Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Causal Theory | Goldman Vs Causal Theory | Brandom I 310 Causal Theory of Knowledge: an observation is considered knowledge if it is caused by the very thing it is about in the right way. GoldmanVs: the claim of an inhabitant of the Real Barns Province expresses true knowledge, the claim of an inhabitant of the Barns Facade Province does not express knowledge. Here it is mere chance if he actually looks at a real barn. I 311 1. One must go beyond the causal prehistory of a belief. 2. The difference between the circumstances influences the assessment of the authorization (even if they are causally irrelevant!) This can be explained by terms of Reliability based on circumstances. (probability, quantity). |
Gold I Alvin I. Goldman Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays Oxford 2015 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Goldman, A. | Brandom Vs Goldman, A. | II 151-155 BrandomVsGoldman: his theory paved the way for theories of reliability, but it is a double-edged sword in terms of naturalized epistemology. For his example it is important that we assume that the causal chain is an ideal one. E.g. barn facades / Brandom: you can think of the province as embedded in a country with real barns, this in turn embedded in a state with facades, embedded it in a continent with real ... But e.g. Twin Earth: a modern internalist could claim that the "internal states" be the same. All they have in common is that the subject can not tell them apart. McDowell: this fact has not to be considered as sufficient for the identification of their contents! Goldman / Brandom: it shows that the presence of barn facades in the area is causally irrelevant. BrandomVsGoldman: "Goldman s insight,"does not support the naturalized epistemology, because the knowledge is totally dependent on the choice of the reference class. An argument position therefore remains blank. It depends on how we describe the convinced person: as an inhabitant of the country, the state, etc. And that would be just the naturalistic formulable facts. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 |
| Internalism | Brandom Vs Internalism | Brandom II 151 E.g. Barn facades: you can picture this facades province as embedded in a country with real barns, this in turn embedded in a state with facades, embedded in a continent with real barns, that on a planet with facades which is in turn embedded in a planetary system with real barns etc. Whether the sight of a real barn is knowledge would then entirely dependent on the choice of the reference class! Maximum reliability is given with the narrowest reference class. VsInternalism: Many things speak agains real knowledge. This reveals the inadequacy of the classical justification-based internalism. But E.g. twin earth: a modern internalist could assert that the "internal states" are equal. All they have in common is that the subject cannot distinguish. McDowellVsInternalism: But this fact does not have to be regarded as sufficient to identify its contents!. Goldman/Brandom: all in all, it turns out that the presence of barn facades is causally irrelevant in the surroundings. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Reliability Theory | Field Vs Reliability Theory | II 381 FieldVsReliability Theory: I prefer an alternative to it that is more compatible with non-factualism: Thesis: rationality is not a "de facto property". Solution: We value those rules higher that lead to the truth in the circumstances in which we apply them. ((s) "value rather than fact"). II 382 Accordingly, we value a rule higher of which we believe that it is reliable. Belief/Necessity/Field: we must inevitably believe that our most basic rules are reliable. Equally inevitably, we assign a high value to them. Externalism/Field: Is this an externalist point of view? (The term was coined by Goldman 1980). FieldVsGoldman: the distinction externalism/internalism is based on a false premise: that epistemic properties like rationality are factual. If this is so, then it makes sense to ask whether the factual property contains external elements. EvaluationismVsGoldman: when measured by the evaluation of rules rather than facts about rules, the distinction externalism/internalism is obsolete. What is internalistic about our point of view is that we simply value our own rules more highly. Problem: this might lead to extreme relativism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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