Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Introspection Chomsky Vs Introspection Münch III 304
Museum myth/Chomsky: Vsintrospection: introspective evidence is not reliable, diffuse and sometimes influenced by prejudice to the meaning or structure of certain words and phrases. >Myth of the museum.
Helmut Schnelle, Introspection and the Description of Language Use“, in: Florian Coulmas (Ed) Festschrift for native speaker, Den Haag 1981, 105-126. – dt: Introspektion und Beschreibung des Sprachgebrauchs, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992

Chomsky I
Noam Chomsky
"Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Chomsky II
Noam Chomsky
"Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Chomsky IV
N. Chomsky
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965
German Edition:
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Chomsky V
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Mü III
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Myth/Museum Field Vs Myth/Museum II 201
Def Museum Myth/Myth of the Museum/Mere Tags/Gavagai/Quine/Field: the thesis that it is determined (somewhere) whether means Gavagai rabbit or rabbit part. ((s)> Naive Realism). Indeterminacy/FieldVsMyth of the Museum: pro Quine: if the indeterminacy is to be rejected, then only because of physical facts.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Myth/Museum Quine Vs Myth/Museum XII 44
Definition Myth of the Museum/original point/Quine: Thesis: Exhibits: the meanings
Labels: the words.
QuineVsMyth of the Museum:
1. Then meanings should be mental entities.
2. (more important, it also exists when meanings should not be mental but platonic ideas or even concrete objects): the semantics is still considered somehow as set in the mind of humans. Thus, it becomes unclear. It should then be something that goes beyond behavior and dispositions.
---
XII 46
Indeterminacy/translation/Gavagai/Quine: E.g. Suppose, in a foreign language there is a word for which there are two mutually incompatible German translations. But no ambiguity in the foreign language. Assuming the foreign expression can be translated in the same use into German in both ways. And both can be equally well reconciled by compensation with the foreign and the own speaker's behavior (assumed with all behavioral dispositions).
Problem: then you could never know which translation is right or wrong.
QuineVsMyth of the Museum: would not be a solution, because we would have no access to the Museum. ((s) to the mental entities).
1. decomposition of translation: E.g. "ne ... rien" in French: the "rien" could be translated into German as "something" or equally well, with "nothing".
Compensation: you can make both in accordance with each other: by translating the "ne" with either "no" or translate it as empty.
Solution: Here we have simply broken down the French into too small parts. The example is disappointing.
---
XII 47
Problem: The decomposition is still a problem because it has to be admitted with this length of expressions, which correspond to predicates. Because then they must bear meanings. 2. E.g. (W + O, § 12): Gavagai: based on the fact that exactly a whole rabbit is present if a non- seperated part or a temporal stage is present.
Ostension/Show: also repeated showing on several occasions does not help.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Relativism Field Vs Relativism II 204
FieldVsQuine: However,
(4) For each predicate T, set y (or {x I Fx} and translation hypothesis M: T signs {x I Fx} relative to M gdw. M T maps to a term that signs y. (or {x I Fx}).

