Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Armstrong, D. | Lewis Vs Armstrong, D. | V 353 "New Work for a Theory of Universals" (Armstrong 1983)(1): Universals/Armstrong: Armstrong's theory of universals is supposed to be the solution for the problem of the One and the Many >Universals/Armstrong, >Universals/Lewis. LewisVsArmstrong: but it allows for either nominalist solutions or for no solution of any kind. --- Schwarz I 71 Combinatorialism/Armstrong: combinatorialism merely consists of several fundamental properties for which - contrary to colours - any combination should be possible (1986(2), §7). LewisVs: 1986a(3), 86, HellerVs (1998)(4): it is unclear whether this is actually possible. LewisVsArmstrong: as such the problem is not solved, it only allows different interpretations of the descriptions: when does a set of sentences represent the fact that there are donkeys if there is no mention of donkeys? It does represent this fact if the sentences imply the existence of donkeys (1986e(5), 150-157). Problem: modality is required. VsVs: it could be stated that the relationship between the distribution of fundamental properties and of all other truths is analytic, and can be characterized without requiring primitive modal vocabulary. (2002b(6), Heller 1996, see below Chapter 11, LewisVs: 1992a(8), 209). Schwarz I 118 Laws of Nature/LoN/DretskeVsLewis/TooleyVsLewis/ArmstrongVsLewis: there is something missing in Lewis’ laws of nature: for Lewis, laws of nature are simple regularities. But they should be more than that. Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong-Theory: thesis: laws of nature are based on fundamental relations between universals, therefore properties. Since regularities are logically independent from local events, possible worlds with precisely the same local events can nicely differ in their laws of nature. For one world, it may be a Regularity, for the other, a relation of universals. Relation of universals: is the foundation for everything and cannot be analyzed. To state that there is a relation between F's and G's because all F's are G's is not enough. This would be the Regularity theory. SchwarzVs: this leads to problems with not instantiated universals (Mellor 1980(9), §6). Laws of Nature/LewisVsArmstrong/LewisVsTooley/LewisVsDretske: if laws of nature express fundamental relations between universals which are logically independent from observable regularities why do we assume that physics will tell us something about laws of nature? Schwarz I 119 What is the use of universals? Physicists only want to observe regularities. And what is then the relation between universals and regularities? Additional explanations will then be needed! How could a rule-maker exclude that N(F,G) is valid, but some F's are nevertheless not G's. It is not resolved by giving a name to the "rule-maker" like Armstrong does with the term "necessitation". Laws of Nature/LewisVsArmstrong: better: regularities which are justified because of a primitive relation between universals. It is a relationship which also exists in possible worlds in which laws of nature are not valid. It is rather more obscure, but at least not a miracle anymore that all F's are G's if a law of nature demands it. Schwarz I 124 Probability/LewisVsArmstrong: VsFundamental probability property: fundamental properties cannot fulfill the role which we attribute to probability. Schwarz I 139 Cause/causation/Armstrong: absence is not a real cause. LewisVsArmstrong: yes, it is. However, it is so common that is it ignored. Problem: numerous absences in vacuum. Schwarz I 140 Solution/Lewis: absences are absolutely nothing, there is nothing. Problem: if absence is only an empty space-time region, why would oxygen - and not nitrogen- only exist because of absence? Solution/Lewis: "influence", small increase of probability. Schwarz I 141 Counterfactual dependence as well between the how, when and where of the event. Schwarz I 231 Def Principle of truth-maker/to make truth/Armstrong/Martin/Schwarz: all truths must be based on the ontology. Strong form: for each truth, there is something that makes it true. Its existence necessarily implies the truth. LewisVsArmstrong: that is too strong, e.g. the example "no unicorns exist" is true, not because there is something specific, but because unicorns really do not exist (1992a(8), 204, 2001b(10), 611f). Truthmaker: a truthmaker would be an object here which only exists in worlds in which there are no unicorns. Problem: why is it not possible for this object to also exist in worlds in which there are unicorns? Answer: such an object would be a contradiction to the principle of recombination. SchwarzVsLewis: but this is not true: the truth-maker for "no unicorns exist" could be an object which essentially lives in a possible world without unicorns. However, the object could very well have duplicates in the possible worlds with unicorns. The counterpart relation is not a relation of intrinsic resemblance. To make truth/predicate/Armstrong/Schwarz: (Armstrong 1997(11), 205f): if object A has the property F, an object must exist which implies the existence of this fact. LewisVsArmstrong: why can this object not exist, although A is not F (1998b)(12)?. If A is F in one world, but it is not so in the other world, why is it always necessary to have something that exists in one possible world, but is missing in the other world. Two possible worlds are only different on the grounds of the characteristics the objects have in their worlds. ((s) So different characteristics in an area that remains constant). Characteristics/truth-maker/Lewis: a truth-maker is not needed for something that has a (basic) characteristic: the sentence "A is F" is true because A has the characteristic F. That is all (1998b(12), 219). Def principle of truth-maker/LewisVsArmstrong/Schwarz: only the following will then remain: truth supervenes upon the things that exist, and upon perfect natural characteristics which it chooses to instantiate (1992a(8), 207, 1994a(13), 225, Bigelow 1988(14), §25). Whenever two possibilities are different from each other, there are either different objects in them or these objects have different fundamental characteristics (1992a(8), 206, 2001b(10), §4). Schwarz I 232 N.B.: if there are possibilities that are qualitatively indistinguishable, but numerically different (which Lewis neither states nor denies, 1986e(5), 224), the principle must be limited to qualitative truths or characteristics (1992a(8), 206f). If there are none, simplification is possible: no other two possibilities are exactly the same regarding which objects exist as well as the fundamental characteristics are instantiated. ((s) If the distribution of fundamental characteristics sets everything, then the objects are set as well. As such, the possible worlds are only different regarding their characteristics, but these are naturally set.) Schwarz: this can be amplified. 