Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 29 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Association Hume I 13
Association/Hume: is a natural law. - Ideas: the effect of the association of ideas has three forms: 1. General idea(similarity)
2. Procedure/Regularity (through idea of "substance" or "mode")
3. Relation: an idea draws another to itself - thereby ideas do not acquire new quality.
---
I 126f
Association/principle/Hume: Problem: 1. Association only explains the form of thought, not the content - 2. A. does not explain the individual contents of the individual - solution: the explanation lies in the circumstances of the perception - also substances, general ideas and modes require the circumstances ---
I 137f
Associations/KantVsHume/Deleuze: the "Law of Reproduction" (frequent consecutive ideas set a connection) assumes that the phenomena actually follow such a rule - (Kant pro). - There must be a reason a priori -> synthesis of the imagination - (not of the senses!). KantVsHume: his dualism (relations are outside of things ) forces him to grasp that as the accordance of subject with nature. - But this cannot be a priori, otherwise it would remain unnoticed.
---
I 154
Association/Hume: cannot Select - if the mind determined only by principles, there would be no morality.
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997
Causality Quine I 33
Causality sentences as responses to stimuli.
Graeser I 173
Causality/opportunity sentences/Quine: opportunity sentences provide us with causal hypotheses.
Quine VI 106
Causality/Quine: we have no concept of causality that is as clear as we would like it to be. When science is particularly strict, it is content with constant correlations. (>Causality/Hume).
VI 107
Disposition/Quine: this term is similar to causality in that it tolerates the substitutability of identity but blocks the predicate calculus.
V 20/21
Def Cause/Quine: cause is ultimately the effect of forces on particles which is energy transmission (>Causality/Vollmer.) Causality/Quine: I am not interested in the epistemological basis like Hume, but in the ontological nature as the subject of a scientific theory.
Even if the difference between energy and matter has been shaken in modern physics, the concept of cause is not out of place here. On a more abstract level, it simply plays no role.
V 22
Cause/Quine: the interest in partial causes is remarkably independent of the share of energy transfer. For example, we have weak sound waves during communication and strong waves during a shot.
V 23
Everyday language: "because" does not speak at all of energy transfer, but is also applied to logical premises, purposes, disposition. Disposition: is therefore often a better term than causality. >Dispositions/Quine.
XI 112
Causality/QuineVsRegularity/QuineVsHume/Lauener: For example, to what kind of events does the crying of geese on the Capitol belong and to what belongs the salvation of Rome?

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002
Causality Strawson IV 152 f
Causality/Strawson: because of different possible descriptions in reality dependent on generality - Hume was right with that - but it's also not a selection of individual descriptions
IV 157
Causality/StrawsonVsHume: he overlooks the very obvious fact that objects exert physical force - (Dennett: and that is observable) - I 162 pro Hume: you can observe many reactions without knowing what forces are at work - IV 163 VsHume: regularity is time neutral, it could also be reversed - (s) because (type-type, not type-token) - IV 165 VsHume: we learn the regularity, because we already have the concept of causality - IV 172 Strawson: the utmost we can recognize are probability laws - Causality/Language: more in transitive verbs than in the word "cause" - IV 175 Common Causes: easily possible: E.g. malaria - cause: denotes relation that occurs in different modes of being

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Causes Quine VI 106
Cause/Disposition/Quine: cause is not intensional but there is a problem: bringing nested sentences into play that are no longer dissolved by spelling. Instead of causality we assume today constant correlations and instead of dispositions one can speak also of symptoms (of fragility) - (symptom /(s): only if it is broken.)
V 19
Cause/Regularity/QuineVsHume: Problem: one can also use the two single classes consisting of a and b for regularity. Then the fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc is reached. See >Causality/Hume. Dispositions: there is the same problem here.
V 20/21
Def Cause/Quine: lastly, there is the influence of forces on particles which is energy transmission. See Causality/Vollmer.
V 22
Cause/Quine: the interest in partial causes is remarkably independent of the share of energy transfer. For example, we have weak sound waves during communication and strong sound waves during a shot.
V 23
Everyday language: "because" does not speak at all of energy transfer, but is also applied to logical premises, purposes and dispositions. Disposition: is therefore often a better term than causality. >Dispositions/Quine.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Epiphenomenalism Chalmers I 150
Epiphenomenalism/Consciousness/Chalmers: Question: when consciousness only supervenes naturally (but not logically) on the physical, there is apparently no causality involved. Then consciousness would only be a side effect and would not exist at all. (Huxley (1874) (1)) argues thus. ChalmersVs: the causal unity of our physical world looks only like epiphenomenalism.
---
I 151
VsEpiphenomenalism/Chalmers: a strategy against it would be to deny the causal unity of the physical world. We should not do that. There are better ways that assume more appropriate assumptions of metaphysics and causation. 1. Regularity-Based Causation/Chalmers: Instead of causality, we could assume Regularity with Hume. Then one could argue that the behavior itself would have been the same without phenomenological consciousness.
ChalmersVs: there are many systematic regularities between conscious experiences and later physical events, each of which leads us to conclude a causal link.
---
I 152
2. Causal overdetermination: one might assume that a physical and a phenomenal state, although completely separated, might cause a later physical state. Problem: causal redundancy. Solution: Tooley (1987) (2): we could assume an irreducible causal connection between two physical and one separate irreducible causal connection between a phenomenal and a physical state. This is a non-reducible view of causation.
ChalmersVsTooley: it is not easy to show that there is something wrong with it. I do not pursue this, but it has to be taken seriously.
3. Non-supervenience of the causation: facts about consciousness and those about causation are the only facts which do not logically supervene on certain physical facts.
Chalmers: it is quite natural to speculate as to whether these two kinds of non-supervenience have a common root.
Rosenberg: (1966) (3) has developed this. Rosenberg Thesis: Experience recognizes causation or some aspects of it. After that, causation needs recognition by someone or something.
ChalmersVsRosenberg: this is, of course, very speculative, and leads among other things to panpsychism.
---
I 153
In addition, the zombie problem would persist. 4. The intrinsic nature of the physical: thesis: a physical theory characterizes above all the relations of its entities, i.e. its propensities to interact with other elements.
Problem: what is it that causes all these relations of causation and combinations? Russell (1927) (4): This is what the physical theory is silent about.
Solution: to adopt an intrinsic nature of the physical elements.
Chalmers: the only class of such intrinsic properties would be the class of phenomenal properties.
---
I 154
There must be no panpsychism following from this. Instead, we can assume proto-phanomenal properties. ---
I 159
VsEpiphenomenalism/Chalmers: Arguments against it fall into three classes: 1. Those which concern the relations of experience to normal behavior,
2. Those which concern the relations of experience to judgments about normal behavior,
3. Those which concern the overall picture of the world, which provokes the acceptance of epiphenomenalism.
Ad 1. VsEpiphenomenalism: For example, the intuitions about why I withdraw my hand from a flame are strong, on the other hand, we can clarify these intuitions by assuming regularities. We simply perceive experiences more directly than the corresponding brain states.
Ad 2. VsEpiphenomenalism: It seems to be extremely counterintuitive that our experiences could be irrelevant to the explanation of our behavior.
---
I 160
Ad. 3. VsEpiphenomenalism: the image of the world which is drawn by it is implausible because there should be nomological appendages which are not integrated into the system of other natural laws. Epiphenomenalism/Chalmers: I do not describe my own position as epiphenomenalism. The question of the causal relevance of experience remains unanswered.



1. T. Huxley, On the hypothesis that animals are automata. In: Collected Essays, London 1987, pp. 1893-94.
2. M. Tooley, Causation: A Realist Approach, Oxford 1987
3. G. H. Rosenberg, Consciousness and causation: Clues toward a double-aspect theory, Ms Indiana Universwity, 1996.
4. B. Russell, The Analysis of Matter, London 1927

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Experience Genz II 304
Experience/Hume/Genz: thesis: their reliability (based on uniformity) cannot be theoretically justified, because again this can only by justified by experience (circular). >Reliability, >Regularity/Hume.

Gz I
H. Genz
Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999

Gz II
Henning Genz
Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002

Generality Bigelow I 232
Natural Laws/Realism/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: a Humean theory of natural laws cannot be as realistic as ours. >Humean world. Generalisation/Regularity/Hume: the Humean can be realistic with regard to generalisations.
---
I 233
"Total generality"/"pure" generality/Hume/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: may not contain a reference to an individual: It is too weak and too strong.
a) too strong: for example, Kepler's laws refer to all planets but also to an individual, the sun.
b) too weak: it is still not a law. For example, that everything moves towards the center of the earth.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Humanities Gadamer I 9
Humanities/"Geisteswissenschaften"/Tradition/Gadamer: The word "Geisteswissenschaften" has become established primarily through the translator of John Stuart Mill's logic. In his work, Mill seeks to begin by sketching the possibilities of applying induction logic to the moral sciences. The translator says humanities(1). >Humanities/Mill.
I 10
GadamerVsTradition/GadamerVsMill/GadamerVsHume/GadamerVsInduction: But now the real problem that the humanities pose to thinking is that one has not correctly grasped the essence of the humanities when one measures them by the yardstick of progressive knowledge of regularity. The experience of the social-historical world cannot be elevated to a science by the inductive method of the natural sciences.

1. J. St. Mill, System der deduktiven und induktiven Logik, übertragen von Schiel,
18632, 6. Buch »Von der Logik der Geisteswissenschaften Oder moralischen Wissen-
schaften«.

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

Individual Causation Individual causation, philosophy: theoretical problem following David Hume's contention that causation is not observable, but only to be inferred from a Regularity of repeated events. Practical problems are then inter alia, the explanation of the evolution of the universe as a whole or the emergence and extinction of species. See also universe, natural kinds, species, cause, effect, causality, causation, causal explanation, causal theory, Regularity theory.

Induction Genz II 303
Uniformity/Hume: we assume a uniformity of past and future. Physics/theory/explanation/Genz: but we assume more than mere uniformity when we explain why.
Physics also hopes for a certain outcome of experiments that have never been conducted before. Merely uniformity is not enough.
Expectation/Genz: expection is justified by an understanding of the past. It is better than Regularity. Therefore, there is no "problem of induction".
II 304
Induction/GenzVsPopper: there is no "problem of induction". Understanding is the solution rather than the acceptance of regularities. Principle/Genz: the disguised reality of the laws of nature is such that we can understand it by principles.

Gz I
H. Genz
Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999

Gz II
Henning Genz
Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002

Laws Chalmers I 86
Physical Laws/Causes/Supervenience/Reduction/Chalmers: Natural laws are not logically supervenient on the physical facts of our world with their spatio-temporal history. There could be another world, indistinguishable from our world, on which other physical laws apply. Regularity/Chalmers: on such arguments one can see that causality must be a bit above and independent of regularities (Hume's view of laws and causation: see Lewis 1986b, Mackie 1974, Skyrms 1980. VsHueme's view: Armstrong 1982, Carroll 1994, Dretske 1977, Molnar 1969, Tooley 1977)) .. Laws and causality have something irreducible.
---
I 213/214
Laws/Consciousness/Chalmers: we will need psychophysical laws to explain consciousness together with a underlying physical structure. ---
I 216
Data: we have at least data about regularities between physical processes and conscious experiences, from which we can conclude the best explanation. First Person/Chalmers: Problem: with the perspective of the first person, a number of contradictory theories are possible: e.g. Solipsism, panpsychism, etc.
---
I 308
Laws/psychophysical laws/Chalmers: some questions need to be answered: 1. If the information space is phenomenologically realized, then why in one way and not in another? E.g. With inverted Qualia?
2. Is the nature of the phenomenal information defined by the structure of space?
---
I 309
How can complex emotional experiences be explained? 4. What kind of formal structure best captures the structure of phenomenal information?
5. How can the unity of consciousness within our framework be captured?
6. What are the criteria according to which information in my brain corresponds to my conscious experiences?



