Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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The author or concept searched is found in the following 13 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Abstraction Berkeley Vs Abstraction Ber I 233
BerkeleyVsAbstraction: if one erroneously assumes mental objects were physical or if one refines real things to general abstract terms or splits simple things with metaphysical craftsmanship into diverse parts. Where will this lead? But when I ask a simple Person regarding the free will, they agree immediately. And I agree with them because of what I find inside me.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997
Churchland, P. Pauen Vs Churchland, P. Pauen I 99
Churchland/Pauen: commits sciences to a very strong notion of ​​nature as a kind of "thing in itself", ultimate authority in the decision about theories.
I 100
VsChurchland/Pauen: claim to be able to justify the renunciation of the terminology of folk psychology. However, this presupposes that the relevant entities do indeed not exist. So this is an ontological and not only a language philosophical thesis.
All the while, Churchland assumes that there are no serious objections to eliminative materialism. That's not the case, though.
I 101
VsMaterialism, Eliminative/Pauen: 1) false claim of knowing that there are neural, but not mental states. Performative contradiction: if this is about knowledge, then it must be true for its part. I.e. there may be no opinions (i.e. mental states).
On the other hand, however, the knowledge status implies that the representative of an assertion himself is of the opinion that the facts are true.
Patricia Churchland/Pauen: concedes this performative contradiction, but sees it as only another piece of evidence of our involvement in folk psychology.
VsChurchland: this is a mere announcement that the contradiction would eventually be dissolved.
I 102
Performative Contradiction/Churchland/Pauen: E.g. vitalism also diagnoses this contradiction: the opponent claims that there are no animal spirits. But this opponent himself is alive, so he must have animal spirits...
PauenVsChurchland: this is not the same: the contradiction does not run on the same level:
The opponent of vitalism does not make himself dependent on vitalism, but has an alternative design.
In contrast, the defender of folk psychology does not need to make such a requirement: the assertion that knowledge implies opinion (the controversial mental state) is not an invention of folk psychology after all, it is not an empirical thesis at all.
I 103
VsMaterialism, Eliminative/Pauen: 2nd problem of inter-theoretical reduction: folk psychology is to be eliminated mainly because it cannot be reduced to the neurobiology. Robert McCauley/Pauen: the two theories would have to compete on the same level for that. E.g. phlogiston/chemistry.
In contrast, folk psychology and scientific psychology are located on completely different levels. (First/Third Person, Micro/Macro).
I 104
3) E.g. Split Brain Patients/Pauen: Empirical evidence shows that feelings in particular are language-independent, and thus can also be identified pretheoretically. Patients respond, but have no conscious access anymore. The stimuli reach the right, unconscious hemisphere that is incapable of speech. Nevertheless, the patients can give correct information. In doing so, they can rely neither on the generalizations of folk psychology nor on a knowledge of the perceived object.
I 105
This can only be explained if one assumes that emotional states have an intrinsic quality that also allows theory-independent interpretation. Churchland/Pauen: consequently excludes phenomenal states from the elimination. Everyday experience should now no longer be changed by elimination.
VsChurchland: this now differs from the common folk psychology, however, which also includes pain. Before, he himself had still counted pain among the states which have been changed by the elimination of the concepts.
He is also inconsistent when he adheres to the eliminability of cognitive awareness.

I 188
Explanation Gap/Pauen: already recognized by Leibniz in principle. Then Dubois Reymond, Nagel, Joseph Levine. Explanation Gap/Levine/Pauen: between scientific and folk psychological theories.
Chalmers: "Hard Problem of Consiousness":
I 189
forces us to perform huge interventions in previously accepted views and methods. Identity theory: refers to ontology.
Explanatory gap argument epistemically refers to our knowledge.
Context: if we accept the identity theory, we must expect that our respective knowledge can be related to each other.
I 191
Churchland: it would now be a fallacy to try and infer from our present ignorance the insolubility of the problem. ("Argument from Ignorance") VsChurchland: in the case of the explanation gap that does not need to be plausible!
The representatives do not rely on their own ignorance and do not refer to the failure of previous research. They assume a fundamental difference between entities such as e.g. water and heat on the one hand and mental processes on the other.
Therefore, our methods must fail.
I 192
Causal properties play a significant role with these differences. Then, according the representatives of the explanatory gap argument, it must be possible to characterize our natural phenomena designated by everyday concepts characterized by such causal properties:
Levine: then there is a two-stage process:
I 193
1) quasi a-priori process: the concept is brought "into shape" for the reduction through the determination of the causal role. 2) empirical work to discover what the underlying mechanisms are.
I 194
This method fails now when it comes to the explanation of mental and especially phenomenal states. They cannot be translated into causal roles in principle! Unlike in our colloquial speech of physical processes, we obviously do not mean these effects, when we talk about mental states.