1. D. M. Armstrong [1983]: What is a Law of Nature?. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. D. M. Armstrong [1986]: “The Nature of Possibility”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 16: 575–594. 3. D. Lewis [1986a]: “Against Structural Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64: 25–46. 4. Mark Heller [1998]: “Property Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds”. Journal of Philosophy, 95: 293–316. 5. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell. 6. D. Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97. 7. Mark Heller [1996]: “Ersatz Worlds and Ontological Disagreement”. Acta Analytica, 40:35–44. 8.D. Lewis [1992a]: “Critical Notice of Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70: 211–224. In [Lewis 1999a] als “Armstrong on Combinatorial Possibility”. 9. David H. Mellor [1980]: “Necessities and universals in natural laws”. In David H. Mellor (Hg.) Science, belief and behaviour, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10. D. Lewis [2001b]: “Truthmaking and Difference-Making”. Noˆus, 35: 602–615. 11. D. M. [1997]: A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 12. D. Lewis [1998b]: “A World of Truthmakers?” Times Literary Supplement , 4950: 30. 13. D. Lewis [1994a]: “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind, 103: 473–490. 14. John Bigelow [1988]: The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist’s Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
Epiphenomenalism | Lewis Vs Epiphenomenalism | I (a) 18 Epiphenomenalism: a variant of my argument seems to miss: Assumed experiences would non-physical epiphenomena, which would be correlated by some causal law exactly with simultaneous physical states, then the experiences and their physical correlates were causally equivalent. I (a) 19 Then these non-physical experiences would still have their explanations: namely the defining physical effects. LewisVs: that would only double the experience. (The non-physical in addition to the physical). Moreover, it is not true that they would be causally equivalent: this is an error in the Regularity theory of the cause (LewisVsHume): we know from elsewhere that the theory must be corrected in order to distinguish between genuine causes and pseudo causes that are their epiphenomenal correlates. E.g. the light does not cause the engine running, even though it is a legitimate perfect correlate of electrical current what actually causes the engine s running. |
LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
Hume, D. | Armstrong Vs Hume, D. | Arm III 120 Then all universals would only be substances in Hume’s sense: i.e. something that logically might have an independent existence. III 121 ArmstrongVsHume/ArmstronVsTooley: it is wrong to think of universals like that. Then there are problems regarding how universals are to relate to their particulars (P). E.g. If a rel between Pa and Pb is something that is able to have an independent existence without a and b and any other P, would there not have to be at least one other rel to relate it with a and b?. And if this rel itself can be uninstantiated (e.g. in a universe with monads!), then this rel is just as questionable, etc. ad infinitum (Bradley’s regress). This can only be avoided if universals are merely abstract factors of states (but real). Arm II (b) 46 Causality/Causation/ArmstrongVsHume: E.g. Inhaling a quantum of cyanide leads to the death of the person who inhales it. There seems to be a causal relation here, i.e. one between types: one type produces the other type. II (b) 47 Analytic philosophy/Armstrong: hastens to reassure that we are dealing only with the truth of a universal proposition. "Any person who inhales cyanide dies." Those who represent a singularistic theory of causation will say that each (unique event of) inhaling by a particular person causes their death. (Armstrong pro). But that’s not the whole truth!. Surface structure/Proposition/Armstrong: the proposition itself asserts a connection of universals on its surface, from which individual causal findings follow. Thesis: this surface structure reflects something more profound. If the connection exists, then Regularity is included at the level of universals, of course. But this Entailment can probably not be grasped formally. Rather, it is something like Carnap’s "meaning postulate"!. Place II 64 Causality/Hume/Armstrong: ... From this follows that we can never have an empirical proof of the truth of a counterfactual conditional. Law statement/Place: (universal counterfactual conditional): what we can have, however, is empirical proof that supports the truth of a universal Counterfactual Conditional. Proof/Hume/Armstrong: but the proof consists in nothing more than the observation of either regular following or coinciding with Type B and Type A. (Regularity). Place II 65 Ceteris paribus/PlaceVsHume/PlaceVsArmstrong: Such regularities are no evidence of the truth of the counterfactual conditional if it is not ensured that all circumstances remain the same. C.p. must supplement regularity in order for it to become proof. But then Armstrong does not need to refute the Regularity theory. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
Hume, D. | Goodman Vs Hume, D. | II 112 Hume imagined the mind in a way that it can be caused to make forecasts according to regularities in the observable. GoodmanVsHume: We, however, see the mind as being in activity from the beginning. He corrects gradually. (Like Dennett) Sainsbury V 139 Grue/Goodman: "regularities are where we find them, and we find them everywhere." Grue/Goodman/Sainsbury: therefore, there are still many ramifications between confirmation and belief. Grue/GoodmanVsHume: shows that the Regularity defined by Hume is not the only one. Problem: what is Regularity after all (>Regularity)? The connection of emeralds with "green" or the connection with "grue"? Problem: either we cannot explain what Regularity is, then there is no induction, or we provide an explanation of Regularity, which includes the unwanted connection with "grue". Regularity depends on description! This has led some people to extreme conventionalism according to which there is no separation of the world from the conventions. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 |