1. D. Lewis, Philosophical Papers Vol II, New York 1986
2. J. L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe, Oxford 1974
3. B. Skyrms Causal Necessity, New Haven 1980
4. D. M. Armstrong, Metaphysics and supervenience, Critica 42, 1982: pp. 3-17
5. J. W. Caroll, Laws of Nature, Cambridge 1994
6. F. Dretske, Laws of Nature, Philosophy of Science 44, 1977: pp. 248-68
7. G. Molnar, Kneale's argument revisited. Oghilosophical Review 78, 1969: pp. 79-89
8. M. Tooley, The Nature of Laws. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7, 1977: pp. 667-98

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Natural Laws Armstrong III 137
Laws of Nature/LoN/Natural Laws/Science/Form/Identification/Armstrong: theoretical identification of water and H2O is not a law of nature. - Intead there are two all-quantifications on molecules and water. - Each law of nature must have double-digit form of premise-conclusion. Ontology/Armstrong: what entities exist is inextricably linked with laws of nature. - But also distinguishable from it.
III 158
Laws of nature/Armstrong: contingent - but not because they are discovered - the distinction a priori/a posteriori an epistemic one.
II (a) 17
Laws of nature/Armstrong: Laws are not true >statements of law, but >truth-makers. ArmstrongVsHume: strong LoN: contain regularities, but cannot be reduced to them (because dispositions do not always show) -
Def Natural law/Armstrong: can be identified with relations between universals (properties).
Scientific camp: realistic view: e.g., possession of a property leads to possession of another property. - Laws of nature/Armstrong: are contingent! - But the regularity seems to be contained analytically. >Regularity.

Place I 25
Law of nature/Armstrong: is a relation between categorical properties (not dispositional ones) - PlaceVsArmstrong: this smuggles modality into the laws (because the relations then have to be intentional or modal). >Modality.
III 44
Laws of nature/Armstrong: laws are no causal factors. - A law exists only when it is instantiated. - That three values ​​of volume, pressure, temperature always are connected is not because of the law! (Boyle's law is no law of nature).

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004
Natural Laws Bigelow I 113
Natural Laws/Counterfactual Conditional/Bigelow/Pargetter: are often formulated in terms of "ideal systems". To do this, they need the counterfactual conditionals. ---
I 114
Similarly, thought experiments need counterfactual conditionals. ---
I 214
Law/Antiquity/Bigelow/Pargetter: For example,"What goes up must fall". Lucrez: what consists mainly of soil or water has to move downwards. "Down" was a marked direction.
Atomism: Representative: Lucrez. Little astronomical knowledge yet.
Aristotle/Ptolemaios: believed that everything that consists mainly of earth or water moves to the center of the cosmos, and since it moves to the center of the earth, it must be the center of the cosmos.
---
I 215
Antiquity/Bigelow/Pargetter: in one respect Aristotle is closer to the truth, in other respects it is Lucrez. He was right that the center of the earth is not marked. Natural Laws/Physics/Biology/Bigelow/Pargetter: a one-sided diet with examples from physics does not necessarily lead to a correct view of the natural laws.
Instead, here are some examples from biology:
Generalization/Biology: For example, a living being has father and mother of the same species as it itself. (Today we know that this has some exceptions).
---
I 216
It was a surprise to discover that this also applies to some plants. ---
I 217
Generalization: most of them have an exception. For example, without exception: perhaps the generalization "All mammals have a mother". Exceptions/counter-examples/Bigelow/Pargetter: one should not overestimate the threat posed by exceptions to laws.
Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: we are looking for two things:
a) something that is more than Regularity, on the other hand
b) less than a Regularity without exception.
It may be that we have discovered with a law an important property of the cases that are sufficient for it, even if not all cases satisfy it.
Modal/Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: the commonalities that satisfy the law are modal.
Law/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not always need a law, for example to know that our cat is pregnant. > Generalization.
---
I 220
Laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: are improved: e.g. Aristotle - Copernicus - Newton. Copernicus: still thought that the material of the moon does not fall towards the earth, but towards the moon center. Therefore the moon is round.
Newton/(s): first explained the circular motion of the moon.
Aristotle: thesis: everything (earthly and watery) falls to a center and this is coincidentally the center of the earth.
N.B.: thus he fulfils the quasi-copernican theory!
---
I 221
VsAristotle: his theory was nevertheless wrong. But not because any movement would have been different, but because the reasoning was wrong: it is about gravity, Aristotle considered the center of the earth to be the center of the cosmos. Error: was not that Aristotle thought that no object would fall in a different direction, but because he thought that no object could fall in a different direction. (Necessity).
---
I 221
Law/Laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: are generalizations (description of regularities) plus attribution of necessity. (Dretske 1977, Tooley 1977, Armstrong 1978,1983) Bigelow/Pargetter: if they are wrong, they must be strictly wrong or empty. (Cartwright 1983, Hacking 1983).
---
I 222
Definition Laws/Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: are truths about Possibilia. Understanding/Bigelow/Pargetter: Actualia cannot be fully understood without understanding Possibilia. ((s) Here understanding is associated with objects, not sentences.)
Possible Worlds/Understanding/Bigelow/Pargetter: we understand the actual world only by locating it in the logical space of possible worlds.
Natural Law/NG/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: cannot be adequately described in a non-modal language. Because a natural law is not just a Regularity.
Logical form: i.e. a natural law cannot be merely defined as
(x)(Fx > Gx).
Logical form: of a natural law will often be a universal generalization (UG). But it can also be another generalization or other form of sentence. We assume, however, that natural laws (UG) will be involved and therefore have the following form:
---
I 223
natN (x)(Fx > Gx). Natural necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: entails that natural laws involve counterfactual conditionals. Because they are about what would happen, not just what already happens. And even if things were different in certain respects.
I.e. in addition to Regularity
(x)(Fx > Gx)
it will be true that every F would be a G ((s) Logic of 2nd level!)
Logical form/(s) counterfactual conditional instead of quantification of 2nd level:
(x) Fx would be > would be Gx)
we take this together as a truthmaker of the proposition
natN (x)(Fx > Gx). (see above)
Natural Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: this is the view of natural laws that we defend.
LewisVsBigelow: (1979) the theory is circular.
---
I 226
Non-modal Theory/Natural Laws/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: (instead of relative necessity:) most non-modal theories of natural law are derived from Hume. Then we can accept nomic necessity as a relative necessity, without falling into a circle. N.B.: then we can simply accept nomic necessity as a relative necessity and rely on it being based on independent access to laws!
Explanation: so it makes sense to use laws to explain nomic necessity rather than vice versa. And this is much less obscure than modal arguments.
---
I 227
BigelowVsVs: modal explanations are not so mysterious. BigelowVsHume: Humean theories are not able to explain these non-modal properties of the laws, they have less explanatory power.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Natural Laws Place Armstrong III 137
Laws of Nature/LoN/Natural Laws/Science/Form/Identification/Armstrong: theoretical identification of water and H2O is not a law of nature. - Intead there are two all-quantifications on molecules and water. - Each law of nature must have double-digit form of premise-conclusion. Ontology/Armstrong: what entities exist is inextricably linked with laws of nature. - But also distinguishable from it.
III 158
Laws of nature/Armstrong: contingent - but not because they are discovered - the distinction a priori/a posteriori an epistemic one.
Armstrong II (a) 17
Laws of nature/Armstrong: Laws are not true >statements of law, but >truth-makers. ArmstrongVsHume: strong LoN: contain regularities, but cannot be reduced to them (because dispositions do not always show) -
Def Natural law/Armstrong: can be identified with relations between universals (properties).
Scientific camp: realistic view: e.g., possession of a property leads to possession of another property. - Laws of nature/Armstrong: are contingent! - But the regularity seems to be contained analytically. >Regularity.

Place I 25
Law of nature/Armstrong: is a relation between categorical properties (not dispositional ones) - PlaceVsArmstrong: this smuggles modality into the laws (because the relations then have to be intentional or modal). >Modality.
Armstrong III 44
Laws of nature/Armstrong: laws are no causal factors. - A law exists only when it is instantiated. - That three values ​​of volume, pressure, temperature always are connected is not because of the law! (Boyle's law is no law of nature).

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004


Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Object Davidson I (b) 16 ff
Thought/Knowledge/DavidsonVsHume: there are infinitely many properties, so ignorance of the imagined objects is possible Hume/Descartes: ... it is necessary to find objects for which mistakes are impossible. As objects that are necessary what they seem to be.
DavidsonVsDescartes: Such objects simply do not exist. Not even appearances are all what they seem to be. Also, the aspects of sense data cannot be protected against misidentification, insofar as they are real objects.
We must drop the idea that there are inner objects or mental images in the required sense.
No "internal objects", no "uninterpreted given", "no stream" within a schema (VsSchema/content). >Scheme/Content, >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mentalism.

Frank I 678
Objects/Putnam/Fodor: a) "true inward", "in front of the mind", "conceived" by him - b) those who identify thoughts in the usual way. (external) - Davidson: I agree that there are no objects that serve both purposes - ((s) not an excellent class). - Putnam: the two cannot coincide, because otherwise the mind could not be deceived. Ideas/impressions/Hume: "are as it seems and seem as it is" - DavidsonVsHume: such objects do not exist - neither abstract nor concrete, neither public nor private. Even propositions do not exist - there is no object that would satisfy the dual function to be in front of the mind and also to determine the content of the thought - otherwise one could not be deceived. - meaning depends on the types of objects and events which have caused the person acausally to take the words as applicable. But the agent cannot ask himself/herself whether he/she regularly applies them correctly, because his/her regularity gives them importance. - Thus, authority of the first person and social character go hand in hand. >First Person.


Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and
Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Properties Armstrong III 12
Properties/Armstrong: properties are always non-local! - E.g. "living in Australia" is not a property. - Relational properties may not be local either! ((s) Cf. >Properties/Chisholm).
III 14
Individuation/Individual/particulars/properties/Armstrong: It is likely that for every particular there is least one individuating conjunction of properties. - E.g. no property: "being one light-second away from proton A". - But: E.g. this is a property: "being one light-second away from a proton" would be correct. ((s) Generality).
III 83
Properties/Armstrong: properties are strictly identical in all different instantiations (universals) - therefore they are not all arbitrary predicates. Pseudo-property: self-identity (not a universal). - Identity lends no causal or nomic force. >Identity.
III 114f
Properties/Armstrong: the state N(F,G) is also a 1st order relation. - If E.g. "to be a mass" is a property of properties, then "the property of 1 Kg to be a mass" will be a second order state (M(K) and this will, for reasons of symmetry, also be a 1st order property that is applied to 1st order particulars, just like this weight. >Laws/Armstrong, >Natural laws/Armstrong. VsRealism of Properties/VsProperty realism: there is a risk of duplication and intermediate elements. - Armstrong late: skeptically Vs "property of being a mass".
III 141
Properties/Armstrong: a "property of being a property" is not desirable. - At least it is not a second order Humean regularity, - But it is used by Tooley when he assumes a universal law as second order law about laws. >Tooley.
III 145
Solution/Armstrong: We should rather introduce new properties than new laws.
III 163ff
Properties/Armstrong: if they are essential, then only in relation to a conceptual scheme. >Conceptual schemes.
II 5
Properties/Armstrong: categorical property = non-dispositional property. - But many properties are actually dispositional, E.g. "hard" as well as "flexible". - But dispositional properties cannot be reduced to categorical properties. >Dispositions/Armstrong.
II (c) 96
Properties/Categorical/Dispositional/Armstrong: there is a asymmetry between categorical/dispositional: dispositional properties require categorical properties in a way, in which categorical properties do not need dispositions. - It is possible that in a possible world things have only categorical properties without dispositional side. - According to Martin that would be a "lazy" world, because there would be no causality.
II (c) 102
MartinVsArmstrong: A world does not have to be so "busy" that every disposition would be manifested. (> 77 II)
II (c) 97
Properties/Nominalism/Martin/Place: properties are individuals! - Therefore there is no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same". ArmstrongVs: 1st that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! >Regularity.
ArmstrongVs: 2md Per universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "The identical causes the identical".

