Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Abstraction Duhem I 219
Abstractions/Duhem: E.g. Abstraction of the ordinary mind: Before the thunder is heard, one can see the flash. The concepts are abstract, but the sensory rumbling and twitching is recognizable.
This is no longer the case with the laws of physics.
E.g. at a constant temperature, the volumes occupied by the same gas mass are inversely proportional to the pressures under which they are placed. The notions are not only abstract, but supremely symbolic, and the symbols get a meaning only through the physical theories. The relations are by no means immediate; they are only produced by means of instruments.
---
I 241
Abstraction/Duhem: Difference Physiology/Physics:
Physiology
E.g. Assumption: the anterior extremities of the spinal cord contain the motor nerve fibers, the posterior the sensory. When he cuts the front end, the mobility of certain parts of the body must cease. The physiologist observes the consequences of his operation and must abstract from all his thoughts on the physiology of the marrow. He must not ignore any move, no twitching that contradicts his prediction. He must not attribute it to any secondary cause. He must establish an absolute separation between the consequences of his theoretical deductions and the factualization of the facts shown by his experiments.

Even if the experimental Method (as described earlier) is difficult, the logical analysis is very simple.
---
I 242
Physics: This is no longer the case when the theory which is to be subjected to the control of facts is not part of physiology anymore but of physics. Here, one cannot leave the theory which one wants to examine, in front of the door of the laboratory. For without it, it is impossible to adjust even a single instrument, to interpret a single reading. When the physiologist, or the chemist, makes use of instruments, he implicitly assumes the correctness of theories which give the abstract concepts, such as temperature, density, etc., a real meaning by means of which the concrete information of these instruments are translated. But the theories belong to the realm of physics. For all, the expression of the result of the experiment contains an act of belief in a whole group of theories.
Cf. >Theories, >Laws/Cartwright, >Natural Laws/Cartwright.

Duh I
P. Duhem
La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906
German Edition:
Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998

Assertibility Putnam Rorty I 307
Justified Assertibility/Putnam: (according to Rorty): if you retreat to that, you may say that e.g. "X is gold" can be justifiably asserted at Archimedes' times, and is no longer justifiably assertible today. But he would have to dismiss the statement that X was in the extension of gold, just like the statement that "X is Gold" was true, as meaningless. (> de re / de dicto). Putnam: (according to Rorty): Follows 3 trains of thought:
1) Against the construction of 'true' as meaning the same as "justified assertibility" (or any other "soft" concept that had to do with justification). This is to show that only a theory of the relationship between words and the world can provide a satisfactory meaning of the concept of truth.
2) A certain kind of sociological facts requires an explanation: the reliability of the normal Methods of scientific research, the usefulness of our language as a means, and that these facts can only be explained on the basis of realism.
3) Only the realist can avoid the conclusion from "many of the terms of the past did not refer" to "it is highly probable that none of the terms that are used today refers ".
Wright: Truth/Justified Assertibility/Putnam: (Reason, Truth and History): PutnamVs equating truth and assertibility ("rational acceptability"), but for other reasons:
 1) Truth is timeless, assertibility is not.
 2) Truth is an idealization of rational acceptability.
 E.g. idealization: not to achieve friction-free surfaces, but talking about them pays off, because we come very close to them.
---
Rorty VI 30
Rorty: "justified assertibility" (pragmatism, Dewey) PutnamVs: "naturalistic fallacy": a given belief can satisfy all such conditions and still be wrong. PutnamVsRorty et al.: ignore the need to admit the existence of "real directedness" or "intentionality". Putnam: an "ideal audience" (before which a justification is sufficient) cannot exist. A better audience can always be assumed.
---
Putnam I (c) 96
Ideal Assertibility/PutnamVsPeirce: no "ideal limit" can be specified sensibly - not to specify any conditions for science - PutnamVsKuhn. if you do not believe in convergence, but in revolutions, you should interpret the connectors intuitionistically and understand truth intra-theoretically. ---
I (e) 141
Truth/Assertibility/Tarski/Putnam: from his truth-definition also follows assertibility - the probability of a sentence in the meta-language is equivalent to that in the object language. ---
I (i) 246
Truth/Justified Assertibility/Kripke's Wittgenstein: that would only be a matter of general agreement - PutnamVsKripke: that would be a wrong description of the concepts that we actually have - and a self-contradictory attempt at taking an "absolute perspective".

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Colour Wright I 164
Color/Supervenience/Wright: Color supervenes other physical properties: E.g. there is a chaotic variety of physical conditions which is illustrated by scarlet things.  This conception is therefore weaker than that according to which color words have the semantics of concepts for natural species.
 It's the commitment to the idea that physically identical objects share their color, even if one of the objects offers the "best" conditions and the others don't. Form of thinking. This supervenience is therefore, as it were, a force towards the uniqueness of color concepts.
I 169
Color/Wright: However, I do not want to go so far as to assert that color predicates are semantically concepts for natural species.  That would also be inconsistent with the thesis that the extension is partially determined by the best opinion.
Color/Wright: for our everyday understanding of color words there is no such risk (that there is nothing red): if it turned out that there are no interesting physical properties that red things have in common, then we learn by that that red things are, in fact, not a natural species, but that there are still indeed infinitely many red things.
 This statement is, however, entirely consistent with the belief that red things do indeed have interesting physical properties in common!
 The explanatory intuition does not have to be more than an epiphenomenon of the presumed accuracy of the conviction that something in which redness physically consists actually exists and that it is one of the reasons for the fact that there are best judgments about that which is red. (See also Euthyphro contrast/Wright).
---
II 247
Color Predicates/Sorites/Vagueness/Wright: not like "two meters long", but "less than two meters" (length ranges) - criterion: still measuring! But we can also say without measuring what the result would be! - Solution/Wright: Actual distinction between cases where we can judge by eyesight, and cases where we cannot - then still observation predicates - which other base should this distinction provide? - Additionally: (s) Why should it be easier to distinguish colors in English than in German? Wright: thesis: the methodological approach must be completely behavioristic and anti-reflexive!

