are true. And this is of course again a proposition. (W5) Closeness-condition: for each set of propositions G there is a proposition A so that G implies A and A implies every element of G. Stalnaker: that means that for each set of propositions there is a proposition that says that every proposition in the set is true. So I suppose that the world-stories-theorists wants to add (W5) to his theory. (W6) Equivalent propositions are identical. Problem: the problems of (W6) are known. ((s) > hyperintensionalism/ hyperintensionality): propositions that are true in the same worlds are indistinguishable, Vspossible worlds semantics). I 40 modal realism/MR/Lewis/Stalnaker: by Lewis the actual world (act. wrld.) is only a real part of a reality which consists of many parallel universes which are spatially and temporally separated. Actual world/Lewis/Stalnaker: is then indexically defined as the part that is related to us. Unrealized possibilities/Possibilia/Lewis/Stalnaker: then actually exists, but in another part of the reality. Its non-actuality only exists in its localisation somewhere else. ((s) This is only a polemical presentation: Localization must be more than "somewhere else". Localization may be not carried out by us for areas that do are not related to us because we have then no knowledge.) Modal Realism/MR/Stalnaker: divides into 1. semantic thesis: assertions about what is possible and necessary, should be analyzed in concepts about what is true in some or all parts of reality 2. metaphysical thesis: about the existence of possible worlds (poss.w.). Semantic MR/Stalnaker: problem: VsMR it could be argued that it is not possible to know the metaphysical facts about it even if the semantic part was true. I 41 Lewis: there is a parallel here to Benacerraf's dilemma of mathematical truth and knowledge. I 42 EpistemologyVsModal Realism/Stalnaker: the representatives of the epistemological argument against the MR reject the parallel between mathematical objects and realistically construed possibilia. They insist that reference and knowledge require causal relation of concrete things even if that does not apply for abstract things (numbers etc.). Knowledge/LewisVs: why should the limit between what for knowledge and reference requires a causal relation to be made in concepts of the distinction abstract/concrete? Knowledge/Lewis: instead we should say that reference and knowledge require a causal relation of contigent facts but not the one of modal reality (knowledge about what is possible and necessary). Modal Realism/knowledge/Lewis: thesis: in the context of MR, we can say that indexical knowledge requires causal relation, but impersonal knowledge does not. I 43 Platonism/mathematics/Stalnaker: pro Lewis: here knowledge does not have to be based on a causal relation. Then Benacerraf's dilemma can be solved. EpistemologyVsModal realism/Stalnaker: but I still feel the force of the epistemological argument VsMR. Reference/knowledge/Stalnaker: problem: to explain the difference between knowledge and reference to numbers, sets and cabbages and so on. I 49 Possible worlds/pos.w./MR/Vsmodal realism/knowledge/verificationism/StalnakerVsLewis: the modal realist can cite no verificationist principles for what he calls his knowledge. Conclusion: problem: the MR cannot say on the one hand that poss.w. things are of the same kind (contingent physical objects) like the real world and say on the other side that poss.w. things are of what we know in the same kind as of numbers, sets, functions. ((s) The latter are not "real" things). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Possible Worlds | Stalnaker Vs Possible Worlds | I 49 Possible world/poss.w./knowledge/mathematics/StalnakerVsLewis/Stalnaker: I am inclined to say that the poss.w.-theory makes assumptions about the nature of their properties that are - unlike the corresponding assumptions of mathematical platonism - incompatible with the representation of the connection between the knowledge subjects and their objects in the case of poss.w.. poss.w./MR/VsModal realism/knowledge/verificationism/StalnakerVsLewis: the modal realist cannot cite any verificationist principles for what he calls his knowledge. Conclusion: problem: the MR cannot on the one hand say that poss.w. things are of the same kind as the actual world (contingent physical objects) and say on the other hand that poss.w. are things of which we know by the same kind like of numbers, sets, functions. ((s) Namely no real existing things.). I 53 StalnakerVsLewis: he contradicts himself because his other thesis about poss.w. about which we can have substantial beliefs contradicts his definition of content (see above). I 58 Contradiction/Lewis: there is no object howsoever fantastic about which one could tell the truth by contradicting oneself. Footnote: Takashi YagisawaVsLewis: why not? What should you expect otherwise? Impossible things are impossible. II 20 Belief ascription/solution/Stalnaker: I always wonder how the poss.w. would be according to what the believer believes. E.g. Pierre: for him there are two cities (Londres and London) E.g. Lingens in the library: for him there are two men, one named "Lingens" about which the other reads something. Relations theory/RelTh/Stalnaker: this can reconcile with the assumption that propositions are the belief objects. (Team: Stalnaker pro Relations theory? (1999)) Index/belief/Stalnaker: nevertheless I believe that convictions have an irreducible indexical element. Solution/Lewis: sets of centered poss.w. as belief objects. StalnakerVsLewis: although I have accepted that such poss.w. then include a representation of the mental state of the believer. But that is not what it is about! It is not sufficient that poss.w. that are