Martin III 168
Composition Model/Martin: Thesis: We should assume properties instead of parts. - The complex properties and dispositions and relations of the whole are composed of the simpler properties and relations and dispositions of the parts.
Martin III 169
Properties/Martin: Thesis: whatever the ultimate constituents (properties) of the nature should be, they are no purely qualitative properties or pure acts like any macroscopic or structural properties. ((s) Talking about "whatever" leads to the assumption of "roles", e.g. "causal role", >functional role" etc. Example "whatever plays the causal role of pain..."). Martin: The properties of merely assumed particles must be capable of more than is manifested. ((s) Cf. >Hidden parameters).

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Properties Place Armstrong III 12
Properties/Armstrong: properties are always non-local! - E.g. "living in Australia" is not a property. - Relational properties may not be local either! ((s) Cf. >Properties/Chisholm).
Armstrong III 14
Individuation/Individual/particulars/properties/Armstrong: It is likely that for every particular there is least one individuating conjunction of properties. - E.g. no property: "being one light-second away from proton A". - But: E.g. this is a property: "being one light-second away from a proton" would be correct. ((s) Generality).
Armstrong III 83
Properties/Armstrong: properties are strictly identical in all different instantiations (universals) - therefore they are not all arbitrary predicates. Pseudo-property: self-identity (not a universal). - Identity lends no causal or nomic force. >Identity.
Armstrong III 114f
Properties/Armstrong: the state N(F,G) is also a 1st order relation. - If E.g. "to be a mass" is a property of properties, then "the property of 1 Kg to be a mass" will be a second order state (M(K) and this will, for reasons of symmetry, also be a 1st order property that is applied to 1st order particulars, just like this weight. >Laws/Armstrong, >Natural laws/Armstrong. VsRealism of Properties/VsProperty realism: there is a risk of duplication and intermediate elements. - Armstrong late: skeptically Vs "property of being a mass".
Armstrong III 141
Properties/Armstrong: a "property of being a property" is not desirable. - At least it is not a second order Humean regularity, - But it is used by Tooley when he assumes a universal law as second order law about laws. >Tooley.
Armstrong III 145
Solution/Armstrong: We should rather introduce new properties than new laws.
Armstrong III 163ff
Properties/Armstrong: if they are essential, then only in relation to a conceptual scheme. >Conceptual schemes.
Armstrong II 5
Properties/Armstrong: categorical property = non-dispositional property. - But many properties are actually dispositional, E.g. "hard" as well as "flexible". - But dispositional properties cannot be reduced to categorical properties. >Dispositions/Armstrong.
Armstrong II (c) 96
Properties/Categorical/Dispositional/Armstrong: there is a asymmetry between categorical/dispositional: dispositional properties require categorical properties in a way, in which categorical properties do not need dispositions. - It is possible that in a possible world things have only categorical properties without dispositional side. - According to Martin that would be a "lazy" world, because there would be no causality.
Armstrong II (c) 102
MartinVsArmstrong: A world does not have to be so "busy" that every disposition would be manifested. (> 77 II)
Armstrong II (c) 97
Properties/Nominalism/Martin/Place: properties are individuals! - Therefore there is no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same". ArmstrongVs: 1st that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! >Regularity.
ArmstrongVs: 2md Per universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "The identical causes the identical".

Martin III 168
Composition Model/Martin: Thesis: We should assume properties instead of parts. - The complex properties and dispositions and relations of the whole are composed of the simpler properties and relations and dispositions of the parts.
Martin III 169
Properties/Martin: Thesis: whatever the ultimate constituents (properties) of the nature should be, they are no purely qualitative properties or pure acts like any macroscopic or structural properties. ((s) Talking about "whatever" leads to the assumption of "roles", e.g. "causal role", >functional role" etc. Example "whatever plays the causal role of pain..."). Martin: The properties of merely assumed particles must be capable of more than is manifested. ((s) Cf. >Hidden parameters).

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004


Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Properties Martin Armstrong III 12
Properties/Armstrong: properties are always non-local! - E.g. "living in Australia" is not a property. - Relational properties may not be local either! ((s) Cf. >Properties/Chisholm).
Armstrong III 14
Individuation/Individual/particulars/properties/Armstrong: It is likely that for every particular there is least one individuating conjunction of properties. - E.g. no property: "being one light-second away from proton A". - But: E.g. this is a property: "being one light-second away from a proton" would be correct. ((s) Generality).
Armstrong III 83
Properties/Armstrong: properties are strictly identical in all different instantiations (universals) - therefore they are not all arbitrary predicates. Pseudo-property: self-identity (not a universal). - Identity lends no causal or nomic force. >Identity.
Armstrong III 114f
Properties/Armstrong: the state N(F,G) is also a 1st order relation. - If E.g. "to be a mass" is a property of properties, then "the property of 1 Kg to be a mass" will be a second order state (M(K) and this will, for reasons of symmetry, also be a 1st order property that is applied to 1st order particulars, just like this weight. >Laws/Armstrong, >Natural laws/Armstrong. VsRealism of Properties/VsProperty realism: there is a risk of duplication and intermediate elements. - Armstrong late: skeptically Vs "property of being a mass".
Armstrong III 141
Properties/Armstrong: a "property of being a property" is not desirable. - At least it is not a second order Humean regularity, - But it is used by Tooley when he assumes a universal law as second order law about laws. >Tooley.
Armstrong III 145
Solution/Armstrong: We should rather introduce new properties than new laws.
Armstrong III 163ff
Properties/Armstrong: if they are essential, then only in relation to a conceptual scheme. >Conceptual schemes.
Armstrong II 5
Properties/Armstrong: categorical property = non-dispositional property. - But many properties are actually dispositional, E.g. "hard" as well as "flexible". - But dispositional properties cannot be reduced to categorical properties. >Dispositions/Armstrong.
Armstrong II (c) 96
Properties/Categorical/Dispositional/Armstrong: there is a asymmetry between categorical/dispositional: dispositional properties require categorical properties in a way, in which categorical properties do not need dispositions. - It is possible that in a possible world things have only categorical properties without dispositional side. - According to Martin that would be a "lazy" world, because there would be no causality.
Armstrong II (c) 102
MartinVsArmstrong: A world does not have to be so "busy" that every disposition would be manifested. (> 77 II)
Armstrong II (c) 97
Properties/Nominalism/Martin/Place: properties are individuals! - Therefore there is no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same". ArmstrongVs: 1st that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! >Regularity.
ArmstrongVs: 2md Per universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "The identical causes the identical".

Martin III 168
Composition Model/Martin: Thesis: We should assume properties instead of parts. - The complex properties and dispositions and relations of the whole are composed of the simpler properties and relations and dispositions of the parts.
Martin III 169
Properties/Martin: Thesis: whatever the ultimate constituents (properties) of the nature should be, they are no purely qualitative properties or pure acts like any macroscopic or structural properties. ((s) Talking about "whatever" leads to the assumption of "roles", e.g. "causal role", >functional role" etc. Example "whatever plays the causal role of pain..."). Martin: The properties of merely assumed particles must be capable of more than is manifested. ((s) Cf. >Hidden parameters).

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010


Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Regularities Armstrong II (c) 42ff
ArmstrongVsHume/ArmstrongVsRegularity: 1) it is impossible to distinguish Regularity from coincidence because of laws of nature (LoN): E.g. every ball of uranium is smaller than 1 km, so is every ball of gold, but the latter by coincidence.
2) Laws of nature support counterfactual conditionals - regularities do not.
3) Regularity theory turns induction into an irrational procedure.
4) Probability: Problem: every connection of F"s and G"s can exist due to a merely probable law: although the distribution is manifestation of the law of nature, it is not identical with it.
Solution: natural laws: connection of types of states.
Solution: ad 1: properties instead of regularities: properties of the gold/Uranium.
ad 2: universals make the number of instantiations irrelevant (unequal Regularity).
ad 3: universals turn induction into abduction (conclusion to the best explanation).
ad 4: Relations between properties (universals) can occur in different strength, then deterministic laws of nature are a borderline case.
II (c) 45
Regularity/Tooley: regularity is molecular fact: conjunction: This F is a G and this...and... In contrast to that: law of nature as a link between properties (universals): leeds to atomic facts: the number of instances irrelevant.
>Armstrong: this is a solution for non-actual situations as truth makers of counterfactual conditionals. >Counterfactual conditionals, >Truthmakers, >Regularity Theory, >Natural Laws, >Facts.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Regularities Chisholm II 42/43
Regularity of the world/Hume: both the belief in a uniform and in a non-uniform world (in which the predictions fail) refer to a contingent state of affairs of reality - hence no logical proof - empiricism, in turn, requires regularity - for the regularity thesis itself it can never be ascertained whether it leads to success or failure - Rutte: one who believes in universal regularity must proceed through guessing who guesses does not believe in regularities but in a method for success! Contradiction.
II 45
Regularity of the world/Rutte: a belief in it should be maintained - but a transition to it is not methodologically justifiable.

Rutte, Heiner. Mitteilungen über Wahrheit und Basis empirischer Erkenntnis, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Wahrnehmungs- und Außenweltproblems. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Regularities Lewis II 198
Regularity: there is always an alternative regularity that could have fulfilled the same function if the whole process had only started differently.
II 224
Regularity/Lewis: rules of syntax and semantics are not even regularities.
II 234
Communication depends not only on truthfulness, but also on principles of usefulness and relevance. However, these regularities are not independent language conventions. They are by-products.
V XI
Natural Laws/Lewis: at least they are regularities without exception. Not all regularities are laws, of course. Def Natural Laws/Ramsey: Laws are those that enter into the truth systems (buy into) that are unsurpassed in severity and simplicity. This is enough for the Humean Supervenience.
Simplicity/Lewis: what is simple is certainly not contingent. And the regularities (or candidates for truth systems) are supervised on the arrangement of qualities.

V XIII
Probability/Lewis: Probabilities are in play from the beginning. If Ramsey says that laws are regularities that enter into the best systems, the question is: what kind of systems?

V 70
Zeit/Lewis: in the life of ordinary people there is a regularity: For example, hair grows, relative to the external time. Time traveller: no Regularity at external time, but there is a way of assigning coordinates to his or her travel stages and only one, so that the regularities, as they correspond to his or her attribution, match with those normally assumed in relation to external time:
This is the personal time of the time traveler: for example his hair grows, etc. but it is not really time, it only plays the same role in his life as the role it plays in the life of a normal person. (functional, not operational).