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Dialectic Hegel Bubner I 75
Dialectic/Plato/Hegel/Bubner: true dialectic is not a matter of controversy of different, changing aspects, but a necessary movement inside the grasping of reality. Irony/Socrates/Hegel/Bubner: the Socratic Method makes everyone think for themselves and thus creates a distance to the given immediacy, which is not based on arbitrary intervention.
      It allows for the withdrawal of the subjective positioning. Room is made for the things themselves. The dogmatism of one-sided aspects destroys itself. Thus the dialectic admits everything and allows inner destruction to develop by it.
I 76
Irony/Friedrich Schlegel: is thus the highest mode of behavior of the mind. Bubner: Dialectic as the "irony of the world" is then the counterpart to the self-importance of the modern ego with its all-decomposing reflection.
I 77
HegelVsPlaton: stopped halfway. He moved undecided between the subjective and the objective dialectics, i.e. the supple reflection, of which we are all capable, and the inevitability in presenting a connection of intolerance.       This is a translation task (from the subjective into the objective dialectic) which can be achieved with Socratic irony.
"General irony of the world".
---
Wright I 21
Dialectic/Hegel/Marx/Wright, G. H.: the dialectic scheme of development through thesis, antithesis and synthesis is not a causalist thought pattern. The Hegelian and Marxist concepts of law and development come closer to what we would call patterns of conceptual or logical connections.
Wright I 154
G. H. von WrightVsMarx: Marx shows a clear ambivalence between a "causalist", "scientistic" and on the other hand a "hermeneutical-dialectic", "teleological" orientation. This ambivalence gives rise to radically different interpretations of his philosophical statements.
Gadamer I 471
Dialectic/Hegel/Gadamer: The speculative relationship must (...) change into dialectical representation. According to Hegel, this is the demand of philosophy. >Speculation/Hegel, >Predication/Hegel. What means expression and representation here is of course not actually a proving action, but the thing
Gadamer I 472
proves itself by expressing and representing itself in this way. Thus dialectic will also really experience that thinking is turned into its opposite as an incomprehensible inversion. Expression: Dialectic is the expression of the speculative, the representation of what actually lies in the speculative, and insofar the "real" >speculative.
Proof: But if (...) the representation is not an additional action, but the emergence of the thing itself, then the philosophical proof itself belongs to the thing.
Representation: (...) nevertheless, such representation is not at all external in truth.
It only considers itself to be so as long as thinking does not know that in the end it proves itself to be a >reflection of the thing within itself. It is true that Hegel emphasizes the difference between speculative and dialectical only in the preface to phenomenology. Because this difference cancels itself out, Hegel later, from the point of view of absolute >knowledge, no longer records it. >Speculation/Hegel, >Thinking/Hegel.


Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Explanation Droysen Wright I 19
Explanation/Droysen/Wright, G. H.: Droysen shaped the methodological dichotomy of explanation and understanding. (J. G. Droysen, Grundriss der Historik, 1858). Wright: the Methodological distinction made by Droysen originally had the form of a trichotomy: the philosophical Method, the physical Method and the historical Method. The goals were to recognize, explain and understand.
Science/Droysen: The aim of science is to explain, the aim of "history" is to understand the phenomena that fall within its domain.

Droys I
J. G. Droysen
Grundriss der Historik Paderborn 2011


WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Fitness Landscape Norvig Norvig I 155
Fitness landscape/Norvig/Russell: Work by Sewall Wright (1931)(1) on the concept of a fitness landscape was an important precursor to the development of genetic algorithms. >Optimization, >Genetic algorithms, >Local minima, >Search algorithms. In the 1950s, several statisticians, including Box (1957)(2) and Friedman (1959)(3), used evolutionary techniques for optimization problems, but it wasn’t until Rechenberg (1965)(4) introduced evolution strategies to solve optimization problems for airfoils that the approach gained popularity.



1. Wright, S. (1931). Evolution in Mendelian populations. Genetics, 16, 97–159.
2. Box, G. E. P. (1957). Evolutionary operation: A Method of increasing industrial productivity. Applied
Statistics, 6, 81–101.
3. Friedman, G. J. (1959). Digital simulation of an evolutionary process. General Systems Yearbook, 4,
171–184.
4. Rechenberg, I. (1965). Cybernetic solution path of an experimental problem. Library translation 1122, Royal Aircraft Establishment

Norvig I
Peter Norvig
Stuart J. Russell
Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010

Hegel Wright I 20
Hegel/Marx/Wright, G. H.: both authors had a strong and lasting influence on the methodological ways of thinking.
---
I 21
The Hegelian and Marxist views on the method put strong emphasis on laws, universal validity and necessity. In it, at least superficially, they are like the positivist trend oriented towards (natural) science. However, the idea of laws found in the writings of Hegel and Marx, for example, when discussing the historical process, differs greatly from the concept of law that underlies "Galilean" causal explanations.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

History Hempel Wright I 23
History/Explanation/Hempel: C. G: Hempel "The Function of General Laws in History", in: Journal of Philosophy, 1942). Wright, G. H.: Hempel's explanatory Method was called the "Covering Law Model". See Covering Law.
---
Wright I 34
History/Explanation/Laws/Hempel/Wright. G. H.: Hempel thesis: historical explanations are missing the complete formulation of general laws, because the laws are too complex and we do not know them precisely enough. Historians' explanations are elliptical or incomplete in a characteristic sense. Strictly speaking, they are just sketches of explanations. (C. G. Hempel, Explanation in Science and History, 1962, p. 107.)