Hume, D. | Quine Vs Hume, D. | Hume I 115 Time/Hume was structure of the mind, now the subject turns out to be a synthesis of the time. Memory/Hume: the re-emergence of an impression in the form of a still vivid imagination. ((s) QuineVsHume). Memory itself does not cause a synthesis of time. It does not overcome the structure. I 178 The achievement of memory does not consist in holding on to individual imaginations, but in retaining their order. Quine V 19 Cause/Regularity/QuineVsHume: Problem: you can just take the two single classes in regularity consisting of a and b. Then one succumbs to the fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc. Dispositions: here there is the same problem. V 88 Identity/Identity Predicate/Language Learning/Quine: it seems as though we have recognized the emergence of the identity predicate: it is nothing but a common constituent of various relative observation terms for substances such as V 89 e.g. "the same dog as" or even less: a word for the temporal extension of referencing (pointing). Identity/Locke/Hume: only useful for appearances of the same object at different times. QuineVsLocke/QuineVsHume: that fits very well with our present purpose of the individuation of things. However, identity goes beyond that. V 177 Past/Observation/Quine: but there are also reports of earlier observations, where the term was learned by definition instead of by conditioning. Since you can replace a defined term by its definiendum this amounts to a composite observation term. Example "I have seen a black rabbit": Learning situation: one for black, one for rabbits, as well as attributive composition. Imagination/Memory/Quine: in the language of mental images we can say that these are caused, even if the corresponding object does not exist. But now we must go further and assume even more skills: the child has to distinguish between two types of mental images: a) Fantasies b) Memories. V 178 QuineVsHume: referred unconvincingly to liveliness as a differentiator. Def Memory/Hume: attenuated sensation Def Fantasy/Hume: attenuated memory. Def Mental Image/QuineVsHume: is an event in the nervous system that leads to a state of readiness for a corresponding stimulus. This ostensive nervous process is perceived by the subject, i.e. it must be able to react specifically to it in two different ways: a) Summary of previously learned items e.g. "black" and "rabbit" b) strengthened by acquaintance: i.e. real earlier encounter with a black rabbit. Basis for affirmation. V 179 Observation Sentence/Complete Thought/Reference/Quine: refers to the object and the calendar clock and, where appropriate, to a location. Complex observation term. >Protocol Sentence: timeless sentence (forever-lasting) if location and times complete. Quine VII (d) 65 Objects/Individual Things/Thing/Hume: the notion of physical objects arises from a mistake in identification. In reality, we invent a new item every minute! QuineVsHume: we do not need to share it. Quine XI 112 Causality/QuineVsRegularity/QuineVsHume/Lauener: E.g. to what type of events does the cry of the geese heard on Capitol Hill belong and to which the fact that Rome is saved? |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Hume, D. | Searle Vs Hume, D. | II 101 Perception/cause/SearleVsHume: my knowledge that my car has caused my visual experience, is because I know that I see the car, and not vice versa. I do not conclude that there is a car, but I just can see it. >Perception/Searle. II 102 Perception: the experience is not literally yellow, but it is caused literally. Moreover, it is experienced as caused, whether it is satisfied or not. But it is not experienced as yellow, but as of something yellow. II 103 Causality: I may very well experience directly! However, not independent but the being caused belongs to the experience. (This does not mean that the experience confirms itself). II 104 Causality: also for things characteristic, which are not directly observable such as ultraviolet and infrared.. If they could not have an impact on our measuring instruments, then we might not know about their existence. >Causality/Hume. ((s) Ultraviolet cannot be hallucination. But one can imagine a sunburn.) II 156 Causality/SearleVsHume: I believe that "to cause" describes a real relationship in the real world, but it does not follow a universal correlation of similar cases. II 160 Tradition: one never has a causing experience. SearleVsTradition: you have not often a causing experience, but every perception or action experience is indeed just such a causing experience! SearleVsHume: he looked for a wrong spot, he looked for a power. II 170 Regularity/SearleVsHume: not all regularities are causal. It is wrong to think that we can have in addition of an experience of cause and effect a hypothesis about regularities in the world. II 171 I have not the hypothesis, but I have the ability to distinguish regularity from irregularity. Regularity becomes the background. >Regularity/Hume. II 173 SearleVsCausal Law/SearleVsHume: does not need to be derived from the existence of causation. After 300 years of unsuccessful attempts with the regularity you have to see that the concept of to make something happening differs from the concept of regularity. II 174 There are not two types of causation: "Regularity causation" and "intentional causation". There is exactly one way: this is the action-causation. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Hume, D. | Strawson Vs Hume, D. | IV 157 Causality/StrawsonVsHume: he overlooks the very obvious fact that objects exert physical forces. (>Dennett: and they are observable). IV 160 Theory/Strawson: I do not want to draw a too sharp line between observation and theory. IV 162 Causality/Hume/Strawson: we can actually observe many actions and reactions without knowing what effects were actually working. IV 163 Regularity/causality/regularity/StrawsonVsHume: Regularity (happening according to rules) is time neutral. The regularity does not prohibit reversing the order. IV 165 KantVsHume: We learn a lot about rule-like sequences in the world by observing, but only because we already have the concept of causality. IV 166 Causality/Strawson: to understand it we are consciously or unconsciously using the model of our human behavior and experience, what forces we must exert ourselves and to what forces we are exposed to. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