V 122
Law/natural law/Lewis: this is a kind of regularity theory of lawfulness, but a collective and selective one at the same time: collective: because regularities do not acquire their status as a law from themselves, but through a system within which they are either axioms or theorems,
selective: because not every Regularity is worthy of being called a law.
Laws should have at least the following characteristics (based on chance).
V 123
(1) Simplicity, rigour and their balance can only be determined in the light of competing hypotheses. But I don't want to make lawfulness dependent on the kind of access. Nevertheless, our laws would be different if our approach were different, at least in the sense that we can keep our standards fixed and ask what the laws would be like in counterfactual situations. (2) With this approach, it is not possible to say whether certain generalisations are lawful, whether they are true or false, and whether the laws are the true lawful ones.
Three possibilities: something can be wrong, randomly true, or lawfully true.
(3) I do not say that the competing systems of truths must consist entirely of regularities. Nevertheless, the regularities in the best systems should be laws.
Laws: should not mention indiviuals, not even the Big Bang, but such laws should not be excluded a priori.
(4) Simplicity: in order to be able to compare them, we must not allow our theories to be simply formulated with particularly trivial terms.
V 124
This means that the theory must not make all properties the same! Really simple systems may only be called those that integrate real natural characteristics as simply as possible. But then it is also useless to say that natural properties are those which occur in laws ((s) that would be circulatory).
(5) What about a Regularity that occurs in some but not all systems? Three options:
1. it is not a law, (you can take the average)
2. it is a law (association),
3. It is uncertain whether it is a law.
Lewis pro 1, but I hope that nature is kind enough to show us the right system in the end.
I also hope that some systems are completely out of the question. Then it will not matter whether the standards themselves are unfounded.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Regularities Quine V 19
Cause/Regularity/QuineVsHume: Problem: you can also use the two unit classes consisting of a and b for regularity. Then one succumbs to the fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc. See Causality/Hume. Dispositions: here there is the same problem.
XI 112
Causality/QuineVsRegularity/QuineVsHume/Lauener: For example, to what kind of events does the crying of geese on the Capitol and to what belongs the salvation of Rome?

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Regularities Tooley Armstrong II (c) 42ff
ArmstrongVsHume/ArmstrongVsRegularity: 1) it is impossible to distinguish Regularity from coincidence because of laws of nature (LoN): E.g. every ball of uranium is smaller than 1 km, so is every ball of gold, but the latter by coincidence.
2) Laws of nature support counterfactual conditionals - regularities do not.
3) Regularity theory turns induction into an irrational procedure.
4) Probability: Problem: every connection of F"s and G"s can exist due to a merely probable law: although the distribution is manifestation of the law of nature, it is not identical with it.
Solution: natural laws: connection of types of states.
Solution: ad 1: properties instead of regularities: properties of the gold/Uranium.
ad 2: universals make the number of instantiations irrelevant (unequal Regularity).
ad 3: universals turn induction into abduction (conclusion to the best explanation).
ad 4: Relations between properties (universals) can occur in different strength, then deterministic laws of nature are a borderline case.
Armstrong II (c) 45
Regularity/Tooley: regularity is molecular fact: conjunction: This F is a G and this...and... In contrast to that: law of nature as a link between properties (universals): leeds to atomic facts: the number of instances irrelevant.
>Armstrong: this is a solution for non-actual situations as truth makers of counterfactual conditionals. >Counterfactual conditionals, >Truthmakers, >Regularity Theory, >Natural Laws, >Facts.

Tooley I
M. Tooley
Time, Tense, And Causation Oxford 2000

Regularity Theory Regularity Theory, philosophy: is an expression for the thesis that in reference to causality one can determine nothing more than the Regularity of previous cases, which, however, can be extended to future cases. The main representative of Regularity theory, D. Hume, formalizes the connection between cause and effect on relations between types of events rather than relations between individual events. See also causality, law of nature, effect, cause.

Skepticism Hume Stegmüller VI 3ff
Skepticism / Hume / Stegmüller: "implicit": only in terms of necessity - this is also shared by Wittgenstein -> "skeptical solution" / Hume: "the problem does not exists" or regularity, types instead particulars - "radical" skepticism / hyper skepticism: there is no fact which decides what we mean, and therefore none that underlies our meaningful speech or mathematical knowledge (WittgensteinVs) - Wittgenstein: question: 1st what is the fact that I follow this rule ? - 2nd that I mean something specific when using a word? - 3rd that I Have acquired a term?
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Truthmakers Armstrong Place I 21
Truth Maker/Armstrong: Problem: counterfactual conditionals point to something that does not exist: "counterfactual state" is therefore no truth maker. - There are no counterfactual states - ((s) see below: but there are counterfactual facts (as assumptions). >Counterfactual conditionals.
Place II 66
Truth Maker/Counterfactual Conditional/Place: the truthmaker is a special disposition, finite. (Like Goodman, nominalist). ArmstrongVsPlace:the truthmaker is a law, infinite.

II (c) 92
Truth Maker/Armstrong: truthmakers are also necessary for the true attribution of unmanifested dispositions - but non-dispositional properties plus laws of nature are sufficient. - E.g., two non-occurring, equally likely events: here there is no fact as truthmaker. Same case: E.g.s distant elementary particles that never react would behave idiosyncratically: no truth maker, no certain way. Nevertheless: a counterfactual conditional applies: if they had come together, they would have behaved idiosyncratic.
II (c) 99
Laws/Armstrong: Laws are truth makers for law statements. - Atomic state: higher order relation between universals; the number of instantiation is irrelevant. All are identical, therefore F is deducible from a: a is G. Hume: molecular state: Regularity.
Armstrong: here, these many cases only extend the law and do not justify deduction from the unobserved.

Place III 121
Truth Maker/Armstrong: a single law of nature G makes a universal law statement true and covers all instantiations - PlaceVsArmstrong: individual truth makers necessary.
Place IV 156
Truth Maker/Place: it is tempting to assume that the state which makes the counterfactual conditional true is the same which makes the causal law statement true from which it is epistemically derived. - (Vs"counterfactual facts"). PlaceVs, Vs"general facts" - VsArmstrong , VsThought-Independent Laws of Nature as Truth Makers -> II 176

Martin III 175f
Truth maker/MartinVsArmstrong: it is still unclear whether his invocation of laws is strong enough to provide the full ontological weight as truth maker for the solvability of salt that was not put in water.
Martin III 176
Whatever laws he quotes, they seem to be wrong for the situation, namely solely for the situation of the compound, i.e. the actual manifestation.
II 182 f
Absence/Lack/Holes/MartinVsLewis: absence actually is a suitable truth maker: a state. Problem: a state is merely "general fact" (Russell) (>general term).
David Lewis: "as it is", "how things are" must not simply cover everything that is fulfilled by things, otherwise it is trivial.
Solution/Lewis: truth supervenes on what things there are and what properties and relations they instantiate.
MartinVsLewis: "The way the universe is" is a general term, but still 1st order!
Solution/Martin: reciprocal disposition partnes for mutual manifestation.
Existence theorem/Martin: whether positive or negative: the world is at the other end and not in vain.


Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Truthmakers Place Place I 21
Truth Maker/Armstrong: Problem: counterfactual conditionals point to something that does not exist: "counterfactual state" is therefore no truth maker. - There are no counterfactual states - ((s) see below: but there are counterfactual facts (as assumptions). >Counterfactual conditionals.
Place II 66
Truth Maker/Counterfactual Conditional/Place: the truthmaker is a special disposition, finite. (Like Goodman, nominalist). ArmstrongVsPlace:the truthmaker is a law, infinite.

Armstrong II (c) 92
Truth Maker/Armstrong: truthmakers are also necessary for the true attribution of unmanifested dispositions - but non-dispositional properties plus laws of nature are sufficient. - E.g., two non-occurring, equally likely events: here there is no fact as truthmaker. Same case: E.g.s distant elementary particles that never react would behave idiosyncratically: no truth maker, no certain way. Nevertheless: a counterfactual conditional applies: if they had come together, they would have behaved idiosyncratic.
II (c) 99
Laws/Armstrong: Laws are truth makers for law statements. - Atomic state: higher order relation between universals; the number of instantiation is irrelevant. All are identical, therefore F is deducible from a: a is G. Hume: molecular state: Regularity.
Armstrong: here, these many cases only extend the law and do not justify deduction from the unobserved.

Place III 121
Truth Maker/Armstrong: a single law of nature G makes a universal law statement true and covers all instantiations - PlaceVsArmstrong: individual truth makers necessary.
Place IV 156
Truth Maker/Place: it is tempting to assume that the state which makes the counterfactual conditional true is the same which makes the causal law statement true from which it is epistemically derived. - (Vs"counterfactual facts"). PlaceVs, Vs"general facts" - VsArmstrong , VsThought-Independent Laws of Nature as Truth Makers -> II 176

Martin III 175f
Truth maker/MartinVsArmstrong: it is still unclear whether his invocation of laws is strong enough to provide the full ontological weight as truth maker for the solvability of salt that was not put in water.
Martin III 176
Whatever laws he quotes, they seem to be wrong for the situation, namely solely for the situation of the compound, i.e. the actual manifestation.
Armstrong II 182 f
Absence/Lack/Holes/MartinVsLewis: absence actually is a suitable truth maker: a state. Problem: a state is merely "general fact" (Russell) (>general term).
David Lewis: "as it is", "how things are" must not simply cover everything that is fulfilled by things, otherwise it is trivial.
Solution/Lewis: truth supervenes on what things there are and what properties and relations they instantiate.
MartinVsLewis: "The way the universe is" is a general term, but still 1st order!
Solution/Martin: reciprocal disposition partnes for mutual manifestation.
Existence theorem/Martin: whether positive or negative: the world is at the other end and not in vain.

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004


Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Truthmakers Martin Place I 21
Truth Maker/Armstrong: Problem: counterfactual conditionals point to something that does not exist: "counterfactual state" is therefore no truth maker. - There are no counterfactual states - ((s) see below: but there are counterfactual facts (as assumptions). >Counterfactual conditionals.
Place II 66
Truth Maker/Counterfactual Conditional/Place: the truthmaker is a special disposition, finite. (Like Goodman, nominalist). ArmstrongVsPlace:the truthmaker is a law, infinite.

Armstrong II (c) 92
Truth Maker/Armstrong: truthmakers are also necessary for the true attribution of unmanifested dispositions - but non-dispositional properties plus laws of nature are sufficient. - E.g., two non-occurring, equally likely events: here there is no fact as truthmaker. Same case: E.g.s distant elementary particles that never react would behave idiosyncratically: no truth maker, no certain way. Nevertheless: a counterfactual conditional applies: if they had come together, they would have behaved idiosyncratic.
Armstrong II (c) 99
Laws/Armstrong: Laws are truth makers for law statements. - Atomic state: higher order relation between universals; the number of instantiation is irrelevant. All are identical, therefore F is deducible from a: a is G. Hume: molecular state: Regularity.
Armstrong: here, these many cases only extend the law and do not justify deduction from the unobserved.

Place III 121
Truth Maker/Armstrong: a single law of nature G makes a universal law statement true and covers all instantiations - PlaceVsArmstrong: individual truth makers necessary.
Place IV 156
Truth Maker/Place: it is tempting to assume that the state which makes the counterfactual conditional true is the same which makes the causal law statement true from which it is epistemically derived. - (Vs"counterfactual facts"). PlaceVs, Vs"general facts" - VsArmstrong , VsThought-Independent Laws of Nature as Truth Makers -> II 176

Martin III 175f
Truth maker/MartinVsArmstrong: it is still unclear whether his invocation of laws is strong enough to provide the full ontological weight as truth maker for the solvability of salt that was not put in water.
Martin III 176
Whatever laws he quotes, they seem to be wrong for the situation, namely solely for the situation of the compound, i.e. the actual manifestation.
II 182 f
Absence/Lack/Holes/MartinVsLewis: absence actually is a suitable truth maker: a state. Problem: a state is merely "general fact" (Russell) (>general term).
David Lewis: "as it is", "how things are" must not simply cover everything that is fulfilled by things, otherwise it is trivial.
Solution/Lewis: truth supervenes on what things there are and what properties and relations they instantiate.
MartinVsLewis: "The way the universe is" is a general term, but still 1st order!
Solution/Martin: reciprocal disposition partnes for mutual manifestation.
Existence theorem/Martin: whether positive or negative: the world is at the other end and not in vain.