Hempel I
Carl Hempel
"On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Hempel II
Carl Hempel
Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950
German Edition:
Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums
In
Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982

Hempel II (b)
Carl Hempel
The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951
German Edition:
Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung
In
Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982


WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Humanities Dilthey Gadamer I 12
Humanities/history/historiography/ Dilthey/Gadamer: Even Dilthey, in which the influence of the scientific method and the empiricism of Mills' logic(2) is much more strongly asserted, nevertheless retains the romantic-idealistic heritage in the concept of the spirit. ((Cf. >Historiography/Droysen). DiltheyVsEmpirism: He always felt superior to English empiricism because he lived in the vivid perception of what distinguished the historical school from all scientific and natural law thinking. "Only from Germany can the real empirical Method come in place of the prejudiced dogmatic empiricism."
DiltheyVsMill: "Mill is dogmatic for lack of historical education" - this is a note Dilthey wrote in his copy of Mill's Logic. In fact, all the decades of hard work Dilthey dedicated to the foundation of the humanities is a constant examination of the logical demand that Mill's famous final chapter(2) had made on the humanities.
Method/Dilthey/Gadamer: Nevertheless, Dilthey let himself be deeply influenced by the model of the natural sciences, even if he wanted to justify the Methodological independence of the humanities. For Dilthey, scientific knowledge includes the dissolution of the bond of life, the gaining of a distance to one's own
Gadamer I 13
history, which alone makes it possible to make them into objects. >Method/Dilthey.

1. W. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften Bd. V, S. LXXIV.
2. J. St. Mill, System der deduktiven und induktiven Logik, übertragen von Schiel,
1863, 6. Buch »Von der Logik der Geisteswissenschaften Oder moralischen Wissen-
schaften«.



Wright I 19
Humanities/W. Dilthey/Wright, G. H.: Dilthey used the term "humanities" for the entire domain of the method of understanding. The German term "humanities" comes from the translation of the English "moral science".

Dilth I
W. Dilthey
Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990


Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Institutions Demsetz Parisi I
Institutions/law/legal history/Demsetz/Wangenheim: Initiated by Harold Demsetz's seminal paper (1967)(1), neo-institutional investigations of legal evolution typically look at specific changes of property rights regimes. Alchian: The basic idea is closely related to Alchian's (1950)(2) optimistic account of behavioral evolution: societies tend to have institutions that reflect, and are adapted to, the current needs of this society, given their environment and their preferences.
Property rights/Demsetz: The Labrador Indians switched from open access property rights regimes to private property
Parisi I 163
when fur trade made hunting beavers more valuable to each hunter, so that the natural setting could not sustain the radically increased burden resulting from consequentially increased hunting activities. Conditions/Demsetz: In his reappraising paper thirty-five years later, Demsetz (2002)(3) based his argument on a number of conditions that have to be satisfied to make environmental changes induce optimal institutional adaptations. In particular, he considered
(1) the number and closeness of involved persons,
(2) their productivity in solving resource allocation problems, and
(3) the complexity of this problem as relevant conditions.
If they change, most often due to new levels of specialization in production, observable property rights regimes will adapt to better solve the externality problems that become prevalent in effect, so Demsetz (2002)(4) argues.
North: The idea of institutions evolving towards efficiency is also at the heart of the earlier writings of Douglas North (e.g. 1981)(4), who grounded his account of economic history on this argument.
WangenheimVsDemsetz: Independently of whether one wants to label this functionalist Demsetzian approach as truly evolutionary or not, the argument lacks any causal explanation for why the institutions change. There is no discussion of how rules in archaic societies are made, nor is there any hint of legislators' incentives when more complex societies are discussed (mainly in the 2002 paper).
WittVsDemsetz: Many authors like Witt (1987)(5), Banner (2002)(6), Eggertson (1990(7), pp. 247—280), and Anderson and Hill (1975(8) , 2002(9)) have noted this pitfall of Demsetz's approach.
The idea has been taken up by scholars like Umbeck (1977a(10), 1977b(11)), Ellickson (1991(12), 1994(13)), and Anderson and Hill (1975(8), 2002(9)), who have argued that societies self-organize and develop property rights when law does not exist or is not enforced (prominent examples are farmer - rancher conflicts in Shasta County, mining claims during the California gold rush, Maine lobster fishing grounds, and grazing areas on the American Western frontier in the second half of the nineteenth century).
Causality: (…) the authors proffer a causal complement to Demsetz's teleological hypothesis: they identify some individuals who find it privately worthwhile to design and enforce property rights against infringing group members or outsiders.
VsUmbeck: Not all examples have remained undisputed. Clay and Wright (2005)(14), for example, challenge Umbeck's observations on mining district codes producing order. They argue that the mining district codes gave equal attention to the rights of claim-jumpers as to claim holders, whence chronic insecurity and litigation resulted.


1. Demsetz, H. (1967). "Toward a Theory of Property Rights." American Economic Review, P&P
57: 347-359.
2. Alchian, A. (1950). "Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory." Journal of Political
Economy 58: 211—221.
3.Demsetz, H. (2002). "Toward a Theory of Property Rights Il: The Competition Between Private and Collective Ownership." Journal of Legal studies 31: S653—S672.
4. North, D. C. (1981). Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton.
5. Witt, U. (1987). "How Transaction Rights Are Shaped to Channel Innovativeness." Journal
of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 143: 180—195.
6. Banner, S. (2002). "Transitions Between Property Regimes." Journal of Legal studies 31:
S359-S371.
7. Eggertson, T. (1990). Economic Behavior and Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 8. Anderson, T. L. and P. J. Hill (1975). "The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the
American West." Journal of Law and Economics 18: 163—179.
9. Anderson, T. L. and P. J. Hill (2002). "Cowboys and Contracts." Journal of Legal studies 31:
S489-S514.
10. Umbeck, J. (1977a). "The California Gold Rush: A Study of Emerging Property Rights." Explorations in Economic History 14: 197—226. 11. Umbeck, J. (1977b). "A Theory of Contract Choice and the California Gold Rush." Journal of
Law and Economics 20: 421—437.
12. Ellickson, R. (1991). Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
13. Ellickson, R. (1994). "The Aim of Order without Law." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150: 97—100.
14. Clay, K. and G. Wright (2005). "Order without law? Property Rights during the California
Gold Rush." Explorations in Economic History 42: 155—183.