Hume, D. | Verschiedene Vs Hume, D. | Hacking I 68 Causality/W.C.BroadVsHume: VsRegularity: For example we can see that the siren of Manchester howls every day at the same time, whereupon the workers of Leeds let the work rest for one hour. But no causation. Hacking I 70 CartwrightVsHume: the regularities are characteristics of the procedures with which we establish theories. (>Putnam). Hume I 131 Def Atomism/Hume/Deleuze: is the thesis that relations are external to conceptions. (KantVs). VsHume: Critics accuse him of having "atomized" the given. Theory/DeleuzeVsVs: with this one believes to have pilloried a whole system. As if it were a quirk of Hume. What a philosopher says is presented as if it were done or wanted by him. I 132 What do you think you can explain? A theory must be understood from its conceptual basis. A philosophical theory is an unfolded question. Question and critique of the question are one. I 133 It is not about knowing whether things are one way or the other, but whether the question is a good question or not. Apron I 238 Lawlikeness/lawlike/Schurz: b) in the narrower sense: = physical necessity (to escape the vagueness or graduality of the broad term). Problem: not all laws unlimited in space-time are legal in the narrower sense. Universal, but not physically necessary: Example: "No lump of gold has a diameter of more than one kilometre". Universality: is therefore not a sufficient, but a necessary condition for lawfulness. For example, the universal statement "All apples in this basket are red" is not universal, even if it is replaced by its contraposition: For example "All non-red objects are not apples in this basket". (Hempel 1965, 341). Strong Hume-Thesis/Hume/Schurz: Universality is a sufficient condition for lawlikeness. SchurzVs: that is wrong. Weak Hume-Thesis/Schurz: Universality is a necessary condition for lawfulness. ((s) stronger/weaker/(s): the claim that a condition is sufficient is stronger than the claim that it is necessary.) BhaskarVsWeak Hume-Thesis. BhaskarVsHume. Solution/Carnap/Hempel: Def Maxwell Condition/lawlikeness: Natural laws or nomological predicates must not contain an analytical reference to certain individuals or spacetime points. This is much stronger than the universality condition. (stronger/weaker). Example "All emeralds are grue": is universal in space-time, but does not meet the Maxwell condition. ((s) Because observed emeralds are concrete individuals?). I 239 Natural Law/Law of Nature/Armstrong: are relations of implication between universals. Hence no reference to individuals. (1983) Maxwell condition/Wilson/Schurz: (Wilson 1979): it represents a physical principle of symmetry: i.e. laws of nature must be invariant under translation of their time coordinates and translation or rotation of their space coordinates. From this, conservation laws can be obtained. Symmetry Principles/Principle/Principles/Schurz: physical symmetry principles are not a priori, but depend on experience! Maxwell Condition/Schurz: is too weak for lawlikeness: Example "No lump of gold..." also this universal statement fulfills them. Stegmüller IV 243 StegmüllerVsHume: usually proceeds unsystematically and mixes contingent properties of the world with random properties of humans. Ethics/Morality/Hume: 1. In view of scarce resources, people must cooperate in order to survive. 2. HumeVsHobbes: all people have sympathy. If, of course, everything were available in abundance, respect for the property of others would be superfluous: IV 244 People would voluntarily satisfy the needs in the mutual interest according to their urgency. Moral/Ethics/Shaftesbury/ShaftesburyVsHume: wants to build all morality on human sympathy, altruism and charity. (>Positions). HumeVsShaftesbury: illusionary ideal. Ethics/Moral/Hume: 3. Human insight and willpower are limited, therefore sanctions are necessary. 4. Advantageous move: intelligence enables people to calculate long-term interests. IV 245 The decisive driving force is self-interest. It is pointless to ask whether the human is "good by nature" or "bad by nature". It is about the distinction between wisdom and foolishness. 5. The human is vulnerable. 6. Humans are approximately the same. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
Hume, D. | Mackie Vs Hume, D. | Armstrong III 57 MackieVsHume: (1979) (Stove, et al.): overlooked the possibility that observational premises, while they do not contain any conclusion about the unobserved, still can yield a logical possibility, e.g. 99% of Fs are Gs. Then it is obviously rational to conclude that a is a G. So one can say that the observed cases provide a logical opportunity for unobserved cases. Purely mathematical argument about distribution. VsTheory of Regularity: yet there is a coherent reason why the principles of logical possibility alone cannot solve the problem of the theory of Regularity. The issue with logical possibility is that it cannot distinguish between natural and non-natural classes. Ex.: grue as an unnatural predicate cannot readily be ruled out. III 58 That all emeralds are grue, has the same logical possibility (the same percentage as the green ones). Stegmüller IV 238 Virtue/Hume: distinction: natural virtue: is part of biological provisions. Moral philosophers before Hume exclusively referred to these virtues. Ex: generosity, forbearance, charitableness, altruism, moderation, impartiality. (Basis: human sympathy). artificial virtue: nothing but human inventions. Ex: respect for property; rules of transfer of property, promise, commitment to adhere to contracts, loyalty towards the government. IV 239 Artificial virtues have no natural origin. Ex: respecting other's property: 1. cannot originate from benevolence towards others: for then the respectation would depend on whether the property serves the welfare of all. 2. also, it cannot depend on whether the person concerned seems sympathetic or not. 3. sympathy is imaginable in gradations, respect for property is not. This applies mutatis mutandis to all artificial virtues. IV 240 Morality/Hume: I cannot base my duties on whether someone seems sympathetic or not. natural virtue/MackieVsHume/Stegmüller: to begin with, one would expect that the discussion of the natural virtues is much easier, since the first step (about the genesis) does not apply. Problem: (also recognized by Hume) if the natural virtues were an effluence of sympathy, they would have to run parallel. But this is not the case. Our sympathies are self-centered! We have more sympathy for people who are closest to us. IV 241 But we expect from moral judgments that they are impersonal and impartial. Thus, the seemingly absolute difference between natural and artificial virtues must partially be abandoned. The "natural" virtues, too, thus form a system of conventions. They are supposed to serve the "long-term interests" of all. The natural virtues then are such artificial virtues in which we find instinctive inclination to act accordingly. In the artificial virtues, we find no such basis. They are merely socialized. Stegmüller IV 355 Miracle/probability/Hume/Stegmüller: probability is always to be qualified by the level of