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010


Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004
Verification (Confirmation) Armstrong III 42/43
Confirmation/Armstrong: confirmation of all G's are F: the refutation of the converse (a)Ga & Fa through ~Fa & Ga is no confirmation of the law. Tooley: from "it is a law that Fs are Gs" to "it is a law that ~Gs are ~Fs"?
Armstrong: only: "It is the case...": there are no negative universals. - Still, the law is an explanation of the observation of instances of the counter position.
Confirmation/Dretske: is a converse of an explanation.
III 46
Conjunction of two properties is only in positive cases a confirmation of the law - negative cases: merely confirmation of a Humean regularity. I.e. a consequence of the law, but not the law itself.
III 102
Confirmation/Armstrong: not a circle: if the law applies, the observation is explained. - Therefore, the observation confirms the existence of the law. Problem: ~ G"s that are ~F"s. (see above). - It is unclear whether they have confirmation power - Proposal: we could assume 2nd order confirmation.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


The author or concept searched is found in the following 18 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Armstrong, D. Lewis Vs Armstrong, D. V 353
"New Work for a Theory of Universals" (Armstrong 1983)(1) Universals/Armstrong: His theory of U. is supposed to be the solution for the problem of the One and the Many. >Universals/Armstrong, >universals/Lewis.
LewisVsArmstrong: But it allows for either nominalist solutions or for no solution of any kind.

Schwarz I 71
Combinatorialism/Armstrong: Merely consists of several fundamental properties for which - contrary to colours- any combination should be possible(1986(2),§7). LewisVs: 1986a(3),86, HellerVs (1998)(4): It is unclear whether this is actually possible. LewisVsArmstrong: As such the problem is not solved, it only allows different interpretations of the descriptions: When does a set of sentences represent the fact that there are donkeys if there is no mention of donkeys? It does represent this fact if the sentences imply the existence of donkeys (1986e(5), 150 157).
Problem: Modality is required.
VsVs: It could be stated that the relationship between the distribution of fundamental properties and of all other truths is analytic, and can be characterized without requiring primitive modal vocabulary. (2002b(6), Heller 1996, see below Chapter 11. (LewisVs: 1992a(8),209).

Schwarz I 118
Laws of Nature/LoN/DretskeVsLewis/TooleyVsLewis/ArmstrongVsLewis: There is something missing in Lewis’ LoN: For Lewis, laws of nature are simple regularities. But they should be more than that. Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong-Theory: Thesis: laws of nature are based on fundamental relations between universals, therefore properties. Since regularities are logically independent from local events, possible worlds with precisely the same local events can nicely differ in their laws of nature. For one world, it may be a Regularity, for the other, a relation of universals.
Relation of Universals: is the foundation for everything and cannot be analyzed. To state that there is a relation between F's and G's because all F's are G's is not enough. This would be the Regularity theory.
SchwarzVs: This leads to problems with not instantiated universals (Mellor 1980(9), §6).
Laws of Nature/LewisVsArmstrong/LewisVsTooley/LewisVsDretske: If laws of nature express fundamental relations between universals which are logically independent from observable regularities why do we assume that physics will tell us something about laws of nature?
Schwarz I 119
What is the use of universals? Physicists only want to observe regularities. And what is then the relation between universals and regularities? Additional explanations will then be needed! How could a rule-maker exclude that N(F,G) is valid, but some F's are nevertheless not G's. It is not resolved by giving a name to the "rule-maker" like Armstrong does with the term "necessitation". NG/LewisVsArmstrong: Better: Regularities which are justified because of a primitive relation between universals. It is a relationship which also exists in poss.w. in which NG is not valid. It is rather more obscure, but at least not a miracle anymore that all F's are G's if a LoN demands it.
Schwarz I 124
Probability/LewisVsArmstrong: Vs fundamental probability- Property. Fundamental properties cannot fulfill the role which we attribute to probability.
Schwarz I 139
Cause/Causation/Armstrong: Absence is not a real cause. LewisVsArmstrong: Yes, it is. However, it is so common that is it ignored - Problem: Numerous absences in vacuum.
Schwarz I 140
Solution/Lewis: Absences are absolutely nothing, there is nothing. Problem: If absence is only empty space-time region, why would oxygen - and not nitrogen- only exist because of absence? > Solution/Lewis: "Influence", small increase of probability –
I 141
counterfactual dependence as well between the how, when and where of the event.
Schwarz I 231
Def Principle of truth-maker/To make truth/Armstrong/Martin/Schwarz: All truths must be based on the ontology. Strong form: For each truth, there is something that makes it true. Its existence necessarily implies the truth. LewisVsArmstrong: That is too strong, e.g. the example "no unicorns exist" is true, not because there is something specific, but because unicorns really do not exist. (1992a(8),204, 2001b(10),611f).
Truthmaker: Would be an object here which only exists in worlds in which there are no unicorns. Problem: Why is it not possible for this object to also exist in worlds in which there are unicorns? Answer: Such an object would be a contradiction to the principle of recombination.
SchwarzVsLewis: But this is not true: the truth-maker for "no unicorns exist" could be an object which essentially lives in a poss.w. without unicorns. However, the object could very well have duplicates in the poss.w. with unicorns. The counterpart relation is not a relation of intrinsic resemblance.
To make truth/Predicate/Armstrong/Schwarz: (Armstrong 1997(11),205f): If object A has the property F, an object must exist which implies the existence of this fact.
LewisVsArmstrong: Why can this object not exist, although A is not F?(1998b)(12). If A is F in one world, but it is not so in the other world, why is it always necessary to have something that exists in one poss.w., but is missing in the other world: Two poss.w. are only different on the grounds of the characteristics the objects have in their worlds.
((s) So different characteristics in an area that remains constant).
Characteristics/Truth-maker/Lewis: A truth-maker is not needed for something that has a (basic) characteristic: The sentence "A is F" is true because A has the characteristic F. That is all. (1998b(12), 219).
Def Principle of truth-maker/LewisVsArmstrong/Schwarz: Only the following will then remain: Truth supervenes upon the things that exist, and upon perfect natural characteristics which it chooses to instantiate.(1992a(8),207,1994a(13),225, Bigelow 1988(14), §25).
Whenever two possibilities are different from each other, there are either different objects in them or this objects have different fundamental characteristics.(1992a(8),206, 2001b(10),§4).
Schwarz I 232
N.B.: If there are possibilities that are qualitatively indistinguishable, but numerically different(which Lewis neither states nor denies, 1986e(5),224), the principle must be limited to qualitative truths or characteristics (1992a(8), 206f). If there are none, simplification is possible: No other two possibilities are exactly the same regarding which objects exist as well as the fundamental characteristics are instantiated.((s) If the distribution of fundamental characteristics sets everything, then the objects are set as well. As such, the poss.w. are only different regarding their characteristics, but these are naturally then set.) Schwarz: This can be amplified.


1. D. M. Armstrong [1983]: What is a Law of Nature?. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
2. D. M. Armstrong [1986]: “The Nature of Possibility”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 16: 575–594
3. D. Lewis [1986a]: “Against Structural Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64: 25–46.
4. Mark Heller [1998]: “Property Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds”. Journal of Philosophy, 95: 293–316
5. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell
6. D. Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97
7. Mark Heller [1996]: “Ersatz Worlds and Ontological Disagreement”. Acta Analytica, 40:
35–44
8.D. Lewis [1992a]: “Critical Notice of Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility”. Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, 70: 211–224. In [Lewis 1999a] als “Armstrong on Combinatorial Possibility”
9. David H. Mellor [1980]: “Necessities and universals in natural laws”. In David H. Mellor
(Hg.) Science, belief and behaviour, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
10. D. Lewis [2001b]: “Truthmaking and Difference-Making”. Noˆus, 35: 602–615
11. D. M. [1997]: A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
12. D. Lewis [1998b]: “A World of Truthmakers?” Times Literary Supplement , 4950: 30.
13. D. Lewis [1994a]: “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind, 103: 473–490.
14. John Bigelow [1988]: The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist’s Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Epiphenomenalism Lewis Vs Epiphenomenalism I (a) 18
Epiphenomenalism: a variant of my argument seems to miss: Assumed experiences would non-physical epiphenomena, which would be correlated by some causal law exactly with simultaneous physical states, then the experiences and their physical correlates were causally equivalent.
I (a) 19
Then these non-physical experiences would still have their explanations: namely the defining physical effects. LewisVs: that would only double the experience. (The non-physical in addition to the physical). Moreover, it is not true that they would be causally equivalent: this is an error in the Regularity theory of the cause (LewisVsHume): we know from elsewhere that the theory must be corrected in order to distinguish between genuine causes and pseudo causes that are their epiphenomenal correlates.
E.g. the light does not cause the engine running, even though it is a legitimate perfect correlate of electrical current what actually causes the engine s running.

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Hume, D. Armstrong Vs Hume, D. Arm III 120
Then all universals would only be substances in Hume’s sense: i.e. something that logically might have an independent existence.
III 121
ArmstrongVsHume/ArmstronVsTooley: it is wrong to think of universals like that. Then there are problems regarding how universals are to relate to their particulars (P). E.g. If a rel between Pa and Pb is something that is able to have an independent existence without a and b and any other P, would there not have to be at least one other rel to relate it with a and b?.
And if this rel itself can be uninstantiated (e.g. in a universe with monads!), then this rel is just as questionable, etc. ad infinitum (Bradley’s regress).
This can only be avoided if universals are merely abstract factors of states (but real).

Arm II (b) 46
Causality/Causation/ArmstrongVsHume: E.g. Inhaling a quantum of cyanide leads to the death of the person who inhales it. There seems to be a causal relation here, i.e. one between types: one type produces the other type.
II (b) 47
Analytic philosophy/Armstrong: hastens to reassure that we are dealing only with the truth of a universal proposition. "Any person who inhales cyanide dies." Those who represent a singularistic theory of causation will say that each (unique event of) inhaling by a particular person causes their death. (Armstrong pro).
But that’s not the whole truth!.
Surface structure/Proposition/Armstrong: the proposition itself asserts a connection of universals on its surface, from which individual causal findings follow. Thesis: this surface structure reflects something more profound.
If the connection exists, then Regularity is included at the level of universals, of course.
But this Entailment can probably not be grasped formally. Rather, it is something like Carnap’s "meaning postulate"!.

Place II 64
Causality/Hume/Armstrong: ... From this follows that we can never have an empirical proof of the truth of a counterfactual conditional. Law statement/Place: (universal counterfactual conditional): what we can have, however, is empirical proof that supports the truth of a universal Counterfactual Conditional.
Proof/Hume/Armstrong: but the proof consists in nothing more than the observation of either regular following or coinciding with Type B and Type A. (Regularity).
Place II 65
Ceteris paribus/PlaceVsHume/PlaceVsArmstrong: Such regularities are no evidence of the truth of the counterfactual conditional if it is not ensured that all circumstances remain the same. C.p. must supplement regularity in order for it to become proof. But then Armstrong does not need to refute the Regularity theory.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004
Hume, D. Goodman Vs Hume, D. II 112
Hume imagined the mind in a way that it can be caused to make forecasts according to regularities in the observable. GoodmanVsHume: We, however, see the mind as being in activity from the beginning. He corrects gradually. (Like Dennett)
Sainsbury V 139
Grue/Goodman: "regularities are where we find them, and we find them everywhere." Grue/Goodman/Sainsbury: therefore, there are still many ramifications between confirmation and belief.
Grue/GoodmanVsHume: shows that the Regularity defined by Hume is not the only one.
Problem: what is Regularity after all (>Regularity)? The connection of emeralds with "green" or the connection with "grue"?
 Problem: either we cannot explain what Regularity is, then there is no induction, or we provide an explanation of Regularity, which includes the unwanted connection with "grue".
 Regularity depends on description! This has led some people to extreme conventionalism according to which there is no separation of the world from the conventions.