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Descriptivism Lewis Vs Descriptivism Stalnaker I 212
Def Local Descriptivism/Lewis/Stalnaker: Is simply a way to describe a part of the language vi another part.((s) The only possibility,according to Lewis and Stalnaker.) The broader paradigm of Kaplan corresponds to:
Def Global Descriptivism/Lewis/Stalnaker: (Lewis 1984, 224) The entirety of a speaker's language is taken as a description of the world. (Theory). All terms of the language are interpreted at the same time, and statements on the world are made by establishing the theory.
i.e. the terms refer to "whatever things", characteristics and relations render the theory true, as much as it is possible.
LewisVsGlobal Descriptivism/Stalnaker: This cannot work because it is then impossible to explain how statements can be wrong. This is Putnam's Paradox.
Def Putnam's Paradox/Stalnaker/(s): If a language is taken as a whole in order to explain all terms (and to set all its references) at the same time, then statements refer to "whatever things". And then relations and characteristics are always going to be what renders the theory the most truthful.
Language/Thinking/World/Reality/Lewis/Stalnaker: Additional condition for global descriptivism: The easy terms must Split the word "at its joints". ((s) But this is not given with one language.)
LewisVsGlobal Descriptivism.
StalnakerVsGlobal Descriptivism/StalnakerVsLewis: Such a metasemantic theory is not going to work, but if it were, the theory would give us quite a different depiction of our thoughts' contents.
1. Were the theory holistic, whatever somebody thinks depends from everything else he/she is thinking
2. Were the theory solipsistic, causal relations would depend on the use of the Person. Then "Tullius" would mean something different for each Person using it.
Problem: We would then only speak about the language in the highest degree of generalization. We would not only be unable to refer to singular things which are different from the others, we would also describe the things not by their basic characteristics, but only in terms of characteristics and relations which fit the best, in order to render our theory, which is not interpreted, true.
Vs: Representatives of the broader paradigm of Kaplan (semantic, not meta-semantic) could reply:
The built-in two-dimensional frame in language allows us to express propositions which convey more direct statements on the world because
Secondary propositions: which are set by our thoughts and utterances, are singular propositions and propositions which express basic characteristics and relations. However:
primary propositions: they represent the cognitive values of our thoughts.
Secondary propositions/semantic//broader frame of Kaplan: based on him, the secondary propositions are described and not expressed. ((s) mentioned, not used/Mention/Use).
Secondary proposition/semantic: they are clearly set as a function of the facts.
Problem: we do not have a cognitive access to them.
Bsp Propositions, which we only know because of descriptions: "The sentence which is cited in Frank Jakson's "From Metaphysics to Ethics"on page 26, lines 3-4".
E.g. The content of the first sentence Napoleon spoke to Josephine after his coronation.
However: these propositions cannot be claimed by saying, e.g. "I hereby claim the proposition which fulfills the following condition."
Secondary Proposition/semantic/Stalnaker: By semantically (not meta-semantically) interpreting the two-dimensional frame, the secondary propositions seem to be like these examples.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Epiphenomenalism Pauen Vs Epiphenomenalism Pauen I 67
Property Dualistic Variants/Epiphenomenalism: recently: advantage: the renunciation of interactions is obvious from the perspective of property dualism, because this position then also becomes acceptable for physicalism and complies with multiple realizability. Multiple Realizability/Pauen: a variety of neural activity can cause one and the same mental state. (E.g. Split brain: takeover by other areas).
This is a problem for the identity theory and materialism.
I 68
Property-Dualistic Variants/Epiphenomenalism/Pauen: E.g. we are repeatedly dealing with events in everyday life that are by far not causally effective with all their properties. It is not the sound of the ball that destroys the window pane. Explanation/Epiphenomenalism: then come only neuronal, not mental properties can be considered here.
Epiphenomenalism Pauen: is, unlike the identity theory, not forced to assume that consciousness is "nothing but" electrochemical processes.
I 69
VsEpiphenomenalism/Pauen: 1) The experiments by Libet are not without controversy. 2) Libet himself admits that there might still be a conscious veto even after the build-up of the potential.
3) Nothing else speaks against the act of will being identical with the neural process. It might not have an effect, but it might leave traces in the memory.
4) PopperVsEpiphenomenalism: theory of evolution: without effect the consciousness would have no selective advantage.
I 70
EpiphenomenalismVsVs: certain intelligent processes can possibly only occur together with consciousness. But there is no independent evidence for this. There are also no theoretical arguments for the necessity to combine mental and neural properties. Empirically recognized relations would not indicate the necessity. However, it would be possible that certain neural activities that are de facto linked to consciousness, could also occur without consciousness. Insofar, epiphenomenalism has no argument against the evolutionary objection.
VsEpiphenomenalism Pauen: 5) violates the deeply rooted intuition that mental states are causally effective.
E.g. We believe that our feelings are the cause for us to speak of sensations.
E.g. That beliefs are responsible for ensuring that we act according to our beliefs.
VsEpiphenomenalism Pauen: the absence of consciousness remains completely inconsequential.
I 71
Test/Evidence/Proof/Experiment/VsEpiphenomenalism/Pauen: it is questionable whether empirical evidence of a stable psychophysical correlation under the premises of epiphenomenalism could actually preclude the possibility of a disintegration of mental and neural processes. Test: trivially, a test can only confirm a hypothesis if it was negative as long as the hypothesis was wrong.
An experiment that always yields a positive result, regardless of the accuracy of the hypothesis, cannot be a real test.
E.g. normally, we would take the statement of a subject that they feel severe pain as evidence of the mental state. Under the premise of epiphenomenalism we cannot do this, though: here, the statement solely depends on neuronal processes. Now that we want to verify whether mental states are involved, it can precisely not be assumed that they (according to epiphenomenalism) usually are involved as a side effect.
What would happen now if the hypothetical case occurred and the mental processes failed to take place?
I 72
Since they are causally irrelevant, their absence cannot have an effect. I.e. the subject would also speak of their pain if they lacked the experience! Therefore, empirical tests are not suitable to preclude a dissociation of neural and mental states. This does not only affect the perspective of the third, but even that of the first Person: the installation of memory traces is causally caused by the event; therefore, the process cannot be affected by the absence of causally irrelevant mental properties.
Then I would have to believe to remember an experience that I never had.
E.g. The epiphenomenalist should not even be irritated if a device indicates a state of pain that he does not feel.
I 73
The reason is always the same: since mental states are causally irrelevant, their absence is, too. VsEpiphenomenalism/Pauen: with this, he jeopardizes our beliefs about the existence of mental states (which he actually does not deny).
E.g. If there is no causal difference between pain and happiness, we could not distinguish them in memory and behavior either!
I 109
Identity TheoryVsEpiphenomenalism/Pauen: makes the causal efficacy of mental processes without effort, because they simply are always physical processes as well.