Wangenheim, Georg von. „Evolutionary Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press

EconDems I
Harold Demsetz
Toward a theory of property rights 1967


Parisi I
Francesco Parisi (Ed)
The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Method Freud Wright I 154
Method/Marx/Freud/Wright, G. H.: Marx shows a clear ambivalence between on the one hand a "causalist","scientistic" and on the other hand a "hermeneutic-dialectic","teleological" orientation. This ambivalence gives rise to radically different interpretations of his philosophical statements. In this respect, it is interesting to compare Marx with Freud, in whose work an explicit, scientifically oriented search for causal explanations often runs counter to an implicit hermeneutic and teleological tendency of his thinking. Both authors make the impression that their thinking was hindered and distorted to a certain extent by the "Galileoism" prevailing at that time in both science and science theory ( the positiveism). (G. H. of WrightVsFreud.).

Freud I
S. Freud
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011


WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Method Droysen Wright I 19
Method/Droysen/Wright, G. H.: Droysen shaped the methodological dichotomy of explanation and understanding. (J. G. Droysen, Grundriss der Historik, 1858). Wright: the Methodological distinction made by Droysen originally had the form of a trichotomy: the philosophical Method, the physical Method and the historical Method. The goals were to recognize, to explain and to understand.

Droys I
J. G. Droysen
Grundriss der Historik Paderborn 2011


WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Method Durkheim Wright I 20
Method/Durkheim/Wright, G. H.: from the two great sociologists of the turn of the 19th century to the 20th century, Durkheim was essentially a positivist in terms of his methodology, while Max Weber combines a positivist tendency with teleological accents ("functional rationalism") and an emphasis on empathetic understanding of "understanding sociology". Durkheim's Methodological point of view is most clearly seen in "E. Durkheim, De la division du travail social, 1893" and "E. Durkheim Les règles de la méthode sociologique, 1894".
Wright: Despite his positivist attitude, I believe that some of Durkheim's main ideas, such as those on the "représentations collectives" of social consciousness, could be reinterpreted fruitfully in the sense of a hermeneutic Method of understanding.

Durkheim I
E. Durkheim
The Rules of Sociological Method - French: Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique, Paris 1895
German Edition:
Die Regeln der soziologischen Methode Frankfurt/M. 1984


WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Method Weber Wright I 20
Method/M. Weber/Wright, G. H.: of the two great sociologists of the turn of the 19th century to the 20th, Emile Durkheim was essentially a positivist in terms of his methodology, while Max Weber combined a positivist tendency with teleological accents ("purpose-rational acting") and an emphasis on empathetic understanding of "understanding sociology". (See in particular M. Weber „Über einige Kategorien der verstehenden Soziologie“ in Logos 4, 1913 und M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie, 1921, I i.)

Weber I
M. Weber
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930
German Edition:
Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013


WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Method Marx Wright I 154
Method/Marx/Freud/Wright, G. H.: Marx shows a clear ambivalence between a "causalist", "scientistic" and on the other hand a "hermeneutic-dialectic","teleological" orientation. This ambivalence gives rise to radically different interpretations of his philosophical statements. In this respect, it is interesting to compare Marx with Freud, whose work often contravenes an explicit, scientifically oriented search for causal explanations with an implicit hermeneutic and teleological tendency of his thinking. Both authors make the impression that their thinking was hindered and distorted to a certain extent by the "Galileoism" prevailing at that time in both science and science theory (positivism). (G. H. von WrightVsFreud.).

Marx I
Karl Marx
Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957


WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Positivism Wright I 152
Positivism/Wright, G. H.:can be characterized in different ways: a) associated with a phenomenalist or sensualist epistemology; and
b) modern positivism: associated with a verification theory of meaning.
c) associated with a "scientist" and "technological" conception of knowledge and its uses.
Mill: has more of a positivist in the first sense of the word than Comte.
Comte: his positivism is above all science theory (cf. Comte, A., Cours de philosophie positive, Avertissement de l' Auteur, 1830). Comte's ultimate goal was to be an advocate of the "positive" scientific spirit in the study of social phenomena. This was coupled with a strong belief in the usefulness of scientific knowledge for social reforms. (1830, lecon I, 8).
Wright, G. H.: it is perhaps not uninteresting that Comte, as a herald of a technological understanding of knowledge, can be compared to Francis Bacon. Both of them contributed significantly to the creation of a certain "scientistic climate of opinion", but almost nothing at all was contributed to the actual scientific progress. (G. H. von WrightVsBacon, G. H. von WrightVsComte.)
---
I 21
Positivism/VsPositivism/Wright, G. H.: the anti-positivist methodology of the nineteenth century can be associated with an older Aristotelian tradition, a tradition that had been replaced three centuries earlier by a new spirit in science theory, above all by Galileo.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Sociology Comte Wright I 20
Sociology/Comte/Wright, G. H.: Comte coined the term "sociology" for the scientific investigation of human society. ---
I 154
The term "sociology" is also used in J. St. Mill, System of deductive and inductive logic, 1873. ---
I 20
Wright: The application of mathematical methods to the political economy and other forms of social science investigation was a legacy of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, which was readily adopted by the nineteenth-century positivists.

Comte I
A. Comte
Cours de Philosophie Positive (Ed.1830) New York 2012


WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Understanding Droysen Gadamer I 216
Understanding/Droysen/Gadamer: The philosophical significance of Droysen's historiography lies precisely in the fact that he seeks to free the concept of understanding from the indeterminacy of aesthetic-pantheistic communion that he has with Ranke and formulates his conceptual preconditions. The first of these preconditions is the concept of expression(1). Understanding is understanding of expression. An inner being is immediately present in an expression. But the inner being, "the inner essence" is the first and actual reality. Gadamer: Droysen stands here entirely on Cartesian soil and in the succession of Kant and Wilhelm von Humboldt. The individual "I" is like a lonely point in the world of phenomena. But in its utterances, especially in language, basically in all forms in which it is able to express itself, it is no longer a lonely point. It belongs to the world of the intelligible (German: "verständlich", derived from "Verstehen" - understanding).
Historical understanding is thus not of a fundamentally different kind than linguistic understanding. Like language, the world of history does not have the character of a pure spiritual being.
Droysen: "Wanting to understand the ethical and historical world, means above all to recognize,
that it is neither merely docetic nor merely metabolic"(2).
Gadamer: That is said against Buckle's flat empiricism, but it is also true the other way round against the historical-philosophical spiritualism of Hegel, for example. >History/Droysen.
Gadamer I 221
The concept of understanding now retains the mark of a final immediacy for Droysen despite all the mediation (see >Research/Droysen). "The possibility of understanding lies in the congenial nature of the utterances that are available to us as historical material." "We are and feel towards people, human expressions and designs in essential equality and reciprocity" (§ 9). Just as understanding connects the individual "I" with the moral commonalities to which it belongs, so these commonalities themselves - family, people, state, religion - are understandable as expressions. >Sense/Droysen.
1. Cf. below p. 341 f. , 471 f. und Bd. 2 der Ges. Werke, Exkurs VI, p. 384ff.
2. Droysen (ed. Rothacker). p. 65.