G IV
N. Goodman
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
German Edition:
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Goodman I
N. Goodman
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
German Edition:
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

Goodman II
N. Goodman
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
German Edition:
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

Goodman III
N. Goodman
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
German Edition:
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

Sai I
R.M. Sainsbury
Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995
German Edition:
Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993
Hume, D. Quine Vs Hume, D. Hume I 115
Time/Hume was structure of the mind, now the subject turns out to be a synthesis of the time. Memory/Hume: the re-emergence of an impression in the form of a still vivid imagination. ((s) QuineVsHume).
Memory itself does not cause a synthesis of time. It does not overcome the structure.
I 178
The achievement of memory does not consist in holding on to individual imaginations, but in retaining their order.
Quine V 19
Cause/Regularity/QuineVsHume: Problem: you can just take the two single classes in regularity consisting of a and b. Then one succumbs to the fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc. Dispositions: here there is the same problem.

V 88
Identity/Identity Predicate/Language Learning/Quine: it seems as though we have recognized the emergence of the identity predicate: it is nothing but a common constituent of various relative observation terms for substances such as
V 89
e.g. "the same dog as" or even less: a word for the temporal extension of referencing (pointing). Identity/Locke/Hume: only useful for appearances of the same object at different times.
QuineVsLocke/QuineVsHume: that fits very well with our present purpose of the individuation of things. However, identity goes beyond that.

V 177
Past/Observation/Quine: but there are also reports of earlier observations, where the term was learned by definition instead of by conditioning. Since you can replace a defined term by its definiendum this amounts to a composite observation term. Example "I have seen a black rabbit": Learning situation: one for black, one for rabbits, as well as attributive composition.
Imagination/Memory/Quine: in the language of mental images we can say that these are caused, even if the corresponding object does not exist.
But now we must go further and assume even more skills: the child has to distinguish between two types of mental images:
a) Fantasies
b) Memories.
V 178
QuineVsHume: referred unconvincingly to liveliness as a differentiator. Def Memory/Hume: attenuated sensation
Def Fantasy/Hume: attenuated memory.
Def Mental Image/QuineVsHume: is an event in the nervous system that leads to a state of readiness for a corresponding stimulus. This ostensive nervous process is perceived by the subject, i.e. it must be able to react specifically to it in two different ways:
a) Summary of previously learned items e.g. "black" and "rabbit"
b) strengthened by acquaintance: i.e. real earlier encounter with a black rabbit. Basis for affirmation.
V 179
Observation Sentence/Complete Thought/Reference/Quine: refers to the object and the calendar clock and, where appropriate, to a location. Complex observation term. >Protocol Sentence: timeless sentence (forever-lasting) if location and times complete.

Quine VII (d) 65
Objects/Individual Things/Thing/Hume: the notion of ​​physical objects arises from a mistake in identification. In reality, we invent a new item every minute!
QuineVsHume: we do not need to share it.

Quine XI 112
Causality/QuineVsRegularity/QuineVsHume/Lauener: E.g. to what type of events does the cry of the geese heard on Capitol Hill belong and to which the fact that Rome is saved?

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Hume, D. Searle Vs Hume, D. II 101
Perception/cause/SearleVsHume: my knowledge that my car has caused my visual experience, is because I know that I see the car, and not vice versa. I do not conclude that there is a car, but I just can see it. >Perception/Searle.
II 102
Perception: the experience is not literally yellow, but it is caused literally. Moreover, it is experienced as caused, whether it is satisfied or not. But it is not experienced as yellow, but as of something yellow.
II 103
Causality: I may very well experience directly! However, not independent but the being caused belongs to the experience. (This does not mean that the experience confirms itself).
II 104
Causality: also for things characteristic, which are not directly observable such as ultraviolet and infrared.. If they could not have an impact on our measuring instruments, then we might not know about their existence. >Causality/Hume. ((s) Ultraviolet cannot be hallucination. But one can imagine a sunburn.)

II 156
Causality/SearleVsHume: I believe that "to cause" describes a real relationship in the real world, but it does not follow a universal correlation of similar cases.
II 160
Tradition: one never has a causing experience. SearleVsTradition: you have not often a causing experience, but every perception or action experience is indeed just such a causing experience!
SearleVsHume: he looked for a wrong spot, he looked for a power.

II 170
Regularity/SearleVsHume: not all regularities are causal. It is wrong to think that we can have in addition of an experience of cause and effect a hypothesis about regularities in the world.
II 171
I have not the hypothesis, but I have the ability to distinguish regularity from irregularity. Regularity becomes the background. >Regularity/Hume.
II 173
SearleVsCausal Law/SearleVsHume: does not need to be derived from the existence of causation. After 300 years of unsuccessful attempts with the regularity you have to see that the concept of to make something happening differs from the concept of regularity.
II 174
There are not two types of causation: "Regularity causation" and "intentional causation". There is exactly one way: this is the action-causation.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Hume, D. Strawson Vs Hume, D. IV 157
Causality/StrawsonVsHume: he overlooks the very obvious fact that objects exert physical forces. (>Dennett: and they are observable).
IV 160
Theory/Strawson: I do not want to draw a too sharp line between observation and theory.
IV 162
Causality/Hume/Strawson: we can actually observe many actions and reactions without knowing what effects were actually working.
IV 163
Regularity/causality/regularity/StrawsonVsHume: Regularity (happening according to rules) is time neutral. The regularity does not prohibit reversing the order.
IV 165
KantVsHume: We learn a lot about rule-like sequences in the world by observing, but only because we already have the concept of causality.
IV 166
Causality/Strawson: to understand it we are consciously or unconsciously using the model of our human behavior and experience, what forces we must exert ourselves and to what forces we are exposed to.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Hume, D. Verschiedene Vs Hume, D. Hacking I 68
Causality/W.C.BroadVsHume: VsRegularity: For example we can see that the siren of Manchester howls every day at the same time, whereupon the workers of Leeds let the work rest for one hour. But no causation.
Hacking I 70
CartwrightVsHume: the regularities are characteristics of the procedures with which we establish theories. (>Putnam).
Hume I 131
Def Atomism/Hume/Deleuze: is the thesis that relations are external to conceptions. (KantVs). VsHume: Critics accuse him of having "atomized" the given.
Theory/DeleuzeVsVs: with this one believes to have pilloried a whole system. As if it were a quirk of Hume. What a philosopher says is presented as if it were done or wanted by him.
I 132
What do you think you can explain? A theory must be understood from its conceptual basis. A philosophical theory is an unfolded question. Question and critique of the question are one.
I 133
It is not about knowing whether things are one way or the other, but whether the question is a good question or not.
Apron I 238
Lawlikeness/lawlike/Schurz: b) in the narrower sense: = physical necessity (to escape the vagueness or graduality of the broad term). Problem: not all laws unlimited in space-time are legal in the narrower sense.
Universal, but not physically necessary: Example: "No lump of gold has a diameter of more than one kilometre".
Universality: is therefore not a sufficient, but a necessary condition for lawfulness. For example, the universal statement "All apples in this basket are red" is not universal, even if it is replaced by its contraposition: For example "All non-red objects are not apples in this basket". (Hempel 1965, 341).
Strong Hume-Thesis/Hume/Schurz: Universality is a sufficient condition for lawlikeness. SchurzVs: that is wrong.
Weak Hume-Thesis/Schurz: Universality is a necessary condition for lawfulness.
((s) stronger/weaker/(s): the claim that a condition is sufficient is stronger than the claim that it is necessary.) BhaskarVsWeak Hume-Thesis. BhaskarVsHume.
Solution/Carnap/Hempel:
Def Maxwell Condition/lawlikeness: Natural laws or nomological predicates must not contain an analytical reference to certain individuals or spacetime points. This is much stronger than the universality condition. (stronger/weaker).
Example "All emeralds are grue": is universal in space-time, but does not meet the Maxwell condition. ((s) Because observed emeralds are concrete individuals?).
I 239
Natural Law/Law of Nature/Armstrong: are relations of implication between universals. Hence no reference to individuals. (1983) Maxwell condition/Wilson/Schurz: (Wilson 1979): it represents a physical principle of symmetry: i.e. laws of nature must be invariant under translation of their time coordinates and translation or rotation of their space coordinates. From this, conservation laws can be obtained.
Symmetry Principles/Principle/Principles/Schurz: physical symmetry principles are not a priori, but depend on experience!
Maxwell Condition/Schurz: is too weak for lawlikeness: Example "No lump of gold..." also this universal statement fulfills them.
Stegmüller IV 243
StegmüllerVsHume: usually proceeds unsystematically and mixes contingent properties of the world with random properties of humans. Ethics/Morality/Hume: 1. In view of scarce resources, people must cooperate in order to survive.
2. HumeVsHobbes: all people have sympathy. If, of course, everything were available in abundance, respect for the property of others would be superfluous:
IV 244
People would voluntarily satisfy the needs in the mutual interest according to their urgency. Moral/Ethics/Shaftesbury/ShaftesburyVsHume: wants to build all morality on human sympathy, altruism and charity. (>Positions).
HumeVsShaftesbury: illusionary ideal.
Ethics/Moral/Hume: 3. Human insight and willpower are limited, therefore sanctions are necessary.
4. Advantageous move: intelligence enables people to calculate long-term interests.
IV 245
The decisive driving force is self-interest. It is pointless to ask whether the human is "good by nature" or "bad by nature".
It is about the distinction between wisdom and foolishness.
5. The human is vulnerable.
6. Humans are approximately the same.





Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Hume, D. Mackie Vs Hume, D. Armstrong III 57
MackieVsHume: (1979) (Stove, et al.): overlooked the possibility that observational premises, while they do not contain any conclusion about the unobserved, still can yield a logical possibility, e.g. 99% of Fs are Gs. Then it is obviously rational to conclude that a is a G. So one can say that the observed cases provide a logical opportunity for unobserved cases. Purely mathematical argument about distribution. VsTheory of Regularity: yet there is a coherent reason why the principles of logical possibility alone cannot solve the problem of the theory of Regularity. The issue with logical possibility is that it cannot distinguish between natural and non-natural classes. Ex.: grue as an unnatural predicate cannot readily be ruled out.
III 58
That all emeralds are grue, has the same logical possibility (the same percentage as the green ones).
Stegmüller IV 238
Virtue/Hume: distinction: natural virtue: is part of biological provisions. Moral philosophers before Hume exclusively referred to these virtues. Ex: generosity, forbearance, charitableness, altruism, moderation, impartiality. (Basis: human sympathy).
artificial virtue: nothing but human inventions. Ex: respect for property; rules of transfer of property, promise, commitment to adhere to contracts, loyalty towards the government.
IV 239
Artificial virtues have no natural origin. Ex: respecting other's property: 1. cannot originate from benevolence towards others: for then the respectation would depend on whether the property serves the welfare of all.
2. also, it cannot depend on whether the person concerned seems sympathetic or not.
3. sympathy is imaginable in gradations, respect for property is not.
This applies mutatis mutandis to all artificial virtues.
IV 240
Morality/Hume: I cannot base my duties on whether someone seems sympathetic or not. natural virtue/MackieVsHume/Stegmüller: to begin with, one would expect that the discussion of the natural virtues is much easier, since the first step (about the genesis) does not apply.
Problem: (also recognized by Hume) if the natural virtues were an effluence of sympathy, they would have to run parallel. But this is not the case.
Our sympathies are self-centered! We have more sympathy for people who are closest to us.
IV 241
But we expect from moral judgments that they are impersonal and impartial. Thus, the seemingly absolute difference between natural and artificial virtues must partially be abandoned. The "natural" virtues, too, thus form a system of conventions. They are supposed to serve the "long-term interests" of all.
The natural virtues then are such artificial virtues in which we find instinctive inclination to act accordingly.
In the artificial virtues, we find no such basis. They are merely socialized.