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Evans, G. Peacocke Vs Evans, G. I 169/170
Demonstratives/Evans: perceptually demonstrative ways of givenness are possible, because these conditions are fulfilled: in a normal perception situation, there is an information link between subject and object, and also the subject knows or is able to find out where the object is.
If the subject has the general ability to know what propositions makes of the form
"π = p" true for any π (where π is an identification of a public place without index words (in a non-indexical frame of reference)) if p is the notion of ​​a place in its egocentric space. If it is also able to locate the object in its egocentric space, we can say that it has an idea of the object.
Idea/Notion/Evans/Terminology/Intension/Way of Givenness/Peacocke: Evans "Idea" (notion) corresponds to my way of givenness "mode of presentation".
Idea/Evans: Thesis: we can conceive the idea of an object a as consisting in its knowledge of what it is to be true for an arbitrary sentence of the form "δ = a".
Peacocke: where "δ" is the area of ​​the basic ideas of an object.
Fundamental Idea/Evans: is what you have if you think of an object as the possessor of the fundamental ground of difference that it actually has.
Peacocke: i.e. what distinguishes an object from all others.
I.e. for material objects type and location.
PeacockeVsEvans: we have already seen cases where the thinker was unable to locate the object in his egocentric space: E.g. the craters on the moon.
I 171
E.g. apple in the mirror cabinet. But it still seems possible to think about it, for example, wonder where it is!
It is true that it is possible to at least provide a rough direction in egocentric space, but that is hardly sufficient for the knowledge condition of Evans.
In the case of the memory image, it is clearer that no localization in the current egocentric space is needed.
pro Evans: there must be additional imaginable evidence, e.g. experience or tools for localization (if necessary, even space travel!).
If that were not imaginable, we would have to assume that the subject was not able to think of the object in public space!
pro Evans: an information link is not sufficient to think demonstratively about the object.
VsEvans: but that is less than to demand that the thinker can locate the object at present.
Weaker Requirement: Instead, a general ability of the subject can locate the object, if necessary, is sufficient.
Evans: if you cannot locate an object, you can still think of it in the mixed demonstrative descriptive way of givenness: "that which causes my experience".
But in normal cases this is a wrong description!
Peacocke: it also seems to be wrong in the examples of the lunar craters, the apple in the mirror cabinet.
PeacockeVsEvans: trange asymmetry:
Idea/Evans: an idea a of ​​a place in a self-centered space is an adequate idea of ​​a place in the public space.
Holistic/Evans: if an arbitrarily fundamental identification of a location is possible, it is holistic. (Varieties of reference, p. 162).
Peacocke: this knowledge is grounded in a general ability to put a cognitive map of the objective spatial world over our own egocentric space.
I 172
E.g. in some cases this will not be possible, for example, when you are kidnapped, or ended up in an unknown area, etc. Point: even in such cases, you can still use the demonstrative pronoun "here" (in reference to objects). I.e. the thoughts are still thoughts about public space! ((s) and the self-centered space).
Idea/Demonstrative Way of Givenness/PeacockeVsEvans: so his theory does not demand any ability to give a public, non-egocentric individuation our thoughts to have thoughts about a place in the public space at all.
Analogy/Peacocke: exactly analogous objections can be made in the case of demonstrative ways of givenness: E.g. Suppose a subject perceives an object of type F in the manner H.
Then F is the token way of givenness.
Then we can introduce: [W, Fs] for the perceptual "this F".
Then there is exactly one proposition of the form "p = localization of [W, Fs] now", which is true, and the subject knows what it is for it that it is true for it.
PeacockeVsEvans: why should we demand here, but not in the earlier example, that the subject also knows which p (or which  in the earlier case) is mentioned in this one true proposition?
This is particularly absurd in the case of the lost subject.
PeacockeVsEvans: his theory allows that [W, Fs] is an adequate idea here, although the subject has no fundamental idea of the object.
Peacocke: but if we insisted that it could have a fundamental idea if he had more evidence, then why is an analogous possibility not also sufficient for adequacy in terms of the egocentric space?
I 173
There seem to be only two uniform positions: 1) Identification/Localization/Idea/Demonstratives/Liberal Position: sufficient for a genuine way of givenness or adequate ideas are the general ability of localization plus uniqueness of the current localization in the relevant space.
2) Strict position: this is neither sufficient for genuine ways of givenness nor for adequate ideas.
PeacockeVs: this can hardly be represented as a unified theory: it means that, if you are lost, you cannot think about the objects that you see around you. That would also mean to preclude a priori that you as a kidnapped Person can ask the question "Which city is this?".
Demonstratives/Peacocke: Thesis: I represent the uniformly liberal position
Demonstratives/Evans: Thesis: is liberal in terms of public space and strictly in terms of egocentric space!
ad 1): does not deny the importance of fundamental ideas. If a subject is neither able to locate an object in the public nor in egocentric space ((s) E.g. he wakes up from anesthesia and hears a monaural sound), then it must still believe that this object has a fundamental identification. Otherwise it would have to assume that there is no object there.
Anscombe: E.g. a subject sees two matchboxes through two holes which (are manipulated) so arranged that it sees only one box, then the subject does not know what it means for the sentence "this matchbox is F" to be true.
The uniformly liberal view allows the subject to use demonstratives which depend on mental images, even if it has no idea where in the public space and when it has encountered the object.
EvansVs: representatives of this position will say that the knowledge of the subject is at least partial,
I 174
because this idea causally results from an encounter with the object. But that makes their position worse instead of better: for it completely twists the grammar and logic of the concept of knowing what it is for the subject that p is true. Ability/PeacockeVsEvans: but a capability can also consist in the experience of finding out the right causal chains in a given environment: the same goes for the localization of an object point seen in the mirror in egocentric space.
PeacockeVsEvans: his distinction seems unreal: it may be simultaneously true that someone has a relation R to the object due to causal relations, and be true that the possibility of being in this relation R is a question of the abilities of the subject.
E.g. (Evans) to recognize the ball:
Peacocke: this is not a sensory motor skill, but rather the ability to draw certain conclusions, which however require an earlier encounter.
This also applies to e.g. the cognitive map, which is placed over the egocentric space:
PeacockeVsEvans: in both cases it does not follow that the presented object, remembered or perceived, is thought of explicitly in causal terms: the way of givenness is truly demonstrative.
First Person/PeacockeVsEvans: the second major objection concerns thoughts of the first Person: the different examples of immunity to misidentification, which contain the first Person, roughly break down into two groups:
a) here, immunity seems absolute: E.g. "I am in pain".
I 175
b) Here, the immunity seems to depend on presuppositions about the world: if these assumptions are wrong, they open the possibility of picking out something wrong without stopping to use the word "I". These include: E.g. "I was on the ocean liner": memory image.
E.g. "I sit at the desk": visual, kinesthetic, tactile perceptions.
The distinction between a) and b) may be made by the constitutive role:
"The Person with these conscious states."
Infallibility/Tradition/Evans: (absolutely immune judgments): the judgment to be a judgment of a specific content can be constituted by the fact that this judgement responds to this state.
Peacocke pro.
PeacockeVsEvans: Problem: can this infallibility be connected to the rest of Evans' theory? Because:
I/Evans: Thesis: the reference of "I" may fail!
Peacocke: how is that compatible with the absolute immunity of "I am in pain"?
Conditionalisation: does not help: E.g. "if I exist, I am in pain" that cannot fulfill the purpose: the existence of the idea still needs the reference of "I".
Similarly: E.g. "If my use of "I" refers, I am in pain":
because "my use" must be explained in terms of the first Person.
Question: Can we use memory demonstratives which refer to previous use of first-Person ways of givenness?
E.g. "If those earlier uses of "I" speak, I am in pain." (Point: not "my uses").
PeacockeVs: that does not help: Descartes' evil demon could have suggested you the memories of someone else. (>Shoemaker: q-memories.)
I 176
Constitutive Role/Brains in the Vat/BIV/EvansVsPeacocke: the constitutive role of [self] would not explain why the brains in the vat would be able to speak in a demonstrative way about their own experiences: Mental States/Evans: differ from all other states and objects in that they refer demonstratively to their owners.
Pain is identified as an element of the objective order.
Then someone can have no adequate idea of ​​these mental states if he does not know to which Person they happen.
Peacocke: we can even concede thoughts about its pain to the brain in a vat, provided that it can give a fundamental identification of the Person who has the pain.
Peacocke: No, the nerves must be wired correctly. I.e. this is not true for the brains in the vat. So we can stick to the liberal point of view and at the constitutive role and the idea of a Person.
Also to the fact that the mental states are individuated on the Person who has them.
Individuation/Mental States/PeacockeVsEvans: not through localization (like with material objects), but through the Person.
I 177
E.g. Split-Brain Patient/Peacocke: here we can speak of different, but qualitatively equivalent experiences. From this could follow two centers of consciousness in a single brain. But: after the surgery we should not say that one of the two was the original and the other one was added later.
E.g. olfactory sensation of the left and right nostril separate. Then there are actually separate causes for both experiences. ((s), but the same source.)
Peacocke: it does not follow that in normal brains two consciousnesses work in harmony. Here, the sense of smell is caused by simultaneous input through both nostrils and is thus overdetermined.

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Four-Dimensionalism Chisholm Vs Four-Dimensionalism Simons I 120
Object/Thing/Chisholm: Thesis: "mereological constance objects in the original sense: entia per se: cannot change. Objects in the derived sense:
Entia per alio: are subject to flux, but only in the sense that they are successively constituted by different entia per se, which differ in their parts.
Continuants/Chisholm: he does not deny them! Rather ChisholmVsFour-Dimensionalism (because of his ontology of temporal objects).
Simons I 124
Event/occurrents/Ontology/Chisholm/Simons: Chisholm disproves three arguments for the ontology of events (occurrences): (Chisholm 1976, Appendix A) 1. Argument of spatial analogy: there is a great disanalogy between space and time: a thing cannot be in two different places at the same time, but a thing can be in the same place at two different times.
ChisholmVs: this is not conclusive, a defender of temporal parts can argue against it. But then he can use this argument to argue for his thesis without circularity.
2. Argument of change (change): for example, how can Philip be drunk once and sober once? For him, both are contradictory together.
ChisholmVsFour-Dimensionalism/Solution: instead of saying a time stage of Philip is (timelessly) drunk, we simply say in everyday language: he was drunk last night and is now sober.
Either we use grammatical times as in everyday language, or we relativize our predicates to the time ((s) "have-at-t", "be-at-t").
3. Argument of the river (not "flux-argument"): Example
River/QuineVsHeraclitus: Quine uses the temporal extension of the river on the same level as the spatial extension.
ChisholmVsQuine: not every sum of river stages is a river process.
I 125
Solution/Chisholm: we have to say what conditions a sum has to meet to be a river process. ChisholmVsQuine: Problem: this again requires continuants: (river banks, human observers) or a theory of absolute space or the introduction of a technical term ((s) predicate) "is cofluvial with").
Problem: this can only be understood in terms of "is the same flux as". So circular.
VsFour-Dimensionalism/VsProcess-Ontology: he did not succeed in eliminating all singular or general terms that denote continuants.
Process-Ontology/Four-Dimensionalism/SimonsVsProcess-Ontology: all representatives except Whitehead speak with a "Split tongue" when it comes to concrete examples.
Continuants/Quine: says he can "reconstruct them four-dimensionally". "Describe them as new".
Reconstruction/Redescription/SimonsVsQuine: when something is rewritten, it gets a new description. Reconstruction is strictly speaking a discarding. So continuants must then disappear from our ontology and something else must take their place.
Problem: thus, it is misleading to speak of river stages or cat stages. E.g. not one Philip stage is drunk, but the whole Person is. For example, one does not bathe in one river stage, but in the whole river.
Error: it cannot be right to change the subject and leave the predicate unchanged, and think you still have a true sentence! Similarly:
Four-Dimensionalism/Cartwright: (1975,p. 167) "four dimensional objects have different careers".
SimonsVsCartwright: only continuants like generals or opera singers have careers. Four-dimensional objects have no career, they are at best a career.
Problem: if continuants are to disappear from ontology, then there is nothing that can be a career. That is talking with a "Split tongue": you cannot enjoy the advantages of the old entities if you abolish them. Four-Dimensionalism needs a whole new way of speaking (unfamiliar, contrary to everyday language).
Whitehead/Simons: is the only one who can do this and it is literally obscure.
I 126
Process-Ontology/Simons: all this does not show their impossibility, only their alien nature. We must not only adopt continuants, but also events that involve them, especially changes of continuants. SimonsVsProcess-Ontology/SimonsVsVsFour-Dimensionalism: that the space-time requires the task of continuants is not so sure and rather depends on the circumstances. Certainly, Minkowski diagrams simply represent time as another (equal) dimension.
I 127
Argument/Simons: it is not a conclusive argument to derive an ontology from a convenient representation.