information. But Hume's argument would even be valid if credibility of witnesses were a law of nature! Even then it would not be rational to believe in miracles. Miracle/Mackie: difference: a) question: on grounds of the reports, which hypotheses about laws should be assumed? b) the weight of the evidence itself. Miracle/MackieVsHume: also the reporter himself requires the notion of a well-founded natural law in order to classify the event as a miracle. IV 356 Hume does not anywhere considere the strengthening by several independent witnesses. IV 412 Teleological proof of God's existence/MackieVsHume: (by and large pro Hume): but one can interpret the conclusion by analogy in a way that God is introduced as that which caused the natural world and explains it. IV 413 But also here Hume would be proved to be correct that no further consequences arise therefrom. In particular, the relationship between God and the world remains unexplained. Science/theory/Mackie: Darwinian theory of evolution, too, does not facilitate any predictions! IV 414 Order/theory of evolution/Mackie/Stegmüller: in Darwinism order is not explained by the proposition, that God created the world for us, but that we have adapted to it. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
Hume, D. | Vollmer Vs Hume, D. | I 103 Causality/VollmerVsHume: not a layperson, but also not a scientist feels comfortable with Hume's observation. Causality/Hume: attributes causality to an instinct that we have in common with animals. Causality/KantVsHume: Instincts can fail, the law of causality does not seem to fail. I 105 Causality/Regularity/VsHume: For example, although day and night follow each other regularly, we do not say that day is the cause for night. VollmerVsHume: has no convincing argument for it! Vollmer: no energy transfer from day to night, so one cannot be the cause of the other! I 106 Causality/Energy transfer/VollmerVsHume: the frequency is not decisive, how else could we explain the expansion of the universe (which by definition is unique) by the Big Bang? Energy conservation is relevant for our ontological interpretation of causality, not frequency. It is essential for the possibility of an effective energy transfer. I 107 However, in principle there could also be causal processes in which only half of the released energy is transferred, while the other half disappears in violation of the conservation law! Conversely, the "cause" does not need to provide the total energy for the effect. (butterfly effect). Vollmer: small cause - big effect? - Yes, but without a minimum of energy transfer there is no effect, no causality. II 47 Natural Law/Law/General Sentence/Vollmer: three classes of true, general sentences: 1. Randomly true - for example all balls in this box are red 2. Lawfully true without energy transfer: E.g. duration of oscillation = 2π √ (pendulum length multiplied by acceleration due to gravity). 3. Causal laws (with energy transfer) E.g. heating leads to expansion This does not imply that this causal "necessity" gives causal assertions any unassailable status. Here, too, the hypothetical character of all our knowledge remains. Causality/VollmerVsHume: nevertheless, causal assertions say more than mere subsequent assertions: their empirical content is greater. This, of course, makes them easier to refute. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
Induction | Armstrong Vs Induction | Arm III 105 VsInduction/Vs Best explanation/BE: inductive skepticism could doubt that it really would be the best explanation; more fundamental: why should the uniformities (unif.) of the world have an explanation at all? Unif./Berkeley: through God. He could also abolish the "laws of nature" tomorrow. Berkeley/Armstrong: answering this already means to concede the possibilities. We have no guarantee that the BE is the best scheme. But it is informative. Arm III 53 Induction/ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: 1) Induction is rational. We use it to cope with lives. The conclusion is formally invalid and it is extremely difficult to formalize it. HumeVsInduction: with his skepticism of induction he has questioned a cornerstone of our life. (Much worse than skepticism when it comes to God). Moore: defended induction because of the common sense. Armstrong pro. III 54 The best thing the skepticsVsInduction can hope is playing off some of our best justified (inductively gained) everyday certainties. VsVs: it is a coherent system that our everyday certainties (beliefs) form a coherent system. Application to itself. Hume: the doubt of this involves a quantum of mauvaise foi. (Armstrong ditto). He is only a skeptic during his studies and rejects the skepticism in everyday life. VsReg th: it is therefore a serious accusation against a philosophical theory, if it is obliged to skepticism VsInduction. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
Lewis, D. | Armstrong Vs Lewis, D. | Armstrong III 70 Def Law of Nature/LoN/Lewis: Iff it occurs as a theorem (or axiom) in each of the true deductive systems that unites the best combination of simplicity and strength. Armstrong: "each" is important: Suppose we had L3 and L4 (see E.g. above), both as a law, but both support incompatible counterfactual conditionals. Lewis: then there is no third law. ArmstrongVsLewis: that seems wrong. III 71 The least evil would be to say that an involuntary choice must be made between L3 or L4 as the third law. The price for this is the discovery that in some possible situations the view of Ramsey Lewis does not offer an involuntary response. This may not be a problem for Lewis: Law/Lewis: "vague and difficult concept". ArmstrongVsLewis: if one does not assume the Regularity theory, there is a precise distinction between laws and non-laws. Vs Systematic approach/VsRamsey/VsLewis: pro: it is as they say, the manifestations of LoN can be singled out of the Humean uniformities. But: This is not a necessary truth. Their criterion is not part of our concept of LoN. ArmstrongVsLewis: it is logically possible that the uniformities (unif.) in an arbitrarily chosen subclass are manifestations of LoN, while the unif. in the residue class are purely coincidental unif... It is logically possible that every Humean uniformity is the manifestation of a LoN, that none is a manifestation or that any other subclass is this class of manifestations of LoN. Schwarz I 94 Def properties/Lewis: having a property means being a member of a class. ArmstrongVsLewis/Problem/Schwarz: you cannot explain "red" by saying that its bearer is the element of such and such a class. ((s) either, it is circular, or it misses the property, because the object (bearer) can also belong to other classes. E.g. the