Stegmüller IV 355
Miracle/probability/Hume/Stegmüller: probability is always to be qualified by the level of information. But Hume's argument would even be valid if credibility of witnesses were a law of nature! Even then it would not be rational to believe in miracles. Miracle/Mackie: difference:
a) question: on grounds of the reports, which hypotheses about laws should be assumed?
b) the weight of the evidence itself.
Miracle/MackieVsHume: also the reporter himself requires the notion of a well-founded natural law in order to classify the event as a miracle.
IV 356
Hume does not anywhere considere the strengthening by several independent witnesses.
IV 412
Teleological proof of God's existence/MackieVsHume: (by and large pro Hume): but one can interpret the conclusion by analogy in a way that God is introduced as that which caused the natural world and explains it.
IV 413
But also here Hume would be proved to be correct that no further consequences arise therefrom. In particular, the relationship between God and the world remains unexplained. Science/theory/Mackie: Darwinian theory of evolution, too, does not facilitate any predictions!
IV 414
Order/theory of evolution/Mackie/Stegmüller: in Darwinism order is not explained by the proposition, that God created the world for us, but that we have adapted to it.

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Hume, D. Vollmer Vs Hume, D. I 103
Causality/VollmerVsHume: not a layperson, but also not a scientist feels comfortable with Hume's observation. Causality/Hume: attributes causality to an instinct that we have in common with animals.
Causality/KantVsHume: Instincts can fail, the law of causality does not seem to fail.
I 105
Causality/Regularity/VsHume: For example, although day and night follow each other regularly, we do not say that day is the cause for night. VollmerVsHume: has no convincing argument for it!
Vollmer: no energy transfer from day to night, so one cannot be the cause of the other!
I 106
Causality/Energy transfer/VollmerVsHume: the frequency is not decisive, how else could we explain the expansion of the universe (which by definition is unique) by the Big Bang? Energy conservation is relevant for our ontological interpretation of causality, not frequency. It is essential for the possibility of an effective energy transfer.
I 107
However, in principle there could also be causal processes in which only half of the released energy is transferred, while the other half disappears in violation of the conservation law! Conversely, the "cause" does not need to provide the total energy for the effect. (butterfly effect).
Vollmer: small cause - big effect? - Yes, but without a minimum of energy transfer there is no effect, no causality.
II 47
Natural Law/Law/General Sentence/Vollmer: three classes of true, general sentences: 1. Randomly true - for example all balls in this box are red
2. Lawfully true without energy transfer:
E.g. duration of oscillation = 2π √ (pendulum length multiplied by acceleration due to gravity).
3. Causal laws (with energy transfer)
E.g. heating leads to expansion
This does not imply that this causal "necessity" gives causal assertions any unassailable status. Here, too, the hypothetical character of all our knowledge remains.
Causality/VollmerVsHume: nevertheless, causal assertions say more than mere subsequent assertions: their empirical content is greater. This, of course, makes them easier to refute.

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Induction Armstrong Vs Induction Arm III 105
VsInduction/Vs Best explanation/BE: inductive skepticism could doubt that it really would be the best explanation; more fundamental: why should the uniformities (unif.) of the world have an explanation at all? Unif./Berkeley: through God. He could also abolish the "laws of nature" tomorrow.
Berkeley/Armstrong: answering this already means to concede the possibilities. We have no guarantee that the BE is the best scheme. But it is informative.

Arm III 53
Induction/ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: 1) Induction is rational. We use it to cope with lives. The conclusion is formally invalid and it is extremely difficult to formalize it. HumeVsInduction: with his skepticism of induction he has questioned a cornerstone of our life. (Much worse than skepticism when it comes to God).
Moore: defended induction because of the common sense. Armstrong pro.
III 54
The best thing the skepticsVsInduction can hope is playing off some of our best justified (inductively gained) everyday certainties. VsVs: it is a coherent system that our everyday certainties (beliefs) form a coherent system. Application to itself.
Hume: the doubt of this involves a quantum of mauvaise foi. (Armstrong ditto).
He is only a skeptic during his studies and rejects the skepticism in everyday life.
VsReg th: it is therefore a serious accusation against a philosophical theory, if it is obliged to skepticism VsInduction.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Lewis, D. Armstrong Vs Lewis, D. Armstrong III 70
Def Law of Nature/LoN/Lewis: Iff it occurs as a theorem (or axiom) in each of the true deductive systems that unites the best combination of simplicity and strength. Armstrong: "each" is important: Suppose we had L3 and L4 (see E.g. above), both as a law, but both support incompatible counterfactual conditionals.
Lewis: then there is no third law.
ArmstrongVsLewis: that seems wrong.
III 71
The least evil would be to say that an involuntary choice must be made between L3 or L4 as the third law. The price for this is the discovery that in some possible situations the view of Ramsey Lewis does not offer an involuntary response. This may not be a problem for Lewis:
Law/Lewis: "vague and difficult concept".
ArmstrongVsLewis: if one does not assume the Regularity theory, there is a precise distinction between laws and non-laws.
Vs Systematic approach/VsRamsey/VsLewis: pro: it is as they say, the manifestations of LoN can be singled out of the Humean uniformities. But:
This is not a necessary truth. Their criterion is not part of our concept of LoN.
ArmstrongVsLewis: it is logically possible that the uniformities (unif.) in an arbitrarily chosen subclass are manifestations of LoN, while the unif. in the residue class are purely coincidental unif... It is logically possible that every Humean uniformity is the manifestation of a LoN, that none is a manifestation or that any other subclass is this class of manifestations of LoN.

Schwarz I 94
Def properties/Lewis: having a property means being a member of a class. ArmstrongVsLewis/Problem/Schwarz: you cannot explain "red" by saying that its bearer is the element of such and such a class. ((s) either, it is circular, or it misses the property, because the object (bearer) can also belong to other classes. E.g. the fact that a tomato is red is not due to the fact that it is an element of the class of red things, but vice versa.) Armstrong 1978a(1), 2,5,2,7)
Schw I 95
LewisVsVs: Unlike other representatives of the universals theory, Lewis does not want to explain what it means or why it is that things have the properties that they have. Explanation/Lewis: proper explanations don’t speak of elementness. (1997c(2), 1980b(3)). However, there can be no general explanation of having properties or predication! Because the explanation has to contain predicates if it were circular. Therefore, "Having a property" is not a relation. But there is nothing more to be said about it, either. (2002a(4), 6,1983c(5): 20 24,1998b(6), 219). E.g. "A is F" is to be generally true, because A has this and that relationship with the property F: here, "A is in this and that relationship with the property F" would have to be true again, because A and F are in this and that relation with "having this and that relation", etc.


1. David M. Armstrong [1978a]: Universals and Scientific Realism I: Nominalism & Realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
2. David Lewis [1997c]: “Naming the Colours”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 325–342.
3. David Lewis [1980b]: “Mad Pain andMartian Pain”. In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of
Psychology Bd.1, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 216–222
4. David Lewis [2002a]: “Tensing the Copula”. Mind, 111: 1–13
5. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press
6. David Lewis [1998b]: “A World of Truthmakers?” Times Literary Supplement , 4950: 30.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Mackie, J. L. Armstrong Vs Mackie, J. L. Arm III 50
Induction/Counterfactual conditional/Co.co./Regularity theory/Mackie: if it is very likely that all Fs are Gs, and we look at an a of which we believe or know that it is not an F or that it does not exist: Assuming that a is an F, it is nevertheless inductively very likely that a is a G. Therefore we are entitled to the Counterfactual Conditional: if a were an F, it would be a G.
Armstrong: that is neutral in itself and can now be used to show that Humeean uniformities could also support counterfactual conditionals. And that is simply because of induction. Then the Counterfactual conditional is justified.
III 51
Vs: 1) then it must be possible to solve the problem of induction, even if assuming that the laws of nature (LoN) are mere LoN. But I believe that the reg. th. is committed to skepticism regarding induction (see above).
Vs: 2) a) If law statements support Counterfactual Conditional, then they would also have to inherit the uncertainty of induction! E.g. assuming all Fs are Gs, but there are doubts as to whether that is a law. Then the evidence is likely, but not certain. The corresponding Counterfactual Conditional: if a were an F, it would be highly probable that it would be a G.
The consequence of this Counterfactual Conditional would be a probability statement.
ArmstrongVsMackie: but we would not establish this Counterfactual Conditional Either it is a law that Fs are Gs or it is not. If it is not, the Counterfactual conditional is simply wrong.
b) it appears logically possible that a being could know the content of all laws, but this knowledge or belief are not acquired inductively. Couldn’t this being use GA just like us to support Counterfactual Conditional? That seems possible.
Nevertheless: how would it be possible if the assertion of Counterfactual Conditional was based on an inductive inference from antecedent to consequent? (As demanded by Mackie).