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Freud, S. Verschiedene Vs Freud, S. Derrida I 101
Analogy/Artaud: it cannot teach us what her counterpart is. (ArtaudVsFreud).
Derrida I 101
ArtaudVsFreud: the interpretation would deprive the theatre of its holiness, which belongs to it, because it is an expression of life in its elementary powers.
Lacan I 41
LacanVsFreud: against the rule of the (wrong) me. - Not where "it" was, should become "I", but the "it" is to be revealed and opened up, so that the subject can understand and experience itself from this eccentricity as a being and saying.
I 122
LacanVsFreud: not "I" instead of "it", but to reopen the horizon of "It speaks" and let the truth emerge behind the false objectivism. (BarthesVsLacan: there is no "behind").
Rorty V 42
Freud/RortyVsHume: in contrast to Hume, Freud has actually reshaped our self-image! If the ego is not master in its own house, it is because there is actually another person! The unconscious of Freud is actually effective.
V 43
But it does not seem like a thing that we can claim, but like a person that claims us. The I is populated by counterparts of people we need to know in order to understand a person's behaviour. DavidsonVsFreud/Rorty: Splitting is always perceived as disturbing by philosophers. But: (pro Freud) there is no reason to assume "you unconsciously believe that p" instead of "there is something in you that causes you to act as if you believed that p".
(Unconscious/unconscious/(s): "something in you..." then there are several brain users.)
V 62
Rorty: Freud's greatest achievement is the gratifying character of the ironic, playful intellectual.
V 63
MacIntyreVsFreud/Rorty: the abandonment of the Aristotelian "functional concept of the human" leads to "emotivism": to the annihilation of any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations. Rorty: he was right, insofar moral concepts like "reason", "human nature" etc. only make sense from the Aristotelian point of view.
Def Emotivism/MacIntyre/Rorty: value judgements nothing more than the expression of preferences, attitudes or feelings.
V 64
"Ability"/Freud/Rorty: (according to Davidson): Freud drops the idea of "ability" at all and replaces it with a multitude of beliefs and desires.
V 65
RortyVsMacIntyre: this criticism only makes sense if such judgements could have been something else (e.g. expression of a rational knowledge of nature). Freud/Rorty: if we take him seriously, we no longer need to decide between a "functional" Aristotelian concept of the human, which is decisive in matters of morality, and the "terrible freedom" of Sartre.
V 66
We can track down psychological narratives without heroines or heroes. We tell the story of the whole machine as a machine, without central, privileged parts.
V 67
Dignity/Machine/Human Dignity/Rorty: only if we believe we have to have reasons to treat others decently, we lose our human dignity by proposing that our stories were about mechanisms without a centre.
V 67/68
Rationality/Traditional Philosophy/Tradition/Rorty: actually believes that there is a core of rationality in the deepest inner (even of the tormentor) to which I can always appeal. Freud: calls this "the pious world view".
V 69
Ethics/Morality/Psychology/Rorty: such a striving results in nothing more than the continued oscillating pendulum between moral dogmatism and moral skepticism.
V 70
What metaphysics has not been able to accomplish, psychology (no matter how "deep" it may be) cannot accomplish it either. Freud does not explain "moral motives" either.

Derrida I
J. Derrida
De la grammatologie, Paris 1967
German Edition:
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Holism Dummett Vs Holism Fodor/Lepore IV 8
Analytic/Synthetic/(a/s)/Holism/Fodor/Lepore: there is an argument that anatomical features are also holistic, which presupposes that the distinction anal/synth (a/s) is suspended. E.g. DummettVsHolism: shows neither how communication should function nor language acquisition or language proficiency. (If you have to know all propositions at the same time, which is impossible). ((s) This therefore expects that even anatomical properties are holistic. (or that there are no analytical propositions). Due to this extreme position learning only becomes impossible). Dummett/(s)VsDummett: Departs from the extreme assumption that anatomical properties (which only a second similar thing can have) are also holistic, i.e. are shared by many similar things. So almost a bugbear. Dummett: nor does holism show how a whole theory can be significant at all: if in turn its internal structure cannot be broken down into significant parts, then it has no internal structure. Fodor/Lepore: Dummett argues from the following analogy: Sentences are interPersonally understandable, because their meanings are formed from the meanings of their components and the speaker and hearer are privy to these meanings. Dummett/Fodor/Lepore: this explanation assumes that the speaker and hearer mean the same thing.
Fodor/Lepore IV 9
And it assumes that the constituents have meaning at all. If holism were true, this would be false.
Fodor/Lepore IV 10
Holism/Fodor/Lepore: is also a revisionism: he could reply HolismVsDummett: "so much the worse for our conventional understanding of how languages ​​and theories learned and taught". Quine, Dennett, Stich, the Churchlands and many others are strongly tempted by this revisionist direction.
Horwich I 459
Meaning Theory/M.Th./DummettVsDavidson: we need more than he gives us: it could be that someone knows all truth conditions without knowing the content of the (metalinguistic) right side of the T sentence. T sentence/Dummett: explains nothing if the metalanguage contains the object language. And because this is so, the same applies if meta language and object language are separated (terminology/Dummett: "M sentence". T-sentence/Davidson: "neutral, snow-bound triviality" No single T-sentence says what it means to understand the words on the left side, but the whole corpus of sentences says that this is everything you can know about it ((s) no theory "beyond", "about").
DummettVsDavidson: thus Davidson admits defeat: then it cannot be answered how the speaker came to his own understanding of the words he used. ((s)> DummettVsHolism) DummettVsDavidson: The ability for language use cannot be Split into separate skills Language/Use/Wittgenstein/Davidson/SellarsVsDummett/Rorty: such partial skills do not exist. If "tertia" such as "special meaning ", "response to stimuli", etc. are abolished, there are no components anymore, in which the capacity for language use could be divided (>competence?). E.g. "How do you know that this is red?" Wittgenstein: "I speak German."
T-sentence/Davidson: does not double any internal structures. They do not even exist, otherwise the "Tertia" would be introduced again.
Meaning theory/DummettVsDavidson/Rorty: he makes a virtue of necessity. But we can expect more from a MT. And that is that it retains the traditional concepts of the empiricist epistemology. Such a theory must explain the ability to use language through knowledge of the truth conditions. Dummett: Contrast: E.g. "this is red" and E.g. "there are transfinite cardinal numbers".
Holism/Wittgenstein/VsDummett/DavidsonVsDummett: There is no contrast!. Understanding/Grasping/Wittgenstein/Davidson/Rorty: for Davidson and Wittgenstein grasping in all these cases is acquiring the inferential relations between the sentences and other sentences of the language. Meaning/Wittgenstein: accepting some inferential principle helps to determine the meaning of words. (Davidson ditto).
DummettVsWittgenstein/DummettVsHolism: This leads us to the attitude that no systematic MT is at all possible.
RortyVsDummett: does not show, however, how it is possible.(1)

1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994

Rorty I 289
Philosophy/Dummett/Rorty: (VsDavidson) (like Putnam): only task of philosophy is the analysis of meaning. (It is the foundation, and not Descartes’ epistemology). DummettVsDavidson/DummettVsHolismus/Rorty: you cannot provide adequate philosophy of language without the two Kantian distinctions (Givenness/Interpretation and Necessity/Contingency).