compatible with one's convictions then include a person who has these convictions (> e.g. Lingens), the believer must identify himself with the person who has this thought! Proposition/identification/self-identification/Stalnaker: I am not suggesting that this identification is fulfilled by the belief in a proposition. I now think that this is not at all about some kind of cognitive performance. Indexical conviction/Stalnaker: (E.g. Perry: memory loss, library, e.g. Lewis: 2 gods (2 omniscient gods, e.g. Castaneda: memory loss): indexical unknowing. Stalnaker: thesis: people do not differ in what they believe. II 21 E.g. O'Leary knows that he is in the basement and that Daniels is in the kitchen. And Daniels knows the same thing: that he is in the kitchen and O'Leary in the basement. Everyone knows who and where he is and who and where the other is. The poss.w. that are compatible with the convictions of the two are the same. They argue about nothing. Yet there is an obvious difference in their doxastic situation: O'Leary identifies himself with the one in the basement and Daniels identifies himself as one who is in the kitchen. poss.w. semantics/StalnakerVspossible worlds semantics/Stalnaker: this difference in the belief states of the two is not reflected by a set of poss.w. as belief state. Solution/Lewis: self-ascription of properties, or - equivalently - sets of centered poss.w.. StalnakerVsLewis: I do not want that. StalnakerVsLewis: problem: it is wrong to treat the difference in perspective as a dispute (disagreement). The two argue about nothing. Problem: it is not sure if one can express their agreement with the fact that the set of their uncentered poss.w. is the same. Because E.g. Heimson/Perry/Stalnaker: (Heimson believes "I am David Hume") all his impersonal beliefs about Hume are correct. Suppose they are the same convictions as the convictions of Hume about Hume. Stalnaker: nevertheless it would be wrong to say that they argue about nothing. ((s) unlike O'Leary and Daniels). II 134 Localization/space/time/self-localization/logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: set of poss.w. from which one selects one. Self-Localization/physical: in space and time. We usually know where we are. ((s) but we never know all poss.w. in which we could be localized, we cannot distinguish all poss.w. because we do not know everything). Gods example/Stalnaker: the two know exactly where they are in the logical space. II 135 But they do not know where within this poss.w. they are. LewisVsTradition: the doctrine of the proposition is focused only on one of the two types of localized belief. Generalization: is what we need and for that the transition from propositions to properties (as belief objects) serves. II 144 Gods example/Stalnaker: this is also a case of unknowing, which of two indistinguishable poss.w. is actual. One is actually the actual world while the other exactly the sam, with the exception that the god who sits in the actual world on the highest mountain is this time sitting on the coldest mountain and in fact with all the properties that the god on the highest mountain actually has. ((s) two individuals change places but keep all the properties. This is only possible if Localization is not a property) Omniscience/Stalnaker: then you have to say, the two gods are not really omniscient regarding propositions, but rather omniscient in relation to purely qualitative criteria. LewisVsStalnaker: Lewis rejects this explanation for two reasons: 1. because he represents the counterpart theory (c.th.) that makes the cross world identity superfluous or meaningless. 2. even without counterpart it would not work because Assuming that the two gods of world W have traded places in world V assuming the god on the highest knows that his world is W, not V. Assuming he is omniscient with respect to all propositions not only the qualitative propositions. II 145 V: the world V cannot be relevant because he knows that he does not live there. Problem: there are still two mountains in a poss.w. W where he after all what he knows can live. StalnakerVsLewis: that does not answer the question: you cannot simply stipulate that the God in W knows something and not V. Because after the explanation we proposed that leads to the fact that he knows on which mountain he lives. Lewis/Stalnaker: his explanation is plausible if one conceives it as a metaphor for a location in the logical space: logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: assume that a map of the logical space divided into large regions match the poss.w. and in smaller subdivisions represent the locations within poss.w.. Important argument: then we can tell someone in which large region he is without telling him exactly where he is located in it. Modal Realism/MR/logical space/Stalnaker: for him this image might be appropriate. Actualism/logical space/Localization/Stalnaker: for the actualism this image is misleading: to know in which country you are is different to know where in the country you are but it is not so clear that there is a difference between the fact that one knows anything about in which poss.w. one is and knowing which poss.w. is the actual. Lewis also admits this. Stalnaker: my approach seems to be really close to the one of Lewis, but no. Centered poss.w.: one should perhaps instead of indistinguishable poss.w. speak of centered worlds (after Quine). These are then distinguishable. Indistinguishability/poss.w./Stalnaker: distinct but indistinguishable poss.w. would then be the same worlds but with different centers. Attitude/properties/propositions/centered world/Lewis: to treat objects of attitudes as sets of centered poss.w. makes them to properties instead of propositions. Centered poss.w./Stalnaker: I agree that possible situations normally, perhaps even essential, are centered in the sense of a representation of a particular mental state. II 146 StalnakerVsLewis: but this makes the approach (gods example) more complicated when it comes to the relations between different mental states. E.g. to compare past with current states is then more difficult, or relations between the convictions of different people. Information/communication/Stalnaker: we need then additional explanation about how information is exchanged. Two examples: E.g. O'Leary is freed from his trunk and wonders at around nine: a) "What time was it when I wondered what time it was?" Stalnaker: that is the same question like the one he asked then. When he learns that it was three o'clock, his doubt has been eliminated. Solution: the doubt is eliminated since all possible situations (poss.w.) in which a thought occurs at two different times are involved. The centers of these situations have moved in the sense that it is now nine o'clock and O'Leary no longer in the trunk but it may be that the first occurrence of the then thought is what O'Leary is now thinking about. Important argument: this moving of the center does not require that the poss.w. that the propositions characterize are changed. b) "What time was it when I wondered if it was three or four?". (If he wondered twice) Indistinguishability: even if the two incidents were indistinguishable for O'Leary, it may still be that it was the first time which O'Leary remembers at around nine o'clock. StalnakerVsLewis: his approach is more complicated. According to his approach we have to say at three o'clock, O'Leary wonders about his current temporal Localization in the actual world (act.wrld.) instead of wondering in what poss.w. he is. Versus: at nine, things are quite different: now he wonders if he lives in a poss.w. in which a particular thought occurred at three or four. This is unnecessarily complicated. E.g. Lingens, still in the library, meets Ortcutt and asks him "Do you know who I am?" – "You are my cousin, Rudolf Lingens!". Stalnaker: that seems to be a simple and successful communication. Information was requested and given. The question was answered. II 147 Proposition/Stalnaker: (Propositions as belief objects) Ortcutt's answer expresses a proposition that distinguishes between possible situations and eliminates Lingen's doubt. StalnakerVsLewis: according to his approach (self-ascription of properties), it is again more complicated: Lingens: asks if he correctly ascribes himself a certain set of properties i. Ortcutt: answers by ascribing himself a completely different set of properties. Lingens: has to conclude then subsequently himself the answer. So all the answers are always indirect in communication. ((s) also StalnakerVsChisholm, implicit). Communication/Lewis/Chisholm/StalnakerVsLewis/StalnakerVsChsholm: everyone then always speaks only about himself. Solution/Stalnaker: Lewis would otherwise have to distinguish between attitudes and speech acts and say that speech acts have propositions as object and attitudes properties as an object. Problem/StalnakerVsLewis: Lewis cannot say by intuition that the content of Ortcutt's answer is the information that eliminates Lingen's doubt. That is also a problem for Perry's approach. (> StalnakerVsPerry) |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Prior, A. | Lewis Vs Prior, A. | IV 19 Perspective/Index/Indexicality/Time/Lewis: when we take a timeless viewpoint and neglect our own localization in time, the great difference between the present and other times disappears. Cf. >Perspective. However, this is not because we then regard all times as equal, but because we IV 20 lose the possibility to use indexical time words we "currently"! possible world/perspective: just the same, if we take an a priori standpoint and neglect our Localization in the worlds, then we lose the distinction between the worlds. This is not because we consider all worlds to be the same, but because we could no longer use index words like "actual". Prior: the word "aktual" can then no longer be used to classify a world that is more real than others!° LewisVsPrior: he fell for it himself: "real" can no longer be used as an index word. |
LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| |||
The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Counterpart Theory | Stalnaker, R. | I 11 Counterpart Theory/Actualism/Stalnaker: in part III I use an updated version of the counterpart theory. The original one was of course developed by David Lewis for a realistic theory. Stalnaker: Thesis: the modal properties of individuals is a function of the properties of their counterparts. For example Aristotle could have died as a child iff a counterpart of him died as a child. Actualism: also he can have a motivation for the counterpart theory, namely a reductionist in relation to individuals: a bundle theory according to which an individual's identity is based on his qualitative character and his Localization. I 120 Counterpart Theory/Stalnaker: my variant: thesis the individual that I would be if things were different would still be identical to me (despite counterpart theory). I 142 Counterparts/Stalnaker: Thesis: are representations, not objects. I 185 Def liberal Leibniz-Approach/Terminology/Stalnaker: Thesis: Shakespeare - the person himself - would not have had to write plays, but a counterpart of the person in another possible world. Counterpart Relation/Stalnaker: can be reduced to a kind of qualitative similarity. Counterpart Theory/Leibniz/Stalnaker: the Leibniz version of counterpart theory is not a thesis about names - it is a thesis about the modal properties of individuals, no matter how they are referred to. |
|
| |||