Wright I 153
Understanding/Droysen/Wright, G. H.: (J. G. Droysen, Enzyklopädie und Methodologie der Geschichte, 1857 p. 25): Our historical understanding is exactly the same as we understand the one who speaks with us.

Droys I
J. G. Droysen
Grundriss der Historik Paderborn 2011


Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Understanding Dilthey Gadamer I 235
Understanding/Finiteness/Infinfinity/History/Dilthey/Gadamer: Must not the historical conditionality of consciousness be an insurmountable barrier to its completion in historical knowledge?
Gadamer I 236
The foundation of history in a psychology of understanding, as Dilthey envisioned it, places the historian in precisely that idealistic simultaneity with his or her object that we call aesthetic and admire in Ranke. Of course, the decisive question remains, how the finite human nature should be able to achieve such infinite understanding. Can this really have been Dilthey's opinion? DiltheyVsHegel: Didn't Dilthey insist towards Hegel that one has to hold on to the consciousness of one's own finiteness? Here alone one has to look more closely. His criticism of Hegel's rational idealism meant only the apriorism of his concept speculation - the inner infinity of the spirit had no fundamental gravity for him but was positively fulfilled in the ideal of a historically enlightened reason, which would have matured into the genius of "understanding everything" (German: "Allesverstehen").
Infinity/Dilthey: For Dilthey, the consciousness of finiteness did not mean an infinity of consciousness and no limitation. Rather, it testifies to life's ability to rise above all barriers in energy and activity. In this respect, the potential infinity of the spirit is represented in him. Certainly not speculation, but historical reason is the way in which this infinity is actualized. Historical understanding spreads out over all historical circumstances and is truly universal because it has its firm ground in the totality and infinity of the spirit. For this, Dilthey follows the old teaching, which derives the possibility of understanding from the sameness of human nature.
The limits set to the universality of understanding by the historical finiteness of our being are thus only of a subjective nature to him. Certainly, he can nevertheless recognize something positive in them that will be fruitful for knowledge; thus he assures that only sympathy makes real understanding possible.(1) >Sympathy/Dilthey.


1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften V, 277



Wright I 153
Understanding/Dilthey/Wright, G. H.: Dilthey's Concept of Understanding (W. Dilthey: Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, 1883; W. Dilthey: Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie, 1894) was originally strongly "psychologistic" and "subjectivistic". Later he emphasized - obviously under Hegel's influence - the "objective character of the achievements of the method of understanding. (especially W. Dilthey: Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik , 1900, Appendix S. 332-338.)

Dilth I
W. Dilthey
Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990


Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Disquotation Putnam Vs Disquotation Putnam VII 431
Truth/Putnam: the only reason one can have to deny that truth is a property would be that one is physicalist or phenomenalist. Or maybe a culture-relativist. Truth/property/Putnam: only reductionist theories deny that truth is a property. (PutnamVsDisquotationalism: >Disquotationalism).
Truth/Putnam: is a property - >PutnamVsDeflationism - Rorty: (R. Rorty, The Mirror of Nature): truth is no property.
---
Horwich I 455
Divine perspective/outside/PutnamVsGods perspective/Rorty: Putnam is amused as James and Dewey about such attempts. Rorty: but he has a problem when it comes to PutnamVsDisquotationalism: this one is too reductionist, to positivistic, to "behaviorist" for him ("transcendental Skinnerism").
Truth/Putnam: if a philosopher says, truth is something other than electricity because there is probably room for a theory of electricity but not for a truth theory,
Horwich I 456
and that the knowledge of the truth conditions was everything what one could know about the truth, then he denies that truth is a property. Thus, there is then no property of the correctness or accuracy ((s)> Deflationism, PutnamVsDeflationism, PutnamVsGrover. PutnamVs: that is, to deny that our thoughts are thoughts and our assertions assertions.
Theory/existence/reduction/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam assumes here that the only reason to deny is that one needs a theory for an X, to say that the X is "nothing but Y". ((s) eliminative reductionism).
PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson must show that assertions can be reduced to noise. Then the field linguist must reduce acts on motions.
Davidson/Rorty: but he does not say that assertions were nothing but noise.
Instead:
Truth/explanation/Davidson: unlike electricity truth is no explanation for something. ((s) A phenomenon is not explained that a sentence which it claims, is true).
Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994
---
Horwich I XIV
VsDeflationism/Horwich: provides no explicit truth-definition, but is only based on a scheme (disquotational scheme).
Horwich I XVI
Truth/simple/unanalysable/Russell/Moore/Cartwright/Horwich: if truth is unanalysable basic concept (VsDeflationism), then it is completely independent of awareness. That is, truth gets something metaphysical. Problem: then we cannot assume that the propositions which we believe, have this property. Then the skepticism follows.
---
Horwich I 457
Correctness/PutnamVsDavidson: although he shares his distaste for intentionalist terms, (and therefore does not consider truth as an explanation), he nevertheless wishes a representation of what kind of statement it is, to be correct. Putnam/Rorty: he wants that because he is afraid that the "inside view" of the language game where "true" is an appreciative term - is weakened, if it is not philosophically supported. Because:
If language is only production of noise - without normative element - then the noises that we utter are nothing but "an expression of our subjectivity".
Normativity/standard/language/Putnam: why should there be no normative elements in the language game? That would be the inside view of the language game.
RortyVsPutnam: thus it still depends on a synoptic God's perspective to be brought together in the inner view and outside view of the language game.
Norm/JamesVsPutnam/DeweyVsPutnam: we cannot take such a God's perspective. That is, we cannot solidify our standards in that we support them metaphysically or scientifically.
Truth/appreciation/PragmatismVsPlato/DeweyVsPlato/RortyVsPutnam: we should not repeat Plato's error, and interpret expressions of appreciation as the names of esoteric entities.
---
Williams II 497
Belief/PutnamVsDavidson: that most are true, is not guaranteed by the methodology of interpretation, because the stock of beliefs is constantly changing. Therefore, we can only give a sense (ii) if we explain the reliability of learning and that can only do the realism. Causal theory/correspondence/Putnam: the reliability of learning: would represent us as reliable signal transmitters. What would the truth theory add? It announced that the sentence is true iff the condition exists. This is the correspondence, which is involved in the causal theory, it is precisely the correspondence that is established by the truth definition.
Deflationism/correspondence/M. Williams: the minimal correspondence is also available for him. That is, Putnam's argument does not guarantee physical correspondence or another substantive theory.
Williams II 502
Truth/Putnam: must be substantial ((s) explanatory role, truth as a property, PutnamVsDeflationism). Otherwise it leads to cultural relativism. PutnamVsCultural relativism: an extreme culture-relativist may himself not even consider a thinker or speaker, as opposed to a mere noise maker. ((s) speaking not distinguishable from sound). This is mental suicide.
PutnamVsDisquotationalism: has no explanatory power, unless something is said about the concept of assertion.
M. WilliamsVsPutnam: do we need that?
Putnam: to be able to view ourselves as thinkers, speaking must be more than noise-making and then we must be able to explain to ourselves what it means to understand a sentence.
PutnamVsmetaphysical Realism/M. Williams: although Putnam finds this picture sympathetic, he prefers to explain meaning in terms of situation appropriate use.
Problem: that we do not stop that there are various inguistic practices ((s) different communities) and therefore different ways of justification.
Solution: ideal justification. And that is how Putnam understands truth.
Truth/PutnamVsDisquotationalism: if we say nothing about the truth in terms of assertibility conditions, we do not get a concept of objective truth, which allows the cultural relativism to escape. Then we identified truth implicitly with assertibility relative to the norms of a particular community.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