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Lewis, C.I. Schwarz Vs Lewis, C.I. Schwarz I 31
Personal identity/SchwarzVsLewis: his criterion is not accurate and provides in interesting cases no answer. E.g. continuity after brain surgery, etc. But Lewis does not want that. Our (vague) everyday term should only be made explicitly. Beaming/Teleportation/Doubling/Lewis: all this is allowed by his theory.
Schwarz I 60
Identity/Lewis/Centered world/Possible world/Schwarz: my desire to be someone else, does not refer to the whole world, but only to my position in the world. E.g. Twin Earth/Schwarz: one of the two planets is blown tomorrow, the two options (that we are on the one or the other) do however not correspond to two possible worlds! Detailed knowledge would not help out where we are, because they are equal. ((s) so no "centered world"). Actually, we want to know where we ourselves are in the world. (1979a(1),1983b(2),1986e(3):231 233).
SchwarzVsLewis: says too little about these perspective possibilities. It is not enough here to allow multiple counterparts (c.p.) in a world. It should not just be possible that Humphrey is exactly as the actual Nixon, he should also to be allowed to be different. Humphrey may not be a GS of himself. (> Irreflexive counterpart relation,> see below Section 9.2. "Doxastic counterparts".
Similarity relation. No matter what aspects you emphasize: Nixon will never be more similar to Humphrey than to himself.
Schwarz I 100
Fundamental properties/SchwarzVsLewis: this seems to waver whether he should form the fE to the conceptual basis for the reduction of all predicates and ultimately all truths, or only a metaphysical basis, on which all truths supervene. (>Supervenience, >Reduction).
Schwarz I 102
Naturalness/Natural/Property/Content/Lewis: the actual content is then the most natural candidate that matches the behavior. "Toxic" is not a perfectly natural property (p.n.p.), but more natural than "more than 3.78 light years away" and healthy and less removed and toxic". Naturalness/Degree/Lewis: (1986e(3):, 61,63,67 1984b(4):66): the naturalness of a property is determined by the complexity or length of their definition by perfectly natural properties.
PnE: are always intrinsically and all their Boolean combinations remain there.
Problem: extrinsic own sheep threaten to look unnatural. Also would e.g. "Red or breakfast" be much more complicated to explain than e.g. "has charge -1 or a mass, whose value is a prime number in kg. (Although it seems to be unnatural by definition).
Naturalness/Property/Lewis: (1983c(5), 49): a property is, the more natural the more it belongs to surrounding things. Vs: then e.g. "cloud" less natural than e.g. "table in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant or clock showing 7:23".
Schw I 103
Naturalness/Properties/Lewis: (1983c(5): 13f): naturalness could be attributed to similarity between characteristics: E.g. a class is more natural, the more the properties of its elements resemble each other. Similarity: Lewis refers to Armstrong: similarity between universals 1978b(6),§16.2,§21, 1989b(7): §5.111997 §4.1). Ultimately LewisVs.
Naturalness/Lewis/Schwarz: (2001a(8):§4,§6): proposing test for naturalness, based on similarity between individual things: coordinate system: "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" axis. A property is then the more natural, the more dense and more compact the appropriate region is.
Problem: 1. that presupposes gradual similarity and therefore cannot be well used to define gradual naturalness.
2. the pnE come out quite unnatural, because the instances often do not strongly resemble each other. E.g. if a certain mass property is perfect, of course, then all things with this mass build a perfectly natural class, no matter how dissimilar they are today.
SchwarzVsLewis: it shows distinctions between natural and less natural properties in different areas, but does not show that the distinction is always the same.
Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: could also depend on interests and biological expression. And yet, can in various ways the different types of natural - be determined by perfect naturalness. That is not much, because at Lewis all, by definition, by the distribution of p.n.p. is determined. ((s)>Mosaic).
Schwarz I 122
Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: not reasonable to assume that it was objectively, regardless of how naturally it appears to us. Lewis introduced objective naturalness as a metaphysical basis for qualitative, intrinsic similarity and difference, as some things resemble each other like eggs and others do not. (see above 5.2). Intrinsic Similarity: also qualitative character and duplication: these terms are intended to be our familiar terms by Lewis.
SchwarzVsLewis: but if objective naturalness is to explain the distinction of our opinions about similarity, one cannot ask with sense the question whether the distinction serves exactly this.
So although there are possible beings (or worlds) whose predicates express relatively unnatural properties and therefore are wrong about natural laws, without being able to discover the error. But we can be sure a priori that we do not belong to them.
Problem: the other beings may themselves believe a priori to be sure that their physical predicates are relatively natural.
Solution: but they (and not we) were subject to this mistake, provided "natural" means in their mouth the same as with us. ((s) but we also could just believe that they are not subject to error. Respectively, we do not know whether we are "we" or "they").
Schwarz: here is a tension in our concept of natural law (NL):
a) on the one hand it is clear that we can recognize them empirically.
b) on the other hand they should be objective in a strong sense, regardless of our standards and terms.
Problem: Being with other standards can come up with the same empirical data to all other judgments of NL.
Schwarz I 134
Event/SchwarzVsLewis: perhaps better: events but as the regions themselves or the things in the regions: then we can distinguish e.g. the flight from the rotation of the ball. Lewis appears to be later also inclined to this. (2004d)(9). Lewis: E.g. the death of a man who is thrown into a completely empty space is not caused by something that happens in this room, because there is nothing. But when events are classes of RZ regions, an event could also include an empty region.
Def Qua thing/Lewis/Schwarz: later theory: “Qua-things” (2003)(10): E.g. „Russell qua Philosoph“: (1986d(9a),247): classes of counterpieces – versus:
LewisVsLewis: (2003)(10) Russell qua Philosoph and Russell qua Politician and Russell are identical. Then the difference in counterfactual contexts is due to the determined by the respective description counterpart relation. These are then intensional contexts. (Similar to 1971(11)). counterfactual asymmetry/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis' analysis assumes similarity between possible worlds.
HorwichVsLewis: (1987(15),172) should explain why he is interested in this baroque dependence.
Problem/SchwarzVsLewis: so far, the analysis still delivers incorrect results E.g. causation later by earlier events.
Schwarz I 139
Conjunctive events/SchwarzVsLewis: he does not see that the same is true for conjunctive events. Examples A, B, C, D are arbitrary events, so that A caused B and C caused D. If there is an event B&C, which exactly occurs when both B and C happen, then A is the cause of D: without A, B would not have happened, neither B&C. Likewise D would not have happened without B&C. Because causation is transitive, thus any cause causes any effect. Note: according to requirement D would not happen without C, but maybe the next possible world, in which B&C are missing, is one in which C is still taking place? According to Lewis the next possible world should however be one where the lack of cause is completely extinguished.
Schwarz: you cannot exclude any conjunctive events safely. E.g. a conversation or e.g. a war is made up of many events and may still be as a whole a cause or effect. Lewis (2000a(13), 193) even used quite unnatural conjunctions of events in order to avoid objections: E.g. conjunction from the state of brain of a Person and a decision of another Person.
Absence/Lewis/Schwarz: because Lewis finds no harmless entities that are in line as absences, he denies their existence: they are no events, they are nothing at all, since there is nothing relevant. (200a, 195).
SchwarzVsLewis: But how does that fit together with the Moore's facts? How can a relationship be instantiated whose referents do not exist?.
Moore's facts/Schwarz: E.g. that absences often are causes and effects. Something to deny that only philosopher comes to mind.
I 142
Influence/SchwarzVsLewis: Problem: influence of past events by future. Example had I drunk from the cup already half a minute ago, then now a little less tea would be in the cup, and depending on how much tea I had drunk half a minute ago, how warm the tea was then, where I then had put the cup, depending on it the current situation would be a little different. After Lewis' analysis my future tea drinking is therefore a cause of how the tea now stands before me. (? Because Ai and Bi?). Since the drinking incidents are each likely to be similar, the impact is greater. But he is not the cause, in contrast to the moon.
Schwarz I 160
Know how/SchwarzVsLewis: it is not entirely correct, that the phenomenal character must be causal effect if the Mary and Zombie pass arguments. For causal efficacy, it is sufficient if Mary would react differently to a phenomenally different experience ((s) >Counterfactual conditional). Dualism/Schwarz: which can be accepted as a dualist. Then you can understand phenomenal properties like fundamental physical properties. That it then (as above Example charge 1 and charge 1 switch roles in possible worlds: is possible that in different possible worlds the phenomenal properties have their roles changed, does not mean that they are causally irrelevant! On the contrary, a particle with exchanged charge would behave differently.
Solution: because a possible world, in which the particle has a different charge and this charge plays a different role, is very unlike to our real world! Because there prevail other laws of nature. ((s) is essential here that besides the amended charge also additionally the roles were reversed? See above: >Quidditism).
SchwarzVsLewis: this must only accept that differences in fundamental characteristics do not always find themselves in causal differences. More one must not also accept to concede Mary the acquisition of new information.
Schwarz I 178
Content/Individuation/Solution/LewisVsStalnaker: (1983b(2), 375, Fn2, 1986e(3), 34f), a person may sometimes have several different opinion systems! E.g. split brain patients: For an explanation of hand movements to an object which the patient denies to see. Then you can understand arithmetic and logical inference as merging separate conviction fragments.
Knowledge/Belief/Necessary truth/Omniscience/SchwarzVsLewis/SchwarzVsFragmentation: Problem: even within Lewis' theory fragmentation is not so easy to get, because the folk psychology does not prefer it.
Schwarz I 179
E.g. at inconsequent behavior or lie we do not accept a fragmented system of beliefs. We assume rather that someone changes his beliefs or someone wants to mislead intentionally. E.g. if someone does not make their best move, it must not be the result of fragmentation. One would assume real ignorance contingent truths instead of seeming ignorance of necessary truths. Fragmentation does not help with mathematical truths that must be true in each fragment: Frieda learns nothing new when she finally finds out that 34 is the root of the 1156. That they denied the corresponding proposition previously, was due to a limitation of their cognitive architecture.
Knowledge/Schwarz: in whatever way our brain works, whether in the form of cards, records or neural networks - it sometimes requires some extra effort to retrieve the stored information.
Omniscience/Vs possible world/Content/VsLewis/Schwarz: the objection of logical omniscience is the most common objection to the modeling mental and linguistic content by possible worlds or possible situations.
SchwarzVsVs: here only a problem arises particularly, applicable to all other approaches as well.
Schwarz I 186
Value/Moral/Ethics/VsLewis/Schwarz: The biggest disadvantage of his theory: its latent relativism. What people want in circumstances is contingent. There are possible beings who do not want happiness. Many authors have the intuition that value judgments should be more objective. Solution/Lewis: not only we, but all sorts of people should value under ideal conditions the same. E.g. then if anyone approves of slavery, it should be because the matter is not really clear in mind. Moral disagreements would then in principle be always solvable. ((s)>Cognitive deficiency/Wright).
LewisVsLewis: that meets our intuitions better, but unfortunately there is no such defined values. People with other dispositions are possible.
Analogy with the situation at objective probability (see above 6.5): There is nothing that meets all of our assumptions about real values, but there is something close to that, and that's good enough. (1989b(7), 90 94).
Value/Actual world/Act.wrld./Lewis: it is completely unclear whether there are people in the actual world with completely different value are dispositions. But that does not mean that we could not convince them.
Relativism/Values/Morals/Ethics/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis however welcomes a different kind of relativism: desired content can be in perspective. The fate of my neighbor can be more important to me than the fate of a strangers. (1989b(14), 73f).
Schwarz I 232
Truthmaker principle/SchwarzVsLewis: here is something rotten, the truth maker principle has a syntax error from the outset: we do not want "the world as it is", as truth-makers, because that is not an explanation, we want to explain how the world makes the truth such as the present makes propositions about the past true.
Schwarz I 233
Explanation/Schwarz: should distinguish necessary implication and analysis. For reductive metaphysics necessary implication is of limited interest. SchwarzVsLewis: he overlooks this when he wrote: "A supervenience thesis is in the broader sense reductionist". (1983,29).
Elsewhere he sees the difference: E.g. LewisVsArmstrong: this has an unusual concept of analysis: for him it is not looking for definitions, but for truth-makers ".