fact that a tomato is red is not due to the fact that it is an element of the class of red things, but vice versa.) Armstrong 1978a(1), 2,5,2,7) Schw I 95 LewisVsVs: Unlike other representatives of the universals theory, Lewis does not want to explain what it means or why it is that things have the properties that they have. Explanation/Lewis: proper explanations don’t speak of elementness. (1997c(2), 1980b(3)). However, there can be no general explanation of having properties or predication! Because the explanation has to contain predicates if it were circular. Therefore, "Having a property" is not a relation. But there is nothing more to be said about it, either. (2002a(4), 6,1983c(5): 20 24,1998b(6), 219). E.g. "A is F" is to be generally true, because A has this and that relationship with the property F: here, "A is in this and that relationship with the property F" would have to be true again, because A and F are in this and that relation with "having this and that relation", etc. 1. David M. Armstrong [1978a]: Universals and Scientific Realism I: Nominalism & Realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2. David Lewis [1997c]: “Naming the Colours”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 325–342. 3. David Lewis [1980b]: “Mad Pain andMartian Pain”. In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology Bd.1, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 216–222 4. David Lewis [2002a]: “Tensing the Copula”. Mind, 111: 1–13 5. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 6. David Lewis [1998b]: “A World of Truthmakers?” Times Literary Supplement , 4950: 30. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
Mackie, J. L. | Armstrong Vs Mackie, J. L. | Arm III 50 Induction/Counterfactual conditional/Co.co./Regularity theory/Mackie: if it is very likely that all Fs are Gs, and we look at an a of which we believe or know that it is not an F or that it does not exist: Assuming that a is an F, it is nevertheless inductively very likely that a is a G. Therefore we are entitled to the Counterfactual Conditional: if a were an F, it would be a G. Armstrong: that is neutral in itself and can now be used to show that Humeean uniformities could also support counterfactual conditionals. And that is simply because of induction. Then the Counterfactual conditional is justified. III 51 Vs: 1) then it must be possible to solve the problem of induction, even if assuming that the laws of nature (LoN) are mere LoN. But I believe that the reg. th. is committed to skepticism regarding induction (see above). Vs: 2) a) If law statements support Counterfactual Conditional, then they would also have to inherit the uncertainty of induction! E.g. assuming all Fs are Gs, but there are doubts as to whether that is a law. Then the evidence is likely, but not certain. The corresponding Counterfactual Conditional: if a were an F, it would be highly probable that it would be a G. The consequence of this Counterfactual Conditional would be a probability statement. ArmstrongVsMackie: but we would not establish this Counterfactual Conditional Either it is a law that Fs are Gs or it is not. If it is not, the Counterfactual conditional is simply wrong. b) it appears logically possible that a being could know the content of all laws, but this knowledge or belief are not acquired inductively. Couldn’t this being use GA just like us to support Counterfactual Conditional? That seems possible. Nevertheless: how would it be possible if the assertion of Counterfactual Conditional was based on an inductive inference from antecedent to consequent? (As demanded by Mackie). |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
Quine, W.V.O. | Hintikka Vs Quine, W.V.O. | II 184 Intentionality/Hintikka: if it is to be defined by the need to explain it with possible worlds, we have to examine possible counterexamples. Counterexample/(s): shall be something that also requires possible worlds without being intentional. However, the thesis was not that intentionality is the only thing that requires possible worlds. Possible counter-examples to the thesis that intentionality is essentially possible-world based: 1) E.g. physical modalities: E.g. causal necessity really does not seem to be intentional. II 185 Vs: but this is deceptive: Solution: Hume has shown that causality is what the mind adds to Regularity. To that extent, causality is quite intentional. It points to something behind the perception. 2) E.g. logical (analytical) modalities. They are certainly objective and non-psychological. Nevertheless, they are best explained by possible worlds. I 186 Solution: Meaning/Intentionality/Quine/Hintikka: Quine has shown that meanings are indeed intentional, in that they are dependent on the beliefs (convictions) of the subject. Thesis: According to Quine, we must always ask what are the beliefs of a person are to understand what are their meanings are. DavidsonVsQuine. QuineVsDavidson: belief and meaning cannot be separated. Quine/Hintikka: for meanings what Hume was for causality. 3) E.g. Probability/Probability Theory/de Finetti/L.J.Savage/Hintikka: according to the two authors all probability is subjective. Def Probability/Prob/Mathematics/Hintikka: measure in a sample space. Samples: are "small possible worlds". II 187 Possible Worlds/Dana Scott: "Is there life in possible worlds?". Intentionality/Hintikka: if probability can only be subjective (Thesis: there is no objective probability), this corresponds, in the turn, to what Hume says regarding causality and Quine in relation to meanings. Probability/Prob/Hintikka: is then not a real counterexample to the thesis that intentionality is possible-world based, because even probabilities are in a way intentional. (If probability is possible-world based, in any case). Gradually/Degree/Yes-No/Explanation/Method//Definition/Hintikka: Thesis: seemingly dichotomous concepts can often be better explained if they are conceived as gradual. Definability/Rantala/Hintikka: Rantala: Thesis: we do not begin by asking when a theory clearly specifies a concept, but how much freedom the theory leaves the term. II 188 Determinacy/Hintikka: is a gradual matter, and definability sets in when the uncertainty disappears. This is an elegant equivalence to the model theory. Qualitative/Comparative/Hintikka: by assuming that a property is gradual, a qualitative concept can be transformed into a comparative one. Then we no longer only deal with yes-no questions. Intentionality/Hintikka: thesis is a gradual matter. This is obvious, given that in case of intentionality we must always consider unrealized possibilities. "Ontological Power"/Hintikka: the greater the ontological power of a mind, the farther you can go beyond the real world. Degree of Intentionality/Hintikka: is measured by the distance to the actual world. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