only defines Quine’s relativized concept of signification in terms of an unrelativized concept of signification, applied to our own language (into which we translate). So we need to understand the unrelativized concept before we can understand the relativized one. >Reference systems.
Underdetermination/Reference/Quine/Field: this was responsible for the fact that the unrelativized concepts of denotation and signification are not physicalistically acceptable. FieldVsRelativized Denotation: now we see that the relativized concepts do not help either. FieldVsQuine: with the relativized signification and denotation Quine himself has become a victim of his >museum myth.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Tradition Sellars Vs Tradition I 57
Meaning/Sellars: false: to regard it as a relation between a word and a non-linguistic entity. There is then the danger that one perceives this relation as a type of association. ((s) >tags, Myth of the museum). Meaning/relation/SellarsVsTradition: misleading that predicates would associated with objects. E.g. it is wrong that the semantic statement, ""red" means "rot" in German" would assert "red" would associated with red things. This would mean that this semantic statement would so to speak be a defining symbol of a longer statement on associative connections. That is not the case. (Here: difference of use and mention). (> Association).
I 62
Report/act/Sellars: who supplies a report, does something. (SellarsVsTradition). Epistemology/tradition: a proposition token can play the role of a report,
a) without that this is a public language implementation, and
b) without speaker/listener!
Sellars: here the accuracy of confirmations is supposed to correspond to the correctness of actions. This is not true, moreover, not every Ought is a Doing-Ought.
I 65
Knowledge/SellarsVsTradition: Observational knowledge does not stand on its own two feet! It presupposes language acquisition. (Elsewhere: we cannot perceive a tree, without the concept of a tree.) But at the time of earlier perceptions you do not necessarily have to have had the concept. Long history of acquiring linguistic habits.
Myth of the Factual/Sellars: thesis: that observation is constructed by self-authenticating, not linguistic episodes whose authority is transferred to linguistic and quasi linguistic full executions.
I 84
Thinking/language/tradition: Thesis: Thoughts are possible without verbal ideas.
I 88
SellarsVsTradition: Categories of intentionality are semantical.
I 86
Theory/classic explanation/science/tradition/Sellars: the construction of a theory is to develop a system of postulates that is tentatively correlated with the observation language. SellarsVsTradition: this creates an extremely artificial and unrealistic picture of the actual procedure of scientists.
I 87
Theory/Sellars: the basic assumptions of a theory are not normally formed by an uninterpreted calculus, but by a model (Def model/Sellars: the description of a domain of known objects that behave in the usual way). A model is distinguished primarily by the fact that it is provided with a comment which restricts or limits the analogies. The descriptions of the basic behaviors comply with the postulates of the logistical image of theorizing.
SellarsVs logistical image of theorizing: most explanations did not come readily from the theorists' minds. There is a continuous transition between science and everyday life. The distinction between theory language and observation language belongs to the logic of the concepts of inner episodes.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977
Wittgenstein Quine Vs Wittgenstein I 209
Equation/Quine: most mathematicians would like to consider equations as if they correlated numbers that are somehow the same, but yet different. Whitehead once defended this view: 2 + 3, 3 + 2 are not identical, the different sequence leads to different thought processes. (QuineVs/FregeVs)
I 210
Identity/QuineVsWittgenstein: Wittgenstein's mistake is easier to recognize: Wittgenstein: "To say of two things that they are identical is nonsense and saying of one thing that it is identical with itself says nothing." Quine: Indeed identity statements that are true and not idle consist of unequal singular terms that refer to the same thing, of course.
XII 96
Facts/QuineVsState of Affairs/QuineVsWittgenstein: the concept has no meaning, because most sentences are theoretical (except for the pure observation sentences). But that is no problem for the verification theory of meaning.

XII 44
Representation Theory/Language/QuineVsWittgenstein: traditional, close to the myth of the museum.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Thermometer Th. Price, H.H. Sellars I 56
Thermometer theory / meaning / Price / Sellars: main representative: Price - thesis: meaning consists of the syntax of a predicate and the fact of a reaction - SellarsVs: error: to see meaning as a relation between a word and a non-linguistic entity - (s)> tags -> "myth of the Museum").

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977
Gavagai Quine, W.V.O. IV 425
The Gavagai-Example serves just to refute the myth of the museum, the legend of somewhere fixed meanings (descriptions). The thesis of the indeterminacy of translation does not mean that there are no points of view at all: there are the principles of simplicity, brevity and the principle of indulgence. (However, they are not empirically verifiable).
VI 73
Quine: Ironically, at the time I had not yet meant the indeterminacy of translation in the strong sense: it was not intended to illustrate this, because "Gavagai" is an observation sentence whose translation with "Look, a rabbit" is perfectly assured. What this translation cannot succeed in doing, however, is the determination of the reference! This thesis was the real punch line of the example. Only the term here was identical with the whole sentence, so that there was no possibility of compensation.
Museum Myth Quine, W.V.O. Field II 201
Def Museum Myth/Gavagai/Quine/Field: the thesis that it is determined (somewhere) whether Gavagai means hare or hare part. ((s) >Naive Realism). QuineVsMuseum Myth.
Quine XII 44
Def Museum Myth/Original Place/Quine: thesis: Exhibits: the meanings
Descriptions: the words.
QuineVsMuseum Myth:
1. Then meanings should be mental entities. 2. (more important, also exists if meanings are not to be mental but platonic ideas or even concrete objects): semantics is still regarded as somehow fixed in the mind of humans. This makes it unclear. It should then be something that goes beyond behaviour and disposition.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987