1. David Lewis [1979a]: “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”. Philosophical Review, 88: 513–543.
2. David Lewis [1983b]: “Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation”. Philosophical Review, 92:
3. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell
4. David Lewis [1984b]: “Putnam’s Paradox”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377
5. David Lewis [1983c]: “New Work for a Theory of Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
61: 343–377.
6. David M. Armstrong [1978b]: Universals and Scientific Realism II: A Theory of Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 7. David M. Armstrong [1989b]: Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder: Westview Press
8. David Lewis [2001a]: “Redefining ‘Intrinsic’ ”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 381-398
9. David Lewis [2004d]: “Void and Object”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 277–291
9a. David Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269
10. David Lewis [2003]: “Things qua Truthmakers”. Mit einem Postscript von David Lewis und Gideon
Rosen. In Hallvard Lillehammer und Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Hg.), Real Metaphysics:
Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor, London: Routledge, 25–38.
11. David Lewis [1971]: “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies”. Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203–211.
12. David Lewis [1987]: “The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance”. Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 12: 81–97.
13. David Lewis [2000a]: “Causation as Influence”. Journal of Philosophy, 97: 182–197. Gekürzte Fassung von [Lewis 2004a]
14. David Lewis [1989b]: “Dispositional Theories of Value”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 63: 113-137.
15. Paul Horwich [1987]: Asymmetries in Time. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Parfit, D. Lewis Vs Parfit, D. IV 55
Identity/Continuity/Survival/Person/Lewis: Problem: we asked a question and got two answers: a) Identity: can only be total identity.
b) Continuity: can be gradual.
Which of these two should be relevant for survival?
If we had to choose, we should prefer everyday platitude to philosophical subtlety.
The only hope is that identity view and continuity version are somehow reconcilable. That I would like to defend VsParfit.
IV 57
Identity/Continuity/Person/Parfit: Thesis: not both answers (continuity and identity) can be right, so we have to choose. a) Identity: is a relation with a certain formal character: it is one to one and cannot be gradual.
b) Continuity: (and connectedness) (e.g. in relation to mental things) can be one to many or many to one as well as gradual.
Parfit: therefore it is the continuity and connectedness that is relevant to Personal (temporal) identity (survival).
c) what is important for survival is not identity! At most a relation that coincides with identity to the extent that problem cases do not occur.
LewisVsParfit: someone else could just as well represent the argument in the other direction and make identity relevant. And of course, identity is what matters in the end! Therefore, the divergence between a) and b) must be eliminated!
I agree with Parfit that continuity and connectedness are crucial, but it is not an alternative to identity.
Border case/Parfit: Problem: Border cases have to be decided arbitrarily somehow.
Identity/continuity/survival/Person/LewisVsParfit: the opposition between identity and continuity is wrong.
Intuitively, it's definitely about identity. It is literally about identity!
Def Identity/Lewis: the relation in which everything stands to itself and to nothing else. ...+.... R-relation, I-Relation
IV 58
Def R-Relation/Identity/Continuity/Person/Lewis: a certain relation and connectedness among person states. Def I-Relation/Lewis: Question: Which of the permanent Persons are identical to the previous ones?
But of course there are also I-Relations between the individual states!
IV 73
ParfitVsLewis: we should not cross our common views with the common sense. I.e. it is about another sense of survival.
For example, shortly after the Split, one of the two dP (continuants) dies, the other lives for a very long time.
S is the state divided to t0 (before the Split), but after it is known that the Split will take place. Then the thought that we found in S is the desire for survival, and extremely like common sense and quite unphilosophical.
Since S is a shared state (stage), it is also a shared desire.
Problem: C2 has the survival he desires and he depends on mental continuity and connection. (RR) but what about C1 (the prematurely dying continuant)?
IV 74
Lewis: I had written that what matters is identity in survival. Then for the short-living C1, the stage S to t0 is actually IR to states in the distant future such as S2, namely via the long-living C2! ParfitVsLewis: "But isn't that the wrong Person?"
Lewis: in fact, if C1 really wants him to survive (C1), then that wish is not fulfilled.
(Lewis, however, deals with the more difficult problem):
LewisVsParfit: but I don't think he can have this wish! There is a limit to everyday psychological desires under conditions of shared states.
The shared state S thinks for both. Every thought it has must be shared. It cannot think one thing in the name of C1 and one thing in the name of C2.
If, on the other hand, C1 and C2 are to share something that is understandable in everyday life, then it must be a "plural" wish, "let us survive".
Here we must now distinguish between two pluralistic wishes:
a) weak: lets at least one of us survive
b) strong: lets us both survive.
Because these desires are plural and not singular, they are not common sense. This is because everyday psychological survival is understood in terms of survival of dP rather than of relations of states.
The weak desire of C1 corresponds to the desire for IR for future states. Then the IR also corresponds to the RR. and the corresponding wish.
If C1's wish is strong, he will not be satisfied. Then it does not correspond to the "philosophical wish" either.
IV 75
After RR for future stages and parfit is right VsLewis. LewisVsParfit: but should we say that C1 even has this strong desire? I don't think so. Because if C1 can have it, C2 can also have it.
Example Suppose (according to Justin Leiber): a wish is recorded from time to time, but deleted after a certain time. This corresponds to the weak desire for survival, but not the strong one. Suppose the recording takes place at the time of the Split, C1 dies shortly afterwards due to an accident. C2, survives.
Additional complication: C" then undergoes a body transplant. If his desire to survive is to be fulfilled, then it is predominantly the weak desire.
Person/Survival/Identity/LewisVsParfit: For example, until now we had assumed that both knew before the Split that there would be a Split. Now
Suppose (variant): both do not know about the coming Split.
Question: can we not perfectly share the wish: "Let me survive"?
Problem: that C1 and C2 share the desire is based on the false presupposition that they are one Person. I.e. the "me" is a wrong identification. It cannot refer to C1 in C1' thoughts and not to C2 in his thoughts. For these thoughts are one and the same.
Vs: but their desire to survive is fulfilled! At least that of C2 and that of C1 is not different. Then their wish cannot only consist in the unfulfillable singular wish. They must both also have a weak pluralistic desire, even if they do not know the division beforehand.
N.B.: that then also applies to all of us, although we are not often divided, many of our current desires are not current occurrences:
The desire to be spared unimaginable pain.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Perry, J. Lewis Vs Perry, J. Lewis IV 70
Person/Identity/Split/Perry/Lewis: we both have the same objective, but different priorities. Perry: does not use the temporal identity (identity to t). He does not allow the identification of the I-Relation (IR) and the R-Relation (RR) but only of certain temporal underrelations of them.
LewisVsPerry: for this, he must introduce an unintuitive distinction between people who exist (have states) at different times. ((s) >Castaneda: "Volatile I":