Regularity Theory | Armstrong Vs Regularity Theory | Arm III 13 ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: 1) extensional problems: A) Humean Regularity: there seem to be some that are not laws of nature. (H.R. = Humean regularity). That means being an H.R. is not sufficient for being a law of nature (LoN). B) LoN: there might be some that do not universally apply in time and space. There are also laws of probability. Neither of these two would be Humean regularities (H.R.). That means being an H.R. is not necessary for being an LoN. 2) "intensional" problems: Assuming there is a H.R. to which an LoN, corresponds, and the content of this regularity is the same as that of the law. Even then, there are reasons to assume that the law and the regularity are not identical. Arm III 25 TooleyVsArmstrong: (see below): laws of nature which essentially involve individual things must be admitted as logically possible. Then it must be allowed that laws change from one cosmic epoch to the next. TooleyVsRegularity theory: for them it is a problem that only a narrow conceptual gap separates the cosmic epochs (i.e. H.R.) from just very widely extended regularities which are not cosmic anymore. Assuming there were no cosmic regularities (reg.), but extended ones would indeed exist, then it is logically compatible with all our observations. VsRegularity theory: how can it describe the situation in a way that there are a) no laws but extensive regularities? or b) that there are laws, but they do not have cosmic reach? The latter is more in line with the spirit of reg.th. III 27 VsReg. th.: it cannot assert that every local reg. is a law. III 52 ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: makes induction irrational. Arm III 159 ArmstrongVsIdealism: being forced to assume an unspecified absolute because of the requirement of the necessity of existence. There are no principles of deduction from the absolute downwards. There has never been a serious deduction of this kind. Explanation/Armstrong: if the explanation has to stop shortly before coming to the absolute, then idealism must accept contingency. At what point should we accept contingency? ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: it gives up too soon. Universals theory: can the atomic bonds of universals be explained that we have assumed to be molecular uniformities? Necessity/Armstrong: can only ever be asserted, it cannot be demonstrated or even be made plausible. Arm III 53 Induction/ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: 1) Induction is rational. We use it to cope with lives. The conclusion is formally invalid and it is extremely difficult to formalize it. HumeVsInduction: with his skepticism of induction he has questioned a cornerstone of our life. (Much worse than skepticism when it comes to God). Moore: defended induction because of the common sense. Armstrong pro. III 54 The best thing the skepticsVsInduction can hope is playing off some of our best justified (inductively gained) everyday certainties. VsVs: it is a coherent system that our everyday certainties (beliefs) form a coherent system. Application to itself. Hume: the doubt of this involves a quantum of mauvaise foi. (Armstrong ditto). He is only a skeptic during his studies and rejects the skepticism in everyday life. VsReg th: it is therefore a serious accusation against a philosophical theory, if it is obliged to skepticism VsInduction. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
Skyrms, B. | Armstrong Vs Skyrms, B. | Arm III 36 Regularity theory/Armstrong: If we vary the accompanying circumstances now, then the limit value of the relative frequency in each class of circumstances is maintained. (Truth conditions/tr.cond./law statements/Resilience: But the resilience throws no light on the truth conditions for law statements, as the text might suggest). Description dependence/Resilience/ArmstrongVsSkyrms/ArmstrongVsMackie: this introduces a considerable element of arbitrariness or convention. The law statement ascribes a precise probability to Fs for being Gs. It conceals that it depends on the decision how the facts are described. Mackie and Skyrms are honest enough not to conceal that: Coincidence/physical coincidence/Skyrms: is not absolute! (Facts are description dependent). Standards for resilience evolve along with physical theories. Resilience/Armstrong: the term is useful when we want to develop objective tests. Laws of Nature/LoN//ArmstrongVsSkyrms: one should never ask more of laws than this: they should be potentially resilient. Fs have the probability of being a G always under all nomically possible circumstances. III 37 But the fact that these circumstances exist is contingent! We expect that some never occur. Skyrms: Follows the reg. th. Arm III 65 Resiliency/Laws of nature/Regularity/Armstrong: E.g. it is assumed to be a Humean Regularity that Fs are Gs. Which additional condition would turn this into a law? We want the Fs to resilientyl be Gs, i.e. under every nomically possible circumstance. Of course, this cannot absolutely be fulfilled. But relative resilience: E.g. there may be Fs that are Hs that are Js that are Ks ... where the class of factors {H, K, J ...} covers a wide range of appropriate circumstances. Then and only then the reg. is a law. How broad must the range be to ensure that the factors are suitable? Intuitively, so that if there are many factors, it is nomically possible in the test to produce an F which is a ~G. E.g. Smith’s Garden (see above). The generalization is highly resilient here, because there is a broad range of circumstances that could falsify it if it is falsifiable. VsResiliency/VsSkyrms: why should there not be laws that are non-resilient?. Law: if it is a law that the Fs are Gs, then s is potentially resilient by definition. It is physically not possible for an F, which is a K, not to be a G. But why should nature be so accommodating as to provide us with reasons to assume that there is no such K? Why should there be Fs which are accompanied by factors that are plausible candidates for Ks, but happen to be not?. E.g. why should Smith’s Garden not exist somewhere, but without fruits, and yet be it a law that it contains nothing but apples? Only a vulgar positivism could prohibit that. ArmstrongVsResilience/ArmstrongVsSkyrms: that is the reason why the refinement of reg.th. must be rejected by resilience. This requires an urgent systematic solution. How can the resilience theorists specify the real factors for a test?. III 66 Only by filtering out the nomically significant factors. He needs a coherent system. Therefore, problems of the systematic approach are also problems of the resilience approach. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