WilliamsB I
Bernard Williams
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011

WilliamsM I
Michael Williams
Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001

WilliamsM II
Michael Williams
"Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Habermas, J. Rorty Vs Habermas, J. Brendel I 133
Justification/Rorty/Brendel: Thesis: truth is not its goal. That would suppose a false separation of truth and justification. There is also not the one scientific method that leads to the truth. Epistemic justification: can have many goals.
Brendel I 134
Correspondence/RortyVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty/Brendel: therefore there is no correspondence between statements and independent reality. Truth/RortyVsPutnam: is not idealized rational acceptability either.
Reality/PutnamVsRorty: there is a consciousness independent reality.
Truth/Peirce/Rorty/Brendel: Both: Thesis: there are no in principle unknowable truths.
Reality/PeirceVsRorty: there is a reality that is independent of consciousness.
Truth/Peirce/Brendel: obtained by the consensus of an ideal research community.
Convergence/Peirce/Brendel: Thesis: there is a convergence of research. The corresponding true conviction expresses actually existing states of affairs. (Habermas ditto).
Convergence/RortyVsPeirce: does not exist and therefore no universally valid convictions of an ideal research community.
Brendel I 135
RortyVsHabermas: ditto. Communication/RortyVsHabermas/Rorty/Brendel: is not a pursuit of universally valid statements. Thesis: there is no difference in principle between a cooperative search for truth and the pursuit of group interests.

Rorty II (b) 50
RortyVsHabermas: sounds as if he took over the metaphysical position, as if all the alternative candidates for belief and desire already exist and the only thing that must be ensured is that they can be freely discussed. Ahistorical universalist "transcendentalism".
II (b) 29
French Philosophy/HabermasVsFrench: "the vexatious game of these duplications: a symptom of exhaustion." RortyVsHabermas: Rather signs of vitality. I read Heidegger and Nietzsche as good private philosophers,
Habermas reads them as poor public ones. He treats them as if they targeted what he calls "universal validity."
II (b) 43
Principle/Validity/Application/RortyVsHabermas: the question of the "internal validity" of the principles is not relevant. Especially not if it these are "universally valid". The only thing that keeps a society from having considering the institutionalized humiliation of the weak as norma, of course, is a detailed description of these humiliations. Such descriptions are given by journalists, anthropologists, sociologists, novelists, playWrights, filmmakers and painters.

II (d) 94
Habermas/Rorty distinguishes between a strategic and a genuinely communicative use of language. Scale of degrees of confidence.
II (d) 94/95
Rorty: if we stop to interpret reason as a source of authority, the Platonic and Kantian dichotomy between reason and emotion dissolves.
II (d) 96
RortyVsHabermas: the idea of ​​the "better argument" only makes sense if you can find a natural, transcultural relevance relationship.
III 113
Foucault/Rorty: Society denies the space for self-creation and private projects. (VsHabermas).
III 119
RortyVsHabermas: Habermas is more afraid of a "romantic revolution" like Hitler and Mao have brought about than of the stifling effect that encrusted societies may have. He is more afraid of autonomy than what Foucault calls the "biopower" of experts. >Biopower.
III 120
RortyVsHabermas: I am very suspicious of the idea of ​​'universal validity' (metaphysics). This claim is no longer credible if we are convinced of the "contingency of language".
III 231
Self/Literature/Appropriateness/RortyVsHabermas: for him the very traditional image of the self with its three spheres, the cognitive, the moral and the aesthetic, is of central importance. This classification means that he sees literature as a "matter for the appropriate expression of feelings" and literary criticism as a "matter of taste".
III 232
Rorty: if we give up this classification, we will no longer ask questions like "Does this book promote truth or beauty?" "Does it promote proper behavior or pleasure?" and instead we will ask: "What is the purpose the book?"