Frank I 210
"I" / Castaneda: thesis: "here", "now", "there" are volatile. Irreducible volatile individual things only exist as content of experience.)
Fra I 402
(Castaneda thesis: "I" is irreplaceable for its user.)).
Lewis IV 70
All persons are identifiable at one time (except for problem cases). Example Stage S1 is R relative to t short R1r in relation to S2 if and only if S1 and S2 are Rr simpler and S2 is also localized to t. Then the R1 relation is the R-Relation between stages at t and other stages at other times or at t.
IV 71
And S1 is IR to t short I1 relative to S2 when both S1 and S2 are stages of a dP which is determinable to t and S2 is localized to t. We must omit the enduring person that cannot be determined to t. Enduring Person/Perry: (continuant, e.p.): a C is an e.p. if for a Person stage S, isolated to t, C is the aggregate that comprises all and only stages that are Rtr on S.
Generally, a dP is a continuant that is determinable at a time. No one is condemned to permanent unidentifiability.
Def Lifetime/Perry: enduring Person, (continuant).
Def Branch/Terminology/Perry: maximum R correlated aggregate of Person stages (exactly what I call a dP).
Split: here some lifetimes are not branches. The whole is a lifetime (no branch) that can be determined to t0 (before Splitting). C1 and C2 are not yet distinguishable, while C can no longer be determined to t1 (after Split).
PerryVsLewis: Thesis: the RR is not the same as the IR (in this case). Because C is a lifetime and then according to Perry S1 and S2 are IR, but because of the Split they are not RR.
It follows that for each time t the RtR is the same as the I1R.
Lewis: maybe that is enough, then every question about survival or identity arises at a certain time! This means that only RtR and ItR are relevant for t.
It is harmless that S1 and S2 are IR because they are neither It0 nor It1R nor ever ItR at any time.
Perry thesis: each Person stage at a time must belong to exactly one dP determinable at the time. Persons can share stages:
E.g. Split: S belongs to three lifetimes: C, C1, C2 but only to two branches: C1 and C2. S1 belongs to two LZ C and C1 but only to one branch: C1.
Stages/Perry: are only Split if all but one carrier cannot be determined.
Therefore, we can count with identity if we only count the people who are identifiable at a time and get the right answer. One Person exists before the Split, two after.
Altogether there are three, but then also the indeterminable ones are counted! But with the Split, the first one disappears and two new ones emerge.
LewisVsPerry: I admit that counting by identity to t is slightly counterintuitive, but isn't it just as counterintuitive to omit indeterminable Persons?
"There are"/exist: seeing it timeless there are people but they exist at a time. (i.e. they have states, stages).
IV 72
And so they are not identical to the people we count. Isn't it unjustified to exclude them? Perry can say: we have excellent practical reasons. Methusela/Perry/Lewis: Perry does not go into this, but his approach can be applied to it:
The whole of Methuselah is both a lifetime and a branch and thus an unproblematic Person.
Branches/Lewis: (= continuants, permanent Persons) the (arbitrarily chosen) segments of 137 years. For Perry, it's the double 274 years.
Lifetime: is not identical for the trivial exceptions of the beginning and the end. This means that the first and the last 137 years are both: branch and lifetime, since they cannot diverge.
Each stage belongs to exactly one Person who can be determined to t and to an infinite number of indeterminable Persons!
Counting by identity provides the correct answer, because it omits the indeterminable one.
RtR and ItR are identical for each time t, but the RR and IR differ for two stages further apart than 137 years. (But not more than 274).
Identity/Perry: he says nothing about degrees of Personal identity.
Lewis: but he could take it over.
LewisVsPerry: pro Perry for normal cases, but in pathological cases (Splits, etc.) an exact point of reference is missing:
This leads to overpopulation again:
For example, how many people were involved in a Split that occurred a long time ago? I say: two, Perry: three. Or he says: none that can be determined today.
IV 151
Heimson Example/LewisVsPerry: as far as his argument goes and I think it works, but it's too complicated without doing anything extra. His solution must be at least as good as mine, because it is part of my solution. Whenever I say that someone attributes property X to themselves, Perry says: the first object is a pair of him and property X. The second object is the function that ascribes the pair Y and X to any subject.
The apparent advantage of Perry is that he explains external attribution (e.a.) as well as self attribution (s.a.).
Belief de re: Attribution of characteristics to individuals.
Perry's schema is made for attribution de re, but de se falls under this as a special case.
IV 152
De re: Heimson and the psychiatrist agree to attribute Heimson the quality of being Hume. LewisVsPerry: my solution is simpler: the self-attributions of a subject are the whole of its belief system ((s) >Self-Ascription/Chisholm).
External attributions: are no further belief settings apart from the ...
Belief/Conviction/LewisVsPutnam: is in the head! ((s) Putnam also speaks only of meanings that are not in the head.)
Lewis: but I agree with Perry that belief de re is generally not in the head, because in reality it is not belief at all! They are facts, power of the relations of the subject's belief to things.
LewisVsPerry: his scheme represents something else besides belief. For belief it is redundant. If we have a few first objects and a few necessary facts that are not about belief.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Searle, J.R. Poundstone Vs Searle, J.R. I 350
Chinese Room/Searle/Poundstone: Variant: E.g. book: "What to do if a text in Chinese is slipped under your door." The room is exhibited at fairs. It is claimed that there was a pig in the room that speaks Chinese. People assume that in reality a Chinese is locked in the room (this variant also expresses the belief in the behavior).
I 351
PoundstoneVsSearle: Problem: feasibility of the thought experiment. The algorithm must include commmon knowledge.
I 352
It must be able to answer questions like those from the short story: e.g. a guest gets scorched food. Furious, he leaves the restaurant without paying. Question: did he eat the food? E.g. "What's the red stuff called that some people put on their fries?" Here, the answer is not included in the question. And perhaps there is no Chinese word for ketchup.
SearleVsTuring: the Turing test is not very insightful, therefore Chinese Room. A computer that behaved exactly like a human would be situation a sensation, no matter if he possessed consciousness or not.
I 353
Searle: Surprising position: the brain is indeed something like a computer, but consciousness has something to do with the biological and neurological structure. A computer made of wires would therefore not make the experience of his own consciousness. And yet, it could pass the Turing test!
Artificial Intelligence/AI/Searle: compares it with photosynthesis: a computer program could create a detailed realistic illustration of photosynthesis, but it would not produce sugar! It would only deliver images of chlorophyll molecules on the screen.
I 354
VsSearle/Chinese Room: a book with the algorithm "What to do if a text in Chinese is slipped under your door" cannot exist: it would have to be larger than the largest libraries in the world.       We could depart from Davis' office simulation. E.g. the brain contains about 100 billion neurons. If every human drew 20 strings, all of humanity could simulate a single brain.
I 355
But no one would know what thoughts are going on! Consciousness/Searle: his followers resort to the distinction "syntactic/semantic". Semantic understanding seems essential for consciousness.
I 356
Meaning/PoundstoneVsSearle: VsSemantic Understanding E.g. you were ill on the first day of school and missed the lesson in which numbers were introduced. Later you never dared to ask, what numbers are. In spite of that, you can do maths quite passably. At the bottom of your heart, you have the feeling of being an impostor. In fact, actually we all do not know what numbers are.
I 357
Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde: Ex Chinese Room: Suppose that, due to brain damage, the person does not know that they speak Chinese. We all have many skills of which we know virtually nothing. (Involuntary muscle movements, metabolism).
I 358
Chinese Room/"System Response": the person himself does not speak Chinese, but the overall system: Person, plus room, plus manual, plus time, plus paper and pencil fulfill the condition.
I 359
SearleVsSystem Response: We tear down the walls and let the person learn the manual by heart. Does he speak Chinese? PoundstoneVsSearle/Thought Experiments: the risk with thought experiments is their convenience. One must make reassure oneself that the reason of only imagining the experiment is no reason that makes the experiment altogether impossible. Here: the manual would be to extensive to be written at all, let alone to be learned by heart.
((S) VsPoundstone: could construct a simpler example which is about fewer rules.)
I 364
Chinese Room/Poundstone: the room is not only extremely enlarged spatially but also timely. The person could also be a robot, that does not matter.
I 365
Consciousness/Hofstadter: E.g. conversation with Einstein's brain: book with answers that simulate exactly what Einstein would have said. Two levels that must be separated: the book and the user! Of course, the book itself has no consciousness!
Here, some hair-Splitting questions about the "mortality" of Searles room arise: suppose the user goes on a 5-weeks holiday, is the book called "Einstein" dead in meantime?
I 366
The book itself could not notice the interruption. Variant: if the pace of work was reduced to one question per year, would that be enough to keep the book "alive"?
Time/Poundstone: we could not find that time had stopped if it did.