Thomas Aquinas | Hume Vs Thomas Aquinas | Fraassen I 212 Proof of the Existence of God/HumeVsThomas Aquinas/Fraassen: our new view (modern analogy) is not exposed to criticism by Hume (HumeVsThomas Aquinas). Even though regress in causation or explanation must end. I 213 There is no reason to assume that this end (end point) should not be the universe (world) itself (instead of God). Problem: because if the world can only be understood by reference to the will of God, how are we to understand God's will? And if we cannot understand Him, why should we not halt at the universe? VsHume: all counterarguments seem to be based on the assumption that God is essentially different from the universe. God himself requires no explanation or justification. Fraassen: this may be true for God, yet there is a possible counterargument for our case: namely as follows: Explanation/Fraassen: in terms of explanation there is no difference between galvanometers and electrons. Instead: we assume a microstructure (MiSt). Microstructure/MiSt/VsFraassen: demanding a microstructure does not mean appealing to a cosmic coincidence, e.g. that cloud chambers and galvanometers behave like this, is even then surprising if there are theoretical entities such as electrons. Because it is surprising that there should be such a Regularity in the behavior of the electrons. If we are not metaphysically minded, we should be glad that our relation to quantum mechanics has brought order in there. Because we do not understand the underlying (prior, not temporal) coincidence. If we then continue to ask what brings the micro-things of the same kind to behave in the same way in the past, present and future, we have a new exaggerated realism. FraassenVsVs: Explanation/regularity/Fraassen: thesis: there are regularities of observable phenomena that need to be explained! Theoretical Entities/Fraassen: the question of why they behave the way they do is a question on a different level than that of explanation. Because then there are two possibilities: a) there is another, still unexplained Regularity or b) there is the presumption that our theory can still be improved by being simplified. In neither case the regularities behind the phenomena demand an explanation. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
Tooley, M. | Armstrong Vs Tooley, M. | III 104 Tooley: if relations between universals are truthmakers, then these are "atomic facts". Then the standard principles could ascribe a probability of >0 to the confirmation theory. III 105 ArmstrongVsTooley: this is an initial possibility or logical possibility of a tautology. Empiricist should have doubts there. ForrestVsTooley: There could be infinitely many possible universals. Would the attributable initial probabilities not be infinitesimally small then? That would be no justification for the induction. VsInduction/VsBest Explanation: inductive skepticism could doubt that it really would be the best explanation, more fundamentally: why should the regularities in the world ever have an explanation (reg.)?. Regularity/Berkeley: through God. He could abolish the "laws of nature" tomorrow. Berkeley/Armstrong: Answering to this already means to concede the possibility. We have no guarantee that the best explanation is the best scheme. But it is informative. Arm III 120 Then all universals would only be substances in Hume’s sense: i.e. something that logically might have an independent existence. III 121 ArmstrongVsHume/ArmstronVsTooley: it is wrong to think of universals like that. Then there are problems regarding how universals are related with their particulars (part.). E.g. If a rel. between particulars a and b is something that is able to have an independent existence without a and b and any other particulars, would there not have to be at least one other relation to relate it to a and b?. And if this rel. can be uninstantiated itself (e.g. in a universe with monads!), then this rel. is just as questionable, etc. ad infinitum. (Bradley’s regress). One can avoid this only if universals are merely abstract factors of states of affairs (but real). |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
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Causal Explanation | Versus | Vollmer I 104 Causality / Hume: bare sequence - Solution: regularity, the types of events are concerned - not isolated events. - Kant / Vollmer admits that Hume is right. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Natural Laws | Armstrong, D.M. | Lewis V XII Natural Laws/Laws of Nature/LoN/Lewis: I contradict the "non-Humean lawmakers" (e.g. Armstrong): they cannot carry out their own project. Def Laws of Nature/Armstrong: thesis N is a "lawmaker relation", then it is a contingent fact, and one that does not supervene on the AvQ, which universals are in this relation N. But it is nevertheless somehow necessary that if N(F,G) there must be a Regularity, that all F"s are G"s. Lewis/Schw I 118 Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong-Theory: Thesis: laws of nature are based on fundamental relations between universals, i.e. properties. Because regularities are logically independent from local events, possible worlds can differ well in their laws of nature with the same local events: what is a mere regularity here may be a "universals" relationship there. Universals-Relationship: is fundamental and unanalyzable. It is not enough to say that there is a relationship between Fs and Gs because all Fs are Gs. That would be the Regularity theory. Schurz I 239 Law of Nature/Armstrong: Thesis: are implication relations between universals. Therefore no reference to individuals. (1983, Armstrong, Maxwell conditioning/Wilson/Schurz: (Wilson 1979)) |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
Natural Laws | Lewis, D. | V XII Natural Laws/Lewis: I contradict the "un-Humean lawmakers" (e.g. Armstrong): they cannot carry out their own project. Def Natural Laws/Armstrong: thesis: N is a "lawmaker relation", then it is a contingent fact, and one that does not supervene on the Arrangement of Qualities, which universals are in this relation N. But it is nevertheless somehow necessary that if N(F,G) there must be a Regularity, that all F"s are G"s. V 11 Thesis: then the natural laws are generalizations of what we consider particularly important - then conformity with natural laws should be important for the similarity relation between possible worlds - (> similarity metrics). |
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