Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kierkegaard, S. | James Vs Kierkegaard, S. | Stegmüller V 481 ff Pascal's Wager/Pascal/Stegmüller: possible gain: bliss and knowledge of the truth. What we risk is error and misery - the stakes are reason and will. Whatever choice we make, we will not do violence to the reason in any case. JamesVsPascal: What does it actually mean to believe something on such a basis? Maybe someone is simply unable to believe in God? - Vs: 1) The wager itself is unreasonable - 2) It stands for a primitive, vain image of God. IV 493 JamesVsKierkegaard: if we were God, we would exclude believers from salvation (because of the calculation). IV 484 HumeVsReligion: Religion is based on belief, not on reason. James: Many religious people have not understood the irony and took it seriously. Among others Kierkegaard. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Pascal, B. | James Vs Pascal, B. | Stegmüller IV 493 Belief/James: there is no justification for belief. JamesVsPascal: if we were in God's place, we would probably happily exclude believers from eternal salvation. Bet: it is really about real choices: 1. they are lifelike, 2. momentous, IV 494 3. inevitable. >Pascal's wager. |
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| Pascal, B. | Mackie Vs Pascal, B. | Stegmüller IV 481 Pascal's Wager/Pascal/Stegmüller: we know that God exists or does not exist. But our theoretical reason can not decide. One can also not just contain judgment, one has to decide. Possible benefit: bliss and knowledge of the truth. What we risk is error and misery. The stakes are reason and will. Whatever choice we make, we will in no case violate reason. IV 482 The situation is different with bliss: one loses nothing in the case of God's non-existence, but also wins nothing. Thus practical reason is in favor of God. Pascal adds: however, one could lose one's earthly happiness (when it lies in debauchery) but the comparison to eternal bliss speaks for the latter. One need not assume that the probabilities of existence or nonexistence are equal! Even if the difference tends to infinity it is worth working for the benefit of existence. ((s) Cf. egalitarian/inegalitarian theories/Nozick). Mackie offers a table of the probability distribution in his book. IV 483 VsPascal: what does it mean to believe anything on such a basis? Maybe someone is simply unable to believe in God? Faith/Stegmüller: you can not willingly believe in something. Pascal: but perhaps the impediment lies somewhere in the mind - which can be influenced. One can decide to practice faith! Indirectly willful. MackieVsPascal: 1. opposition to his own assertion that a bet doesn't violate reason: whoever thereby reaches faith, does violate his reason and discernment. 2. Who decides against infinite improbability, discards indeed their rational principles! IV 484 3. Pascal's additional requirements come into play: the doctrine of predestination could indeed be correct, in the case, everyone should strive to make their earthly life as happy as possible. Additionally, the bet is based on an extremely primitive concept of God: a stupid and vain God. 4. Even if there should be such a God, it would perhaps not be content with belief in him, but would call for a church, etc. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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