V 9
World/Language/RortyVsHabermas: Vsdemand that the world-disclosing (poetic) power of language (Heidegger, Foucault) should be subordinated to the inner-worldly practice.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999
Hacking, I. Cartwright Vs Hacking, I. I 12
Unit/Nature/Realism/Cartwright: Realism calls upon the "unity of nature". CartWrightVsRealism/CartWrightVsHawking: I do not believe in unifying laws (unifying laws) and I do not think that there are enough bridge laws to connect all areas.
I 13
Another reason is methodological: for choosing our models freely (simple or complex, random or legal) we have no a-priori reasons. Nature/CartWright: we learn best how it is if we consider our knowledge of it. If our best supported theories are probabilistic, we should not insist on determinism at all. How uniform is our knowledge after all?

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

CartwrightR I
R. Cartwright
A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

CartwrightR II
R. Cartwright
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954
Kripke, S. A. Wright Vs Kripke, S. A. Esfeld I 122
Inferentialism/I-You-Relationships/Brandom/Esfeld: Problem: even a community could be arbitrary. The fact of consent could be confused with the right of consent. This is sometimes put VsKripke.
WrightVsKripke: formerly: the community itself is no authority. (No longer represented today).
McDowellVsWright: whatever seems right to us is right! But that only means that we cannot talk about "right" here!
Solution/Esfeld: I-You-Relationships: are symmetrical:
I 123
this leaves room for the possibility that the community as a whole can err. Social Holism/Pettit: the human is dependent on the existence of other people in terms of thinking and rules. (And it is always about relationships of individual people to each other).
VsCollectivism: which assumes that the community as a whole exerts an influence on its members. (>Method/Wright).
I 124
Pettit: social holism is a contingent thesis about the actual practices of us humans. Esfeld: our reconstruction should apply to all possible worlds.
Private following of rules/Pettit: has been left open by him! One can also continue to be a member of a community in isolation.
Social Holism/Esfeld: does not imply that a person who becomes isolated no longer has any beliefs!
I 125
Nevertheless, the concept of "correct" following is then no longer applicable. N.B.: once the customs of the community are internalized, one can argue that real feedback is no longer indispensable!
I.e. there is a metaphysical possibility that the constituents of a holistic system are no longer ontologically dependent on other individuals!
For example radical Robinson who spends his whole life in isolation:
Kripke: is liberal about such a case. We could take it into our community and apply our criteria to it as well. (s) But also vice versa?
I 126
EsfeldVsKripke: we cannot be so liberal here. It is also questionable whether the assertiveness conditions for rule sequences are really fulfilled. One can argue that Kripke's position includes direct or indirect interaction. Private Rule Following/Esfeld: neither the truth conditions nor the assertiveness conditions are fulfilled.
Wright I 264
Kripke's Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/Rule Following/Kripke: in Wittgenstein: "Skeptical Paradox": destroys any possibility that rules and meanings include real limitations. Wright: in the end there is the attempt to stay afloat with the Charybdis. (Def "rule-skeptical Charybdis": view, according to which there are no objective requirements at all, which are produced by rules, but exclusively natural unrestricted human abilities. So no "general real objectivity".)
I 265
Quietism/Kripke's Wittgenstein/Wright: is in any case committed to quietism: for unrealism (that there are no facts concerning any rules) must inflate to a comprehensive unrealism.
I 266
Then there are no relevant facts in the matter anywhere. If there are no substantive facts about what sentences say, then there are also no facts about whether they are true or not. An unrealism of meaning must therefore entail an unrealism of truth.
WrightVsKripke: that is however attackable: however, it is not an error of sublimation (raising to a higher level) of the rules. If anything is unprotected against the skeptical paradox, then it is a humanized platonism no less than the superobjectified version.
McDowell's Skylla does not belong to the scene of Kripke's dialectic. It could only appear if the opponent is denied a point of view. Thus, the assertions in the first person would be presented as inferential but the fact is that the knowledge of earlier meanings is for the most part not inferential and has no clearly recognizable epistemology.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Realism Cartwright Vs Realism I 3
Realism/CartWright: tends to say that if theoretical laws are wrong, the phenomenological ones have to be even more so. CartWrightVsRealism: it is just the other way round: when it comes to experiments, the fundamental laws are worse off. I 12
Unit/Nature/Realism/CartWright: realism calls upon the "unity of nature".
CartWrightVsRealism/CartWrightVsHawking: I do not believe in unifying laws (unifying laws) and I do not think that there are enough bridge laws to connect all areas.
I 13
Another reason is methodological: for choosing our models (simple or complex, random or legal) we have no a-priori reasons Nature/Cartwright: We learn best how it is, when we consider our knowledge of it. If our best-supported theories are probabilistic, we should not insist on determinism. How uniform is our knowledge at all?
I 145
Bridge principles/Realism: we therefore need only few bridge principles, because there is only a small number of fundamental interactions in nature. CartwrightVsRealism: It is just that which is wrong! 1) This is not only an image of physics that we do not have, we should not even have it. The assembly would be infinitely complex. Physics/Cartwright: the beauty and rigor of current, modern physics is to allow easy handling of simple models. Thus, at least, the behavior within a model can be understood and equations cannot be simply written down, but also nearly solved.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