Poundstone I
William Poundstone
Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988
German Edition:
Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995
Various Authors Identity Theory Vs Various Authors Lanz I 281
IdentitätstheorieVsKritiker: drei Repliken: 1. kein Kategorienfehler, sondern das Ungewohnte der wissenschaftlichen Neuigkeit. Viele wissenschaftliche Neuerungen begannen ihre Karriere als angebliche Kategorienfehler. Bsp manche fanden die Behauptung, Röntgenstrahlen gingen durch den Körper, sinnlos. Strahlen werden doch von Körpern reflektiert und nicht durchgelassen! Also quasi Widerspruch zur Definition. (Fälschlich).
2. Replik schlägt verbesserte Formulierung der Identitätsthese vor: sie identifizieren nicht mentale Objekte (Empfindungen, Gedanken, Vorstellungsbilder) mit neuralen Objekten, sondern Sachverhalte!
These der Sachverhalt, dass einer das denkt oder dies empfindet, ist identisch mit dem Sachverhalt, dass sich sein Körper in dem oder dem Zustand befindet! So beziehen sich die psychologischen Ausdrücke nicht auf mentale Objekte, sondern adverbiale Modifikationen von psychischen Personenzuständen, die nichts anderes sind als physische Zustände ihres Körpers.
3. Replik: es handelt sich um den Def eliminativen Materialismus: worüber wir mit psychologischen Ausdrücke reden, darüber werden wir mit Hilfe verbesserter Theorien mit nichtpsychologischen Ausdrücke sprechen lernen. Der Glaube an die Existenz mentaler Phänomene wird genauso verschwinden wieder Glaube an Hexen.
PutnamVsIdentitätstheorie. (Funktionalismus).
FodorVsIdentitätstheorie. (Fodor ist auch Psychologe). (Funktionalismus). >Lager.
Lanz I 287
Identitätstheorie: die Identitätstheorie identifiziert Typen mentaler Zustände mit physikalistisch charakterisierten Typen von Zuständen des Gehirns. Danach muss ein bestimmter Typ von Geisteszustand (z. B. »Schmerzen haben«) immer in derselben neuralen Struktur realisiert sein!
FunktionalismusVsIdentitätstheorie: das ist empirisch unplausibel:
1. Das Gehirn hat die Fähigkeit, Schädigungen seiner Teile zu kompensieren, indem andere Teile die ausgefallenen Funktionen übernehmen. (Split-Brain).
2. Zwei Wesen könnten physiologisch sehr unterschiedlich realisiert sein (Roboter, Marsmenschen) und dennoch die selben Überzeugungen, Wünsche und Erwartungen haben.
Split-Brain VsMaterialismus (Funktion kompensiert).
Funktionalismus (Marsmenschen, Roboter) VsMaterialismus.
FodorVsIdentitätstheorie: die Koextensivität der Prädikate ist bestenfalls ein Zufall, aber niemals ein Gesetz.

Pauen I 108
IdentitätstheorieVs semantischen Physikalismus/Pauen: bestreitet die Übersetzbarkeit der Aussagen und Vokabulare. IdentitätstheorieVsMaterialismus/Pauen: hält an der Realität des Bewusstseins fest. Sonst würde angesichts der postulierten Identität ja letztlich die Existenz des Gehirns bestritten.
I 109
IdentitätstheorieVsEpiphänomenalismus/Pauen: macht ohne Aufwand die kausale Wirksamkeit mentaler Prozesse deutlich, weil sie eben immer auch physische Prozesse sind. IdentitätstheorieVsInteraktionismus/Pauen: kann auf eine Erweiterung der Physik verzichten, schließlich können immer die neuronalen Prozesse der Forschungsgegenstand sein.

Lanz I
Peter Lanz
Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Personal Identity Perry, J. Lewis IV 71
PerryVsLewis: Thesis: the R-relation (> Lewis: a certain relation and connection among person states) is not the same as the I-relation (between states of an individual) in this case (split). Because C is a lifetime and then according to Perry S1 and S2 are I-r, but because of the split not R-r. Perry thesis: every Person stage at a time must belong to exactly one dP determinable to that time. It should be noted that Persons can share stages:
Splitting: S belongs to three lifetimes: C, C1, C2 but only to two branches: C1 and C2. S1 belongs to two LZ C and C1 but only to one branch: C1.
Stages/Perry: are only Split if all but one carrier cannot be determined.
LewisVsPerry: I admit that counting by identity-to-t is somewhat counterintuitive, but isn't it just as counterintuitive to omit indeterminable Persons?

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991