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Quine, W.V.O. Hintikka Vs Quine, W.V.O. II 184
Intentionality/Hintikka: if it is to be defined by the need to explain it with possible worlds, we have to examine possible counterexamples. Counterexample/(s): shall be something that also requires possible worlds without being intentional. However, the thesis was not that intentionality is the only thing that requires possible worlds.
Possible counter-examples to the thesis that intentionality is essentially possible-world based:
1) E.g. physical modalities: E.g. causal necessity really does not seem to be intentional.
II 185
Vs: but this is deceptive: Solution: Hume has shown that causality is what the mind adds to Regularity. To that extent, causality is quite intentional. It points to something behind the perception.
2) E.g. logical (analytical) modalities. They are certainly objective and non-psychological. Nevertheless, they are best explained by possible worlds.
I 186
Solution: Meaning/Intentionality/Quine/Hintikka: Quine has shown that meanings are indeed intentional, in that they are dependent on the beliefs (convictions) of the subject. Thesis: According to Quine, we must always ask what are the beliefs of a person are to understand what are their meanings are.
DavidsonVsQuine.
QuineVsDavidson: belief and meaning cannot be separated. Quine/Hintikka: for meanings what Hume was for causality.
3) E.g. Probability/Probability Theory/de Finetti/L.J.Savage/Hintikka: according to the two authors all probability is subjective.
Def Probability/Prob/Mathematics/Hintikka: measure in a sample space.
Samples: are "small possible worlds".
II 187
Possible Worlds/Dana Scott: "Is there life in possible worlds?". Intentionality/Hintikka: if probability can only be subjective (Thesis: there is no objective probability), this corresponds, in the turn, to what Hume says regarding causality and Quine in relation to meanings.
Probability/Prob/Hintikka: is then not a real counterexample to the thesis that intentionality is possible-world based, because even probabilities are in a way intentional. (If probability is possible-world based, in any case).
Gradually/Degree/Yes-No/Explanation/Method//Definition/Hintikka: Thesis: seemingly dichotomous concepts can often be better explained if they are conceived as gradual.
Definability/Rantala/Hintikka: Rantala: Thesis: we do not begin by asking when a theory clearly specifies a concept, but how much freedom the theory leaves the term.
II 188
Determinacy/Hintikka: is a gradual matter, and definability sets in when the uncertainty disappears. This is an elegant equivalence to the model theory. Qualitative/Comparative/Hintikka: by assuming that a property is gradual, a qualitative concept can be transformed into a comparative one. Then we no longer only deal with yes-no questions.
Intentionality/Hintikka: thesis is a gradual matter. This is obvious, given that in case of intentionality we must always consider unrealized possibilities.
"Ontological Power"/Hintikka: the greater the ontological power of a mind, the farther you can go beyond the real world.
Degree of Intentionality/Hintikka: is measured by the distance to the actual world.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Regularity Theory Armstrong Vs Regularity Theory Arm III 13
ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: 1) extensional problems: A) Humean Regularity: there seem to be some that are not laws of nature. (H.R. = Humean regularity). That means being an H.R. is not sufficient for being a law of nature (LoN). B) LoN: there might be some that do not universally apply in time and space. There are also laws of probability. Neither of these two would be Humean regularities (H.R.). That means being an H.R. is not necessary for being an LoN. 2) "intensional" problems: Assuming there is a H.R. to which an LoN, corresponds, and the content of this regularity is the same as that of the law. Even then, there are reasons to assume that the law and the regularity are not identical.
Arm III 25
TooleyVsArmstrong: (see below): laws of nature which essentially involve individual things must be admitted as logically possible. Then it must be allowed that laws change from one cosmic epoch to the next. TooleyVsRegularity theory: for them it is a problem that only a narrow conceptual gap separates the cosmic epochs (i.e. H.R.) from just very widely extended regularities which are not cosmic anymore. Assuming there were no cosmic regularities (reg.), but extended ones would indeed exist, then it is logically compatible with all our observations. VsRegularity theory: how can it describe the situation in a way that there are a) no laws but extensive regularities? or b) that there are laws, but they do not have cosmic reach? The latter is more in line with the spirit of reg.th. III 27 VsReg. th.: it cannot assert that every local reg. is a law. III 52 ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: makes induction irrational.
Arm III 159
ArmstrongVsIdealism: being forced to assume an unspecified absolute because of the requirement of the necessity of existence. There are no principles of deduction from the absolute downwards. There has never been a serious deduction of this kind.
Explanation/Armstrong: if the explanation has to stop shortly before coming to the absolute, then idealism must accept contingency. At what point should we accept contingency?
ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: it gives up too soon.
Universals theory: can the atomic bonds of universals be explained that we have assumed to be molecular uniformities?
Necessity/Armstrong: can only ever be asserted, it cannot be demonstrated or even be made plausible.
Arm III 53
Induction/ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: 1) Induction is rational. We use it to cope with lives. The conclusion is formally invalid and it is extremely difficult to formalize it. HumeVsInduction: with his skepticism of induction he has questioned a cornerstone of our life. (Much worse than skepticism when it comes to God).
Moore: defended induction because of the common sense. Armstrong pro.
III 54
The best thing the skepticsVsInduction can hope is playing off some of our best justified (inductively gained) everyday certainties. VsVs: it is a coherent system that our everyday certainties (beliefs) form a coherent system. Application to itself.
Hume: the doubt of this involves a quantum of mauvaise foi. (Armstrong ditto).
He is only a skeptic during his studies and rejects the skepticism in everyday life.
VsReg th: it is therefore a serious accusation against a philosophical theory, if it is obliged to skepticism VsInduction.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Skyrms, B. Armstrong Vs Skyrms, B. Arm III 36
Regularity theory/Armstrong: If we vary the accompanying circumstances now, then the limit value of the relative frequency in each class of circumstances is maintained. (Truth conditions/tr.cond./law statements/Resilience: But the resilience throws no light on the truth conditions for law statements, as the text might suggest).
Description dependence/Resilience/ArmstrongVsSkyrms/ArmstrongVsMackie: this introduces a considerable element of arbitrariness or convention. The law statement ascribes a precise probability to Fs for being Gs.
It conceals that it depends on the decision how the facts are described. Mackie and Skyrms are honest enough not to conceal that:
Coincidence/physical coincidence/Skyrms: is not absolute! (Facts are description dependent).
Standards for resilience evolve along with physical theories.
Resilience/Armstrong: the term is useful when we want to develop objective tests.
Laws of Nature/LoN//ArmstrongVsSkyrms: one should never ask more of laws than this: they should be potentially resilient. Fs have the probability of being a G always under all nomically possible circumstances.
III 37
But the fact that these circumstances exist is contingent! We expect that some never occur. Skyrms: Follows the reg. th.
Arm III 65
Resiliency/Laws of nature/Regularity/Armstrong: E.g. it is assumed to be a Humean Regularity that Fs are Gs. Which additional condition would turn this into a law? We want the Fs to resilientyl be Gs, i.e. under every nomically possible circumstance. Of course, this cannot absolutely be fulfilled. But relative resilience: E.g. there may be Fs that are Hs that are Js that are Ks ... where the class of factors {H, K, J ...} covers a wide range of appropriate circumstances. Then and only then the reg. is a law.
How broad must the range be to ensure that the factors are suitable? Intuitively, so that if there are many factors, it is nomically possible in the test to produce an F which is a ~G.
E.g. Smith’s Garden (see above). The generalization is highly resilient here, because there is a broad range of circumstances that could falsify it if it is falsifiable.
VsResiliency/VsSkyrms: why should there not be laws that are non-resilient?.
Law: if it is a law that the Fs are Gs, then s is potentially resilient by definition. It is physically not possible for an F, which is a K, not to be a G. But why should nature be so accommodating as to provide us with reasons to assume that there is no such K? Why should there be Fs which are accompanied by factors that are plausible candidates for Ks, but happen to be not?.
E.g. why should Smith’s Garden not exist somewhere, but without fruits, and yet be it a law that it contains nothing but apples? Only a vulgar positivism could prohibit that.
ArmstrongVsResilience/ArmstrongVsSkyrms: that is the reason why the refinement of reg.th. must be rejected by resilience. This requires an urgent systematic solution.
How can the resilience theorists specify the real factors for a test?.
III 66
Only by filtering out the nomically significant factors. He needs a coherent system. Therefore, problems of the systematic approach are also problems of the resilience approach.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979
Thomas Aquinas Hume Vs Thomas Aquinas Fraassen I 212
Proof of the Existence of God/HumeVsThomas Aquinas/Fraassen: Our new view (modern analogy) is not exposed to criticism by Hume. HumeVsThomas Aquinas. Even though regress in causation or explanation must end.
I 213
There is no reason to assume that this end (end point) should not be the universe (world) itself (instead of God). Problem: because if the world can only be understood by reference to the will of God, how are we to understand God's will? And if we cannot understand Him, why should we not halt at the universe? VsHume: all counterarguments seem to be based on the assumption that God is essentially different from the universe. God himself requires no explanation or justification. Fraassen: this may be true for God, yet there is a possible counter-argument for our case: namely as follows: Explanation/Fraassen: in terms of explanation there is no difference between galvanometers and electrons. Instead: microstructure (MiSt).
MiSt/VsFraassen: demanding it does not mean appealing to a cosmic coincidence. E.g. That cloud chambers and galvanometers behave like this, is even then surprising if there are theoretical entities such as electrons. Because it is surprising that there should be such a Regularity in the behavior of the electrons. If we are not metaphysically minded, we should be glad that our relation to the QM has brought order in there. Because we do not understand the underlying (prior, not temporal) coincidence. If we then continue to ask what brings the micro-things of the same kind to behave in the same way in the past, present and future, we have a new exaggerated realism.
FraassenVsVs:
Explanation/Regularity/Fraassen: Thesis: there are regularities of observable phenomena that need to be explained!. Theoretical Entities/Fraassen: the question of why they behave the way they do is a question on a different level than that of explanation. Because then there are two possibilities:
a) there is another, still unexplained Regularity or.
b) there is the presumption that our theory can still be improved by being simplified.
In neither case the regularities behind the phenomena demand an explanation.
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Tooley, M. Armstrong Vs Tooley, M. III 104
Tooley: if relations between universals are truthmakers, then these are "atomic facts". Then the standard principles could ascribe a probability of >0 to the confirmation theory.
III 105
ArmstrongVsTooley: this is an initial possibility or logical possibility of a tautology. Empiricist should have doubts there. ForrestVsTooley: There could be infinitely many possible universals. Would the attributable initial probabilities not be infinitesimally small then? That would be no justification for the induction.
VsInduction/VsBest Explanation: inductive skepticism could doubt that it really would be the best explanation, more fundamentally: why should the regularities in the world ever have an explanation (reg.)?.
Regularity/Berkeley: through God. He could abolish the "laws of nature" tomorrow.
Berkeley/Armstrong: Answering to this already means to concede the possibility. We have no guarantee that the best explanation is the best scheme. But it is informative.
Arm III 120
Then all universals would only be substances in Hume’s sense: i.e. something that logically might have an independent existence.
III 121
ArmstrongVsHume/ArmstronVsTooley: it is wrong to think of universals like that. Then there are problems regarding how universals are related with their particulars (part.). E.g. If a rel. between particulars a and b is something that is able to have an independent existence without a and b and any other particulars, would there not have to be at least one other relation to relate it to a and b?.
And if this rel. can be uninstantiated itself (e.g. in a universe with monads!), then this rel. is just as questionable, etc. ad infinitum. (Bradley’s regress).
One can avoid this only if universals are merely abstract factors of states of affairs (but real).

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Causal Explanation Versus Vollmer I 104
Causality / Hume: bare sequence - Solution: regularity, the types of events are concerned - not isolated events. - Kant / Vollmer admits that Hume is right.

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Natural Laws Armstrong, D.M. Lewis V XII
Natural Laws/Laws of Nature/LoN/Lewis: I contradict the "non-Humean lawmakers" (e.g. Armstrong): they cannot carry out their own project. Def Laws of Nature/Armstrong: thesis N is a "lawmaker relation", then it is a contingent fact, and one that does not supervene on the AvQ, which universals are in this relation N. But it is nevertheless somehow necessary that if N(F,G) there must be a Regularity, that all F"s are G"s.
Lewis/Schw I 118
Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong-Theory: Thesis: laws of nature are based on fundamental relations between universals, i.e. properties. Because regularities are logically independent from local events, possible worlds can differ well in their laws of nature with the same local events: what is a mere regularity here may be a "universals" relationship there. Universals-Relationship: is fundamental and unanalyzable. It is not enough to say that there is a relationship between Fs and Gs because all Fs are Gs. That would be the Regularity theory.
Schurz I 239
Law of Nature/Armstrong: Thesis: are implication relations between universals. Therefore no reference to individuals. (1983, Armstrong, Maxwell conditioning/Wilson/Schurz: (Wilson 1979))

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Natural Laws Lewis, D. V XII
Natural Laws/Lewis: I contradict the "un-Humean lawmakers" (e.g. Armstrong): they cannot carry out their own project. Def Natural Laws/Armstrong: thesis: N is a "lawmaker relation", then it is a contingent fact, and one that does not supervene on the Arrangement of Qualities, which universals are in this relation N. But it is nevertheless somehow necessary that if N(F,G) there must be a Regularity, that all F"s are G"s.
V 11
Thesis: then the natural laws are generalizations of what we consider particularly important - then conformity with natural laws should be important for the similarity relation between possible worlds - (> similarity metrics).