CartwrightR II
R. Cartwright
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954
Sellars, W. Fraassen Vs Sellars, W. I 32
Empirical Laws/Sellars: We don’t have them! E.g. that water boils at 100 ° applies only when the pressure is normal. (> Cartwright). Fraassen: that’s only Methodically so far, because we have no confidence in the generalization of our everyday experiences.
Problem: but we expect of a theory that postulates microstructure (theoretical entities) that it shows actual universal regularities.
FraassenVsSellars/FraassenVsRealism: thus an unobservable reality is postulated behind the phenomena.
E.g. Suppose at an early stage of chemistry it was discovered that different samples of gold dissolved at different speeds in aqua regia. But the samples were identical in terms of observation.
I 33
Solution: (then): for the two samples a different microstructure was postulated. Then, the variation was explained with that the samples were mixtures of these two substances (which are identical in terms of observation). Thus, the laws have no observation-wise counterpart. Without that no explanation seems possible. And that is the goal of science, so we have to believe in an unobservable microstructure.
This leads to three questions:
1) Does the postulation of the microstructure really have new consequences for the observable phenomena?.
2) Does science really always have to provide explanations?.
3) Could there be another rationale for the use of the image of the microstructure in the development of theories?.
FraassenVsSellars: Ad 1): it seems that these hypothetical chemists very well postulated new observable regularities: Suppose two substances A and B with dissolution rates x and x+y. Every gold sample is a mixture of the two substances. Then it follows that every sample dissolves at a rate between x and x+y. And that is not implied by the fact that different samples have dissolved in this scope in the past. Thus Sellars is refuted in the first point.
Suppose (for the sake of Sellars’ argument), there is still no way to predict the dissolution rates more accurately. Do we then need a categorical statement that is not based on the observable? (That was Reichenbach’s principle of the common cause, or the demand for the existence of hidden parameters).
Sellars/Hidden Parameters: clearly recognizes that this would counter the current quantum mechanics, accordingly, he says that their mathematical models are incompatible with it.
I 34
So he is limits himself to those cases where it is consistent to assume hidden variables. Consistency/Fraassen: is, of course, a logical hold point.
FraassenVsHidden Variables/FraassenVsSellars: this does not prevent the disaster: although there is some evidence that hidden variables cannot be introduced in a classical deterministic theory, this evidence demands something much more stronger than consistency: E.g. the assumption that two different physical variables cannot have the same probability distribution in the measurement across all possible states.
So if we are unable to specify differences in the forecast for the observable, there is no real difference. (No distinction without difference. Stronger demand than consistency stronger/weaker).
Ad. 3) How can anti-realism make sense of that? Apart from the actually new empirical consequences (see above) he will cite Methodological reasons. With the assumption of a particular microstructure we could come to new implications of empirical regularities. This is, of course, only a hope. But:
Science/Fraassen: Thesis: it is not about explanation as such, but about new statements about observable regularities.
I 30
FraassenVsHidden Parameters: if this is empirically equivalent to the orthodox quantum mechanics, it leads to non-logical correlation of non-classical nature, which would still violate the principle of the common cause. But this question is also academic, because modern physics does not need hidden parameters.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Sententialism Schiffer Vs Sententialism I 120
Def classic sententialism/Schiffer: after him the meaning or the contents determine, which proposition one believes.
I 120
And that is also the problem: DavidsonVsclassisc sententialism, VsSententionalism/VsSententialism/Schiffer: Problem: Ambiguity in one language and in several languages. 1. E.g. [Empedokles liept]: in English: he leaped (leaped, (in the Etna), in German: he loves). (Davidson 1968, 98).
2. E.g. Field: "visiting relatives can be boring".
Problem: the truth conditions of belief are after the unrefined sententialism the same as those of the believed proposition. In ambiguous propositions this would then be several truth-conditions!.
E.g. if there was a language in which "love is cruel" means that kangaroos are flying, then Henri must believe both!.
I 123
DavidsonVsSententialism: 1.a) with a proposition as a reference object of the that-proposition, there would be a fixation on only one language. b) Because of the ambiguity then there could be several truth conditions in the same language. (1975, 165f).
2. (alsoVsFrege): A very different semantic role than normal is ascribed to the proposition: Frege and sententionalism construct "the earth moves" as a major part of a singular term, namely "that the earth moves." They both do that because of the lack of substitutability in intensional contexts.
I 137
Meaning/Propositional attitude/Belief/SchifferVsSententialism: there can therefore exist no correct sententialistic theory of propositional attitude Because no man knows the content-determining characteristics. Therefore, it also no proper access to extensionalistic compositional semantics for natural languages can exist.
Previously we had already seen that failed as a non-sententialistic theory.
I 157
Belief/Belief systems/Quine/Schiffer: for Quine belief systems never are true, although he concedes Quine pro Brentano: ~ you cannot break out of the intentional vocabulary. But: QuineVsBrentano: ~ no propositional attitudes belong in the canonical scheme, only physical constitution and behavior of organisms. (W+O 1960, p 221).
Vssententialist dualism/SD/Schiffer: 1. QuineVs:
If we accept the sD, we need to acknowledge with Brentano the "importance of an autonomous science of intention". Problem: this commonsense theory would then be cut off from the rest of science. And:
Isolation/Science/Wright: (Wright 1984): to be isolated from the scientific means to be discredited.
Theory/Quine: if it is discredited, their theoretical terms cannot be true of something and propositions such as "I think some dogs have fleas" cannot be true.
Sententialist Dualism/Field: pro: (1972, 357): Physicalism is a successful hypothesis ... that would only force a large number of experiments to be ad.
I 158
We bring Quine and Field as follows together: (1) "Believes", "wishes", "means" and so on are theoretical terms (TT) of a common sense psychological theory.
(2) The justification for Methodological physicalism (what Field wants) and the nature of the commonsense theory require that - should the theoretical terms physicalistically be irreducible - the folk psychology must be wrong. That means the terms are true of nothing (Quine).
(3) Therefore, the sD must be wrong: belief systems cannot be both: true and irreducible.
SchifferVs: is not convincing. I doubt both premises. Ad (2): there is no legitimate empirical hypothesis that requires that theoretical facts on physical facts are reducible. That would only be plausible if the TT would be defined by the theory itself that it introduces.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Meaning Theory Wright, Cr. EMD II 247 Zus:
Meaning Theory/Wright: we probably cannot associate the concept of what a meaning theory should do with the concept that the investigation is something that someone who speaks the language can do better (from within) than someone who observes us. There are no relevant preliminary considerations that we could rely on to properly explain a term.
What do we have ahead of those who observe us?
(s) Why should one be able to distinguish colours better in English than in German?
Wright: Thesis: the Methodical approach must be completely behavioristic and antireflexive!

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Evans I
Gareth Evans
"The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Evans II
Gareth Evans
"Semantic Structure and Logical Form"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Evans III
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989